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# Evaluation Report

## Evaluation of the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) Program

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# List of Acronyms / Abbreviations

ACT4Peace	Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AMT	Area Management Team
ARB	Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
ARG	ARMM Regional Government
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BFAR	Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BOL	Bangsamoro Organic Law
BTA	Bangsamoro Transition Authority
CAA	Conflict-Affected Area
CAFGU	Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
CASTLE	Cooperative Advancement through Skills Training and Livelihood
CBA-CPLA	Cordillera Bodong Association-Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CDED	Community-Driven Enterprise Development
CDP	Comprehensive Development Plan
CFPD	Cordillera Forum for Peace and Development
CHED	Commission on Higher Education
CID	Clarificatory Implementing Document
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CNN	CPP/NPA/NDFP
CO	Capital Outlay



COSERAM	Conflict-Sensitive Resource and Asset Management
CPD	Community Peace Dividends
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CRMP	Caraga Roadmap for Peace
CSM	Community Security Management
CSMEAL	Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPP	Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting
CVA	Conflict-Vulnerable Area
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAP	Disbursement Acceleration Program
DAR	Department of Agrarian Reform
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DFAT-Australia	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Australia
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DOE	Department of Energy
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ELA	Executive-Legislative Agenda
EO	Executive Order
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ERR	Early Recovery and Rehabilitation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
GIZ	German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH
GPH	Government of the Philippines
HDAP	Humanitarian and Development Action Plan
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPA	Innovations for Poverty Action
JC	Joint Committee
JEMC	Joint Enforcement and Monitoring Committee

Kalahi-CIDSS	Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan–Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Services
KBP	Kalayaan sa Barangay Program
KC	Kalahi-CIDSS
KII	Key Informant Interview
LDC	Local Development Council
LGU	Local Government Unit
MDP	Multi-Donor Programme
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MPDLGP	Mainstreaming Peace and Development in Local Government Planning
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAM	National Acceleration Modality
NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NCR	National Capital Region
NDFP	National Democratic Front of the Philippines
NEA	National Electrification Administration
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGA	National Government Agency
NGP	National Greening Program
NIA	National Irrigation Administration
NPA	New People’s Army
NPMO	National Program Management Office
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
ORG-ARMM	Office of the Regional Governor of ARMM
PAMANA	PAYapa at MASaganang PamayaNAn
PAPRU	Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity
PDA	Peace and Development Advocate
PDC	Peace and Development Community
PDP	Philippine Development Plan

PhilHealth	Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
PLIA	Participatory Livelihood Issue Analysis
PMO	Project Management Office
PDC	Provincial Development Council
PDO	Project Development Officer
PDZ	Peace and Development Zone
PNP	Philippine National Police
PPA	Projects, Programs and Activities
PPOC	Provincial Peace and Order Council
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RDC	Regional Development Council
RPOC	Regional Peace and Order Council
RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG	Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa ng Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade–Tabara-Paduan Group
SARO	Special Allotment Release Order
SLP	Sustainable Livelihood Program
SLPA	Sustainable Livelihood Program Association
SPAN	Support to Peacebuilding and Normalization
SRC	State Revolutionary Command
STREAM-C	Science and Technology for Rapid Economic Advancement of MNLF Communities
SZOPAD	Special Zone of Peace and Development
TAM	Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms
TAN	Transparency and Accountability Network
ToC	Theory of Change
TPM	Third-Party Monitor
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# Executive Summary

For nearly a decade, the *Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan* (PAMANA) program has been the Philippine government's flagship development framework for conflict-affected areas, allocating approximately P53.243 Billion over nine years and across more than 15 implementing agencies. This evaluation of PAMANA was commissioned to Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) of the Philippines, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

PAMANA was launched in 2011 as part of the 2010–2016 Philippine Development Plan's (PDP) mandate to bring armed conflict to a peaceful completion in terms of two tracks: negotiated political settlements and programs for addressing the root causes of armed conflict. PAMANA's approach of harmonizing development efforts targeted at conflict zones under a single framework is distinct from previous programs that were largely donor-driven, relied on existing agency budgets, focused on one specific conflict, or were primarily implemented by the military.

The program was meant to address all major armed conflicts across the country. That said, in practice we found that PAMANA's theory of change, as well as the nature of programs, was organized around three main categories of conflict, which we also use to structure our report:

1. Areas with existing local “completion” agreements (Cordillera, Negros/Panay)
2. Areas in preparation for a political transition (Bangsamoro),
3. Areas with ongoing insurgency led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA).

The breadth of the evaluation is ambitious both in terms of its coverage of conflict lines and project types, as well as the types of evidence we draw from. We employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to gain a comprehensive understanding of the program's processes and outputs:

## **High-level interviews and program review**

Interviewed high-level program implementers and key stakeholders. Reviewed internal agency reports.

## **Quantitative evaluation of administrative data**

Conducted time-series analysis of PAMANA's village-level effects on armed group presence, violence, and economic development.

## **Representative citizen surveys**

Surveyed 1,700 respondents in an area with an existing local peace agreement in Negros-Panay and 2000 respondents in a highly contentious area of the Bangsamoro

## Qualitative case studies

Six case studies conducted relating to the NPA conflict (Bicol, Samar, and Caraga), the RPA conflict (Negros/Panay) and Bangsamoro (Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF], Maguindanao)

We found that PAMANA achieved many successes relating to both its goals of addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting peace negotiations with partner organizations. That said, significant challenges remain and the effectiveness of the framework varied significantly by conflict line.

**PAMANA set the foundations for coordinated, conflict-sensitive development efforts.** Prior to PAMANA, there was a lack of coordination in government efforts to address development challenges in conflict zones. Notable gains were made in terms of mainstreaming the Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting (CSPP) framework at the national-level. One of PAMANA's great strengths was that its programs and theory of change (ToC) were flexible to the varying dynamics of the three main categories of conflict, as well as to changing dynamics over time.

**PAMANA projects successfully addressed root economic causes of conflict.** Communities that experienced PAMANA projects saw important gains in local economic conditions. Registration of new local businesses increased 20% as a result of PAMANA projects. In our surveys, beneficiaries of PAMANA projects reported high levels of satisfaction with the economic outputs of various projects. Our case studies consistently revealed improved economic conditions stemming from new roads, agricultural infrastructure, water projects, and livelihood assistance, among other project types.

**PAMANA empowered partners for peace.** Partnering with the ARMM Regional Government (ARG) to handle PAMANA funds and implement PAMANA projects significantly improved regional governance capacity. This enhanced the prospects for a stable transition after the 2019 implementation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). In addition, by following through on commitments to the *Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa ng Pilipinas*/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade–Tabara-Paduano Group (RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG), despite lengthy delays, PAMANA laid the groundwork for a key local peace agreement to hold. Our surveys and case studies suggest that citizen perceptions of regional and local government legitimacy was relatively high.

**Improved economic conditions did not consistently lead to reduced local conflict.** In many cases, the economic gains borne by PAMANA projects did not significantly reduce local armed group presence or the incidence of violence. While PAMANA projects in barangays already cleared of NPA presence reduced the likelihood of re-affectation, projects in NPA-affected barangays resulted in an increased likelihood that the NPA would retain a presence. PAMANA was associated with a decrease in extremist violence but also with increased local crime. Our case studies revealed that, in some cases, PAMANA projects exacerbated tensions between armed groups. Nearly 80% of survey respondents in Maguindanao reported that armed groups undermined project implementation.

**Implementation was hampered by political transitions, delays, and lapsed funds.** In part because of the difficulty of setting up a new apparatus to coordinate projects across agencies, PAMANA funds were often delayed and sometimes lapsed. This undercut trust in the government by citizens and partner organizations. Politics was a key factor in delaying implementation. One of the most significant challenges

for PAMANA was the transition in national, regional, and local political leadership after 2016. Political issues particularly hampered implementation of commitments made to the MNLF peace table and caused delays to the signing of the peace agreement with the RPA/ABB-TPG. In addition, PAMANA’s success was determined largely by the buy-in (or capture) of local elected politicians.

To improve the success rate of future development efforts in conflict zones, our assessment indicated several areas where programming could be improved and monitoring and evaluation could be strengthened. First, PAMANA’s theory of change (ToC) could be explicitly disaggregated by conflict line and more explicitly connected to conflict-reduction outcomes. Relatedly, project targeting and implementation strategies could be more localized and significant attention should be paid to further enhancing community participation at all stages (planning, implementation, monitoring) — especially relating to road projects — which allows local stakeholders to take ownership over the program. Finally, because of the importance of avoiding lapsed and delayed funding, further efforts could be made to streamline bureaucratic processes such as reporting requirements.

Below we summarize some of our core findings by the evaluation criteria.

Relevance
<p>We considered two main threads of questions relating to program relevance in the evaluation matrix. First, at a broad level, we looked at whether the application of PAMANA’s theory of change was relevant to the specific issues of the various conflict lines. Second, we looked at the ground-level relevance of PAMANA programming to the recipient communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• We found that PAMANA’s overall operational intent was relevant to the challenges relating to conflict. In practice, PAMANA’s theory of change (ToC) was highly flexible to the varying dynamics of the three main categories of conflict identified in this report as well as to changing dynamics over time. In addition, the implementation of PAMANA by the civilian government addressed the perceived absence of government in conflict-affected areas and conflict-vulnerable areas (CAAs/CVAs).</li><li>• In terms of horizontal coordination between government agencies, we found significant progress at the national level, especially given the difficulties associated with a massive and complex project of this nature. There were agencies that were committed to implement PAMANA regardless of changes in organizational structure/management, while there were agencies whose bureaucracies were not oriented towards doing projects in the high-risk zones PAMANA was developed for. At the provincial and municipal levels, bureaucratic impediments associated with inter-agency coordination were a significant hindrance to PAMANA. Implementation was often delayed due to reporting requirements and misaligned bureaucratic incentives associated with taking on PAMANA projects.</li></ul>

- Local-level relevance of PAMANA programs was mixed. On the one hand, our focus group discussions (FGDs) and surveys showed that communities were often highly involved in the planning of PAMANA. Particularly for community-driven development (CDD) programs, many civilians and barangay leaders felt strong ownership over PAMANA projects and found them to be highly applicable to local needs. However, there were also several cases where communities felt left out of the planning process, causing tensions with both government officials and the leadership of its negotiating partner groups.
- Program relevance varied significantly across conflict lines and over time. In particular, the shift from predominantly “hard” infrastructure projects with some community-driven development (CDD) modalities to a more balanced approach that incorporated “soft” capacity building and policy-directed projects improved local relevance in CNN areas over time. In areas with existing completion agreements, both community-level (Community Peace Dividends) and individual-level (e.g., forest guard employment) projects were found to be highly relevant to the needs of civilians, despite implementation delays. In Bangsamoro, the wide range of services provided by the regional government, including those programmed as part of the ARMM Regional Government’s (ARG) post-Mamasapano Humanitarian and Development Action Plan (HDAP) were quite relevant, though the lack of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ownership over PAMANA in its support communities caused detrimental tensions with both the group leadership and its citizen supporters.

## Efficiency

The main efficiency criteria outlined in the evaluation matrix involved the mainstreaming of the conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting (CSPP) framework from the national to local level, the extent of funding lapses and delays, project targeting, and program evolution over time. This category also includes the unintended consequences that resulted from the targeting and implementation process.

- Mainstreaming the CSPP framework has seen great progress at the national level. Agency officials at the national level adopted the CSPP ethos and were able to defend PAMANA on their own during budget hearings, especially from 2014 onwards. This also enabled the activation of some Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils (RPOC/PPOC) and the development of relevant plans, with PAMANA funding as an incentive. At the lower levels, however, the process was less successful. While many of the implementing agencies appreciated the incorporation of CSPP in the local planning process, efforts to incorporate local government units (LGUs) were unsustainable after PAMANA programming systems, particularly those in partnership with DILG, were revised after 2016. Many of the barangay and municipal-level workshops were one-off incidents and local-level project planning quickly returned to “business-as-usual.”

- One major hindrance to PAMANA’s efficiency was the degree to which funding was delayed or lapsed. Major lapsed funding included allocations in Negros-Panay that were held pending until the signing of the implementation agreement with the *Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawang Pilipinas*/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade–Tabara-Paduanano Group (RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG), which was finally executed in 2019. This also included projects originally funded under the 2011 Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) that were discontinued or had to be covered under other funding sources after the 2015 Supreme Court ruling that found several elements of the policy unconstitutional. A reconfiguration of PAMANA after May 2016 also led to a substantial delay in delivery, with some projects programmed for FY 2017 being implemented until late 2019.
- PAMANA reached most CAAs/CVAs over the course of the program. However, a significant number of projects have yet to be completed. Project targeting incorporated local leadership, especially in more recent years, although in some cases, left out important stakeholders. There were some reports of local elites’ influence over targeting being a hindrance to PAMANA’s ability to reach the most in-need barangays and beneficiaries. However, we found an important tradeoff was allowing key stakeholders at the regional and provincial level to take ownership of the projects. In the ARMM, this strategy greatly aided the passage of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), leading to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) transition, for example. In CNN areas, a major hindrance to implementation that was reported was insurgents undermining implementation by requiring “revolutionary taxes.”
- PAMANA saw significant changes over the course of the program. Many of these changes were positive, including prioritizing “soft” projects, increasing fiscal autonomy of the ARMM Regional Government, and the enhanced localization of decision-making, but there was also a lack of institutional continuity and this caused significant disruptions.
- There were several unintended consequences of PAMANA. First, across the board, delayed or lapsed projects often undercut government legitimacy. In areas with existing completion agreements, framing certain programming as “peace dividends” left partner organizations disappointed with the degree to which they controlled procurement and contracting. In addition, by benefiting some stakeholder groups but not others, PAMANA projects sometimes caused tensions between these groups, including in the “completion agreement” areas in Cordillera and Negros-Panay, where faction splintering and continued tensions with the CPP/NPA/NDFP remain to be an issue.



## Effectiveness

### Overview of Criteria

- The main outcomes of interest in this section correspond to the two main categories of goals laid out in PAMANA's theory of change: to what degree were efforts complementary to Track 1 peace negotiations and to what extent did they address the root causes/triggers of conflict, both in terms of economic development and community capacity. As a downstream measure of effectiveness we look at reduction in conflict through multiple lenses, including admin data.

### Broad Takeaways

- Our analysis of administrative data suggests that PAMANA had some positive impacts in terms of economic development. Using data on business registrations from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), initial models show that PAMANA spurred up to a 20% increase in local economic activity. We are currently awaiting Listahanan data to extend our analysis to a wider range of socioeconomic outcomes. Our case studies point to greater accessibility and economic activity in hard to reach communities, as well as improvements in local level community capacity, though the targeting process sometimes resulted in unequal impacts on social cohesion.
- In terms of Track 1 complementarity, there were significant positive impacts on several fronts. Several partner organizations (such as the RPA and the ARMM regional government) saw significant improvements to their bureaucratic and institutional capacity. PAMANA projects also won the support of key regional and local level stakeholders by bolstering the legitimacy of negotiated peace settlements. Track 1 complementarity was not as tangible in MNLF communities due to the group's lack of ownership over PAMANA projects.
- In terms of addressing the root causes of conflict, we found major difficulties in translating improvements in economic conditions to the ultimate goal of conflict reduction, especially in CNN areas. Even when accessibility to markets was increased (through roads, for example), this did not seem to have any tangible impacts on issues like revolutionary taxation or a reduction in violent incidents. That said, it may be unrealistic to expect immediate peace dividends from economic gains, which is better viewed as a long-term process.
- Delayed and lapsed funding significantly undercut program effectiveness. "Overpromising and underdelivering" had counterproductive effects on government legitimacy.

## Sustainability

### Overview of Criteria

We looked at three main categories of sustainability questions as outlined in the evaluation matrix. First, we looked at on-the-ground sustainability of PAMANA programs, including the degree to which programs had a lasting effect on the effectiveness criteria. Second, we looked at the sustainability of PAMANA bureaucratic processes. Finally, we looked at the existing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework (including the CS-MEAL toolkit) and considered ways to improve future M&E for PAMANA.

### Broad Takeaways

- In terms of ground-level sustainability, we found mixed results. For roads in particular (which made up a large portion of PAMANA investments), incomplete or shoddily built road sections make it so that significant repairs and upkeep are necessary to make the effects last. In our RPA survey, we found that a decent portion of respondents still reported knowledge of (and well as receiving continuous benefits from) PAMANA projects and peace dividends distributed several years in the past. Finally, the failure of the CSPP to instill lasting changes on the processes and direction of LGU leadership is a threat to ground-level sustainability.
- The sustainability of the PAMANA processes is promising in some respects. From the national level down to the provincial level, many personnel in implementing agencies appear to have internalized the need to take conflict-related considerations seriously during their targeting and implementation processes. At the same time, we found that PAMANA processes are subject to great change during periods of political turnover, suggesting a need to put in place additional measures aimed at institutional continuity.
- An M&E framework that can guide PAMANA implementation, help implementers understand issues/gaps/successes/failures, and promote learning and continuous development is crucial for PAMANA to continue forward. While PAMANA's theoretical underpinnings are both valid and relevant, if the program itself cannot justify its existence, then it is highly possible that it ceases to continue. In this regard, we recommend indicators for the PDP that can be used to improve PAMANA implementation as well as to gauge whether it is helping reduce conflict in the community. These indicators fall under three categories: 1) Strengthening CSPP at the Local Level, 2) Ensuring Balanced Development, and 3) Understanding Citizens' Perceptions.
- Aside from high-level changes to PAMANA's indicators, we also think that a more structured M&E system is necessary. The ability of OPAPP and the program to collect data inhibits implementers from understanding what is working and what is not. It could be helpful for OPAPP to leverage its implementing partners' current capabilities in gathering data.

# Evaluation Background

This evaluation of PAMANA is part of the larger project “Using Strategic Monitoring & Evaluation to Accelerate the Implementation of the Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022,” which supports NEDA in understanding the implementation of key programs tied to the PDP. In light of the ongoing directive to enhance and strengthen initiatives for conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas (CAAs/CVAs), the goal of the evaluation is to understand how PAMANA was designed to work – and actually worked – in a broad-enough array of contexts so as to inform decisions on the overall program, while also studying each context with enough depth to provide useful conclusions.

## Research Objectives

In the original Request for Proposals, UNDP and NEDA called for a report that would:

- Assess PAMANA’s effects on its own peacebuilding and development objectives;
- Identify gaps and challenges in PAMANA concepts and implementation;
- Enhance existing processes and mechanisms to facilitate future program assessments; and
- Provide recommendations that inform future development-as-peacebuilding efforts.

The evaluation team was guided by these four objectives in how we decided to evaluate a program as complex and encompassing as PAMANA. We understood the first objective as asking us to focus on PAMANA’s ToC and the program’s *raison d’être* as a complement to Track 1. For the second objective, we focused on the operationalization of PAMANA’s high-level concepts and reviewing how they were understood on the ground. We view the third objective as directing us to understand how PAMANA can be assessed more effectively by its implementers and evaluated properly at the national level by NEDA. After analyzing our findings in relation to the first three objectives, we are then able to provide reasonable recommendations for development-as-peacebuilding efforts.

## Methodology

We used a mixed-methods approach that combined 1) high-level interviews and program review, 2) quantitative evaluation of administrative data, 3) barangay surveys and 4) qualitative case studies. We provide a brief overview of our application of these methods in this section; a more complete summary can be found in Annex C.

## High-Level Interviews and Program Review

In the first phase of the evaluation, we focused on understanding PAMANA at a high level. We conducted an initial study of project documents on PAMANA's overall design, the agreements that had been signed with the different groups, and the roles and responsibilities of the program implementers.<sup>1</sup> Once we had a baseline understanding of PAMANA, we conducted interviews with officials from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and implementing agencies.<sup>2</sup> Aside from giving us a high-level understanding of the program, our interviews helped us learn about inter-agency dynamics and how these affected operationalization of the program. We were also able to get recommendations on selection of case study sites and suggested areas of inquiry from interviewees.

## Quantitative Analysis of Administrative Data

Our analysis of administrative data is conducted at the LGU-level, where we aim to understand the degree to which PAMANA projects are associated with economic development and conflict reduction over the 2011–2016 period.<sup>3</sup> In this analysis, the key explanatory variable is whether a barangay or municipality received a PAMANA project in a given year. We consider two main categories of outcomes: 1) economic development and 2) conflict reduction. In terms of economic development, the main outcome we look at is a count of applications for new business registrations from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Applications to open new registered businesses is an important proxy for the level of private economic activity, as well as a proxy for participation in the formal sector, as opposed to opening unregistered businesses, a common practice in areas with low state capacity. The second key outcome is the improvement of peace and security. For NPA areas, we examine conflict affectation as measured by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As shown in Figure 1, there was a significant nationwide reduction in NPA affectation over the 2010–2016 period.


A second way we measure PAMANA's effectiveness at reducing conflict is with data on conflict-related violent incidents. Currently, we rely on Conflict Alert's dataset that was collected from the Philippine National Police (PNP), AFP, and media sources over the 2011–2015 period. The data are disaggregated into measures of criminal incidents (which includes violent crime, trafficking, and other illicit activities) and conflict-related incidents involving non-state armed groups. These data are available for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Davao Region (Region XI) only.

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<sup>1</sup> Annex D has the list of project documents that the evaluation team reviewed from the different agencies.

<sup>2</sup> The list of high-level key informant interviews (KIIs) is in Annex E.

<sup>3</sup> While OPAPP has provided us access to updated data for the 2017–2018 period, we rely on the 2011–2016 PAMANA data due to limited coverage in the later period and a lack of overlap with outcome data sources.



**Figure 1.** Barangays with NPA presence (Haim, 2018).

To more closely approximate the *causal* effects of PAMANA, we use an approach called entropy balancing to create a comparable “control group” of local government units (LGUs) that did not experience PAMANA implementation (Hainmueller 2012). The approach finds a weighted group of barangays that look identical to the barangays that received PAMANA projects in terms of their socioeconomic conditions and levels of conflict prior to PAMANA implementation.


## Surveys

We conducted two surveys. The first was a survey of 1,807 respondents in 178 barangays in Negros and Panay. The second survey focused on the Bangsamoro conflict line and comprised 2,019 respondents. The latter covered a total of 103 barangays located in and around the so-called “SPMS Box” of Maguindanao (Datu Salibo, Datu Saudi Ampatuan [Pagatin], Mamasapano, Shariff Aguak). These surveys bridge the gap between the administrative data and qualitative case studies, allowing for a broad overview of perception-based outcomes while allowing the evaluation team to probe specific mechanisms and hard-to-measure outcomes included in the key evaluation questions.

### Negros/Panay Survey

The Negros/Panay survey assessed perceptions and attitudes in barangays that received benefits from PAMANA through either its Community Peace Dividends (CPD) program, which targeted RPA support communities, or the regular PAMANA-Sustainable Livelihood Program (PAMANA-SLP Regular). In both sets of barangays (CPD and SLP Regular), half of the survey respondents were members of people’s organizations (POs) who were the direct recipients of the PAMANA benefits. In each barangay we took a random sample of four PO members, four non-members, a barangay official (usually the barangay captain),

and the PO head. The Negros/Panay survey was administered in the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Iloilo, Negros Oriental, and Negros Occidental.<sup>4</sup>




**Figure 2.** Negros-Panay survey barangays.

### Bangsamoro Survey

The main objective of the Bangsamoro survey was to evaluate the conditions under which PAMANA was effective in the most contentious areas of conflict. The vast majority of PAMANA funds were spent in the five provinces of ARMM, with a particular focus in and around the SPMS Box leading up to 2016. This area received significant attention from PAMANA through the Humanitarian and Development Action Plan (PAMANA-HDAP), including a huge push to improve infrastructure. Our survey is one of the first major efforts to collect reliable data on citizen experiences and perceptions in this area that is central to the Bangsamoro conflict line. The Bangsamoro survey took place in eight municipalities in Maguindanao.

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<sup>4</sup> The specific barangays included in the sample for both surveys are shown in Figure 2 and 3 and listed in Annexes I and J.



*\*Note: Datu Salibo was surveyed but not included in this map.*

**Figure 3.** Bangsamoro survey barangays.

## Qualitative Case Studies

The qualitative case studies complemented the quantitative analysis with focused inquiry into the underlying mechanisms linking PAMANA to key economic and conflict-related outcomes. In addition, the case studies elucidated the factors that contributed to and hindered PAMANA's success. While the quantitative analysis identified broad patterns in outcomes of interest, the qualitative case studies addressed the process-related questions in the evaluation matrix. For example, how and to what extent PAMANA has mainstreamed a CSPP approach into local development processes and whether PAMANA has resulted in sustainable peace by building local institutional capacity.

The six case studies selected for this evaluation represented the ongoing conflict lines in the peace tables: three for the conflict line with the CPP/NPA/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) (or henceforth, CNN), two for the Bangsamoro region, and one for the RPA/ABB-TPG line. In addition to examining cross-cutting themes related to questions in the evaluation matrix, each case study honed in on a context-specific issue, reflecting the different stages in the conflict cycle. Table 1 lists the provinces studied for each conflict line.

**Table 1. Case Study Area Scope based on Conflict Line**

	CPP/NPA/NDFP	Bangsamoro	RPA/ABB
<b>Case Study Area</b>	1) Sorsogon (Region V) 2) Samar (Region VIII) 3) Agusan del Norte and Agusan del Sur (Region XIII)	4) Maguindanao (BARMM) 5) Sarangani, Davao, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan (MNLF)	6) Negros Occidental (Region VI)

## Scope & Limitations

The sensitive nature of research in CAAs/CVAs, as well as the geographically and programmatically complicated nature of the PAMANA program, means that our analysis has some limitations. Security concerns constrained survey and qualitative researchers’ access to some locations that were originally part of our sample. Administrative data are limited to those collected by government agencies and shared with the research team. Post-2017 PAMANA data is particularly sparse, so we focused largely on the 2011–2016 period in our analysis of admin data. Finally, the breadth of the PAMANA program required the team to focus on particular program types and locations. We chose to focus on projects and locations that were most important to the peace negotiations and from which we could systematically distill lessons. One downside to this approach is that we cannot examine the nuanced ways each project operated and affected beneficiary communities.

In sum, because such a wide range of implementing agencies were involved in PAMANA, we do not view this evaluation as trying to independently evaluate each agency’s specific contribution to the overall framework. Rather, we focus on the processes of PAMANA (for example, the CSPP framework) as they relate to all implementing agencies. We also rely on broader categorizations of project types – moving away from the original “pillars” of PAMANA – to try to understand PAMANA’s effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, and sustainability on aggregate.

## Evaluation Criteria

In Table 2 below, we summarize the key questions from the evaluation matrix in broad strokes, along with notes on how our methodology is designed to speak to those questions. While we independently address the specific questions in the full evaluation matrix (found in Annex C), here, we define our understanding of the most pertinent themes addressed in each section.



**Table 2. Summary of Evaluation Criteria and Study Methods**

Evaluation Criteria	Questions	Methods
Relevance	<u>National-Level Relevance</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In what ways has PAMANA's ToC been relevant in helping achieve and support peace? What aspects of the ToC are missing or misguided?</li> <li>To what extent does PAMANA contribute to horizontal coordination between government agencies?</li> </ul>	National-level relevance is mainly assessed through program review and high-level KIIs with agency leadership.
	<u>Ground-Level Relevance</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are PAMANA projects relevant to the local needs of target communities?</li> </ul>	Ground-level relevance is assessed using the case studies (especially FGDs) as well as through certain survey questions.
Efficiency	<u>Mainstreaming CSPP</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have CSPP processes been adopted into national-level development planning?</li> <li>Have CSPP processes been adopted into local-level targeting and implementation practices?</li> </ul>	Because the evaluation questions relating to efficiency are mainly questions of process, we rely heavily on our KIIs, program review, and case studies. Broad patterns and national-level processes are investigated mainly using KIIs and program review. Local level processes that impact efficiency are investigated mainly using case study evidence and are often conflict-line and region specific.
	<u>Funding Delays and Lapses</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the patterns of PAMANA's funding cycle?</li> <li>What is the nature of project delays?</li> <li>What are the causes?</li> </ul>	
	<u>Targeting Process</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the process for selecting beneficiary communities and individuals?</li> <li>What is the extent of LGU and other stakeholders' involvement in targeting?</li> </ul>	
	<u>Program Evolution</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the changes in the implementation of PAMANA,</li> </ul>	

Evaluation Criteria	Questions	Methods
	the challenges that these changes have sought to address, and the results of these changes?	
	<u>Unintended Consequences</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What type of unintended consequences – positive or negative – if any, have PAMANA projects and activities had?</li> </ul>	Unintended consequences are investigated through the case studies. We also explore whether survey questions reveal unexpected civilian perceptions. The village head survey is used to triangulate our conclusions about the targeting process.
Effectiveness	<u>Track 1 Complementarities</u> How and to what extent has PAMANA impacted peace negotiations and consolidation with partner groups? Through what mechanisms?	PAMANA's effectiveness at achieving the Track 1 complementarity goals in the ToC is investigated mainly through high-level KIIs and Case studies. These methods are used to investigate the perceptions of key actors involved in the peace processes.
	<u>Root Causes and Triggers of Conflict</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How and to what extent has PAMANA affected the socioeconomic conditions in conflict-vulnerable areas? How and to what extent has PAMANA effected citizen opportunities for livelihood and employment?</li> <li>How has PAMANA affected community capacity to addressing conflict and engage in peacebuilding?</li> </ul>	Effectiveness at addressing the root causes and triggers of conflict are addressed using case studies, as well as surveys and administrative data. For example, we use administrative data from DTI, paired with project-level PAMANA data to investigate the effects on local business registrations, a key proxy for socioeconomic activity. Survey data is used to explore civilian grievances and opportunities that shape participation in conflict.
	<u>Downstream Effects on Conflict Prevalence</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How and to what extent has PAMANA facilitated the achievement of peace effectiveness criteria within the targeted communities?</li> </ul>	We look at downstream effects using data on conflict incidence and affectation, as well as through survey questions regarding citizen perceptions of security.
Sustainability	<u>Sustainable Ground-Level Effects</u>	Sustainability of ground-level effects is assessed mainly through case studies and survey evidence. These methods explore

Evaluation Criteria	Questions	Methods
	Do interventions change conditions on the ground such that the effects are likely to last long-term?	citizen and stakeholder perceptions of long-term benefits that may be gained from PAMANA interventions.
	<u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How can the existing MEAL framework (CS MEAL Toolkit) be enhanced to measure the potential impact of PAMANA in the future?</li> <li>• How can mechanisms to systematically collect data be strengthened and/or institutionalized?</li> <li>• How can the PDP Results Matrix better capture PAMANA's contributions to PDP-level outcomes?</li> </ul>	M&E processes are assessed mainly through our high-level KIIs and program reviews. In the process of these methods, we discovered aspects of the data collection infrastructure that could be improved. Case studies were used to investigate local accountability and transparency processes that may be improved.

# PAMANA as a National Program

## Theory of Change

Before proceeding to how PAMANA was implemented in practice, we lay out the framework's broad ToC. In addition to relying on official documents for the stated ToC, we view a directive of this evaluation to include a better understanding of how agency leadership understood the ToC when designing ways to translate the concepts into practice.

Through the process of our high-level KIIs, we developed two key insights about the ToC that shape how we structure the remaining sections of the report. First, we categorize our findings around two main goals that were commonly referred to by agency leadership: (i) complementarity to “Track 1” peace negotiations, and (ii) addressing root causes and triggers of conflict. These two goals correspond with the two main objectives associated with “winning the peace” outlined in the 2011–2016 PDP. In terms of Track 1 complementarity, the major goal of PAMANA was to shape conditions to improve the prospect of successful relations and negotiations with partner-group leadership at the national, regional, and local levels. Specific goals within this category include fulfilling the terms of negotiated settlements, strengthening partner group governance capacity and legitimacy, and winning the support of key stakeholders. With regards to addressing the root causes of conflict, a major goal of PAMANA was to bring the negotiating table closer to the realities on the ground such that long-term participation in conflict was reduced and local-level conflict triggers were less likely to spiral into more large-scale detrimental effects.

Second, we came to realize that even though PAMANA implementers drew from a unified framework, in practice, the ToC was notably distinct for each conflict line. Because of the different stages of conflict/negotiations and the nature of the groups involved, the mechanisms through which PAMANA was conceptualized to be complementary to Track 1 negotiations was different for areas with existing completion agreements, in Bangsamoro (including significant differences between MNLF and ARMM leadership), and in CNN areas. While the ToC relating to the root causes and triggers was less variable by conflict line than Track 1 complementarity, there were still major differences in terms of what grievances and opportunity structures were perceived to exist and how PAMANA was meant to address them.

In the remainder of this subsection, we briefly lay out the main lines of thinking in terms of how PAMANA was meant to complement the peace tables and address the root causes of conflict. In our later discussions of findings, we begin each section with an outline of the conflict-line specific theory of change as conceived by project implementers.

## Complementarity to Track 1 Negotiations

PAMANA as the complementary track was designed to “close the gap between events at the negotiating table and realities on the ground,” (Philippine Development Plan Midterm Update, 2013-2016 Chapter 8: Peace and Security) acknowledging the need to make conditions on the ground conducive for peace talks

to continue, to make peace dividends felt by communities before and after agreements are signed, and to make conflict more “costly” so that peace advocates have a bigger voice. In broad strokes, this aspect of PAMANA’s ToC recognizes that development programming compatible with the incentives and beliefs of key national, regional, and local stakeholders makes it more likely that negotiated settlements can be reached and maintained.

The ways in which PAMANA intended to contribute to Track 1 negotiations is highly conflict-specific, and we go into further detail on these peculiarities in the sections organized by conflict line. That said, across contexts, some of the common themes for this aspect of the ToC include:

1. Trust-building with partner group leadership and their support communities;
2. Providing a source of legitimacy and attribution for negotiated settlements by making tangible the “payoffs of peace;”
3. Increasing the perceived costs of returning to conflict;
4. Improving the institutional capacity of partner groups to mainstream their role in regular government and economic life.

This theory has roots in the 2011–2016 PDP as well as in a prominent line of research on the durability of peace agreements. For example, Walter (1999) argues that transitions in autonomy are dependent on the belief that the government will not renege on development promises and that the negotiating partners have the capacity to properly deliver economic services on their own. Efforts like PAMANA provide a “costly signal” that reassures negotiating partners that the government is committed to attaining peace (Kydd 2006).

While PAMANA’s contributions to Track 1 are salient for all conflict lines, they are most apparent for the Cordillera Bodong Association-Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CBA-CPLA) and the RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG, where PAMANA programming is tied to the fulfillment of the socioeconomic provisions of their respective peace agreements, as well as RPA-TPG’s proposed 2019 implementation agreement. PAMANA in the Cordilleras supports the transformation process of the CBA-CPLA from an armed group to an unarmed socioeconomic entity, the Cordillera Forum for Peace and Development (CFPD) and its component peoples’ organizations. On the ground, the transformation is represented by Peoples’ Organizations (POs) and livelihood associations, whose members include both former rebels and regular civilians of the communities that are supported by PAMANA. Similarly, in strongholds of the RPA/ABB-TPG, PAMANA funds projects that were agreed upon during negotiations between the GPH and the RPA/ABB-TPG, which prioritize reintegration and building community cohesion.

In ARMM, PAMANA initially targeted areas of the MNLF. Following the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (1996 FPA) between GPH-MNLF, PAMANA aimed to broaden the constituencies for peace and to create an enabling environment for continued discussions around the full implementation of commitments parallel to, but separate from, the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Thus, the program attempted to engage MNLF leaders as partners in implementing development projects and to harness their leadership and organizing skills in support of community development. This led to the direct involvement of MNLF combatants in program planning and project implementation. Consequently, PAMANA became

a catch-up development program for the MNLF, particularly in so-called “Peace and Development Communities” (PDCs), which had been the focus of various development initiatives after the signing of the 1996 FPA. However, by the middle stage of PAMANA’s evolution, programming became more inclusive as the responsibility for implementation moved from the national government to the regional government in coordination with the ARMM Reform Agenda. Through this change, communities supporting the MILF also began to receive PAMANA. The government was careful, though, in emphasizing that the MILF communities benefiting from PAMANA were not being targeted to mitigate the risk of these projects being viewed as counterinsurgency measures that could sour negotiations.

While PAMANA for ARMM and completion agreement zones was careful to not appear as counterinsurgency, in areas affected by CNN, PAMANA projects played a more traditional role in winning civilian “hearts and minds”. Projects were not specifically linked to the peace negotiations, but rather, were focused on addressing the perceived causes of armed conflict. With negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the CNN at an impasse, PAMANA is primarily meant to address the root causes of conflict and to support civil-military operations (CMO) implemented by the AFP as part of its “clear-hold-consolidate-develop” approach. During the course of this evaluation, Executive Order No. 70 (EO 70) aimed to institutionalize a localized approach to addressing the communist insurgency, mandating a national taskforce that will recommend programming for PAMANA in CNN-affected zones.


## Addressing the Root Causes & Triggers of Conflict

The second set of goals set out by the PAMANA ToC focuses on changing ground-level conditions that are viewed as being the root causes and triggers of conflict. This design is rooted in the 2011 *World Development Report (WDR): Conflict, Security, and Development* that focuses on breaking cycles of violence through interventions to address the particular security, justice, and economic stressors (e.g., poverty, lack of basic services, crime, land tenurial issues) that drive conflict in a given community, as well as strengthen institutions to better respond to said needs. With the massive development gaps between CAAs/CVAs and more “stable” communities, PAMANA was framed as the government taking affirmative and preemptive action to enable more robust private sector development.

This goal of significantly changing ground-level socioeconomic and political realities necessitates a more long-term view of how PAMANA sets the stage for peace. While the root causes of conflict again vary significantly across conflict lines, the central goals within this category include:

1. Improving economic prospects for combatants and their supporters, thus reducing the “grievances” that spark conflict and increasing the opportunity costs for participating in conflict;
2. Addressing perceived identity and religion-based injustices;
3. Building capacities of communities to address disputes and promote peace through activities that ensure participation and inclusion.

The causal logic of this approach is represented in Figure 4 from the 2011 WDR.



**Figure 4.** OPAPP's framework for the roots of conflict (OPAPP 2012).

Even more so than Track 1 complementarity, this theory has deep roots in the global conflict and development literatures. At a broad level, poor economic conditions (including poverty, inequality, and the lack of education) produce grievances that compel people to take up arms as well as opportunity structures that lead people to participate in conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In terms of fighting an ongoing insurgency – a concept that is particularly relevant to CNN-affected provinces and certain areas in Bangsamoro influenced by “black-flag” affiliated groups – programs that improve socioeconomic conditions are crucial to winning civilian “hearts and minds” and reducing support for insurgents (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2011; Berman, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011; Lyall, Zhou, & Imai, 2017).<sup>5</sup>

## Convergence Approach to Peacebuilding & CSPP

In addition to improving the outcomes of service delivery (poverty and low education, for example) that are likely to spark conflict, PAMANA’s ToC is strongly rooted in changing the process of service delivery in a way that avoids common triggers of conflict and emphasizes civilian-led development. Before PAMANA, development programs for CAAs/CVAs were implemented by the AFP under the Kalayaan sa Barangay Program (KBP), which was started in the 2000s. PAMANA differed from KBP in that it underscored the role of civilian implementers. PAMANA advocated for a more holistic program that included the participation of national government agencies (NGAs) and LGUs. (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2010) As one official put it, “PAMANA should be seen as a mandate of the agencies”. PAMANA recognized that it was not enough to have a military presence; civilian agencies were

<sup>5</sup> See also Corpus (1989) for an early application of this logic to counterinsurgency doctrine in the Philippines.



necessary to make citizens feel that the government understood their community's needs and was taking action to prioritize them.

Similarly, although the program's menu largely consisted of standard socioeconomic interventions such as roads, water systems, electrification, livelihood, and social protection, PAMANA's targeting of beneficiaries and communities, as well as its implementation processes, were designed to be different from other development interventions of the Philippine government by following the "Conflict Sensitive and Peace Promoting" (CSPP) framework. With the CSPP perspective, planning and implementation became targeted and deliberate. The PAMANA Guidebook (OPAPP, 2016) details the main principles of CSPP:

1. **Inclusion:** provision of equal rights and opportunities;
2. **Participation:** active and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders;
3. **Responsiveness:** addressing the needs of all, especially the most vulnerable;
4. **Transparency:** accessibility of relevant information; and
5. **Accountability:** making all stakeholders responsible and answerable for project implementation and success.

In effect, what distinguished PAMANA was not the implementation of development projects but the people who were part of decision-making and the understanding of how certain projects could address specific issues within the community. Using CSPP planning, stakeholders could identify projects that would help build "positive" peace, which emphasizes the presence of peace mechanisms rather than the absence of conflict and violence. Because of this, PAMANA not only prioritized mainstreaming the peace lens in formal institutions but also aimed to strengthen local capacities for peacebuilding and to develop social connectors that could serve as preventive measures against violence and conflict.

## From Design to Implementation

### Program Evolution

#### Timeline of Key Events / Transitions

Changes in PAMANA can be understood in four phases, aligning with the Philippine government's peace and development agenda as well as the current state of peace negotiations with the various non-state armed groups. Table 3 outlines the program's evolution and the key activities for each phase.

**Table 1. *Evolution of PAMANA.***

Year	Phase	Key Events
2010–2011	Inception and development under the Aquino Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Formulation of program documents</li><li>• Realignment of KBP funds for PAMANA programming</li></ul>



Year	Phase	Key Events
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signing of the 2011 GPH-CBA-CPLA Closure Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)</li> <li>• Initial implementation</li> </ul>
2012–early 2014	Program Setup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainstreaming of PAMANA budget and the DILG-led Mainstreaming Peace and Development in Local Governance Project (MPDLGP)</li> <li>• ARMM Reform Agenda, Signing of the 2012 GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro</li> <li>• OIC-GPH-MNLF Tripartite Implementation Review of the 1996 FPA</li> <li>• Responses to the 2012 Typhoon Pablo (Washi), the 2013 Zamboanga Siege, and the 2013 Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)</li> </ul>
2014–2016	Institutionalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shift from OPAPP as implementer to oversight agency</li> <li>• Download of funds directly to the ARMM</li> <li>• Preparations for the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)</li> <li>• Programming in Caraga under the Whole-of-Nation Technical Working Group (TWG)</li> <li>• Responses to the 2015 Mamasapano incident</li> </ul>
2016–present	Reconfiguration under the Duterte Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconsolidation of PAMANA budget under OPAPP</li> <li>• Implementation through UNDP and IOM</li> <li>• Preparations for signing of the 2019 GPH-RPA/ABB-TPG Comprehensive Implementation Document</li> <li>• Responses to the 2017 Marawi crisis</li> <li>• 2018 reconfiguration from Sec. Dureza to new Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (PAPRU) Sec. Galvez</li> <li>• Preparations for the 2019 plebiscite on the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL)</li> </ul>

### Budget Appropriations

Figure 5 shows the changes to PAMANA’s budget appropriations from 2011 to 2019. For its first year of implementation in 2011, PAMANA received funds that were formerly budgeted for the KBP (about P1 billion), and from the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), giving the program an overall budget of

P2.387 billion (OPAPP, 2012). By 2012, PAMANA had become a program with clear line items under OPAPP’s budget allocation in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). However, with changes to PAMANA administration and recognizing that OPAPP better functioned as an oversight body, rather than as a direct program implementer, from 2013–2016, PAMANA appropriations were allocated directly to the implementing agencies. In 2014, the Aquino government also began to appropriate PAMANA funds to the ARG as a way to “build the capacities of local governments in Bangsamoro areas to deliver development programs and basic services” (OPAPP, 2015b). The latter years of PAMANA under Secretary Deles also saw more focus towards Pillar 3 “Sub-regional Development,” as shown by the allocations to the Department of Public Works and Highways in 2015 and 2016.




Figure 5. PAMANA Appropriations from 2011–2019.

With the change in leadership to Secretary Dureza also came a change in how OPAPP’s role was viewed by the agency itself. It once again took on a larger role in program implementation and received the biggest budget appropriation for 2017, amounting to a budget increase of over 1000% from just over 700 million in 2016 to 8 billion in 2017. **In contrast to the GAAs from 2012 to 2016, which limited the role of OPAPP to project oversight and monitoring, the 2017 GAA included a special provision authorizing the agency to implement PAMANA projects.** This was further explained by then-Secretary Dureza that the administration had agreed to expand OPAPP’s mandate to include implementation of development projects, pending an executive order, reportedly to create a “Department of Peace” (Elemia, 2016). However, the executive order was never released, and so the OPAPP-lodged PAMANA funds were largely obligated through the execution of memorandums of agreement (MOAs) with partner government agencies, civil society organizations (CSOs), and international organizations such as the UNDP and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). By 2018, OPAPP reduced its implementation role and allocations in the GAA reverted to the main implementing agencies. With the Duterte administration reconsidering

changes to how PAMANA is managed and implemented, alongside the appointment of Secretary Galvez as the new Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (PAPRU), allocations in 2019 were reduced to its lowest level of P386.862 million.

These programming changes aligned with the recalibration of PAMANA objectives and recategorization of pillars 1, 2, and 3. From 2011-2016, PAMANA projects were categorized in terms of three pillars: (1) macro-level policy reform interventions; (2) community-driven development ; and (3) sub-regional development. After the change in leadership in 2016, Pillar 1 was rebranded as policy interventions addressing issues of injustices relative to land security, natural resources, identity and human rights; Pillar 2 as capacity building interventions; and Pillar 3 as all kinds of peace-promoting socioeconomic interventions regardless of scale. Table 4 shows the differences of the pillars between the two periods.

**Table 2. *Changes in the PAMANA Pillars***

Pillar	Previous (2011–2016)	Enhanced (2016–present)
<b>1</b>	Macro-level policy reform interventions that support the establishment of the foundations of peace; includes governance/convergence interventions, security guarantees and support for internally displaced persons and other marginalized sectors	Policy interventions addressing issues of injustices relative to land security, natural resources, identity and human rights
<b>2</b>	Community-driven development interventions that promote the convergent delivery of services and goods focused on households and communities	Capacity building interventions relative to strengthening government institutions and empowering communities
<b>3</b>	Sub-regional development focuses on high-impact connectivity and value chain development, infrastructure support, economic integration and employment generation	Peace-promoting socioeconomic interventions

## Program Implementation

### Project Programming Cycle

PAMANA programming differs based on project type. In general, though, it follows this order:

1. Targeting: Conflict analysis is used to determine geographic targeting per conflict line and PAMANA zone.
2. Identification of Projects, Programs and Activities (PPAs)

- a. CSPP workshops, project prioritization, and implementing agencies are used to identify the appropriate projects. (Pillar 1 and 3 under initial categorization)
    - i. For CPLA and RPA areas, projects were identified based on pre-agreed elements of the respective peace agreement. In both cases, there was complementation with CNN programming in the same zone.
    - ii. For Bangsamoro, programming was first decided at the provincial level and became increasingly devolved to the ARG (as in early rounds of PAMANA-MNLF and HDAP), then IOM (which built a separate targeting system agreed with OPAPP), and UNDP (which co-designed the parameters with OPAPP for the Support for Peacebuilding and Normalization [SPAN] Programme).
  - b. Barangay/municipal level stakeholders identify projects for the CDD component of PAMANA.
3. Project Delivery: Implementation is done through the agreed-upon modality, e.g, LGU, NGA, PO.

### Implementing Agencies

Over the last nine years, PAMANA has been implemented by 15 agencies, including three attached agencies and one regional government unit. Table 5 details the types of projects under each agency.

**Table 5. PAMANA Implementing Agencies and Project Types**

Agency	Projects
OPAPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mainstreaming of CSPP approach in government</li> <li>● MNLF peace and development communities (PDCs)</li> </ul>
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Capacity building for LGUs on CSPP through the MPDLGP and follow-up activities</li> <li>● Infrastructure               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Local roads</li> <li>○ Water systems</li> <li>○ Community infrastructure</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Capacity building for LGUs on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for Katarungang Pambarangay (Barangay Justice System)</li> </ul>
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Core shelter for internally displaced persons (IDPs)</li> <li>● Community-driven development (CDD)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS)</li> <li>○ Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP) and</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Agency	Projects
	Community-Driven Enterprise Development (CDED) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ LGU-led community projects</li> </ul>
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● CDD in Agrarian Reform Areas</li> </ul>
Department of Agriculture (DA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● National Irrigation Administration (NIA)</li> <li>● Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● CDD in Agrarian Reform Areas</li> <li>● Agri-fisheries production</li> <li>● Infrastructure               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Farm-to-market roads</li> <li>○ Irrigation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Roads and bridges</li> </ul>
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● National Greening Program (NGP) employment of forest guards</li> <li>● Natural resource management</li> <li>● Coordination for tenurial instruments for the Clarificatory Implementing Document (CID) with the RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG</li> </ul>
Department of Energy (DOE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Solar electrification</li> </ul>
National Electrification Administration (NEA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sitio line electrification with electric cooperatives</li> </ul>
ARG and its devolved agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ARMM-ORG</li> <li>- ARMM-DSWD</li> <li>- ARMM-DAF</li> <li>- ARMM-BFAR</li> <li>- ARMM-CDA</li> <li>- ARMM-DENR</li> <li>- ARMM-DPWH</li> <li>- ARMM-DILG</li> <li>- HDAP PMO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Humanitarian and Development Assistance Program (HDAP)</li> <li>● MNLF members and families               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Health insurance</li> <li>○ Study grants</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Core shelter / housing assistance</li> <li>● Strengthening barangay tanods and Katarungang Pambarangay</li> <li>● CDD under DSWD-ARMM</li> <li>● Agri-fisheries production and post-harvest facilities</li> <li>● Natural resource management</li> <li>● Business development services</li> <li>● Free internet</li> <li>● Roads</li> </ul>
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ancestral land and domains titling services</li> <li>● Formulation and updating of Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development Protection Plan (ADSDPP)</li> </ul>

Agency	Projects
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quick response to IP rights violations</li> <li>• Human and economic development services</li> </ul>
Commission on Higher Education (CHED)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Study grant program for former rebels and/or next of kin</li> </ul>
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health insurance program for former rebels and/or next of kin</li> </ul>
Armed Forces of the Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of security and conflict-affectation data for targeting</li> <li>• Roads for implementation through the engineering brigades</li> </ul>
Provincial Local Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct implementation of projects through MOA with OPAPP, particularly Pillar 3 infrastructure and livelihood projects</li> </ul>

### Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)

OPAPP, as the lead agency for PAMANA, had a role in both implementing and overseeing program operations. OPAPP functioned as an implementer from 2011 to 2012 when PAMANA was at its early stages, and again in 2017 when the Duterte administration moved towards empowering the agency to manage all peace-related endeavors of the government – from negotiations to development on the ground. As an implementing agency, OPAPP developed partnerships with NGAs, LGUs, the AFP, CSOs, and international organizations through the use of MOAs and other similar mechanisms.

While OPAPP was not consistently an implementer, it had a more permanent role as the program’s oversight body since PAMANA’s inclusion in the GAA in 2012. Following EO No. 3, s. 2001, which required OPAPP to provide a “systematic approach and administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process,” it was the main agency responsible for program planning and monitoring of PAMANA, providing the official list of barangays for annual targeting across the various PAMANA implementing agencies. In relation to this, OPAPP also provided technical assistance to implementing agencies on developing program guidelines and trained agency partners on mainstreaming and operationalizing CSPP.

From 2011, OPAPP began to conduct orientation and reflection sessions with key national agencies on the framework of conflict, security, and development. The intention was to deliberately embed CSPP principles in program development and management processes, from planning to evaluation. The overall core principles under CSPP were: inclusion, participation, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability. By mainstreaming CSPP to both NGAs and LGUs, the needs of the disadvantaged and vulnerable would take center stage throughout the entire process. In the tail end of the Aquino administration, OPAPP released its

“CSPP Guidebook” (2016), which served as a key reference for understanding CSPP principles and the tools for implementing it.

### **Operationalizing CSPP for LGUs and Project Identification**

Through the support of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), OPAPP and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) formed a partnership to embed CSPP in LGUs. This partnership became the Mainstreaming Peace and Development in Local Governance Project (MPDLGP), which was implemented from December 2011 to September 2016. The MPDLGP was a learning-by-doing process for provincial and municipal LGUs (PLGUs and MLGUs) on CSPP, which allowed stakeholders to identify the drivers of conflict in their areas and to propose projects to address these issues for financing under PAMANA. As a result, MPDLGP was a “soft” intervention that complemented the heavily infrastructure-focused component of PAMANA-DILG. Since PAMANA was focused on addressing the root causes of conflict and aimed to do so through community-level interventions, making local leaders better conflict managers and planners for peace and development was considered an important foundation for sustainable peace. This was operationalized through the setup of PAMANA TWGs lodged under the Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils (RPOCs/PPOCs) and Regional and Provincial Development Councils (RDCs/PDCs), which are local special bodies created under the 1991 Local Government Code. These PAMANA TWGs were tasked to coordinate, plan, and monitor projects funded under PAMANA. The provision of PAMANA funds incentivized the activation of these local special bodies, particularly the PPOCs, which were not always active nationwide.

The CSPP approach prioritized the study of the root causes of conflict, and through this design, PAMANA aimed to make planning for interventions more targeted and localized. Since CSPP put importance on the role of LGUs, the DILG played a significant role. Although the bulk of PAMANA funds under the DILG was spent on infrastructure, based on our KIIs, the MPDLGP was viewed as being equally, if not more, important for long-term peace and development.

Based on the MPDLGP Terminal Evaluation Report, the program did contribute to orienting LGUs on some of the core principles of CSPP. However, it was unable to “pursue CSPP-focused strategies and interventions as the implementers proceeded with a more development-oriented approach to the projects” (AECID, 2018). **Although training for LGUs was done, not all understood how to incorporate the conflict lens in program planning. The complexity of the topic and the conceptual nature of CSPP made actual application difficult.** Successful mainstreaming was dependent on consistent technical support for local implementation, as well as the buy-in of local chief executives for the CSPP ethos as a fundamental component of service delivery. The report recommended having a logical framework that the Project Management Office (PMO) could use to more easily identify needs and gaps of LGUs. This mainstreaming issue was addressed in some areas through PAMANA’s support for RPOCs/PPOCs and RDCs/PDCs. This can be seen in the case of the CARAGA RPOC, whose initiatives were further supported by the Whole-of-Nation-Approach TWG as well as the GIZ-funded Conflict-Sensitive Resource and Asset Management (COSERAM) project. However, many LGUs did not have strong RPOCs/PPOCs, which hampered CSPP-based development planning.



The MPDLGP report found that most projects and activities planned under the MPDLGP were not oriented towards peace and conflict because of the sensitivity of raising those issues with local authorities. While there was a general acceptance of the strong links between security and development, there was a lack of clarity regarding which development levers could be most effective in building peace. This was supported by our interviewees' main criticism of the program: that **there was an outsize investment in infrastructure projects, particularly during the 2011-2016 period**. As one of the most obvious needs of communities, infrastructure was often the default option when LGUs were asked to prioritize PAMANA projects. Officials from implementing agencies struggled to explain how these projects addressed the root causes of conflict although they thought that these could have contributed to improving social cohesion since the projects allowed communities to work together towards a common goal. Although they were necessary for development, the question remains of whether infrastructure largely on its own can improve peacebuilding. Table 6 outlines the intended development goals of PAMANA under each pillar, both old and new. Given the different goals, there is a disconnect between what is needed and what is asked for.

**Table 6. Comparing the Development Goals under the Old and New PAMANA**

Previous	Enhanced
<b>Improve socioeconomic conditions</b> in conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable areas as well as in areas covered by Peace Agreements through infrastructure development and focused delivery of social services	<b>Address issues of injustices and improve community access</b> to socioeconomic interventions
<b>Improve governance</b> by building the institutional capacities of national government agencies and local governments for a conflict-sensitive, peace-promoting, and gender-sensitive approach to development	<b>Improve governance</b> by building the capacity of national government agencies and local government units for a conflict-sensitive, peace-promoting, culture-sensitive and gender-sensitive approach to human rights promotion and development
<b>Empower communities</b> by strengthening their capacities to address issues of conflict and peace through activities that improve social cohesion	<b>Empower communities</b> and strengthen their capacities to address issues of conflict and peace

Interviewees also shared that it was fairly common knowledge that bargaining and compromise had been necessary when selecting communities because leaders tended to politicize targeting. Some felt that PAMANA had become a top-down program over the years since it was unclear whether the identified projects were actually what the communities needed/wanted. Without leaders who appreciated the importance of the conflict lens and understood how it could be operationalized, project identification was problematic for some areas from conception. Although there was discussion of including CSPP criteria in the evaluation of LGUs for the Seal of Good Local Governance to ensure that local officials adhered to the



standards, the plans fell through, and DILG's involvement in PAMANA also significantly decreased after the May 2016 transition.

### **Mainstreaming PAMANA vs. PAMANA as a Special Program**

One of the main features of PAMANA that makes it unique is that it aimed to specifically pair the improvement of development outcomes with the strengthening of Philippine institutions. Since OPAPP is not an implementing agency, PAMANA's success is dependent on the buy-in and coordination of its government partners. The view of many interviewees was that true success for PAMANA would be when it would no longer be considered an OPAPP program but was instead mainstreamed into the regular operations of implementing agencies. That would be the point when other government partners appreciated the importance of delivering services to conflicted-affected areas when before they relied on the military to penetrate and serve them. Aside from conducting training for NGAs, OPAPP also embedded CSPP principles in the guidelines of PAMANA programs. However, as emphasized by one of our interviewees, mainstreaming, or at least integration, of PAMANA in the regular programs and operations of line agencies necessitates the development of new policies and issuances. It is necessary to have conflict-line-specific CSPP modules for agencies to use as a guide in implementation. We found this to be particularly salient for RPA communities where PAMANA programming not only contends with the RPA but also the NPA, which actively disrupted PAMANA projects.

From our KIIs, most of the key implementers at the national level became increasingly cognizant of the importance of serving CAAs/CVAs as a result of PAMANA. However, **the level of implementation varied by agency depending on whether agency leadership viewed conflict-reduction as being related to the mandate of the agency itself.** Some agencies, like DSWD, were already doing targeted work for vulnerable communities before PAMANA, while some, like DPWH, were less experienced and prepared to deliver services in remote and riskier areas. These differences could also have been related to the level of involvement of the agency in conceptualizing the intervention itself. For example, PAMANA-DENR was done in close coordination with the agency and also addressed a need of DENR to supplement the number of forest guards it employed. This program proved to be one of the most successful ones under PAMANA and it has continued unhindered because DENR mainstreamed the employment of former combatants into the National Greening Program (NGP).

This push-and-pull between mainstreaming PAMANA and recognizing it as a program that needed more attention and investment was a recurring issue. OPAPP did indeed intend PAMANA to be mainstreamed into the agencies' work when the program was conceptualized, and it adapted their original implementation documents to allow PAMANA to be part of existing programming. However, this meant limiting mainstreaming to only the programs concerned and only the personnel doing the specific work; **CSPP was not embedded in the bureaucracy as a whole, especially at the local level.** Because of the specific manner that mainstreaming was done, in some ways, PAMANA would have benefited more if it was treated as a specialized program.

This was mentioned particularly in relation to the rules and regulations of the Department of Budget Management (DBM). Implementers said that following regular guidelines for procurement and contracting

significantly hampered their ability to complete projects in a timely fashion, leading to community stakeholders feeling upset about broken promises and a perceived lack of commitment from the government. Making sure that projects are completed without delay is especially critical for areas with peace agreements since the government has clear commitments. With timelines involved and peace partners anticipating follow-through, interviewees felt that projects for these areas should not be included with regular program inefficiencies and a specialized PMO should be set up instead. This was the intention of DSWD in 2016, but DBM disallowed it due to high administrative costs.

While differences existed between agencies, the level of appreciation for CSPP also seemed to vary **within the agencies** based on our discussions with officials. **Although officials and implementers at the national level understood the importance of PAMANA, workers across the bureaucracy saw it as an additional task on top of their existing mandates.** They mentioned that linking PAMANA success to job performance metrics that were submitted to DBM and impacted the performance-based bonus (PBB) under Executive Order No. 80, s., 2012 led to staff-level wariness in taking on the role, especially given the logistical challenges of implementation in CAAs/CVAs. The very nature and targets of PAMANA meant that the work was more difficult than normal, but interviewees did not seem to think that this was taken into account. Long-term commitment and employment of implementers was an even bigger issue in the local level. Because of the contractual nature of many government employees, accountability for implementation frequently changed. This led to relying more on long-term personnel from the central offices in Manila to make sure projects were running, essentially preventing PAMANA from being truly local. Those who did commit, however, often became champions of the program and pushed their organizations to continue implementation despite bureaucratic and/or political roadblocks.

### **Gestation Analysis of Implementation by NGAs**

Implementing PAMANA programs in a timely manner faced significant challenges due to the various agencies involved, changes to the program over time, and local hurdles created by ongoing conflict. However, because a central goal of PAMANA was to gain the trust of both civilians and negotiating partners, following through on promised projects is crucial. The following tables present gestation analyses of PAMANA projects based on available data. These analyses were originally conducted by OPAPP internal reviews and are based on data from 2011–2015.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Project-level PAMANA data shared with the evaluation team were only available at the annual level, which is why we rely on existing OPAPP analyses.

**Table 7. Gestation Period of Project Implementation by Agency**

<b>Agency (Inclusive Years)</b>	<b>Average Gestation Period (months)</b>	<b>Completion Rate</b>	<b>Completed Projects</b>	<b>Total Number of Projects</b>
<b>DSWD (2011-2015)</b>	17.83	73.60%	4,940	6,712
<b>OPAPP (2011)*</b>	17.15	78.54%	366	466
<b>DILG (2012-2015)</b>	23.57	60.32%	415	688
<b>ARMM (2012-2015)</b>	26.25	59.86%	2,880	4,811
<b>DPWH (2012, 2015)</b>	22.25	50.00%	4	8
<b>DOE (2014-2015)</b>	22.29	53.85%	7	13
<b>NEA (2013-2015)</b>	17.96	53.38%	79	148
<b>DAR (2011-2015)</b>	22.49	38.04%	698	1,835
<b>DENR (2013)**</b>	11.58	100.00%	19	19
<b>DA (2012-2015)</b>	26.46	22.31%	141	632

From Table 7, we find that from 2011–2015, the agency that was responsible for the most projects was DSWD. Still, DSWD had a high rate of completion as well as a gestation period that was shorter than that of six other agencies. By contrast, the DA and DAR were the two agencies which had the worst completion rates. Several of our case studies, especially those conducted in CNN-affected areas, confirmed that the perception of LGUs and citizens at the ground-level matched these aggregate figures. Beneficiary communities felt that reporting requirements in place for these agencies were particularly onerous, sometimes leading communities to not pursue projects in the first place.

That said, when comparing by conflict line, we find that the gestation period is significantly shorter for the CNN conflict line and much longer for the RPMP/RPA/ABB. During the 2011–2015 period, there were political issues related to the signing of the peace agreement that delayed project implementation for the latter. This is also most likely the reason for the low level of completion in these areas. Our survey in Negros/Panay, along with our RPA case study, suggest that planned projects in the region have recently seen a much greater rate of follow-through.

**Table 8. Gestation Period of Project Implementation by Conflict Line**

CONFLICT LINE	Average Gestation Period	Completion Rate
Bangsamoro	22.14	62.89%
CPP/NPA/NDFP	18.05	62.10%
CBA/CPLA	22.85	61.36%
RPM-P/RPA/ABB	28.91	5.84%
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.12</b>	<b>62.11%</b>

### Non-Government Implementers

From 2011–2016, several International Organizations were seen as support organizations to a Philippine government focused agenda. This included AECID’s support through the Sorsogon Initiatives and MPDLGP, and GIZ’s COSERAM, which provided complementation in CARAGA and was tapped by the DILG Bureau of Local Government Development (BLGD) to help enhance the CSPP toolkits for Comprehensive Development Plan–Executive-Legislative Agenda (CDP-ELA) formulation. Other partners such as the World Bank and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), now the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia (DFAT-Australia), did not engage directly with PAMANA, but assisted in designing other mechanisms that dovetailed with PAMANA implementation, such as the profiling of combatants for CBA-CPLA and RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG.

This changed from 2017 to 2019, where partnership agreements were executed, bringing in two UN organizations, IOM and UNDP, as direct implementing partners.

### **International Organization for Migration**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was contracted by OPAPP to implement FY 2017 PAMANA in ARMM, which was initially programmed for implementation in MNLF communities but was declined by the ARG. A partnership agreement was signed in April 2017 for a total of P985 million pesos, of which 5% was retained by OPAPP for administrative and monitoring costs. The agreement covered five components, namely:

1. Science and Technology for Rapid Economic Advancement of MNLF Communities (STREAM-C) Project - Livelihood Skills Development Training,
2. Cooperative Advancement through Skills Training and Livelihood (CASTLE) Project - Technical Skills Development Training,
3. Livelihood Skills Development Training for MNLF Cooperatives,
4. PAMANA CDD (family-based livelihood),

## 5. PAMANA-ARMM 2017 for MNLF communities.

Implementation started in September 2017. While it was originally envisioned for one year implementation, the project was extended until the third quarter of 2019.

### **United Nations Development Programme**

An agreement creating the SPAN Programme was signed in December 2017, where P649.26 million pesos from OPAPP funds were transferred to UNDP through the National Acceleration Modality (NAM) for implementation of projects in areas covered by the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the ARMM. Of its seven target outputs, the first four target outputs relate to the normalization component of the GPH-MILF peace process and were not funded through PAMANA. Only three related to PAMANA, namely:

- Component V: Enhanced capacities for conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting governance,
- Component VI: Increased access of vulnerable sectors to critical social services, and
- Component VII: Recovery and rehabilitation of Marawi City strengthened through peacebuilding, social healing and reconciliation.

SPAN was originally planned for one year but was extended to December 2019. As of September 2019, fund implementation remains at 50% and under review by the new OPAPRU.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

### Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning System

The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in OPAPP designed the Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (CSMEAL) System to track and assess the implementation of the CSPP framework and to assess the effects of PAMANA's projects on the communities. Similar to the PAMANA program itself, the CSMEAL System was designed to be different by integrating conflict sensitivity in its implementation. According to the CSMEAL Manual (OPAPP, 2015a), a CSPP-based M&E system should focus on the peace and conflict situation in communities and not just traditional socioeconomic indicators, closely monitor the adherence of program implementers to CSPP processes, promote the active participation of stakeholders in M&E and transparency reporting, and emphasize learning for continuous improvement. The CSMEAL was developed during the latter half of the Aquino Administration, building on initial Transparency and Accountability Mechanism (TAM) guidelines developed in 2011 with the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN).

The principles above were translated into the five key components of the CSMEAL System: 1) Context Monitoring, 2) Outcomes Monitoring, 3) Implementation Monitoring, 4) Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms, 5) Program Evaluation. All five assessed different factors that could contribute to program success/failure. Context monitoring focused on understanding the situation on the ground during both the pre-implementation phase – so that risks, challenges, and opportunities could be catalogued and understood

– and the implementation phase to analyze the effect of PAMANA projects on peace and conflict dynamics. Through outcomes monitoring, PAMANA would be able to record quick wins while also tracking progress on peacebuilding initiatives. TAM allowed citizens and other program stakeholders to understand PAMANA implementation. Lastly, program evaluation made the assessment of PAMANA a top priority and aimed to evaluate the program’s impact on key conflict drivers.

**Although the CSMEAL System provided structure to PAMANA’s M&E processes, it was developed approximately four years after PAMANA implementation began in 2011. Because of this, monitoring of the program was not consistent.** This was reflected in some of the recommendations of the MPDLGP Terminal Report for PAMANA to “formulat[e] a logical framework from the onset... install monitoring and transparency mechanisms... report on results and shar[e] with partner implementers” (AECID, 2018).

It was unclear during our program review whether implementing agencies, excluding OPAPP, had been trained on the CSMEAL System, but we found that OPAPP itself had issues with implementing it. From our interviews, we were informed that although CSMEAL was formulated, OPAPP leadership was unable to finalize PAMANA’s indicators and M&E processes. Lack of implementation was also evident from the deficiencies in data of OPAPP’s M&E Unit when we made our requests for administrative data. We were provided with organized project-level data for years 2011 to 2016, but data for subsequent years was either less detailed or lacking.

### PAMANA National Program Management Office

The PAMANA National Program Management Office (NPMO) is the main unit in charge of overseeing PAMANA operations in its three main phases: 1) Pre-Project Implementation, 2) Project Implementation, and 3) Monitoring and Evaluation. Echoing the NPMO’s overarching role in PAMANA implementation, the CSMEAL System also put the responsibility for M&E mainly on the NPMO.

The NPMO’s responsibilities can be categorized into six main areas: 1) capacity building activities, 2) regular monitoring and tracking through field visits and collaboration with implementers and stakeholders, 3) consolidation of project data and reports, 4) regular project reviews, 5) facilitation of meetings/sessions for sharing lessons, and 6) identification of program improvements.

During our review, it was unclear whether all the tasks the NPMO had been designated were still being done due to organizational changes. Although the evaluation team was able to meet with the first NPMO Program Manager (Assistant Secretary for Operations) and the first Undersecretary for Operations exercising oversight over PAMANA, we were unable to interview the post-2016 NPMO directors appointed by Secretary Dureza and Secretary Galvez, respectively, due to scheduling difficulties arising from the ongoing transition of agency leadership. Being unable to talk to the main implementing office of PAMANA hampered our ability to fully appreciate the role of the NPMO in both the OPAPP and for inter-agency convergence. Our main basis is interviews from partner agencies. From them, we found that while they valued the NPMO’s role in coordinating PAMANA implementation, they also felt that the NPMO needed significant strengthening in its ability to make sure that agencies followed through with plans. Officials said that they needed more support for troubleshooting issues on the ground and that guidance throughout the

implementation process. Also, although the NPMO convened inter-agency meetings to discuss the progress of PAMANA, it was unclear whether convergence happened at the community level. PAMANA implementers followed a common plan but execution was purportedly siloed and/or hampered by separate mechanisms, mandates, and budget download processes. One official said, as an example, “*Nandun si DSWD pero wala si DA kasi wala siyang SARO* (DSWD would be there but DA won’t be because it didn’t have a SARO (Special Allotment Release Order)).”

Because of the significant role of the NPMO in ensuring proper program implementation and the agencies’ dependence on its support, it seems that it had to prioritize implementation responsibilities. Based on the gaps in the data collected and reports from OPAPP, M&E systems were designed and partially implemented well after the start of program roll-out but significantly declined with the change in administration. With organizational and policy changes being a regular occurrence, there needs to be a more embedded M&E system with personnel who can focus on the work and are involved in improving it.

Third-Party Monitors

Following TAM guidelines, PAMANA intended to mobilize citizen participation in peacebuilding by engaging CSOs that could serve as third-party monitors (TPMs) of the program. By providing avenues for constructive feedback, the government could show that it was accountable to the communities it was aiming to serve. The TPMs provided value to OPAPP because of the former’s understanding of and actual experiences in monitoring PAMANA projects that went beyond OPAPP’s monitoring framework.

In the early years of PAMANA, TPMs were formally contracted by OPAPP through MOAs, which included terms on the provision of mobilization funds for CSOs; however, this practice was subjected to scrutiny and has been discontinued. As an alternative, OPAPP raised funds from international/local funding institutions.

Summary of Findings from National Program Review

Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions listed here apply to all three categories of conflict. Conflict-line specific findings are included in the following sections. The conclusions are stated briefly here, though they draw from the more exhaustive descriptions in the sections above.

**Table 3. Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability: PAMANA at the National Level**

Relevance
<u>National-level Relevance</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>PAMANA’s ToC was flexibly applied to the three major categories of conflict. However, it did not explicitly link programming to conflict-reducing outcomes relevant to each conflict line.</li></ul>



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Awareness of issues affecting CAAs increased among agency leadership. Implementation varied by whether leadership viewed conflict reduction as a component of their mandate.</li> </ul> <p><u>Ground-level Relevance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some perceived an outsized investment in infrastructure.</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency</b>
<p><u>Mainstreaming CSPP</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSPP was not fully embedded in the local level bureaucracy. More progress was made at the national level.</li> <li>The complexity and conceptual nature of CSPP made it difficult for LGUs to apply.</li> </ul> <p><u>Funding Delays and Lapses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implementation faced significant delays and lapses, though this could be expected to a certain extent due to the increased difficulty of projects in CAAs.</li> <li>Local agency implementers felt that their performance incentives did not properly account for the additional difficulty of implementing PAMANA.</li> <li>Additional reporting requirements sometimes led to low program take-up.</li> </ul>
<b>Effectiveness</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Track 1 complementarities and the extent to which root causes were addressed varied significantly by conflict line. We discuss effectiveness in the sections that follow</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>
<p><u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programming monitoring through CSMEAL, NPMOs, and TPMs was inconsistent across time, making it difficult to track progress.</li> </ul>



# **PAMANA for Areas with Completion Agreements**

## **Theory of Change**

The purpose of PAMANA in the CPLA and the RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict lines was to consolidate peace. As peace agreements have already been signed in both areas, the peace processes in these conflict lines are focused on following through on the terms and conditions of the agreements and demonstrating the dividends of peace. At this stage of the conflict cycle, a sustainable peace depends critically on the government's ability to maintain trust with key armed actors in negotiations (Walter, 1999), as well as to address socioeconomic grievances (P. Collier, 2004; Paul Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and to improve community resilience (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009; Labonne & Chase, 2011).

## **Track 1 Complementarity**

PAMANA's socioeconomic development programs were meant to facilitate the completion of the 1986 and 2000 peace agreements – in CPLA and RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG (henceforth, RPA) zones, respectively – by directly fulfilling provisions on development assistance to conflict-affected communities. Demonstrating national government commitment to implementing the peace agreement helps build trust with armed actors and, in turn, ensures armed actors' continued commitment. Perhaps the most important goal of PAMANA in areas with existing completion agreements was to keep partner groups at the table during understandably long and complicated negotiations over the terms of implementing the agreements.

The capacity building components of PAMANA had the goal of reinforcing trust by providing armed groups with a sense of control and ownership over the development projects in their communities. This active role in providing peace dividends to partner group support communities aimed to improve the groups' legitimacy among their supporters, deterring the emergence of splinter factions that could derail the peace process. Also of note, participating in program was meant to reduce the amount of time available for engaging in conflict activities. An important part of this process was the gradual disbursement of infrastructure and livelihood opportunities in communities previously isolated from viable markets, which served to increase the opportunity costs of returning to conflict. The perception that conflict was more costly than peace would then incentivize armed actors to invest in peace-promoting activities, such as formal employment and peaceful political engagement.

## **Root Causes of Conflict**


On the ground, PAMANA aimed to reduce socioeconomic grievances exacerbated by decades of armed conflict. Improving government capacity to provide economic opportunities through livelihood support projects and farm-to-market roads was intended to relieve civilian grievances that might lead them to pressure group leadership to return to conflict. Active community participation in project design and implementation was seen as crucial to bolster communities' ability to act collectively to demand good governance. Land tenure insecurity, for example, was a core grievance driving conflict in RPA support

communities. PAMANA’s capacity building efforts could then help communities better engage and negotiate with the government to ensure that they benefited from land reforms. Community collective action was also critical for grassroots level initiatives to maintain peace.

## Summary of Projects/Programs, 2011–2017

For CBA-CPLA and RPA, the coverage of PAMANA followed what was outlined in the respective peace agreements with the two groups. Since the non-state actors in these areas are active partners of the government in implementing PAMANA, they played a prominent role in identifying projects. Both agreements largely focus on the reintegration of members, improving socioeconomic conditions in their support communities, and the dispossession of their firearms and forces.

In support of the implementation of the GPH-CBA-CPLA MOA, Executive Order No. 49, s. 2011 identified livelihood programs under PAMANA as one of the priority projects for CPLA areas. However, we found that even though there has been significant investment in livelihood projects, a bigger percentage of funds still went to building roads and bridges. The balance between roads and “soft” projects for CPLA communities was somewhere between what was allocated to CNN areas (more focused on infrastructure) and RPA areas (more focused on community-based interventions). Figure 6 compares the expenditures per project type over the years in CBA-CPLA areas.




**Figure 6.** PAMANA expenditures by project type from 2011–2017 for the CPLA conflict line.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Graph may include PPAs targeting CNN activity in the Cordilleras.

While PAMANA played an important role in the CBA-CPLA conflict line, the completion area we focused on in this report relates to the RPA. We were asked by OPAPP to not cover the CBA-CPLA conflict line in light of ongoing developments on the ground. In the meantime, existing evidence is documented in OPAPP's internal assessment of the status of the 2011 GPH-CBA-CPLA Closure Agreement as well as the 2017 PAMANA Program Review conducted by the De La Salle University Jesse M. Robredo School of Governance.

In RPA areas, infrastructure was not always the main project type funded. Land tenure and CDD projects were allocated a sizable portion of PAMANA funds which indicates the priority placed on issues regarding land ownership and community empowerment, two of the main identified roots of conflict in the Negros-Panay region. Figure 7 shows PAMANA expenditures in RPA areas from 2011 to 2017.



**Figure 7.** PAMANA expenditures by project type from 2011–2017 for the RPA conflict line.

Unlike in the Cordillera Region, where there was a significant disruption to funds in 2014, the budget for RPA areas consistently increased over time. It is notable that expenditures for the RPA conflict line were much lower initially and, in fact, were less than what was supposed to be allocated to the CPLA. Implementation in Negros-Panay was hampered by the non-passage of the RPA/ABB-TPG Clarificatory Implementing Document (CID), which was envisioned to be signed shortly after the 2011 CBA-CPLA MOA but was only passed in 2019. Sizeable funds (particularly for infrastructure) lapsed and reverted to the National Treasury given that implementation was contingent on the signing of the CID and securing the tenurial instruments for the resettlement sites. Despite this, by 2017, RPA areas were allocated nearly double the funds as CPLA areas in terms of project investment and expenditure.

For both areas, while not apparent in the figures above, one of the most successful PAMANA interventions implemented was the hiring of forest guards under the DENR's NGP. Through the NGP, former members of the CPLA and RPA were given full-time employment and livelihood support. According to the DENR,

as of this year, there are 587 forest guards from the CPLA and 128 from the RPA. From discussions with officials from several agencies, this program provided an avenue for ex-combatants to show their value to their communities (supporting reintegration and social cohesion) while also allowing them to become more economically stable. The forest guard program would be a good starting point for evaluating PAMANA at the individual level. While we originally planned to do this by matching the names of ex-combatants who were part of the program with individuals in the Listahanan, we were unable to do so due to complications in obtaining data from DSWD in relation to the Data Privacy Law.

## **Building the Foundations for Peace in Negros/Panay**

PAMANA is uniquely important for complementing the peace negotiations in the RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict line. Security concerns among RPA members and difficulties reintegrating into civilian life contribute to insecurity. The PAMANA projects most critical to ensuring the peace process moves forward are those that focus on easing the economic concerns of reintegration into civilian life and the security concerns of disarmament.

PAMANA funds for the RPM-P/RPA/ABB conflict line support resettlement sites that facilitate the rebuilding of civilian lives in a secure environment. At the community level, security is a major concern for both RPM-P/RPA/ABB members and their support communities due to the ongoing conflict with the NPA. Resettlement to a secure environment in civilian life is critical to preventing a return to conflict or engagement in lawlessness and violence for both livelihood and self-protection.

One of the most important components of PAMANA for the RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict line is providing benefits to the group's support communities through Community Peace Dividends (CPD). The CPD program is one of the main projects in RPA areas as one of the five components in the CID of the peace agreement between GPH-RPA-TPG. It aims to facilitate the reintegration of RPA members and help build support for their presence in the community. CPD is also especially important to Track 1 complementarity because it allows partner groups to show that they have delivered on the promised benefits that would come from peace negotiations with the government. TPG, along with the security sector, identified 100 barangays (91 in the provinces of Negros and Panay Islands) that would receive community-based grants and enterprise development support.

The program generally follows the guidelines of the PAMANA-SLP program but differs in the amount of the grant given: a one-time grant of P500,000 for CPD vis-a-vis a block grant of P300,000 per year for three years for PAMANA-SLP Regular. As a community-driven enterprise development (CDED) project, CPD aims to bolster economic activity in the community as a whole while also directly benefiting the POs that are the main recipient of the grants. These POs are composed of regular civilians from the barangay. The requirements for PO accreditation are:

1. Minimum of six months operation
2. Minimum 40% of members are women
3. Reached the set number of beneficiaries with updated data


4. Has a remarkable product
5. Has at least one partnership with a sectoral group or a private firm

As a PAMANA project under DSWD, direct implementation and monitoring processes were largely the responsibility of the organization. To support the program, a DSWD Project Development Officer (PDO) coordinates with officials at the provincial, municipal, and barangay level. The Sangguniang Barangay approves the resolution that formally recognizes a particular PO as the Sustainable Livelihood Program Association (SLPA) in the barangay. After accreditation, the SLPA works to map out its and its community's current situation through a Participatory Livelihood Issue Analysis (PLIA). The PDO also supports capacity building for entrepreneurship so that SLPAs become more skilled and market-oriented. The PDO works to assist the SLPA by monitoring project implementation as well as providing mentoring assistance for beneficiaries. Apart from the PDO, during the early years of PAMANA-CPD implementation, community organizers from Kapatiran also provided advice and guidance to the SLPAs.

Because of the centrality of CPD to PAMANA to the RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict line, as well as the fact that this component of PAMANA sets it apart from programming in NPA areas, we apply a special focus to CPD in this section. We used the RPA survey to understand the successes and challenges of implementing the CPD projects and then used the case study (which took place after the completion of the survey) to validate the findings and explore additional mechanisms.


One challenge that we learned about related to membership: a number of respondents who were purportedly members based on the POs' lists did not know that they were, in fact, members of PAMANA POs. We found that **of the CPD PO member respondents, only 64% identified themselves as members when asked.** Of this subset of individuals who self-identified as PO members, we discovered that 36% were unaware of the RPA. Since the CPD program was intended to help reintegrate RPA members and provide benefits to its support communities, PO members not knowing about the group might point to future issues regarding attribution of benefits.

A positive note, however, is that of those listed as PO members in barangays that had implemented a CPD project, **83% indicated that they had personally benefited from their respective projects.** We examined livelihood support and the extent to which livelihood funds had been dispersed and projects had been implemented. From left to right in Figure 8, the columns represent the percentage of PO members who responded affirmatively that (1) they had been informed that they were selected to receive livelihood benefits, (2) the funds had been disbursed for the PO's project, (3) the PO had begun to implement the project (of those who indicated the funds were disbursed), and (4) the PAMANA project was producing benefits at the time of the survey (of those who responded that they had begun to implement the project). We followed up with those who had indicated that the project had yet to be implemented, and the reason that they gave was that there was no space for the crops yet.



**Figure 8.** Percentage of members indicating project status.

We also examined some indicators of success of PAMANA projects in CPD communities. From left to right in Figure 9, we show respondents' agreement (1) that the project addressed the most important needs of the community, (2) that they were satisfied with it, and (3) that it had a positive impact. PO members generally viewed PAMANA more positively by these measures than regular citizens; however, only about **50% of PO respondents said that they were satisfied with the PAMANA project or that it had a positive impact on them.** One caveat to these results is that since we only included respondents who indicated that they were aware of the PAMANA project in their barangay, it is possible that we would find a higher positive perception rating if people were more aware of PAMANA.



**Figure 9.** Measures of PAMANA effectiveness.

From these results, it seems that POs need more support to ensure that positive perceptions grow. From the case study we did in Negros Occidental, we found that **an important factor in implementation and project sustainability is the extent of hand-holding from the implementers.** For the most part, the POs

comprise non-entrepreneurial members, and while they all underwent training, it is unreasonable to expect that the members would be well-qualified after only three to four sessions. From inception to continued implementation, the PDO was intended to support the POs; however, in practice, this was not always the case. In the areas we studied, we found that **after disbursement of CPD funds, there was very little support or oversight given to the POs.** A clear issue that prevented their continued presence was the non-hiring / non-renewal of the PDOs themselves. Since these personnel were contractual, there was very little continuity and it was difficult to keep them there. When the PDOs' contracts expired, the POs were unsure about what to do. They lacked confidence in approaching local offices for help, because they did not see themselves as having "jurisdiction" over a national project.

Aside from gaps in institutional support, the PO members also acknowledged that many of them lacked commitment to attend to the projects. Some were shocked at the extent of attention a project entailed: one PO president signified an intent to resign as the PO already took too much time away from more profitable personal endeavors. Another possible explanation for this lack of commitment may be the ad hoc nature of the POs. Unlike most organizations that are born because of a community issue or initiative, these POs were founded solely to be PAMANA-SLP beneficiary organizations. Organizations that are formed organically are proactive in finding funders/donors, but PAMANA-SLPA members were recruited with the idea of a profitable enterprise, so members do not feel accountable if projects fail.

**In the survey, we found that PO members were relatively better off than regular civilians.** The mean level of education for members is 3.26, with a 3 indicating completion of some high school on a scale of no formal education (0) and graduate school or more (7)<sup>8</sup>. The mean level of education for non-members is 2.83. This difference is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.003, meaning that we can generalize this finding to the rest of the population.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, PO members tend to be better off economically. When asked to compare their economic status to other families that live in their barangay on a scale of 1 (much poorer) to 5 (much richer), the mean response for PO members was 2.85, while the mean response for non-members was 2.66. Again, this difference is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.02. Although not statistically significant, PO members also reported higher levels of employment, with 57% of members reporting employment and 54% of non-members reporting employment. In view of this, it is possible that PO members think that they have other options in terms of economic activities and need to be encouraged to continue their enterprises if difficulties arise.

Although the economic rationale for CPD projects does not appear to be clear-cut yet, both barangays and PO members do appreciate the projects. At the barangay level, it seems that they helped facilitate social cohesion. PO members and barangay officials felt closer to each other after working together to find solutions to problems that they encountered. In one of the projects that we studied, we found that community

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
<sup>8</sup> 0-no formal education, 1-some elementary, 2-completed elementary, 3-some high school, 4-completed high school, 5-some college, 6-completed college, 7-graduate school or more

<sup>9</sup> Tests of statistical significance use a t-test to determine significance and consider a difference in means with a p less than 0.05 statistically significant. This level of significance allows us to make claims with 95% confidence.



members outside of the PO were also eager to see the project bear fruit, because the PO president had committed to supporting malnourished children through its work.


In relation to this, we wanted to measure the perception of community involvement. In the survey, we asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the following: **“People in my community were consulted about what type of project that would best meet our needs.”** While far more members agreed with this statement than non-members, a significant number of non-members still reported that their communities were consulted regarding which types of projects would be the most relevant to them.



**Figure 10.** Perceptions of CPD respondents regarding PAMANA project consultations.


While CPD projects have supported community-building and -development goals, one of PAMANA’s stated goals is also to reduce conflict. We used the survey to measure how citizens perceive the security situation in their communities now. We depict below how respondents from CPD barangays felt about the security situation in their communities the last five years. Security varies significantly by locality, so this is only a broad overview of where individuals feel the most secure and where significant security challenges still remain. However, the data paints a positive picture of the change in security compared to five years ago (though our survey was conducted before the recent increase in violence in the Negros/Panay region). That said, in our case study, respondents did not attribute increased security directly to PAMANA. Because there are not enough administrative units or available violent incidence data in Negros/Panay, we are unable to conduct an analysis of administrative data on conflict reduction like we do in the NPA and Bangsamoro sections of the report.






**Figure 11.** Perceptions of CPD respondents regarding security in their barangay.

Since OPAPP informed us that the NPA frequently targeted PAMANA projects, we wanted to understand how prevalent these issues were based on community perceptions. We depict below the degree to which citizens reported that armed groups tried to capture project funds. Negros Oriental and Antique seemed to suffer the most from this, but variation is highly local. Thus, Figure 12 just gives a general idea of where armed group capture of projects is a bigger problem than others.



**Figure 12.** Perceptions of respondents regarding armed groups' impact on PAMANA.

While the communities are cognizant of the projects and the results paint a fairly optimistic picture, work needs to be done in making the communities aware of PAMANA itself. While non-members might be knowledgeable of the PO and their enterprise, they do not seem to be aware that these are being supported by PAMANA. Figure 13 shows that for each province, excepting Negros Occidental, only about 55-65% of survey respondents were aware of PAMANA. The result for Negros Occidental is most curious, though, since it has the most projects and POs of any province. Similarly concerning is the fact that not all PO members are aware of PAMANA.




**Figure 13.** PAMANA awareness by province, by respondent status.

Since the intention of these projects is to complement the peace table with the RPA, we used the survey to measure support for different actors. Because citizens are not always willing to admit support for non-state armed actors, we used an endorsement experiment. The survey asked respondents to rate their support of a policy on a scale of 1–5.<sup>10</sup> Respondents were assigned to one of four groups. Three of the groups were asked to rate their support of the policy, with the policy being endorsed by the NPA, RPA, or Government of the Philippines. The fourth group was asked to rate their support of the policy, with no mention of endorsement of the policy by any group. Figure 14, below, illustrates the average level of support for the policy in Negros and Panay in comparison to the control condition. Endorsement experiments are a well-known way to establish how much people support the groups themselves, when asking respondents to rate support directly is sensitive (Lyall, Zhou, and Imai 2018). The main drawback is that these questions can only provide an indirect measure of support. The numbers on the y-axis correspond to how much more or less people supported the policy when it was supported by each of the groups, relative to the control. The

<sup>10</sup> Survey respondents were asked the following: “Mining is an important economic activity in many rural parts of the Philippines, but it also increases the danger of landslides and flooding in these areas. It has recently been suggested [BY ACTOR] that a partial mining ban be implemented nationwide. What are your feelings towards this policy?”

question was asked on a five-point Likert scale. The plot shows that in Negros Island, there was almost a 1-point decrease in support for a policy (on a five-point scale) when the policy was endorsed by the NPA. In contrast, there was a modest increase in support for a policy (.2 points on a five-point scale) when the policy was endorsed by the Government of the Philippines.<sup>11</sup>




**Figure 14.** Support for NPA, RPA, and GPH.

One possible reason for the significant difference between areas is that at the time the survey was being implemented in Negros Island, tensions between the military and the NPA were high and there were daily reports of encounters and killings. With our focus on RPA support communities, a number of which had reported that the NPA had disrupted/attacked their PAMANA projects, it comes as no surprise then that respondents felt highly negative towards the NPA.

Finally, the survey also provides some insight into the degree to which PAMANA successfully contributed to the goals of Track 1. Specifically, we examined the degree to which both members and non-members of CPD communities trust the local and national government. Legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of its constituents is key to lessening the likelihood of conflict. PAMANA appears to be succeeding in this endeavor, in that PO members were more likely than non-members to (1) believe that the local government represented their interests well, (2) believe that GPH was committed to economic development in their locality, and (3) trust GPH to solve disputes peacefully (depicted from left to right below – dark

<sup>11</sup> While we think these results suggest important patterns of support, we caution that even when properly implemented, sensitive question techniques have several known weaknesses. For example, if people in Negros felt that support for the NPA was sensitive enough that even this question technique did not hide their true sympathies, the backlash in support would be interpreted differently.

blue represents the highest level of agreement, light blue the highest level of disagreement). Our case study provided significant additional support for the assertion that PAMANA improved the legitimacy of the government as well as the RPA. Several PO heads, barangay captains and citizens mentioned an increased trust in the government’s ability to deliver on development promises as a result of the program.



**Figure 15.** Measures of Track 1 complementarity.

From both the case study and the survey, we find that the community-based format of the projects is instrumental in building the foundations for peace. Although we have yet to see the CPD projects show a real impact in reducing conflict, considering that trust and cooperation are fundamental to peacebuilding, CPD projects can be an avenue for people to come together. While there are very real issues related to the economic viability and sustainability of the enterprises managed by the POs, particularly in relation to their need for close guidance and support from the government, as a starting point to address issues of marginalization and lack of opportunity, the projects seem to be a step in the right direction.

Stepping back from the ground-level impacts of the CPD program, our case study and KIIs suggested that PAMANA’s most important role in the RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict line was in keeping partner group leadership at the table for negotiations. Significant time passed after the signing of the 2000 agreement and several aspects of the agreement were still yet to be implemented nearly two decades later. Because of changed conditions on the ground, negotiations continued between GPH and partner group leadership, with the goal of signing an updated Clarificatory Implementing Document (CID). These negotiations were complex and required time to complete, especially in the face of funding delays and unexpected judicial rulings on the reintegration of former combatants. In the face of these challenges, PAMANA benefits that fulfilled the agreed-upon CPD elements of the 2000 agreement allowed the RPA to maintain legitimacy and incentivized them to follow through on the negotiations. One leader of the TPG stated that PAMANA projects showed that the government was “serious and sincere” about following through on the negotiations. Thus, despite some issues with PAMANA implementation that existed on the ground, these were likely outweighed by the impact that PAMANA funds had on high-level negotiations.

## Summary of Findings

Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions listed here apply only to the RPMP/RPA/ABB-TPG conflict line. The conclusions are stated briefly here, though they draw from the more exhaustive descriptions in the sections above and in the case study included in Annex L.

**Table 4. *Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability: RPA Conflict Line***

Relevance
<p><u>National-level Relevance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG leadership considered PAMANA CPD to be a direct contribution to the terms of the 2000 peace agreement</li> </ul> <p><u>Ground-level Relevance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiaries of PAMANA CPD programs felt that they were consulted about projects and that the projects were largely relevant to their communities</li> </ul>
Efficiency
<p><u>Funding Delays and Lapses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PAMANA projects were highly delayed in RPP/RPA/ABB-TPG zones, though most CPD projects were eventually implemented prior to the signing of the 2019 CID</li> </ul> <p><u>Targeting Process</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>POs contained many members who were unaware of their membership and of the RPA.</li> <li>Because CPD was a national program fulfilling an agreement with the RPA, LGU leadership often felt left out and did not take ownership over the program.</li> </ul>
Effectiveness
<p><u>Track 1 Complementarity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PAMANA's greatest success in the conflict line was in keeping partner group leadership at the table for negotiations and improving partner group legitimacy among support communities</li> </ul> <p><u>Addressing Root Causes</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communities largely experienced positive economic benefits as a result of PAMANA projects. This pattern is consistent with findings from other conflict lines.</li> <li>Cohesion was improved among PO members. However, in some cases, PAMANA projects caused tensions between PO members and other civilians in the barangay.</li> </ul>

### Effects on Local Conflict

- Survey evidence suggests a reduction in local conflict, though we were unable to validate this with the case study or administrative data.

### **Sustainability**

#### Sustainability of Ground-level Effects

- Follow through on projects was low due to non-entrepreneurial POs and lack of agency handholding. DSWD staff and PDOs were not incentivized to follow up after funds were disbursed, especially due to high turnover.

# PAMANA for Communities Affected by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Conflict Line

## Theory of Change

The Philippine Government has been engaged in peace negotiations with the CPP/NPA/NDFP for over 30 years, but the attainment of a negotiated political settlement has remained elusive. PAMANA in CNN-affected areas aims to change conditions on the ground so that civilian grievances are reduced and future opportunities for a negotiated settlement are made more realistic. This approach views insurgency as the result of government failure to provide basic social services, leading to grievances that facilitate recruitment into armed insurgency. A robust academic literature supports development as an important counterpart to military operations in a broader counterinsurgency strategy. Development projects can improve the government's bargaining position by increasing civilian support for the central government through "winning hearts and minds" (Berman et. al 2009), increasing information flows to the government and hindering recruitment and resource gathering for insurgents (Berman, Felter, Shapiro, & McIntyre 2018). Development projects also provide economic opportunities for conflict-affected communities, increasing the opportunity cost of participating in insurgency (Blattman 2016, Gilligan, Mvukiyehe and Samii 2013).

## Track 1 Complementarity

Given the ongoing CNN insurgency, PAMANA in CNN-affected areas aims to help bring armed groups back to the negotiating table. Big ticket infrastructure, water, electrification, agricultural productivity and livelihood development projects demonstrate sincere attempts to improve development and quality of life. This "win[ning] the peace" strategy can help bring back insurgents to the negotiating table by increasing confidence in the government and making armed conflict less attractive. The extent to which PAMANA projects have improved state legitimacy in the eyes of the public is thus a critical indicator of PAMANA's Track 1 complementarity.

## Root Causes of Conflict

PAMANA projects in CNN-affected areas aim to reduce conflict at the grass-roots level through three main mechanisms:

**Improved economic conditions increase the opportunity cost of fighting.** When individuals have opportunities to earn a living and provide for their families through the formal sector, there are greater risks associated with joining or supporting an insurgent group. Insofar as government programs like PAMANA can provide improved economic opportunities to communities where the NPA operates, this creates an impetus for a wind-down in fighting. PAMANA was designed to improve economic conditions by, among other things, building roads and bridges that provide connectivity to economic opportunities in larger

markets, investing in livelihood projects that increase economic returns to at-risk individuals, and enhancing agricultural productivity by providing post-harvest facilities and improved irrigation.


**Effective government service provision reduces grievances.** Highly related to increasing opportunity costs is a reduction in grievances caused by people in hard-to-reach areas feeling “left behind” by the government. If people do not believe that the government can provide basic public goods, reduce poverty and effectively respond to crises, they are more likely to support groups that draw on anti-government resentment. One of PAMANA’s goals in CNN-affected areas is to reduce this resentment and increase trust in the government’s ability to provide basic services

**Involvement in development processes builds community capacity and cohesion.** In addition to reducing conflict through the economic *outcomes* of specific projects, PAMANA aims to address the root causes of conflict through the *processes* by which it engages communities and implementers. PAMANA was deliberately designed to build local government unit (LGU) capacity in conflict-affected areas that have been cut off from state services and to train LGU’s to integrate a conflict sensitive and peace promotion approach into their development programs. It is especially important for PAMANA projects to run efficiently and to avoid being captured by corrupt networks so as to not play into insurgent narratives about exploitative government. This means developing the capacity of local government units to engage directly with barangay leadership and local peace and order councils in beneficiary communities to improve trust and sustainability. This is done by facilitating community-driven development that empowers communities to act collectively for common goals.


## Summary of Projects/Programs, 2011–2017

From 2012–2015, PAMANA spending in CNN areas was led by the DILG (see Figure 16). Much of this funding went to the PAMANA-DILG Fund, which supported regional/sub-regional infrastructure development under Pillar 3. The primary focus on infrastructure in these areas is also shown in Figure 17, which disaggregates PAMANA funds by project type. Infrastructure projects continued to dominate PAMANA for CNN areas until 2016, but a key difference was the agency implementing them. In 2016, we find the DPWH replacing the DILG as the main agency for infrastructure projects, indicating a shift from farm-to-market and municipal-level roads to provincial/regional roadways. Although infrastructure was still the main project type in 2017, its share in the spending pie decreased from 95% in 2016 to a little more than 50%. This represents a shift towards livelihood development and “soft” interventions like capacity building projects.





**Figure 16.** PAMANA expenditures by agency from 2011–2017 for the CNN conflict line.



**Figure 17.** PAMANA expenditures by project type from 2011–2017 for the CNN conflict line.

Because PAMANA for CNN-affected and -vulnerable areas was primarily a counterinsurgency strategy, projects generally complemented/supported the AFP’s plans and operations. With the CPP-NPA occupying remote areas that were often considered inaccessible, building roads and bridges was critical for the military to penetrate these areas more easily. Roads also play an important role in socioeconomic development of remote communities by providing access to markets and government services. While it is clear why infrastructure was considered important for this conflict line, its outsize share in spending left little for other

projects. If PAMANA for CNN-affected and -vulnerable areas was meant to work alongside the military's strategy, a key aspect that was de-emphasized was "Community-Based Peace and Development Efforts", which was also a strategic concept noted by the AFP alongside "Focused Military Operations" (AFP, 2010). Community-based projects fell under Pillar 2 interventions, which were implemented by the DSWD and the DAR, but as shown in Figure 16, these agencies' share of PAMANA expenditures was considerably small compared to that of the DILG and the DPWH.

## Contextualizing the CPP/NPA/NDFP Conflict Line

In this section, we begin by providing context on PAMANA implementation in CNN zones from our case studies. We then turn to results from administrative data paired with supporting information and additional mechanisms from the case studies.

### Connecting Communities in Samar

Due to the military's strong presence in the region, we decided to approach the Samar case study through the lens of Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The region's notable issues in relation to regional/provincial connectivity also allowed us to study the implementation of PAMANA road projects. Given the large funding for infrastructure projects, and the issues raised in our KIIs about the demand of LGUs for roads and bridges, we thought it crucial to understand if PAMANA road projects worked as intended. Although politics was often mentioned as being an issue in implementation, we tried to focus less on political dynamics when possible. Instead, we wanted to see if there were issues encountered that could be instructive for future peacebuilding-oriented development projects in these areas.

To understand implementation, we compared two road projects in Samar Province: one that was mostly completed and another that remains largely unfinished. As areas of active conflict, the locations of the PAMANA road projects coincided with the military's counterinsurgency operations. Until recently, the army participated in regional PAMANA implementation platforms, but they felt that they had no concrete role in it (they were not part of the TWG or monitoring teams). This disconnect between development interventions under PAMANA and army operations in the same space has led to frustrations about project delays and gaps. In relation to the institutional convergence, the municipalities we studied experienced significant implementation issues due to changes in the implementing agencies and intermittent funding. This instability left some community members questioning whether the road projects would truly reach them. Because PAMANA infrastructure projects were first largely under the purview of the DILG, there were already existing institutional arrangements at the local level that were done to support implementation. The change to the DPWH was difficult not only because of the need to build a new partnership but also because they were seen as being less appreciative of the principles of the PAMANA program. This is unsurprising since the DPWH already had its own agency guidelines for road-building, and PAMANA's unique setup of grassroots and local government coordination was unlike it.

While the municipalities encountered many similar problems, their results were significantly different. A possible intervening variable is the strength of the partnership between LGU leaders and PAMANA

implementers. The LGU with the incomplete road project noted that there was very little coordination between them and the PAMANA implementers. Indeed, citizens from the municipality were not even aware that they were actually recipients of PAMANA projects. By contrast, the mayor from the successful LGU that we studied seemed to both fully understand and appreciate CSPP concepts, to know the requirements for project monitors, and was actively involved in encouraging barangays to identify PAMANA projects that the community members can work together on. When barangay officials initially felt wary about the road project because of the military's involvement, the mayor talked to them about it to help them understand. Civil society and barangay monitors were actively involved in overseeing implementation, and citizens came to view it as a community-driven process.

## Empowering Sorsogon Citizens to Build Peace

The need for community participation and community empowerment is echoed by our findings in Sorsogon. In our case study there, we found that PAMANA-KC supported empowerment by (1) allowing the community to identify their needs and build the capability to address them on their own, (2) giving the community the responsibility for planning and project management, and (3) equipping citizens with skills to allow them to become community leaders.

In our research, we found that the level of success and buy-in greatly differed based on how a project was implemented. Projects that were seen as being primarily agency- or LGU-led were less likely to be actively monitored by community members. Project identification in these cases sometimes devolved into politics with leaders deciding for their communities instead of promoting a participatory process. With CDD projects, communities felt that they were addressing actual needs, and because of the sense of ownership that developed, they were much more inclined to monitor implementation. Some interviewees even said that CDD projects were less likely to fall prey to revolutionary taxation, because community members negotiated directly with insurgents to prevent it. While the CPP-NPA acquiescing to the requests of the community might seem counterintuitive, it makes sense if the group legitimately feared losing ground support if its actions ran counter to what the community wanted.

A complication of community-based projects is the size of the budget. PAMANA-KC allocates a standard P300,000 per barangay, but our respondents felt that this fixed figure did not account for differences between development and conflict-affectation levels of communities. Although LGU-led projects could be given a larger amount, it was still considered insufficient for larger community projects. To mitigate the problem, LGUs divided projects into phases, but this became dependent on the timeliness of fund disbursement. Because of budget delays, projects could have already deteriorated before the next phase commenced.

## Reforming Institutions in Caraga towards Civilian-Led Peace and Development

In Caraga, the underlying causes of conflict are markedly different from those in Bicol and Samar. While improving connectedness and strengthening communities are both important, for the IP groups who form

80% of NPA recruits,<sup>12</sup> the core issue is one of land tenure and commercial exploitation. The NPA established its presence in Caraga in the middle of the 1970s, a period when logging companies began flowing into the region and IP groups had to reckon with their presence. The leaders of IP groups and clans became either allies of timber companies or joined the efforts of the NPA which encouraged and supported resistance to commercial exploitation of natural resources in the region. This duality was reflected in our discussions with two different IP communities – Manobo and Higaonon – from two different municipalities.

With the majority of NPA operations being in the region, Caraga has long been a focus of military operations, so when PAMANA began, the shift towards civilian-led peacebuilding was a sea change. In Caraga, more than in other places, there was a clear appreciation for this new orientation and PAMANA's CSPP agenda. This is evidenced by the Caraga Roadmap for Peace (CRMP), which came from a collaboration of representatives from the DILG, NEDA, AFP, and the PNP and was led by Fr. Carlito Clase who was the civil society representative. The CRMP was anchored on the CSPP concept and featured Peace and Development Zones (PDZs) as a centerpiece. Although conflict tends to be local, especially so in Caraga with its separate IP communities, it also tends to be mobile and can easily spill over to other areas. Understanding these two facets of conflict, the CRMP used a clustering approach of the PDZs since clustering was understood to have both focused and domino effects on peace.

The establishment of PDZs in Caraga was jointly supported by the RPOC and the RDC per the results of the 1<sup>st</sup> RPOC-RDC Execom Joint Meeting in June 2017. From our KIIs, a collaboration between the RPOC and RDC had long been desired by government leaders, but it had been difficult to actualize. In this regard, Caraga is an example of true regional convergence and how civilian-led peacebuilding can bolster the government's approach to reduce conflict.

While the PDZs show Caraga's regional efforts for peacebuilding, they also represent a missed opportunity for better coordination between local and national government actors. Although 47 PDZs were recognized by the region, the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (ELCAC) identified almost double the number of sites for Caraga. Similarly, although OPAPP is aware of the PDZs, it has not yet been able to incorporate them in PAMANA programming for the area. However, with the organizational changes in OPAPP that occurred in the past year, it was also understandable that they could not do coordination activities right away.

PAMANA in Caraga shows why reforming institutions and “soft” programming are integral to peacebuilding initiatives. From our FGDs, participants indicated that the facilitation and brokering support provided by another government body or a program like PAMANA was necessary to enable IPs to break through the barriers imposed on them by iniquitous power relations and arrangements as some IP communities found themselves in conflict with the political and economic interests that dominated local governments.

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<sup>12</sup> <https://peace.gov.ph/category/news/cpp-npa-ndf/page/3/>

## Initial Returns of PAMANA Implementation


Because the ToC for PAMANA in NPA-affected and NPA-vulnerable zones is more heavily weighted towards measurable outcomes at the local level rather than Track 1 negotiations, we begin this section with our administrative data analysis. We start by looking at the end-line goal of the program, which is a reduction in conflict affectation and conflict-related violence. We then consider the mechanisms that may have shaped these endline outcomes using data on economic activity as well as evidence drawn from our case studies.

### Conflict Affectation and Violence

The first key outcome we explore is barangay-level NPA affectation or “presence,” which is collected annually by the AFP, drawing from local intelligence reports. We are using data collected by the principal investigators prior to the evaluation. The data cover all provinces nationwide except for ARMM and the National Capital Region (NCR) over the 2010–2015 period. In each year, barangays were coded on a three-point scale (0–2) by military intelligence officers, where 0 indicated a “clear” village, 1 indicated a “threatened” village and 2 indicated an “influenced” village. “Influenced” barangays were ones where the NPA regularly operated and was considered to have an active party organization.<sup>13</sup> If insurgents regularly traveled through the barangay and interacted with civilians but did not have an active party organization, the barangay was considered “threatened.” Because the data were collected from end-of-year (Quarter 4) reports, we assume PAMANA projects implemented in a given year occurred prior to the measure of NPA affectation in the same year. As Figure 18 suggests, NPA presence was widespread upon the inception of PAMANA in 2011 and saw a significant reduction in the following years. This “turning of the tide” occurred after many years of increasing NPA affectation through the late 1990s and 2000s (Felter, 2006).


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<sup>13</sup> In the raw data, an additional distinction was made for “highly” influenced barangays. However, due to data missingness and inconsistent coding between these two categories, we collapse them into a single “influenced” category.



**Figure 18.** Proportion of barangays with NPA presence (Haim, 2018).


An important feature of PAMANA projects was that, even though they were implemented almost entirely in municipalities with NPA activity, many projects were implemented in barangays that were coded as being cleared of NPA presence (See Figure 19). This aligns with the “Clear-Hold-Build” philosophy adopted in many contexts with an ongoing insurgency. It also aligns with recent research suggesting that development projects in conflict zones are more effective at reducing violence in areas already under a modicum of military control (Sexton, 2016) or when the effects development in military controlled areas can spillover into nearby insurgent-affected areas (Haim, 2018).



**Figure 19.** NPA affliction in PAMANA barangays from 2011–2015 (Haim, 2018).

To estimate the association of PAMANA projects with changes in NPA affectation, we employed an entropy balancing approach outlined in the evaluation methodology section (Hainmueller, 2012). We began by using the balancing method to create a weighted “control group” of barangays that were identical in nature (based on the available data) to the barangays that received PAMANA projects in 2013. This approach compares barangays that are identical in terms of three categories of variables. First, because we wanted to compare barangays that are demographically similar to PAMANA barangays, we used a number of measures from the 2010 census, including barangay population, education, religion, and indigenous population, among others. Second, we balanced the barangays based on their prior experience with development projects, including the number of projects implemented by PAMANA and Kalahi-CIDSS during the 2011–2012 period and the “Peace and Development Teams” (PDT) deployed by the AFP in line with the KBP prior to 2011. Most importantly, we balanced the barangays on their level of NPA affectation prior to 2013, which is particularly important because PAMANA projects were more likely to be targeted at NPA areas. In Annex C, we show the average values of these different measures for “Treatment” PAMANA barangays and the balanced group of “Control” barangays. We also provide additional information on the weighting procedure and methodology.

The next step of the procedure was to compare the relevant outcomes in the Treatment and Balanced Control barangays in 2013–2015. The outcome in each barangay (NPA affectation, for example) was multiplied by the same weight as was used to create balance on the pre-2013 covariates. Figure 20 shows the average pattern of NPA affectation in all barangays in the PAMANA treatment group and the balanced control group after the 2013 treatment period. The identical pattern in 2011–2012 NPA affectation in the two groups is a function of the entropy balancing procedure.




**Figure 20.** PAMANA's effect on change in NPA affectation.

These results suggest that, **on net, PAMANA projects had little, if any, effect on NPA presence.** When using the entropy balancing weights in a weighted regression, there is no statistically significant difference in post-2013 NPA affectation between the PAMANA treatment group and the synthetic control group.



While NPA affectation decreased significantly over this time period, these results suggest that this larger pattern may have been driven by factors besides PAMANA.

That being said, when results were further disaggregated, a crucial difference was found between PAMANA’s apparent effect in barangays that were already controlled by the military versus areas that were NPA-affected in 2012. Figure 21 displays this important differential effect. To produce these results, we repeated the entropy balancing procedure on just the subset of barangays that were cleared of NPA presence in 2012. The sub-figure on the left shows the results for PAMANA in government-controlled (cleared) barangays. **Barangays that were cleared of NPA presence in 2012 were significantly less likely to be re-affected by the NPA if they were recipients of PAMANA projects.** The substantive size of this effect is large – PAMANA barangays were approximately 50% less likely to be re-affected. This suggests that if the “clear” and “hold” phases of counterinsurgency are successfully accomplished, the “build” phase associated with PAMANA can have very positive effects.



**Figure 21.** Different effects of PAMANA based on pre-2013 NPA affectation.


By contrast, the right-hand sub-figure in Figure 21 shows a very different pattern when PAMANA projects are implemented directly in NPA-affected barangays. The results in this figure are based on a re-weighted subset of barangays that were either threatened or influenced by the NPA in 2012. **When PAMANA was implemented in NPA-affected barangays, it was associated with a significant increase in the likelihood that the NPA would retain a presence.** By the end of 2013, PAMANA barangays were approximately 16% less likely to see a reduction in NPA presence relative to their balanced non-PAMANA counterparts, and this effect was sustained through the end of 2015.

Our case studies provided additional support for the findings displayed in Figure 21. Evidence from Bicol and Samar suggested that in NPA strongholds, the NPA was able to obstruct the completion of PAMANA projects, possibly allowing for more effective counter-messaging about government ineffectiveness to civilians. This was less true of “soft,” non-infrastructure projects that incorporated community participation, as the NPA was less able to obstruct implementation in fear of undercutting their own legitimacy due to denying needed services. It is also worth noting that existing academic literature seems to support the



existence of similar patterns in other contexts (see, for example, Sexton 2016), though these other studies largely rely on violent incident data rather than insurgent affectation.

A similar pattern arises when looking at violent incidents involving the NPA. To this point, the following findings are based only on violence data collected by Conflict Alert in the Davao Region. In future evaluation efforts, it would be useful to expand this analysis nationwide using data from the AFP. In addition, an important future step would be to look at whether increases in violence were due to the AFP being more able to initiate incidents against the NPA or whether the apparent effect is due to an increase in NPA-initiated incidents. This distinction is crucial, as increased AFP-initiated incidents suggests improved information about NPA activities and whereabouts, while NPA-initiated incidents suggest the opposite.




**Figure 22.** Geographic distribution of PAMANA and violence in Davao.

Figure 22 displays the geographic distribution of PAMANA projects, violent criminal incidents, and violent incidents involving the NPA. Based on the same set of covariates as was included in the analysis of NPA affectation, plus pre-2013 trends in violent incidents, we re-calculated weights for barangays in Davao using the entropy balancing procedure. Figure 23 shows our temporary results based on these data. **PAMANA projects are associated with a significant increase in both violent crime and violent incidents involving the NPA.** For NPA incidents, there is an initial small drop in violence in the year of PAMANA implementation followed by an increase in violence in the following years. The Samar case study provided additional support for these patterns, mentioning that PAMANA sites were more likely to see NPA ambushes after implementation and that in some cases criminal activity increased as well. One specific pattern highlighted in Samar is that in addition to formal sector economic activity, illegal industries (such as limestone mining and charcoaling) were also facilitated by the increased accessibility of remote barangays.

In the following sections, we discuss factors that might be driving the observed associations between PAMANA projects and conflict outcomes presented above. Evidence from the case studies corroborates some of the patterns observed in the data while shedding light on the mechanisms that might be driving

these results. However, at this point, it is worth pausing to discuss potential reasons for why the observed patterns may be an artifact of the data we are using.



**Figure 23.** Effects of PAMANA on violent incidents.

### Threat to Inference 1: Selection Bias

The fact that PAMANA projects are associated with an increased likelihood that the NPA retains a presence in 2012-affected barangays may be an artifact of the data if PAMANA is targeting the barangays where it is the most difficult for the government to establish military control, even after accounting for all the potential factors that are involved in the balancing algorithm. For example, it is possible that two different barangays each coded as being under “NPA Control” (a 2 on the AFP scale) actually vary in terms of NPA entrenchment. If PAMANA projects target the “hardest” barangays that receive the same coding on the AFP scale, the pattern we observe may be due to a form of selection bias caused by the way our dependent variable is measured.

### Threat to Inference 2: Omitted Variable Bias

The relationship may also be biased if there are important variables missing from the entropy balancing procedure. As an example, if PAMANA was more likely to target coastal barangays (a variable that is not currently included in our entropy balancing procedure), it may be that it is more difficult to establish military control in these coastal barangays for reasons other than PAMANA implementation.

### Threat to Inference 3: Measurement Bias

A third possibility specific to the violence data is that people are more likely to report violent incidents in the aftermath of PAMANA projects even if the actual level of violence decreased or stayed the same. Conflict Alert data rely heavily on police reports, which are particularly susceptible to this sort of bias. If PAMANA projects make it more likely that civilians are willing to cooperate with government personnel (as is specified by the theory of change), then an increase in reported incidents might be conceived as a

positive outcome. That being said, Conflict Alert attempts to verify reported incidents in news reports, which are less susceptible to this issue.

## Root Causes: Economic Development and Community Capacity

Given that PAMANA projects appear to have a mixed relationship with conflict outcomes, it is particularly important to investigate PAMANA's effect on the key intermediary variables of interest. The two most important mechanisms we focused on were 1) economic development and 2) community capacity and cohesion.

PAMANA's de facto ToC for NPA areas posits that addressing civilian grievances by enhancing access to economic markets can help mitigate participation in conflict. Our best available time-varying data on economic development is a measure of new business registrations collected by DTI at the municipal level. We think this is a good proxy for whether the local economic environment is conducive to civilian activity in the formal economic sector.


Because the DTI data are only available at the municipal level, we conducted the entropy balancing procedure using municipal-level aggregates.<sup>14</sup> Using these balanced data, Figure 24 shows the estimated association between PAMANA projects and economic activity. Initially, PAMANA projects are associated with a marginal decline in new business registrations, though the difference between the treatment and control municipalities in 2013 is only marginally statistically insignificant. However, over the longer term, **PAMANA projects are associated with a 17% increase in business registrations.** This suggests that perhaps the PAMANA goal of addressing the root causes of conflict should be viewed with a longer time horizon than a single year. It also suggests that perhaps it will take a longer period of time for the conflict dividends to “catch up” to the economic gains associated with PAMANA.

**Our case studies highlighted the central role that roads played in this economic development.** All three NPA case studies mentioned the role that roads played in increasing access to market for remote barangays. Roads allowed civilians to more easily get their goods to market and to take up employment in commercial centers, increased access to rural barangays improved the government's ability to extend needed services through other non-PAMANA development programs. Focus group participants at the community level repeatedly mentioned how important this increased access was to changing their lives for the better and KIIs with municipal elites mentioned a similar impression. Interviewees in all three areas also highlighted the fact that roads increased access for government officials to their barangays, improving citizen access to much needed services. For example, teachers, health workers, and agency officials were

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<sup>14</sup> This introduces an additional complication when deciding what counts as a PAMANA-treated municipality because the entropy-balancing procedure requires a binary treatment variable. Because PAMANA is most commonly assigned at the barangay level, municipalities can vary significantly in terms of the degree of PAMANA saturation. Fortunately for the purposes of our estimation strategy, PAMANA projects are generally highly clustered in certain municipalities in a given year. We use as our threshold for defining a PAMANA municipality as being those in which more than 10% of barangays received a project in a given year. Of these municipalities, more than 70% actually had a saturation level of over 90%. In Annex C, we display the results of the municipal-level entropy balancing procedure.

far more likely to report to work in areas that were serviced by roads built by PAMANA. Military interviewees also emphasized the fact that roads led to increased accessibility for troops.



**Figure 24.** Effect of PAMANA on new business registrations.

We cannot measure community capacity and cohesion using existing administrative data, but **our case studies suggest that PAMANA projects involving community participation improved community capacity and cohesion.** This took several forms. In all three NPA case studies, we found that the inclusion of barangay communities in decisions about the nature of projects, as well as their implementation and monitoring (mostly through the CDD process), led communities to take “ownership” over the programs. This greatly improved buy-in from citizens, increased the likelihood of project completion, and improved government legitimacy. In addition, CDD projects and other project types involving community participation increased cohesion *between* citizens. Examples included a Carabao milking project where community members worked together to come up with a plan for jointly caring for the animals and a community health program that spurred an independent health cooperative to be founded in the barangay. Perhaps most importantly, incorporating community participation in PAMANA planning allowed barangays to see the potential benefits they might experience *before* the project was actually implemented. This improved community capacity to stand up to NPA messaging campaigns. When communities knew about the potential benefits they could experience from accepting government projects, the NPA was less likely to obstruct project implementation for fear of undercutting their own legitimacy.

## Explaining the Gap Between Root Causes and Conflict Reduction

Evidence from our analysis of administrative data and all three case studies is consistent in showing that PAMANA projects were largely successful at addressing important root causes of conflict. However, this did not translate into consistent conflict reduction. What explains this gap?

First, an important challenge to program success was NPA obstruction of PAMANA projects, especially in remote areas where they retained the strongest presence. Contractors and government personnel were often

given hard “red lines” by the NPA not to continue building roads into the most heavily NPA-affected areas, contributing to the number of “ghost roads” that were intended to be built by PAMANA but never came to fruition. In other words, despite the different modality of project implementation, PAMANA projects were not able to fully sidestep the “Aid Under Fire” phenomenon (Croft, Johnston & Felter 2011). Especially in Bicol, “revolutionary taxation” also presented a tremendous challenge to PAMANA success. While military personnel expressed that they initially hoped PAMANA would result in a decrease in revolutionary taxation associated with people being less willing to cooperate with the NPA, in many cases this was not realized. In fact, in the most heavily influenced NPA areas, revolutionary taxation of PAMANA projects may have allowed the NPA to strengthen its hold in the area. This mechanism is consistent with the administrative results showing that PAMANA projects were particularly ineffective when implemented directly in NPA-affected areas. Finally, when paired with delays to project implementation, NPA counter-messaging about government neglect was often effective at preventing changes to citizen perceptions.

An important finding is that community participation went a long way in preventing NPA obstruction and counter-messaging from taking hold. CDD and other project that involved community consultation undercut the NPA’s ability to reduce PAMANA’s effectiveness. Our case studies in Bicol and Samar both suggested that **the effectiveness of road projects at reducing conflict could be improved by incorporating more community-participation and social preparation**. An effective example of how this could work took place in Samar, where one mayor invited all barangay captains to attend a meeting including DPWH, DILG, and the AFP to explain the road project and solicit their feedback. This allowed community leaders to provide input and take ownership over the program in a way that was similar to the “softer” projects implemented by PAMANA. Advanced community participation (perhaps with the input of other civilian agencies) would also allow road-building agencies to more effectively anticipate land-tenurial arrangements that would be disrupted by new roads. An unintended consequence of PAMANA projects is that they created new conflicts between civilians over who owned which parcels of land, allowing the NPA to step in and settle disputes.

Second, the involvement of municipal political leadership was an important factor in program success. **The tradeoff of including politicians in PAMANA planning was tangible** in all case study areas. Mayors’ engagement in the program was a crucial factor that motivated effective contracting, municipal line agency personnel implementation of the program to its fullest degree and facilitation of the timely use of funds. In Samar, we also found that Mayors’ buy-in had a big effect on the barangay captains in the area. On the other hand, political involvement had the opposite effect when PAMANA funds were attempted to be used as patronage or when politicians had ties to the NPA. Given this tradeoff, how should political involvement be handled in the future? While there is certainly no simple solution and political dynamics will have to be flexibly dealt with on a case-by-case, one thing that stuck out in our case studies was that *municipal* political involvement seemed to have a net positive effect while *provincial* political involvement seemed to have a net negative effect. Because PAMANA was implemented such that all barangays in a municipality often received projects in the same year, Mayors had less of an incentive to inefficiently target PAMANA projects for their political benefit. Governors, on the other hand, often swayed the targeting of PAMANA projects to municipalities in a way that benefited them politically but did not efficiently address the priority areas for conflict reduction.

Third, while roads were commonly reported to convey important economic benefits, our case studies suggested that **road-building was more effective when paired with “soft” projects**. This undercut the NPA’s ability to use propaganda saying that roads were just about increasing military access to the area. In addition, it helped the government in branding PAMANA as a unified project meant to address civilian needs in comprehensive manner. When people experienced PAMANA projects that they thought were just unconnected parts of regular DPWH, DSWD or other agency activities, they were less likely to see improvements to perceptions of government legitimacy. Related to this, the *sequencing* of PAMANA projects was noted as an important factor in changing citizen perceptions of the government. We found that in several cases, one government agency would forgo implementation of projects in barangays that they perceived to have already received benefits from other agencies. Our findings suggest that this strategy is the exact opposite of what would most effectively reduce conflict. Instead, proper sequencing and repeated projects could be improved with additional OPAPP oversight over this aspect.

Fourth, we found that **monitoring and follow-up of PAMANA projects was weak, leading to project degradation and undercutting the lasting effects necessary to reduce conflict**. For example, we found that agency participation in regional, provincial, and local Peace and Order Councils (POCs) was inconsistent, affording little incentive for accountability. This was especially problematic for road projects, where there is no mechanism in place for communities to report irregularities. The transition of funds from DILG to DPWH exacerbated this problem, as the latter agency often had the biggest problems with monitoring and follow-up. As in the RPA conflict line, bureaucratic incentives in all agencies focused on distribution of funds rather than on effective support for already-implemented projects. In Samar, this was improved in one region by creating a PAMANA specific technical working group (TWG) to follow up with issues that arose. Monitoring was made especially difficult by the fact that many projects were targeted at border areas between administrative units, where the NPA is most likely to operate. Mechanisms for more effective inter-LGU coordination would improve monitoring capacity.

Finally, and perhaps most saliently, evidence from the case studies suggests that the long history of conflict in the areas made it difficult to sway civilian loyalty, even if economic gains were realized. **The conflict-related payoffs of PAMANA projects may simply need to be viewed with a more long-term lens**. Especially because it takes a couple years for economic activity to be fully realized (See the DTI figure), winning civilian “hearts and minds” may require that civilians see sustained growth over a period of time before making substantial changes to their behavior. In Bicol, we found that PAMANA only had a significant impact on citizen perceptions if people experience *repeated* projects, emphasizing the long-term view that needs to be taken to improve government legitimacy.

## Summary of Findings

Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions listed here apply only to the CNN conflict line. The conclusions are stated briefly here, though they draw from the more exhaustive descriptions in the sections above and in the case study included in Annex L.



**Table 5. *Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability: CNN Conflict Line***

<b>Relevance</b>
<u>Ground-level Relevance</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Hard” road projects and “soft” CDD projects were both highly relevant to citizen needs but could be better paired and sequenced to have greater effects on govt legitimacy</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency</b>
<u>Funding Delays and Lapses</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As in other conflict lines, delays were significant and undercut effects on citizen attitudes.</li> </ul> <u>Targeting Process</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A tradeoff exists between political buy-in and political capture of PAMANA. Municipal involvement seemed to be net-beneficial while Provincial involvement was net-harmful.</li> <li>• Community participation and social preparation was crucial and could be better incorporated with road projects.</li> </ul>
<b>Effectiveness</b>
<u>Addressing Root Causes</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PAMANA projects spurred increased economic development. Roads were especially important.</li> <li>• CDD projects improved community capacity and cohesion, though road projects had some unintended consequences of exacerbating land conflict.</li> </ul> <u>Effects on Local Conflict</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PAMANA projects were associated with a <i>reduced</i> probability of NPA re-affectation in cleared barangays but <b>increased</b> probability of NPA retaining a presence in strongholds. PAMANA projects were also associated with increased violent incidents and crime.</li> <li>• Factors that prevented root causes from translating to conflict reduction included: NPA obstruction, political influence, improper sequencing, and ineffective monitoring.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>
<u>Sustainability of Ground-level Effects</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PAMANA projects could benefit from improved top-down and bottom-up monitoring capacity, especially for DPWH projects.</li> </ul>

# PAMANA in the Bangsamoro Region

## Theory of Change

In the Bangsamoro region, PAMANA aimed to facilitate a peaceful transition from the existing ARMM to the BARMM. While there is no direct interface between the GPH-MILF Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and PAMANA, the program supported its thrusts primarily by creating an enabling environment for peace negotiations with the MILF and the completion of agreements with the MNLF while strengthening local governance during the transition to regional autonomy. This can happen by way of capacity building, providing support for the delivery of social services, as well as the strengthening of local government functions and the rule of law (Gisselquist, 2018). There is a growing consensus that the foundations for peace cannot be laid without strengthening the institutional structures responsible for upholding them (Wyeth & Sisk, 2009).

## Track 1 Complementarity

The multitude of armed actors and powerful clans in Muslim Mindanao make gaining full support for the Bangsamoro peace process a major challenge. Although PAMANA did not directly engage the MILF, PAMANA created an enabling environment that supported local governments in Bangsamoro areas to deliver development programs and basic services. By doing so, it encouraged key groups to get on board with the MILF-driven peace process, while fulfilling outstanding commitments from the GPH-MNLF peace agreement. PAMANA provided critical political actors – governors, mayors, and political clans – with access to resources to incentivize their participation. PAMANA projects were also intended to pacify non-MILF armed groups by providing peace dividends early in the transition.

PAMANA also facilitated the transition to BARMM by supporting the ARG's capacity to govern. The BOL includes provisions for increased resources (such as a block grant and special development funds) to support the new autonomous region that the BARMM government would ultimately be responsible for managing. In preparation for increased fiscal autonomy, PAMANA accompanied the ARMM Reform Agenda instituted in 2011, under a caretaker regional government, by encouraging good housekeeping and building direct regional and provincial bureaucratic capacity around the use of funds.

PAMANA also engaged communities with MNLF presence by following through on the non-implemented socioeconomic components of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. This aimed to minimize the perception that the GPH-MILF peace process had led to the abandonment of the MNLF peace process. As an organized armed group that still has a support base, MNLF buy-in for BARMM was critical to a successful transition.

These targeting and design considerations became politically urgent in the aftermath of the 2013 Zamboanga Siege, when MNLF troops from the Misuari faction engaged in over two weeks of urban warfare with government troops, as well as the 2015 Mamasapano misencounter in Maguindanao.



## Root Causes of Conflict

At the community level, PAMANA also played an important role in providing economic welfare so that communities and individuals were incentivized not to join or support the BIFF and other “black-flag” inspired actors. Economic benefits could address both greed and grievance motivations to support these fringe armed groups. These economic benefits are particularly important for reaching vulnerable communities to ensure they are not left behind in the transition, such as those affected by the Marawi crisis and cyclical displacements in Maguindanao and North Cotabato.


After 2016, the program was retooled to support unserved and underserved communities (PAMANA-IOM) and address the needs of vulnerable groups. After the 2017 Marawi crisis, when ISIS-inspired groups attacked the urban core of the only Islamic city in the country during the 2017 Marawi crisis, portions of PAMANA (specifically those provided to UNDP-SPAN were programmed specifically for displaced populations affected by the event.

## Summary of Projects/Programs, 2011–2017


PAMANA in Bangsamoro first took the form of core shelters for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WaSH) projects in the municipalities of Talayan, Datu Salibo, and Datu Saudi Ampatuan in Maguindanao as a response to the mass displacement of communities due to the violent clashes between the MILF and the military following the Supreme Court’s ruling of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) as unconstitutional. This was implemented using OPAPP funds downloaded to the ARMM under the Adiong designate regional administration. This was followed by provincial infrastructure projects, community-driven development through DSWD, as well as programs for MNLF-affiliated communities both within and outside the ARMM’s jurisdiction. Health insurance coverage and higher-education scholarships were also provided to MNLF-nominated beneficiaries. Over the next few years the program expanded to a range of infrastructure, shelter, and social projects, with almost full saturation of the 2,159 barangays across the five provinces of the ARMM. In 2017, funds originally held by OPAPP were obligated to IOM and UNDP to implement various programs in the ARMM and adjacent municipalities.

We find substantial process differences depending on the specific modality employed: PAMANA through LGUs, PAMANA-MNLF (through the ARG, IOM, and other delivery mechanisms), PAMANA-IOM, PAMANA-SPAN, and PAMANA-ARMM (both regular and HDAP). Before 2014, most projects in the region were either implemented by provincial governments, regional offices of national agencies such as DSWD, DAR, and DILG, and in several cases, by the engineering brigades of the AFP in the years prior. Pre-ARG implementation tended to cause delays, however, given that the regional offices (often, Regions IX, X, and XII) would then obligate the funds to their counterparts in ARMM for actual implementation on the ground. A policy reform was later made to ensure that funds for PAMANA in the ARMM were given directly to the ARG as part of the ARMM’s section in the GAA. Projects managed by the ARG ranged from large road infrastructure to CDD-type interventions under ARMM-DSWD, to specific packages for MNLF communities as well as the post-Mamasapano HDAP. This increased the fiscal space available for

the autonomous region in preparation for greater fiscal autonomy after the passage of the BOL as stipulated in the 2014 GPH-MILF Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The decision to transfer ARMM funds directly to the ARG led to the marked increase of the ARMM budget, particularly in capital outlay (CO) funds that enabled the continued concreting of roads in all ARMM areas, and the construction of bridges, school buildings, and agricultural support facilities. The ARMM Transition Report notes that the region's annual infrastructure fund grew from P985 million in 2012 to P1.498 billion in 2013 to P2.956 billion in 2014, before reaching P10.103 billion in 2015. This was supplemented by P2.104 billion in PAMANA infrastructure funds from 2014–2015.



**Figure 25.** PAMANA expenditures by agency from 2011–2017 for the Bangsamoro conflict line.



**Figure 26.** PAMANA expenditures by project type from 2011–2017 for the Bangsamoro conflict line.

The ARG declined to take on a PAMANA line item in 2017. As a result, the majority of PAMANA projects in ARMM from 2017 onwards were implemented through IOM and UNDP (SPAN), with the exception of selected projects coursed through ARMM-DPWH.

## **PAMANA Implementation in the Bangsamoro Region**

### **PAMANA-MNLF**

PAMANA in MNLF communities was designed in light of the challenges of the Bangsamoro peace processes in 2010. While the 1996 GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA) and its precursor documents led to the creation of the ARMM, certain provisions remained unimplemented, including the socioeconomic component, which did not have clear and measurable mechanisms, deliverables or timelines. This opened the door for divergent accounting of socioeconomic packages implemented prior to 2010 that could be attributable to FPA implementation. This left the MNLF peace process relatively “open-ended” as government prepared to restart negotiations with the MILF in 2010 while dealing with the aftermath of the failed MOA-AD.

PAMANA-MNLF was conceived as GPH’s catch-up socioeconomic program for MNLF communities and was built on the gains of the GPH-UN Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace (ACT4Peace) Programme, which concluded in 2010. ACT4Peace was the fourth phase of a GPH-UN Multi-Donor Programme (MDP), which began in 1997. Initially, it exclusively supported MNLF members and families who desired to be mainstreamed into civilian lives, but it also later focused on MNLF guerilla bases and positions, transforming these into Peace and Development Communities (PDCs). The MDP worked intensively with Peace and Development Advocates (PDA) who were trained on peace building, project management and community organizing. There were other ongoing foreign-funded programs that supported the FPA, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Social Fund of the World Bank and the Japanese government. PAMANA-MNLF was viewed to have been designed to sustain the work of both ACT4Peace and SZOPAD in the PDCs and, in fact, the targeted provinces and cities were ones covered by the latter.<sup>15</sup>

The initial set of PDCs were intended to be ones with a higher level of social preparedness but that continued to experience underdevelopment (OPAPP, 2015). Eventually, the site prioritization criteria were revised to be based on the level of conflict-affectedness and conflict-vulnerability of closure areas needing development (OPAPP, 2017). The program provided economic infrastructure support, livelihood assistance, and social protection support through scholarships from CHED and health insurance from PhilHealth. Funding from the DAP kickstarted the implementation of PAMANA in the PDCs in 2011, with

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<sup>15</sup> SZOPAD covered the ARMM provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi); Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Palawan; and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa.

the initial trajectory of working with PDAs in five PDCs in each of the MNLF State Revolutionary Commands (SRCs) based on the list from ACT4Peace. However, after the Supreme Court ruling against the constitutionality of the DAP, fulfilling the commitments became a challenge, and OPAPP had to continuously negotiate with agencies to include PAMANA in their GAAs.

Due to political developments, including the passing of Republic Act 10153, which synchronized ARMM elections with national and local ones, Mujiv Hataman and MNLF leader Hadja Bainon Karon were installed as caretaker Regional Governor and Regional Vice Governor, respectively. ARMM initiated efforts to reach out to the MNLF, such as the signing of the MOA of ARMM Governance Reform, the executive order creating a Joint Peace and Development Monitoring Committee chaired by MNLF Gen. Abdul Sahrin and consultations with the MNLF leaders. A key agreement from the consultations was the creation of mechanisms to oversee implementation of projects in the MNLF communities in ARMM. In 2012, OPAPP's role in PAMANA shifted back to being an oversight body, and in 2013, PAMANA in ARMM for the MNLF was launched, under the operational supervision of the Office of the Regional Governor (ORG-ARMM).

While MNLF leaders were initially consulted about projects and sites (e.g., 2011 Stakeholder's Conference in Cebu), the government's decision to implement through the provincial LGUs and national government brought down the MNLF's interest to participate. The MNLF's view was that PAMANA was ostensibly in support of a peace agreement with them and the sites were in their communities, so they should have been its implementer. The government was, however, legitimately limited by policies on funds administration. Consequently, because the MNLF was not part of the vetting process, there were PAMANA-MNLF sites which were not MNLF communities; some LGUs just recruited their own "MNLF members." PAMANA-MNLF was implemented as the Tripartite Review of the 1996 FPA continued and convergence with the MILF Peace Agreement was being pushed as a solution to resolve the outstanding issues from the FPA. The design and implementation modalities of PAMANA-MNLF were not acceptable to the MNLF leadership, resulting in dissatisfaction among its ranks. The insistence of the Philippine Government to close the Tripartite Review was opposed by MNLF Founder Nur Misuari, who countered that the government had not fully complied with its commitments to the FPA. One MNLF official said that the group did not see PAMANA-MNLF as being part of the peace process, but instead, it was viewed as a unilateral act of government. The MNLF leadership did not endorse the program since they had no role in it, although members were free to decide what to do with PAMANA.

Still, in an effort to reach out to the MNLF and ensure transparency and inclusion, OPAPP required MNLF representation in LGU-led technical working groups. Involvement of the MNLF in these TWGs was uneven, as it was dependent on the openness of the two parties at the local level to work together and on the ability of the MNLF factions to designate a trusted representative. At the regional level in ARMM, the PAMANA Project Steering Committee (PSC) was created as the governing body and was composed of ARMM, OPAPP, Western Mindanao Command and the MNLF. The MNLF's decision not to engage led to missed opportunities for the group to make strategic programmatic decisions, for instance, in the selection criteria for projects and sites or vetting of proponents. The Tripartite Review, itself, could have been the instrument to establish the parameters of PAMANA-MNLF. Despite the MNLF's ambivalence towards PAMANA, the program was used by the government to gather support for the Framework Agreement on

the Bangsamoro (FAB). In 2012, consultations were done with 27 MNLF commanders in Sulu and Zamboanga Peninsula who were aligned with Misuari but were perceived as being neutral or amenable in relation to FAB to get their buy-in and were offered projects under PAMANA.

However, Misuari's growing dissatisfaction with the implementation of the peace accord and his waning influence culminated in the 2013 Zamboanga Siege. In the aftermath, PAMANA-Community Security Management (PAMANA-CSM) commenced in Sulu in 2014. A series of dialogues were done by OPAPP with MNLF commanders to discuss development interventions and reduction of arms in their communities. This targeted MNLF members who did not join the Zamboanga siege and who were open to the CSM approach. This approach was meant to help manage firearms in MNLF areas, through reduction or regulation, while instituting local peace and security management mechanisms at the same time. In exchange, the commanders were given PAMANA projects. This act, however, was perceived negatively by MNLF leaders as it was akin to decommissioning, which was not a provision in the FPA.

In 2017, ORG-ARMM returned responsibility for PAMANA-MNLF to OPAPP which, in turn, signed a MOA with the IOM for the implementation of PAMANA-MNLF in conflict-affected areas in ARMM. Criteria were retooled to expand it from the original agreed list and to cover areas that were assessed as unserved, and underserved remote, and fragile.

To the extent that the projects were implemented, and at best completed, there were obvious benefits to the communities. Paved roads, for instance, provided ease, convenience and reduced transport costs. Participation, no matter how limited and clarity about the selection criteria of sites, projects and beneficiaries, was key to encouraging the communities to have a greater role, no matter how small, in the implementation. Where consultations were done by the LGUs, the MNLF community organizations were more open to engage in whatever opportunities there were and candidly reported benefits from the projects. The bigger question for the MNLF is the relevance of the projects and the community inputs in the selection process. For instance, in one municipality in Maguindanao, the MNLF cooperative proposed a corn mill/warehouse and dryer and water system. However, they were given a peace center instead, because there was an existing design and the approval process was faster. While they now have a place to converge, they still have poor access to drinking water.

**The broader challenge, however, had to do with insulating the technical aspects of PAMANA as a socioeconomic program from the political issues arising from the Track 1 discussions.** Feedback from respondents showed that PAMANA-MNLF was vulnerable to getting dragged into the quagmire of political/security events linked to the two Bangsamoro peace processes. Mixing it with counterinsurgency or some form of decommissioning strategy muddled the intent, delivery and messaging of the program.

Weak spots in the implementation mechanisms and procedures undermined whatever successes PAMANA achieved as a complementary program. The peacebuilding/conflict sensitivity lens was not pronounced beyond geographic targeting. **PAMANA became more about the implementation of development projects in conflict areas rather than the integration of CSPP in project design and process management.** Losing DAP as a major source of PAMANA led to the downsizing of committed projects to

the MNLF communities (e.g., mobile clinics became ambulances, a fishing vessel for the high seas turned into a boat for two).

Allegations of corruption overshadowed contributions of PAMANA to reforms in the ARMM (pursuant to Phase 2 of the FPA) and in other regions (as part of the broader call for good governance). There are still leftover projects from 2011 that have yet to be implemented or have only been implemented on paper.


As a result of these findings, political insulation of PAMANA as a socioeconomic development program is necessary. Should a successor MNLF-focused program be created, the structure and processes of the program should be redesigned to align with the same intent of being a complementary effort to Track 1 and do so as a joint GPH-MNLF process. This can be challenging given the factions within the MNLF and the one Bangsamoro track, but this is also necessary to rebuild mutual trust and respect in this peace table. The government has to contend with the reality of the factions within the MNLF down to the state level.

## PAMANA-HDAP after the Mamasapano Incident

After the 2015 Mamasapano encounter, where botched law enforcement operations to capture a Malaysian bomb maker/terrorist and high-ranking members of the BIFF led to violence between members of the MILF and the PNP and a general slowdown of the GPH-MILF peace process, PAMANA funds began to support a targeted initiative. The ARG drafted a humanitarian and early recovery planning document, called the ARMM-Humanitarian and Development Assistance Plan, to assist communities in the SPMS Box and 11 other neighboring municipalities: Datu Salibo, Talitay, Talayan, Datu Anggal Midtimbang, Guindulungan, Datu Piang, Rajah Buayan, Datu Unsay Ampatuan, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, and Datu Odin Sinsuat.

These towns were the locus of high conflict intensity (in both frequency and magnitude) in Maguindanao and in Central Mindanao more broadly. Between 2011 and 2015, the area averaged four conflict incidents every week, resulting in 44 persons who were killed, injured, kidnapped, or went missing, according to Conflict Alert data. In our survey, we found that a harrowing 89% of respondents reported that they or their household had been displaced since 2000 due to armed conflict. The figure below plots the percentage of respondents who were displaced in a given year over time, with 2008 being the highest at 42%. Respondents were asked: **“Since 2000, could you tell us which years you experienced displacement? Choose all that apply.”**






**Figure 27.** Percentage of respondents who were displaced in the last 20 years.

The responses align with major conflict incidents that affected the province in the last two decades: the 2000 All-Out-War as well as the 2008–2009 backlash after the Supreme Court ruling that nullified the MOA-AD. This is also consistent with the 2011 World Food Programme study on violent conflicts in Mindanao, which states that Maguindanao is the province most affected by displacement (Vinck & Bell 2011). While talks with the MILF resumed in 2011, sporadic outbreaks of conflict and resulting cyclical displacement were triggered by the MILF’s splinter group, the BIFF. Displacement peaked in January 2015 with the Mamasapano misencounter.

We also asked citizens whether they or a member of their immediate family had been victims of violence due to different types of conflict. The percentage of survey participants who answered affirmatively to this question is pictured in Figure 28. Almost 10% of those surveyed reported that they or a family member had been a victim of violence due to conflict between the government and an armed group. Almost as many citizens reported being a victim of violence due to conflict between armed groups.



**Figure 28.** Percentage of respondents who were victims of conflict (by type of conflict).

In this context, ARMM-HDAP became a banner program of the Hataman Administration as it strived to make sure that development reached the most remote and conflict-affected areas of the region. A farmer from Datu Salibo who was interviewed recalled how ARMM-HDAP came to be: “*Kung ‘di nangyari ang Mamasapano massacre, ‘di rin aabot dito ang development sa lugar namin* [If it were not for Mamasapano massacre, we would never have experienced development].”


Two key strategies employed by ARMM-HDAP for optimum impact of assistance to the communities were: (1) a community-centered approach and (2) the convergence of humanitarian and development interventions and strategies of various agencies and offices of the regional government. By 2015, much of the PAMANA program funds in the ARMM were committed to the regional government’s regular programming exercise of ARMM-DSWD and the Annual Infrastructure Projects (AIPs) of the DPWH. Funding for ARMM-HDAP came from the national government through the PAMANA later in the year after an arduous budgeting process with the DBM and Congress.

The ARMM issued Executive Order No. 022 Series of 2016 establishing the ARMM-HDAP PMO under the ORG-ARMM. The PMO forged MOAs with various ARMM agencies and offices. Under these agreements, ARMM agencies and/or offices would submit proposals, based on the priority projects identified in the ARMM-HDAP planning document, to the PMO. The latter would evaluate and approve the proposals based on relevance and efficacy. This meant that ARMM agencies and offices, together with the LGUs, determined the types of projects, which must reduce conflict, address core basic needs, and be accepted by the community. Implementing agencies and LGUs also jointly identified and endorsed the beneficiaries. After careful review, the PMO would endorse the list to the ORG-ARMM for the first release of funds to the ARMM implementing agencies.

The humanitarian component of ARMM-HDAP dealt with capacity building for both LGUs and communities to train them on immediate humanitarian response and disaster-risk reduction management. The development component of the program focused on rehabilitation and recovery assistance through the provision of social, economic, infrastructure, and peace and governance interventions. The program had an initial budget allocation of P2.234 billion in 2016. Implementation was extended to 2019, for a total budget of P2.395 billion pesos from 2016 to 2017. About 82% of the total budget represented CO and the remaining 18% was for MOOE. Each ARMM implementing agency was allowed to use a maximum of 3% of total program fund allocations to support administrative and monitoring services. As of December 15, 2018, about 84.6% of the total budget was obligated, 71.5% released to the implementing agencies, and 71.1% disbursed accomplishing 73.4% of physical delivery of the overall program.

Since the area still experiences a high level of armed group activity, we wanted to understand whether these groups affected PAMANA/HDAP implementation. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the following statement: “**Armed groups in the area tried to undermine the PAMANA or HDAP project/s**”. The number of survey participants who strongly agreed was very high, at 70%. Figure 29 below shows how respondents perceived armed group activity against PAMANA/HDAP projects by municipality.





**Figure 29.** Perception of respondents that armed groups undermined PAMANA/HDAP.


**Although it does not seem like it significantly reduced conflict, ARMM-HDAP was able to strengthen the risk-management and risk-coping mechanisms of its target areas.** ARMM-HDAP was not intended to bring positive peace in the target areas because there was already an existing formal mechanism for peace settlement under the GPH-MILF peace table. And even the current settlement with the MILF would not be able to end armed conflict in the area since other conflict actors also operate there. The MILF base commanders and their followers are hopeful about the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and the future BARMM, but it is not far-fetched to think that failure to meet expectations could result in conflict reversal. Strong personal and family ties can facilitate recruitment by other armed groups. Still, from the interviews and discussions with locals, it was apparent that assistance from ARMM-HDAP provided respite from the unending insecurity in the area.

Under these circumstances, ARMM-HDAP was able to cushion the beneficiaries from negative shocks after their exposure to the vagaries of conflict. Livelihood assistance was added to the portfolio of production of households that traditionally relied on rice or corn farming. Construction of post-harvest facilities allowed farmers to command more margin from their produce to support basic needs (particularly food) of family members for survival. Roads facilitated and expanded access to opportunities while also easing the mobility of residents during conflicts involving security forces and armed groups. Food and non-food assistance were distributed to IDPs to prevent sudden declines in consumption. Health facilities and provision of health equipment and staff were essential in the communities. Beneficiaries of selected projects indicated that the assistance was based on their local needs. Some of the social benefits identified by the beneficiaries of selected ARMM-HDAP projects were:

- Integrated Potable Water System (level 3).** The water system encompassed eight municipalities: Abdullah Sangki, Ampatuan, Shariff Aguak, Mamasapano, Shariff Saydona Mustapha, Raja Buayan, Datu Salibu, and Datu Piang and served approximately 150,000 households. Some local residents and LGUs observed a reduction of reported incidence of water-borne diseases such as diarrhea and freed household time devoted to fetching water at community taps or deep wells. A Teduray community in one of the municipalities also hopes that the water project could help bring the Moro and IP communities together.

- **Roads.** Connective infrastructure reduced travel time and logistic costs, bringing people closer to markets. Roads facilitated the deployment of other needed public goods and services including education, health and social programs.
- **Socialized housing for agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs).** One group believed that the assistance increased their sense of community and responsibility as they had begun meeting once a week to discuss home improvements, gardening, and livelihood opportunities.
- **Livelihood assistance and training.** Some respondents expressed that it was much “easier” to survive despite multiple sources of shocks (conflict and weather) after ARMM-HDAP helped them diversify their sources of income. Another set of beneficiaries, who were Christians, were surprised by the act of generosity of a Moro-sponsored program. In this way, ARMM-HDAP was able to help build trust.

In Figure 30, we show citizens’ opinions on project impact by type, including roads, farming infrastructure, water infrastructure, livelihood, and infra, which includes new schools, health facilities, and community buildings. The plot below is inclusive of PAMANA projects that citizens attribute to the barangay captain. The plot illustrates that, overall, citizens perceived the projects to have a very positive impact on their communities. Furthermore, an additional survey question showed that close to 100% of citizens felt they benefited personally from PAMANA projects.<sup>16</sup>



**Figure 30.** Type of impact PAMANA had on respondent, by project type.

While we cannot explicitly test PAMANA’s effect due to the lack of a pre-PAMANA measure of economic well-being, we provide descriptive information on the current levels of unemployment (Figure 31) and perceptions of economic status (Figure 32) in each surveyed municipality. The latter question asked

<sup>16</sup> An important note is how many responses make up the results of each project category. Road=28, Infra=37, Farm=258, Water=1, Livelihood=139.

citizens: “During the last 5 years, do you think that the economic situation of your household has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated?” and respondents answered on a five-point scale.




Figure 31. Respondents' employment rate.





Figure 32. Respondents' perception of changes in economic status in the last 5 years.

Although most respondents do not seem to think that much has changed in their economic status between the present time and five years ago, except for respondents in Guindulungan, it seems that there were more people who feel more positively about their economic situation now than they did before.

At the operational level, the program demonstrated that the convergence approach was necessary to address the deep-seated challenges of communities in contested areas. Conflict in this part of ARMM is a multi-faceted problem requiring multi-faceted solutions. The ARMM-HDAP leveraged its key resources by tapping the Central Maguindanao Development Cooperation (CMDC) Alliance, which was formed by 15 LGUs through the support of ARMM-DILG in 2016. The program was able to unify the LGUs, whose mayors were from warring political clans to support programs in the communities, at least for a time, before the upcoming election.

For decades, conflict-affected communities in the target areas were aware that the presence of various groups, including the LGUs competing for legitimacy, framed their environment. In a sense, the economic and political environment in the areas encouraged diversion of limited fiscal resources towards providing human and economic security and away from the production of economic outputs such as agriculture or delivery of much needed social services. **The ARMM-HDAP program showed that, despite all odds, there existed a working government responsive to the needs of the local communities.** Receiving assistance from the government for the first time in 2016 to 2018 conferred exceedingly high marginal economic and social benefits to the communities. “*Ngayon lang kami nakaranas ng totoong programa para sa mga mahihirap sa lugar namin. Dati, wala talaga. Lumalapit sa amin ang gobyerno ‘pag may election. Ngayon, naramdaman namin na may pakinabang din pala ang gobyerno lalo na sa ARMM,*” (It was only recently that we received assistance for the poor in our community. Before, there was none. The government or politicians come to us only during election period. Now, we feel that the government does have a purpose, especially in the ARMM) observed an ARMM-HDAP beneficiary in a municipality that has never received internal revenue allotment despite its creation in 2006. In Mamasapano, beneficiaries felt that the projects they received from ARMM-HDAP made their relationship with the LGU stronger.

In relation to this, we wanted to understand the level of support for both the government and armed groups in different areas. We asked survey respondents whether their neighbors had sympathy towards an array of groups. The respondents were asked: “**In your opinion, which armed groups do your neighbors have sympathy towards? Choose all that apply**”. The figure below shows the level of support for MILF, MNLF, extremist groups like BIFF, Maute Group, ASG, JI, and Ansar al Khalifa, private armed groups, and the military/CAFGUs/PNP (GPH). The colors correspond to the proportion of citizens who reported their neighbors had sympathy for a given group, out of the total number of responses.



**Figure 33.** Support for actors by municipality.

We also studied support for groups like BIFF, in particular. Survey participants have obvious incentives to refrain from reporting support for organizations like BIFF due to fears of the consequences if they do so. To overcome this challenge, we used a sensitive question technique called a list experiment, which can be used to estimate the proportion of people for whom a sensitive statement is true – in this case, support or

agreement with the goals of BIFF. While list experiments are a well-respected sensitive questioning technique, they are characterized by a number of shortcomings that are important to keep in mind. Most consequentially, list experiments are not immune to intentional lying, and the presence of liars would yield an invalid population proportion described by the sensitive item (Pechenkina et al. 2018). This means that in cases in which survey respondents understand the question and wish to conceal their answer may result in an underestimation of the sensitive item, in this case support of BIFF.

Respondents were randomly assigned to either a treatment or a control group. The control group was asked the following question: “**How many of these groups do you support and/or have goals you generally agree with?**” The options for response were: “The Philippine Government”, “The Catholic Church”, “MILF”, “International Organizations”. The treatment group was asked the same question, with one additional option: “BIFF”. The proportion of the population that would not admit to supporting BIFF because they feared the consequences was derived by getting the average (mean) number of people who supported BIFF both in the treatment and control groups, and then subtracting the treatment mean from control mean. The difference in means was only statistically significant in Sharif Aguak, meaning all other appearances of support for BIFF in the figure below should be disregarded.




Figure 34. Support for BIFF by municipality.

By contrast, Figure 35 shows citizens’ perceptions of how well their interests are represented by their local government, whether they think service delivery will improve under BARMM, and the extent they believe that GPH will implement the full terms of the Bangsamoro Peace Agreement, both for citizens aware of PAMANA/HDAP projects in their barangay and for those unaware of such projects. Across all three measures, perceptions of government were better when individuals were aware of PAMANA/HDAP. This represents positive gains/returns from PAMANA implementation in the area. This is supported by

comments from Christian focus group respondents who expressed their happiness and surprise in the effectiveness and generosity of the ARG due to ARMM-HDAP.




Figure 35. Measures of government support and trust.

Given the importance of building support for government institutions, awareness of PAMANA is an important factor. When citizens do not make the connection between the projects from which they are benefitting and projects’ source, improvements in citizen perceptions of the government cannot be expected. Figure 36 illustrates the percentage of citizens surveyed who were aware that projects in their barangay were carried out by PAMANA/HDAP. Awareness of PAMANA is relatively low even though it is key to achieving certain goals in line with Track 1 complementarity.




Figure 36. Awareness of PAMANA/HDAP by municipality.

## PAMANA-IOM

Funds originally intended for 435 barangays as PAMANA-MNLF (Pillar 2) were declined by the ARG in 2016. To address this gap, OPAPP entered into a MOA with IOM in April 2017. While implementation was originally envisioned for the period of June 2017 to September 2018, the agreement was extended to June 2019. A PAMANA-IOM field office was set up in Cotabato to ensure on-the-ground presence for implementation. Eleven local CSOs were engaged as third-party service providers at the outset, although the PAMANA-IOM PMO increasingly took on direct implementation roles. Based on available information, a major aspect of implementation included the setup of community working groups that were strongest at the barangay level, although prior to project wrap-up, municipal and provincial working groups were also being put in place. There is limited evidence that there was a carryover between the pre-2017 PAMANA provincial TWGs and the PAMANA-IOM community working groups. Although coordination with the ARG was intended from the beginning, this was purportedly withdrawn due to the ongoing transition from the ARMM to the BARMM.

Aligned with the Dureza-led vision of a more “inclusive” implementation of peace agreements, a pre-established list of beneficiary barangays with MNLF presence and requested projects (from the 2016 planning cycle) was reprogrammed. Instead, a set of criteria was established by IOM and OPAPP to target barangays that were deemed unserved, underserved, remote, and fragile, with 25% of coverage in the province of Sulu, followed by Tawi-Tawi (24%) and Basilan (21%), and comparatively lighter coverage in Lanao del Sur (16%) and Maguindanao (13%). This was supplemented by PAMANA-IOM community assessments of 394 community-based organizations and cooperatives in ARMM, which included MNLF cooperatives established under the old Act4Peace program and supported by PAMANA. According to interviews with PAMANA-IOM staff, only 10% of the MNLF cooperatives were found to be functional. To manage tensions with LGUs and the MNLF as a result of the reprogramming, six roundtable discussions were held with the MNLF commanders in the presence of OPAPP AMTs and directors. Nevertheless, the perception that PAMANA (regardless of delivery mechanism or administration) still “owed” projects to these MNLF-affiliated communities was difficult to dispel.

Provincial-level assessments led to delivery of packages across five components. Three components centered around livelihood and technical skills training, covering the provision of science and technology or livelihood “toolkits” for cooperatives and communities, training workshops around technical and vocational education and training (TVET) skills, or project management-directed capacities, with limited cash-for-work in selected barangays.

The remaining components (marked as “CDD” for PAMANA-MNLF communities) ranged from toolkits for barangay peacekeeping action teams and community protection/trauma emergency kits, with a smaller percentage for infrastructure support. This component also financed OPAPP officials’ field school visits to Amsterdam and Norway for exchanges with the Royal Norwegian Government (as the facilitator of the talks with the CPP/NPA/NDFP) and with other member-states at IOM HQ.

Given the limited data and time available, a separate evaluation process will have to be designed specifically for PAMANA-IOM to ascertain actual outcomes or future impact – a difficult proposition given that there

are presently no programmed successors in the pipeline, whether funded by the Philippine Government or by IOM. Based on KIIs with the PAMANA-IOM team and local implementing partners across four out of five provinces, procurement and logistics issues hampered implementation. As with many conflict-affected regions, transportation costs tended to be more expensive than the actual goods provided to communities. Despite protocols where community representatives sign off before project procurement and turnover, there were mismatches between community needs and the projects provided, which respondents partially attributed to community attitudes where “they will take whatever they can get,” and partially on logistical limitations. A specific project hampered by logistical limitations was a boat-making project in Sulu that had to be canceled given that the fiberglass boats originally offered by IOM were unsafe for Sulu sea use, while a regional logging ban prevented local sourcing of hardwood.

While financial monitoring of PAMANA-IOM kept to the government Personal Services (PS), Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), and Capital Outlay (CO) line items based on the 2017 General Appropriations Act, this was adjusted to factor in the minimum 7% mandatory overhead charged by IOM. Complementation and coordination between different PAMANA delivery mechanisms will also need to be reviewed, as there are indications of targeting overlaps for livelihood programming in Basilan and Sulu for PAMANA-IOM and UNDP-SPAN.

## Support to Peacebuilding and Normalization Program (UNDP-SPAN)

An agreement between OPAPP and UNDP under the NAM was executed in December 2017 for SPAN, obligating 649.26 million pesos for implementation of projects in areas covered by the CAB and the ARMM. The NAM is a financing modality where GAA funds are transferred to UNDP for fund management and implementation, ostensibly to sidestep slow government procurement mechanisms and ensure faster service delivery. This also allowed OPAPP to obligate funds that would have otherwise lapsed and returned to the Philippine Treasury after 31 December 2017.

Of its seven target outputs, four dealt with the normalization component under the GPH-MILF peace agreement and were not funded through PAMANA. The other three target outputs focused on CSPP governance, provision of social services to vulnerable sectors, support to the national peace tables, and post-Marawi crisis recovery. While the resources for SPAN were originally delimited for ARMM/Bangsamoro, CSPP training across 12 RPOCs, RDCs, and PAMANA partner agencies were provided nationwide. SPAN also provided support to a CSO consortium envisioned to mentor LGU trainees in formulating CSPP Community Development Plans (CSPP-CDPs).

SPAN also financed “peacebuilding” activities such as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) training and direct support to “peace table” activities, which former Secretary Dureza described as expanding from the five traditional peace tables with non-state actors to the “bigger peace table” with the general public. While this was intended to be led by Balay Mindanaw and a consortium of local CSOs, there was no documentation available on the “peace table” component or the implementation of the social enterprise grants.



A SPAN Early Recovery and Rehabilitation (ERR) team, based in Iligan, was contracted to coordinate and implement peacebuilding, social healing and reconciliation activities in Marawi. The ERR project management team is composed of six (6) field personnel endorsed by OPAPP; they were originally contracted under OPAPP in September to December 2017; by June 2018 their contracts were transferred to CTG, an international CSO partner of UNDP that provides staffing services. The contracting mechanism and set-up with three institutions – OPAPP, UNDP, and CTG – directing the team was mired however with delays in processing their contracts, payments, and operational costs for activities.

As with PAMANA-IOM, a separate evaluation process is recommended for PAMANA-SPAN given data and time limitations. As of August 2019 only 50% of funds have been disbursed, pending the approval of a new work plan by OPAPRU.

Available information from project reports and KIIs with local implementing partners and previous and current UNDP and OPAPP personnel suggest that implementation was hampered with various delays due to procurement and logistical limitations. For example, assistive devices for persons with disability still need to be tailor-fit to individual measurements and cases, which complicates procurement and raises transaction costs. UNDP still depends on local implementation partners (often, NGOs) for beneficiary selection (as in the case of WAVE), design and implementation of training modules, and all forms of service delivery. UNDP also remains bound by its own procurement mechanisms, where certain expense items may have to be cleared or purchased from UNDP Bangkok or from the UNDP central office in New York. A fundamental challenge also lies in the lack of clarity around the role of UNDP, whether it was limited to acting as a “fund manager” that hires pre-selected staff and disburses OPAPP-directed sets of activities, or implementing agency that can provide technical inputs and expertise complementing what is instructed by OPAPP/OPAPRU.


As discussed in the earlier PAMANA-IOM section, a more rigorous review for efficiency, effectiveness, and impact is advised, particularly if international development organizations will continue to be engaged by the GPH to implement government-financed programs in the future. As both PAMANA-IOM and PAMANA-SPAN draw from resources programmed under the PAMANA line item of the 2017 General Appropriations Act, the Commission on Audit (COA) is mandated to conduct a special audit of these resources, alongside the eventual review to be conducted for the GPH-UNDP NAM.

With the increasing openness of the Philippine government to engage international development organizations for project implementation, a closer look at the comparative efficiency and effectiveness of GPH vis-à-vis non-government delivery is necessary, especially as all project costs, including office setup and hiring of personnel, are charged to government funds.

## **Analysis of Administrative Data**


In addition to the role that PAMANA played in Bangsamoro as a complement to Track 1 negotiations, it was also intended to address the factors that led people to participate in conflict, especially by joining or supporting “black flag” affiliated groups and criminal enterprises. In our administrative data analysis specific to ARMM, we focused on two main outcomes from Conflict Alert, driven in part by data

limitations. First, we looked at the number of violent incidents involving the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), both of which have affiliated themselves with international terrorist organizations. While several other groups inspired by similar ideologies strengthened after 2015 – including the Maute Group and Ansar al-Khalifa – our data do not include any information involving these groups. Second, we looked at incidents of violent crimes. Figure 38 below shows the distribution of these outcomes across Central Mindanao (on the right) and BaSulTa (on the left).



**Figure 38.** Geographic distribution of violent incidents ASG/BIFF in the ARMM from 2010–2015.


(left-BaSulTa, right-Central Mindanao)



**Figure 39.** Geographic distribution of violent crime incidents in ARMM from 2010–2015.

(left-BaSulTa, right-Central Mindanao)

With these outcomes in mind, we used entropy balancing to match similar barangays in ARMM based on their 2010 Census characteristics, as well as on 2011–2012 levels of ASG/BIFF and criminal violence. Figure 40 below displays the results of this analysis.



**Figure 40.** Effect of PAMANA on violence in ARMM.

Based on these data, PAMANA is associated with a significant lessened expansion in ASG/BIFF violence after 2012 but an increase in criminal violence (consistent with the results from Davao).

## Summary of Findings

Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions listed here apply only to the Bangsamoro conflict line. The conclusions are stated briefly here, though they draw from the more exhaustive descriptions in the sections above and in the case study included in Annex L.

**Table 6. *Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness Sustainability: Conflict Lines in the Bangsamoro Region***

Relevance
<p><u>National-level Relevance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contribution to regional fiscal autonomy and local governance capacity prior to transition.</li> <li>• Participation and legitimacy as key issue – “jointness” of ownership with local stakeholders as a crucial component of implementation.</li> <li>• Issues around service delivery and quality erodes trust of peace partners; outstanding commitments will need to be addressed.</li> </ul> <p><u>Ground-level Relevance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programming of PAMANA-MNLF projects sometimes devolved to what was easy/convenient instead of what was relevant.</li> <li>• Capacities of people in PAMANA-HDAP areas to weather shocks and conflict were improved.</li> </ul>
Efficiency
<p><u>Funding Delays and Lapses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial implementation through NGAs caused delays due to the bureaucratic process of obligating funds to the ARMM counterparts of the agencies.</li> <li>• Contract periods of international organizations have been extended due to delayed fulfilment of PAMANA projects/commitments.</li> </ul> <p><u>Targeting Process</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeting of MNLF beneficiaries was inconsistent with some LGUs recruiting their own “MNLF members”.</li> <li>• Joint planning/programming done by the ARG and the LGUs helped make targeting more effective.</li> </ul>

- There are indications of duplication of projects by IOM and UNDP.

#### Program Evolution

- Policy change to give the ARG responsibility for implementation led to better implementation overall.
- OPAPP was unable to fully utilize PAMANA funds when implementation responsibilities were returned to it. This caused the government to contract PAMANA implementation to international organizations that had higher base costs for implementation (additional overhead) and whose targeting was poorer than that of the ARG.

#### Unintended Consequences

- Dissatisfaction of MNLF founder Nur Misuari led to the Zamboanga siege.
- Transfer of PAMANA funds to the ARG significantly increased CO funds that enabled the continued concreting of roads in all ARMM areas, and the construction of bridges, school buildings, and agricultural support facilities.

### **Effectiveness**

#### Track 1 Complementarity

- GPH used PAMANA-MNLF to gather support from MNLF commanders. However, results were mixed as delays or non-delivery of “promised” projects (due to DAP ruling or other forms of reprogramming, as with PAMANA-IOM) undermined trust.
- After the Mamasapano encounter, PAMANA-HDAP was instrumental in raising support for the BOL.

#### Addressing Root Causes

- There are indications that trust in both the ARG and the national government both improved with the implementation of PAMANA-HDAP.
- Interviewees and focus group participants lent support for the notion that PAMANA projects in the community brought people together.

#### Effects on Local Conflict

- It does not appear that PAMANA had an effect on reducing conflict based on our three methods of evaluation since there are other active armed groups in the area aside from the MNLF and MILF.

## Sustainability

### Sustainability of Ground-level Effects

- There are no clear indications that community-level PAMANA projects are sustainable as the management of the aforementioned Integrated Potable Water System has shifted multiple times and is vulnerable to conflict actors. Livelihood projects are also highly dependent on the level of commitment of beneficiaries as well as their capacity to manage a business.

# Recommendations

Based on these findings, we put forth the following set of initial recommendations in two categories: 1) Program Design, Programming, and Implementation, 2) Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Programs.

## Need for a Civilian-Facing Peacebuilding Approach and Program

Achieving a positive peace beyond the cessation of hostilities, in which peace persists and is actively promoted by civilians and conflict actors alike, cannot be attained by engaging the military in peacebuilding alone. While securitized peacebuilding is critical for preventing bad actors from spoiling peace negotiations, it may backfire if personal freedoms are seen as being disrespected. Achieving a positive peace requires a civilian-led peacebuilding process that develops civilian capacity to prevent potential conflict and to de-escalate conflict if it does happen. While PAMANA as a “development for peace” initiative engaged civilians in CDD that helped community capacity for development, we found a gap in civilian-led peacebuilding projects focused specifically on building skills around conflict resilience and prevention, such as peace education, early warning initiatives or conflict resolution training, or embedding these components alongside standard livelihood or infrastructure investments. The prospects for sustained peace depend not only on economically stable communities but also on conflict-resilient ones. The continuation of PAMANA, as well as the addition of more civilian-led peacebuilding programs, is critical for maintaining a positive peace.

Despite its flaws, PAMANA made significant progress relative to its predecessors (including the KBP) in terms of framing and advocating for development activities in conflict-affected areas of the country. Involving agencies outside of the Security Sector in development projects for conflict areas serves an important message to communities: that the government does indeed care about them and that it is working for their betterment, beyond classic counterinsurgency. At the same time, the Security Sector does play an important role in guiding and targeting implementation. Indeed, the military’s perspective and understanding of these areas is necessary for agencies to understand that the “business-as-usual” way of

doing things is not just impossible for CAAs/CVAs but might even be detrimental. While we recommend several changes to the specific bureaucratic and M&E processes below, the overall guiding philosophy of PAMANA should continue to help structure future development efforts in conflict zones.

## Increased Localization of Programming and Planning

Highly related to the above point, we recommend that project targeting and implementation strategies be localized even further than current practice. This philosophy draws from the experiences of local governments such as the province of Bohol, which has been able to maintain its insurgency-free status through intensified development and strong multi-stakeholder partnerships down to the barangay level. Even within conflict line, we found that the most important issues facing communities are extremely varied. In addition, when local implementers have a greater say in the planning of PAMANA, key stakeholders take greater ownership over the program, which was a key factor in many successful instances of PAMANA implementation up to this point.

## Disaggregating Theory of Change by Conflict Line

We found that the specific mechanisms through which PAMANA programming impacted the goal of conflict reduction varied tremendously by conflict line, especially in terms of Track 1 complementarity. In addition, both the global literature and prominent policy reports treat development relating to 1) already-signed peace agreements, 2) political transitions and 3) counterinsurgency as distinct processes. In many cases, the specific leadership (especially at OPAPP) in charge of planning programs in the different conflict zones had a nuanced understanding of how the broad theory of change applied to their goals. However, additional disaggregation in the initial planning stages of the program could lead to improved practices that are customized specifically to the issues that hinder peace in the different zones. One caveat to this recommendation is that we recommend increased coordination between the NPA-related and RPA and CBA-CPLA related planning due to their geographic proximity and the real historical and security challenges between these groups.



## Balancing “Soft” vs. “Hard” Interventions

As part of the increased localization process, many communities will see the greatest impacts of PAMANA programming if “hard” infrastructure programs (especially roads but also community infrastructure and agricultural equipment) are regularly paired with “soft” capacity building interventions. While many citizens saw the economic benefits associated with increased access to markets and opportunities, there were significant challenges associated with translating these gains into meaningful conflict reduction. Our findings suggest that these challenges were mitigated when the timing of these different types of interventions overlapped.

## Reconfiguration/Rebranding with Current Peace Process Developments

While many improvements were made to previous processes of development in conflict zones, PAMANA did come with significant challenges that in some cases undercut government legitimacy, especially funding lapses and delays. As such, it is worth exploring whether rebranding the program (perhaps in a way specific to the different conflict lines) would be beneficial to future operations. This is especially the case in terms of BARMM and Normalization, where changes in governing structures may allow for improved opportunities to enhance both regional and national government legitimacy. This may also be possible in the case of CNN and the completion areas in Cordillera and Negros-Panay, where the program can be aligned with EO No. 70.

## Aligning the Bureaucracy

At the implementer level, many agency personnel understood the importance of conflict-sensitive practices despite challenges to personal safety. At the same time, the unique reporting requirements and the increased difficulty of implementation made it so that they were often hesitant about PAMANA. Specifically, the degree to which funds were delayed and lapsed was more likely to result in poor performance reports, making PAMANA misaligned with their own professional incentives. Future development programming in conflict zones should take this into account and readjust how implementers are evaluated relative to their “regular” work, thus increasing ground-level agency buy-in.

On an organizational level, although PAMANA often spoke of convergence of government institutions, we found more examples of a lack of coordination and siloed implementation. While OPAPP is responsible for coordination and planning, a significant portion of responsibility for improving convergence is the DBM's. While often overlooked, administrative policies often created operational bottlenecks and even roadblocks. Peacebuilding is dependent on communities having faith in the government as a partner and smooth implementation with timely disbursements and manageable procurement policies are integral to the continuation of development projects. From our findings, it was clear that instances of failed implementation could worsen community relations with the government.

## Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Programs

There are several important challenges to keep in mind when monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding programs. The first involves complexity and scale. When evaluating the results of a peacebuilding program, the outcomes must be situated in a much broader context since the program is just one of many factors that can influence the outcomes of interest. A second challenge is a frequent inability to reach strong conclusions at the end of an evaluation, due to weak methodology that does not allow for causal claims. Evaluations should strive for a methodology that allows for strong conclusions. Finally, evaluations must confront the frequent lack of transparency of accountability chains, which typically characterize peacebuilding programs. Each level of the chain is tasked with holding the level below it accountable, which results in skewed incentives and lack of knowledge of what is transpiring on the ground at the upper echelons of the chain.

## Indicators for the Philippine Development Plan Results Matrix

As the government's flagship program for peace and development, PAMANA should be considered a priority program for evaluation. However, as discussed in this report, the program does not fit into the framework of traditional development programs. The fact that PAMANA is intimately tied to peace negotiations complicates how we track its "success". Also, PAMANA is a program that does not promote the building of projects but the development of a perspective and a particular sensitivity towards peace and conflict needs. Given PAMANA's particularities, the indicators that we recommend for the PDP are less

about tangible program outputs but concentrate on the mechanisms that can encourage conflict sensitivity and indicators that show commitment to peace.

### Strengthening CSPP at the Local Level

- LGUs with a POC
- LGUs with a POC working with the Local Development Council (LDC)
- LGUs integrating conflict analysis in their Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan, Comprehensive Land Use Plan, Comprehensive Development Plan, Executive-Legislative Agenda, Annual Investment Plans, and other mandated plans
- LGUs with a conflict-sensitive Public Order and Public Safety Plan and CCA/DRRM Plan, factoring in human-induced disasters and complex emergencies
- LGUs with community-based projects for peacebuilding (in relation to CDP)

Developing indicators for PAMANA from the bottom-up, we need to first look at how can institutionalize support for CSPP. With political leaders having short terms, it is necessary to develop peace advocates in the community outside of government officials. Having a local POC champion CSPP is a good direction towards more permanent peacebuilding, and but we can also observe how much these LGUs are actually making use of them by tracking their coordination with the LDC and whether they have worked together to plan peacebuilding projects for the LGU that are prioritized in the CDP.

### Ensuring Balanced Development

- Percent of planned projects implemented
- Percent of planned CDD projects implemented
- Ratio of infrastructure projects to “soft” capacity building projects

Although PAMANA is substantially community-based, for successful project implementation, strong support from NGAs is necessary. As discussed in previous sections, although projects may be identified and planned well, if the government is unable to push through with them, good will among communities can quickly evaporate. In this regard, we propose more vigilant tracking of both planned projects (in general) planned CDD projects (specifically). Since our findings show that communities seem to have more

ownership of CDD projects than NGA-led projects, it could be useful to compare the two to help PAMANA improve its design. With the goal of developing communities and helping them “catch up”, an important factor is how much community members are being equipped to manage community-based projects. One of PAMANA’s more obvious biases before was towards roads and bridges, so keeping track of the ratio of projects is one way of making sure that “soft” interventions are given as much funding/value.

### Understanding Citizens’ Perceptions

- Legitimacy of the central government
- Representativeness of the central government

Data for the previous indicators mentioned are all administrative and can be relatively easy to collect, but for this third set of indicators, implementing a community-level survey would be necessary. Citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy of the central government and to what degree they feel they are represented by their government are central factors in citizens’ calculations of whether to support armed groups.

## Design & Mechanisms

### Project-Level Data Consolidation

One set of major obstacles to effective evaluation involves the inconsistency of project-level PAMANA data, especially in recent years. Because PAMANA operations are not centralized with a single agency, consistent and enforceable reporting requirements for the different implementing agencies is crucial. In addition, start-date and end-date values for projects in the PAMANA dataset would greatly improve the ability to evaluate PAMANA’s impact on conflict. As an example, DSWD’s KALAH-I-CIDSS dataset and the AFP’s Peace and Development Teams data includes these values, allowing for evaluators to track patterns of violence specifically surrounding project implementation (Berman, Downey, & Felter, 2016; Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2014).

### Improved Coordination to Incorporate Conflict Data

Because one of the main goals of PAMANA is to reduce conflict, it is crucial to put in place procedures to regularly and reliably track PAMANA's effects on 1) conflict affectation and 2) conflict incidence. Current options (primarily AFP J2 data, Conflict Alert, and ACLED) are not regularly consolidated and accessible to PAMANA M&E teams. In particular, improved M&E coordination with the security sector to track PAMANA's impact on security operations is crucial. In addition, for NPA areas, it is important not to conflate conflict incidence with conflict affectation. In previous evaluations, as well as in common understandings, these two measures are often conflated with each other though they capture very different concepts. Research suggests that in addition to conflict incidence is likely to be low under full government control, it is also likely to be low under full insurgent control (Kalyvas, 2003). As such, short term spikes in violent incidence may be a necessary part of transitions to local military control that result in sustained long-term conflict reduction (this is not necessarily applicable to Bangsamoro, where certain groups are transitioning into legitimate political authorities).

### Disaggregating Outcome Data by Barangay and Individuals

To track PAMANA's impact on key socioeconomic variables (such as education, health, and local governance quality), it is crucial to collect regular (e.g., yearly) information on these outcomes that is representative at the barangay-level. In the PDP, a number of surveys and data sources are mentioned that would be ideal indicators of these outcomes. However, because of the nature of existing procedures, it is difficult to get barangay-level representative data. In addition, for individual-level PAMANA projects, it would be valuable to collect individual-level baseline and endline data for a representative sample of the beneficiaries.

### Baselining

In general, a significant M&E challenge is posed by the lack of reliable baseline data on PAMANA beneficiary communities and individuals. In order to understand whether PAMANA had its intended effect, collecting information on beneficiaries prior to implementation is key. This may in some cases involve

surveys of beneficiaries so that socioeconomic conditions, perceptions of security, and other attitudes/behaviors can be effectively tracked. We hope that the surveys conducted as part of this evaluation can be used for this purpose.

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## Annex B: Evaluation Matrix

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
I. Relevance	1. In what ways has PAMANA been relevant in helping achieve and support peace in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities? How has PAMANA been relevant in addressing causes and impacts of internal armed conflicts and other issues that	<p>A. Does PAMANA target different stakeholders in the community to support peacebuilding?</p> <p>B. Has PAMANA built capacity in the appropriate institutions?</p> <p>C. How accurate are the conflict analyses under PAMANA in determining relevant</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>DSWD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> <li>NHTS / Listahanan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Compare demographic factors to the projects that were assigned to communities (whether they match needs)</li> <li>Whether communities view projects as central to reducing armed conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> <li>Quantitative analysis of administrative data</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	affect the peace process?	projects for communities?  D. Are PAMANA projects localized to focus on specific community-level drivers of conflict?				
	2. To what extent are the different interventions under PAMANA contributing to/aligned with national, regional, and local government development	A. Have CSPP principles that are implemented at the national level (PDP) helped guide local governments (CDP) and communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> <li>NHTS / Listahanan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Whether elites perceive capacity building projects to be important/needed</li> <li>Whether citizens perceive capacity building projects to be important/needed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	strategies and priorities?	<p>(BDP) in developing peacebuilding projects?</p> <p>B. Is PAMANA building the capacity of local governments in a way citizens find valuable?</p> <p>C. Is PAMANA building the capacity of regional governments in a way citizens find valuable?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• DSWD</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether citizens perception of regional/local government legitimacy has changed as a results of interventions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quantitative analysis of administrative data</li> </ul>



Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	3. To what extent are the PAMANA interventions contributing to horizontal coordination?	A. Does the PAMANA framework used by government institutions help agencies align their work on peacebuilding projects?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Whether citizens perceive PAMANA initiatives and other initiatives to be working in conjunction with one another</li> <li>Whether citizens feel as though PAMANA programming is redundant given other programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>
II. Efficiency	1. How has PAMANA been implemented by national government agencies (NGAs) and local government	A. How has convergence been operationalized by OPAPP and PAMANA implementing agencies at different tiers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Citizen and elite perceptions of PAMANA coordination over project goals</li> <li>Established mechanisms of coordination between implementers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	units (LGUs) since 2011?	(national, regional and local levels)?  B. What are the institutional arrangements and mechanisms for convergence and how do they function?				
	2. How has Conflict-Sensitivity and Peace Promotion (CSPP) been mainstreamed by OPAPP among partner implementing agencies through	A. Have the planning workshops helped in cascading the national government's priorities to lower-level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Program implementers in PAMANA barangays</li> <li>● Residents of "counterfactual" barangays</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Key informant interviews</li> <li>● Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Implementers have guidelines and policies for addressing conflict and supporting peacebuilding</li> <li>● Implementers have incorporated CSPP approaches into planning, programming,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>● Process tracing</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	PAMANA? To what extent have implementing agencies mainstreamed CSPP in their interventions?	<p>government units?</p> <p>B. Does PAMANA provide guidelines to encourage convergence at the local level?</p> <p>C. What activities has OPAPP conducted to help the implementing agencies mainstream CSPP?</p> <p>D. Does OPAPP monitor mainstreaming activities in</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local leaders</li> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA project documentation</li> </ul>		<p>implementation and M&amp;E processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PAMANA project personnel have been trained on conflict sensitive and peace promoting approaches</li> <li>• Elite perceptions of the conflict- sensitivity of PAMANA projects and whether the projects “do no harm”</li> </ul>	

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		order to advise the implementing agencies if there are any gaps?				
	3. What are the changes in the implementation of PAMANA, the challenges that these changes have sought to address, and the results of these changes?	<p>A. How has the implementation of PAMANA evolved?</p> <p>B. What were drivers to key changes, and the results of these changes?</p> <p>C. Has the re-categorizing of pillars made it easier for implementing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>PAMANA Program documentation /</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Case study</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Changes in local PAMANA project goals (written and/or stated)</li> <li>Complaints from local leaders, security actors, and international community regarding PAMANA implementation and results</li> <li>Citizen, local elite, and project implementer perceptions of project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		<p>agencies to do their work?</p> <p>D. Have changes in the implementing agencies made it difficult to sustain PAMANA projects at the community level?</p> <p>E. How has resource management been affected by the changes?</p>	notes / monitoring		setbacks, delays and failures	

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	4. What is the process of, and criteria for selecting the beneficiary-communities (or LGUs)? Have there been conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities which have not yet been reached and why?	<p>A. How does PAMANA targeting differ from those of other programs?</p> <p>B. Are spillover effects to nearby communities considered when planning projects in an area?</p> <p>C. Has corruption, mismanagement and/or conflict inhibited the ability of PAMANA projects to target</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>PAMANA Program documentation / notes / monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Elite interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Perceptions of local leaders, security actors, and international community members about the degree to which PAMANA implementers consulted them about beneficiary-communities</li> <li>Implementers have institutionalized clear criteria and guidelines for selecting beneficiaries</li> <li>Proportion of conflict-affected and vulnerable communities / individuals (measured through previous exposure to violence / rebel activity) that have</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		<p>vulnerable communities?</p> <p>D. To what extent did project implementers consult with local leaders to determine beneficiary-communities?</p>			<p>been served by / benefited from PAMANA projects</p>	
	5. What lessons can be drawn from the implementation of PAMANA so far? What are examples of good practice (from implementation to transparency	<p>A. Have PAMANA projects exacerbated conflict under any circumstances? If so, what are the variables that intervene to make</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Elite interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> </ul>	<p><u>Lessons:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Citizens’, local elites’, and implementers’ perceptions of successful projects and practices</li> <li>Socioeconomic development indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	mechanisms)? What type of unintended consequences—positive or negative—if any, have PAMANA projects and activities had?	PAMANA projects more or less effective?  B. Are there any aspects or mechanisms in PAMANA projects that improved peace and/or development in unexpected ways?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation / notes / monitoring</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation / notes / monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrative data (National Household)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace/violence indicators</li> <li>• Number of functioning Third-Party Monitors</li> <li>• Percentage of grievances/ complaints, feedback submitted to OPAPP- PAMANA's grievance redress and feedback system that were subsequently addressed/acted upon in a timely and satisfactory manner</li> </ul> <p><u>Unintended consequences</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceived bias/patronage in access to PAMANA</li> </ul>	



Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Perceived corruption in project implementation</li> <li>● Trust in government and non-government institutions / organizations</li> <li>● Civic and political participation</li> <li>● Intervening variables: violent conflict incidents, electoral / elite / security actor competition, community cohesion, presence of rebel groups, conflict type, etc.</li> </ul>	
III.Effectiveness	1. How and to what extent has PAMANA	A. Are communities better able to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Residents and local leaders of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Key informant interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● # of violent incidents (e.g. rebel-led violence, government-sponsored</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Qualitative case analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	facilitated the achievement of peace effectiveness criteria within the targeted communities?	<p>resist violence and provocations to violence?</p> <p>B. Have there been meaningful improvements in inter-group relations?</p> <p>C. Have their security or sense of security increased?</p> <p>D. Are communities developing their own peace initiatives?</p> <p>E. Have political institutions for</p>	<p>PAMANA barangays</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Residents and local leaders of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elite interviews</li> <li>• Citizen survey</li> <li>• Case study</li> <li>• Administrative data (National Household)</li> </ul>	<p>violence/repression, crime/lawlessness, individual/communal disputes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of communities implementing conflict-resolution and peacebuilding activities</li> <li>• Perceptions of government security provision</li> <li>• Confidence in implementation of peace agreement</li> <li>• Attitudes towards future peace</li> <li>• Perceptions of own agency for developing peace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process tracing</li> <li>• Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		handling conflict-driving grievances been created or reformed?			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Perceptions of central government/autonomous region legitimacy</li> <li>● Generalized trust in society members</li> <li>● Civic and political participation</li> <li>● Participation in community peacebuilding</li> </ul>	
	2. How and to what extent has PAMANA improved the socioeconomic conditions in conflict-affected/ conflict-vulnerable	A. How have the social protection and livelihood interventions under PAMANA uplifted the lives of their	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Residents and local leaders of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>● Residents and local leaders of “counterfactual” barangays</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Key informant interviews</li> <li>● Elite interviews</li> <li>● Citizen survey</li> <li>● Case study</li> </ul>	<u>Outcome variables:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Perceptions of socioeconomic grievances</li> <li>● Perceptions of PAMANA projects’ ability to address</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>● Process tracing</li> <li>● Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	<p>areas? How and to what extent has PAMANA enhanced communities' access to resources and opportunities for livelihood and employment? What indicators can be identified and/or developed to provide a metric of these contributions?</p>	<p>beneficiary-communities?</p> <p>B. How have the infrastructure projects under PAMANA created greater access to opportunities for beneficiary-communities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrative data (National Household)</li> </ul>	<p>socioeconomic grievances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Former combatants willingness to return to conflict</li> <li>• Income/earnings</li> <li>• Employment/livelihoods</li> <li>• Maternal and infant mortality</li> <li>• Literacy/education</li> <li>• Perception of access to basic goods and services</li> </ul> <p><u>Intervening variables:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nature of perceived grievances (e.g.</li> </ul>	

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
					<p>socioeconomic, identity-based, ideological, etc.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Type of aid administration</li> <li>• Social network structure</li> <li>• Local elite competition</li> </ul>	
	3. How has PAMANA facilitated the adoption and implementation of a peacebuilding agenda by NGAs, RLAs and LGUs? How has PAMANA facilitated NGAs' and	<p>A. Have local implementers incorporated CSPP guidelines and policies into programming and practices?</p> <p>B. Have implementers received training in</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Residents and local leaders of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>• Residents and local leaders of "counterfactual" barangays</li> <li>• Program implementers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Elite interviews</li> <li>• Citizen survey</li> <li>• Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # NGAs, RLAs and LGUs that incorporated CSPP approaches into planning, programming, implementation and M&amp;E processes</li> <li>• # of NGAs, LGUs and RLAs implementing conflict and peacebuilding programs</li> <li>• Public perception of effectiveness of policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>• Process tracing</li> <li>• Quantitative case analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	LGUs' implementation of plans and programs following CSPP approaches in conflict areas?	CSPP approaches?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>		and guidelines to address conflict and support peacebuilding	
	4. How has PAMANA enhanced the capacity of PAMANA communities in addressing conflict and engaging in peacebuilding?	<p>A. Do PAMANA recipient communities have informal and/or formal mechanisms to address conflict?</p> <p>B. To what extent are community members in PAMANA barangays engaged in</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents and local leaders of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Elite interviews</li> <li>Citizen survey</li> <li>Case study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of communities implementing conflict-resolution and peacebuilding activities</li> <li>Presence of mechanisms to address conflict in community</li> <li>Participation in peacebuilding activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative case analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		peacebuilding activities within their communities?				
	5. What were major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of key objectives?	<p>A. Who and what are the peace and conflict actors/ processes which facilitate or hinder project delivery?</p> <p>B. What kinds of project mechanisms hinder/facilitate success?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Residents and local leaders of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>● Program implementers</li> <li>● PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Key informant interviews</li> <li>● Elite interviews</li> <li>● Citizen survey</li> <li>● Case study</li> <li>● Administrative data (National Household)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Match between project and community/individual needs</li> <li>● Presence of insurgents</li> <li>● Presence of local elite competition</li> <li>● Project type</li> <li>● Project distribution mechanism/rules</li> <li>● Social capital</li> <li>● Nature of underlying grievances (e.g. identity-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>● Process tracing</li> <li>● Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
					based, ideological, socioeconomic, etc.)	
	6. How have key developments in the different peace tables affected the programming and implementation of PAMANA, if at all?	<p>A. Have there been any communication or coordination problems due to changes in peace tables?</p> <p>B. To what extent have changes caused setbacks, delays and failures in the implementation process?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Elite interviews</li> <li>• Citizen survey</li> <li>• Case study</li> <li>• Administrative data (National Household)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceptions that PAMANA project goals are appropriate and achievable</li> <li>• Perceptions that project goals are well-understood</li> <li>• Degree to which projects being implemented match the peace tables</li> <li>• # of PAMANA projects that have been completed on or implemented according to intended timeline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>• Process tracing</li> </ul>



Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
IV.Sustainability	1. How do capacity building mechanisms and inter-agency technical working groups ensure the sustainable implementation of peace and development programs on the ground?	<p>A. In what conditions do technical working groups produce results that are the most sustainable?</p> <p>B. In what conditions do interventions produce results that are the most sustainable?</p> <p>C. What types of capacity building mechanisms produce the most</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>• Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>• Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Citizen level survey</li> <li>• Case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Success of projects immediately following implementation compared to months/years later</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>• Process tracing</li> <li>• Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
		sustainable results?				
	2. What other existing measures were established to ensure sustainability of interventions?	<p>A. To what extent did PAMANA projects incorporate monitoring activities?</p> <p>B. Did PAMANA project implementers receive buy-in and support from community leaders?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Citizen level survey</li> <li>Case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Perceptions and satisfaction towards PAMANA projects</li> <li>Recognition of PAMANA and the program’s mission</li> <li>Local stakeholder support for PAMANA projects</li> <li># of PAMANA projects that have monitoring activities incorporated into implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	3. Is there a foreseen need for implementing PAMANA over the medium- to long-term? What are the “sunset conditions” for PAMANA and how can these be achieved?	<p>A. What issues cause PAMANA projects to not be sustainable?</p> <p>B. Could certain mechanisms be put in place to address these issues?</p> <p>C. How much would these mechanisms cost/are they feasible?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>Program implementers</li> <li>Local leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Citizen level survey</li> <li>Case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What issues cause PAMANA projects to not be sustainable?</li> <li>What mechanisms could be put in place to address these issues?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> <li>Process tracing</li> <li>Quantitative survey analysis</li> </ul>
	4. How can the existing MEAL framework (CS MEAL Toolkit)	A. In what ways should success be measured?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Program implementers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews</li> <li>Case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How do citizens perceive success?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualitative case analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	be enhanced to measure the potential impact of PAMANA in the future given the security and geographical constraints? How can mechanisms to systematically collect data be strengthened and/or institutionalized?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation / notes / monitoring</li> <li>• Residents of PAMANA barangays</li> <li>• Residents of “counterfactual” barangays</li> <li>• Local leaders</li> </ul>			
	5. How can the PDP Results Matrix better capture PAMANA’s contributions to	A. What are some observable outcomes that are not being captured by the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program implementers</li> <li>• PAMANA Program documentation /</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key informant interviews</li> <li>• Case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What outcomes are not captured by the PDP Results Matrix?</li> <li>• How do citizens perceive success?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative case analysis</li> </ul>

Relevant evaluation criteria	Key Questions	Specific Sub-Questions	Data Sources	Data Collection Methods/Tools	Indicators/ Success Standard	Methods for Data Analysis
	PDP-level outcomes?	<p>PDP Results Matrix?</p> <p>B. In what ways should success be measured?</p>	notes / monitoring			

# Annex C: Evaluation Methodology

## Details on Entropy Balancing

In our analysis of administrative data, we use an “entropy balancing” approach to create a comparable “control group” of LGUs that did not experience PAMANA implementation (Hainmueller 2012).

Once the barangays are reweighted accordingly, we compare 2014–2016 outcome measures in PAMANA barangays and municipalities relative to those same outcomes in the balanced control group. Recent studies suggest that this approach allows for a more accurate estimating of causal effects than other commonly used methods, such as coarsened exact matching or propensity score matching (Zhao and Percival, 2016). We use 2013 as our cutoff year for several reasons. First, because 2013 saw the greatest expansion in PAMANA implementation, it is easier for the entropy balancing algorithm to find similar administrative units that did and did not experience PAMANA for the first time. Second, because the barangays and municipalities treated with PAMANA projects in 2013 were also much more likely to experience PAMANA in future years (see the “post-treatment variables” portion of the tables in the admin analysis sections), the observed effect is likely to be the cumulative effect of PAMANA projects in the post 2013 period. While the entropy balancing approach is well suited for this evaluation, it is still only as good as the quality of the “covariates” that go into the balancing algorithm. Because there are a number of unmeasurable factors that shape PAMANA targeting but are not included in the algorithm, we caution against considering the results to be entirely accurate. The information collected through our survey and case studies was particularly important for corroborating the administrative data analysis.

One important thing to note is that by using this approach, we are not able to account for barangay-specific covariates in the post-2013 period, such as whether they received additional support from PAMANA. The “Post-Treatment Variables” section of Table 7 shows that barangays that received PAMANA projects in 2013 were also far more likely to experience projects in the 2014–2015 period. As a result, we view the patterns in NPA affectation displayed below to be the result of the “package” of PAMANA projects barangays received starting in 2013. The fact that some portion of the barangays in the 2013 control group ended up receiving PAMANA projects in the 2014–2015 period would lead us to underestimate the impacts of PAMANA in the 2013 treatment group. The 2013 PAMANA treatment group was also slightly more likely to receive a Kalahi-CIDSS project in the post-2013 period, meaning that Kalahi-CIDSS projects are a potential confounder that would lead us to overestimate the impacts of PAMANA. While ideally we would have liked to control for these factors in our analysis, accounting for post-treatment variables introduces selection bias that leads to highly inaccurate estimates (Montgomery, Nyhan, & Torres, 2018).

**Table 7. Entropy Balance for Barangay-level Analysis of NPA Affection.**

	Variable	Treatment	Balanced Control	Raw Control
	PAMANA 2013	1	0	0
<b>Balancing Variables</b>	NPA 2012	0.307	0.307	0.154
	NPA 2011	0.354	0.354	0.158
	PAMANA 2012	0.379	0.379	0.007
	PAMANA 2011	0.099	0.099	0.004
	<u>Kalahi</u> 2012	0.134	0.134	0.053
	<u>Kalahi</u> 2011	0.094	0.094	0.021
	PDT Pre-2011	0.123	0.123	0.111
	2010 Population	1011.829	1011.829	1225.049
	2010 Urban	0.079	0.079	0.217
	2010 Education	1.547	1.547	1.846
	2010 Home - Good	0.389	0.389	0.368
	2010 Household Size	3.546	3.546	3.452
	2010 % OFW	0.011	0.011	0.024
	2010 % Age 18-39	0.603	0.603	0.555
	2010 % Single	0.247	0.247	0.276
	2010 % Islam	0.198	0.198	0.007
	2010 % Catholic	0.633	0.633	0.841
	2010 % Indigenous	0.329	0.329	0.115
<b>Post-Treatment Variables</b>	PAMANA 2015	0.62	0.09	0.014
	PAMANA 2014	0.844	0.281	0.011
	KALAHI 2015	0.498	0.412	0.311
	KALAHI 2014	0.42	0.32	0.056
	KALAHI 2013	0.374	0.249	0.056

The “Treatment” column in Table 7 shows the characteristics of barangays that received PAMANA in 2013. Comparing this to the “Raw Control” column (which is the unweighted data for all barangays that did NOT receive PAMANA), PAMANA barangays were less populated, lower educated, more conflict affected, and more likely to have received government development assistance, among other differences. To create the “Balanced Control” group, the entropy balancing algorithm finds an optimal “weight” for each barangay in the raw control group such that, in aggregate, the covariates in the balanced control group are as similar as possible to the covariates in the treatment group of barangays that received PAMANA. For example, a control barangay that is extremely similar to PAMANA barangays will be assigned a weight higher than 1 and all of its characteristics will be multiplied by that weight before averaging covariates across barangays for the whole control group. Meanwhile, a control barangay that is extremely dissimilar

to PAMANA barangays will be assigned a weight less than 1. As seen in the “Balanced Control” column, once the covariates in each barangay is multiplied by its optimized weight, the average characteristics of the comparison barangays are now nearly identical to those of PAMANA barangays. The only difference is that some portion of these barangays received PAMANA in 2013 while others did not.

Table XX below shows the results for the same balancing procedure, but for the municipal-level analysis of DTI data.

**Table 8. Entropy balance for municipal-level analysis of DTI business registrations**

	Variable	Treatment	Balanced Control	Raw Control
	PAMANA 2013 (10 % Saturation)	1	0	0
Balancing Variables	DTI Registrations 2012	47.442	47.442	131.587
	DTI Registrations 2011	34.544	34.544	130.165
	NPA per bgy 2012	0.225	0.225	0.140
	NPA per bgy 2011	0.255	0.255	0.144
	PAMANA per bgy 2012	0.331	0.331	0.006
	PAMANA per bgy 2011	0.093	0.093	0.005
	Kalahi per bgy 2012	0.165	0.165	0.057
	Kalahi per bgy 2011	0.106	0.106	0.022
	2010 Population	21603.993	21603.993	31431.698
	2010 Education	1.644	1.644	1.886
	2010 Home - Good	0.381	0.381	0.366
	2010 Household Size	3.588	3.588	3.492
	2010 % OFW	0.012	0.012	0.025
	2010 % Age 18-39	0.595	0.595	0.555
	2010 % Single	0.260	0.260	0.277
	2010 % Islam	0.153	0.153	0.006
	2010 % Catholic	0.650	0.650	0.820
	2010 % Indigenous	0.345	0.345	0.142
Post-Treatment Vars	PAMANA per bgy 2015	0.528	0.294	0.018
	PAMANA per bgy 2014	0.707	0.418	0.012
	Kalahi per bgy 2015	0.512	0.529	0.330
	Kalahi per bgy 2014	0.377	0.399	0.061
	Kalahi per bgy 2013	0.337	0.255	0.058
	NPA per bgy 2015	0.134	0.108	0.047
	NPA per bgy 2014	0.147	0.125	0.080
	NPA per bgy 2013	0.215	0.192	0.108



# Case Study Methodology

## Case selection

For the qualitative case studies we selected six locations, representing each of the three conflict lines. We selected Samar, Bicol and Caraga for the CNN conflict line and Maguindanao for the ARMM-focused component of the Bangsamoro conflict line. Given the complexity of the MNLF peace process, the case study was not constrained to one geographic location. Instead, it followed the complementarity of PAMANA to Track 1 discussions across the various factions, leading to respondents from Sarangani, Davao, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan. The province of focus for the RPA case study is still being finalized since a replacement researcher was only recently hired. Upon advice from OPAPP officials, no primary data collection was conducted for the Cordillera Bodong Association-Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CBA-CPLA) conflict line due to sensitivities that made field activities infeasible at this time. For the survey, we followed the Evaluation Reference Group's (ERG's) requests to focus on the Bangsamoro and RPA conflict lines as local level information on citizen's attitudes is important in these areas where localized peace processes are being implemented and can be used to inform other conflict line negotiations that have not reached this stage yet.

The case study researchers used key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) to examine the cross-cutting inquiries of interest for each case study. Researchers determined the unit of analysis – i.e. municipality, project, individual beneficiary – based on the conflict-specific issue of interest and compared units that varied on key outcomes of interest or potential intervening variables. This allowed for comparative process tracing that highlighted the conditions and intervening variables that shaped PAMANA's implementation and effects.

## Sampling

Researchers selected key informants and FGD participants based on purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling identifies participants based on pre-identified criteria informed by the research question, while snowball sampling relies on participants to refer the researcher to other potential participants. Snowball sampling is particularly useful in a conflict setting because this technique helps locate hard-to-reach sectors and populations. Several steps were taken to mitigate the selection bias that results from non-random sampling techniques. Researchers improved representativeness through quota sampling, ensuring participation across different identity categories – age, gender, ethnicity, etc. As much as possible, we assigned local case study researchers to each field site, which reduced the amount of distrust researchers faced from informants.

## Analysis

After field work, researchers analyzed their findings based on a pre-determined framework. These individual write-ups informed the broader findings in this report and have been woven into the report alongside the analysis of survey and administrative data.

## **Annex D: Project Documents Reviewed**

- PDP 2011–2016 Chapter 9
- PDP 2011–2016 Midterm Update
- PDP 2017–2022 (Chapter 17, page 259)
- PAMANA-CSPP MEAL Manual
- PAMANA Results Framework
- PAMANA Program Review Report
- Annex F of OPAPP 2016 Terminal Report (PAMANA Program)
- PAMANA Manual of Operations 2017
- PAMANA Guidebook 2016
- PAMANA Implementing Guidelines
  - Implementing Guidelines for the PAMANA Projects in MNLF Communities in ARMM
  - Implementing Guidelines for the 2016 PAMANA Program Implementation of ARMM
  - Guidelines in the Implementation of the PAMANA Program of DA (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)
  - PAMANA-ARA Operations Manual for DAR (2012, 2015)
  - Memorandum of Agreement between DA and DAR
  - Implementing Guidelines on Providing Employment Opportunities to Beneficiaries in Support of the Peace Process through the National Greening Program, Forest Protection and Other Forestry-Related Activities (DENR)

- Guidelines in the Management of the PAMANA or PAMANA-DILG Fund for Infrastructure Component (2012, 2016)
- Supplemental Guidelines for the Management of the PAMANA-DILG Fund
- PAMANA-KALAHI-CIDSS Operations Manual
- Enhanced Guidelines on the Implementation of the PAMANA-SLP (DSWD)
- Implementing Guidelines for the OPAPP-CHED Study Grant Program (2013)
- Memorandum of Agreement between OPAPP and CHED (2013)
- Memorandum of Agreement between PhilHealth and OPAPP (2013)
- PAMANA-ARMM Program
- General Appropriations Act sections related to PAMANA (2011–2019)
- Agreement between Government of the Republic of the Philippines through the OPAPP and IOM on the Implementation of the FY 2017 PAMANA Projects in the ARMM
- PAMANA for CNN Affected Areas 25 April 2013
- PAMANA in Support of the Peace Process with the CPP NPA NDF
- PAMANA Planning Documents
- PAMANA Accomplishment Reports
- PAMANA ARMM Terminal Report
- Resolutions of Local Special Bodies
- CSPP Guidebooks
- MPDLGP documents

## Annex E: List of High-Level KIIs

Name	Affiliation
Jana Gallardo	OPAPP
Evelyn Daplas	OPAPP
Lakambini Magdamo	OPAPP
Eileen Jose	OPAPP
Luisito Montalbo	OPAPP
Howard Cafugauan	OPAPP
Susan Marcaida	OPAPP
Veronica Tabara (Ka Inca)	RPA
Camilo Gudmalin	DSWD
Christian Deloria	DSWD
Austere Panadero	DILG
Maria Theresa Baul	DAR
Lita Rosales	DAR
Dr. Judith de Guzman	OPAPP
Nonito M. Tamayo	DENR
Forester Bert Lansigan	DENR
Emmanuel Bautista	AFP
Jenifer Galorport	DILG

Jed Castrillo	DILG
Mario Paz	DILG
Fred Narte	DILG
Dong Anayatin	ARMM
Engr. Baintan Adil-Ampatuan	ARMM
Hadja Bainon Karon	ARMM
Ollie Binancilan	OPAPP
Imelda Bonifacio	OPAPP
Allan Almoite	OPAPP
Paul Escobar	OPAPP
Johnnel Raneses	OPAPP
Hadzer Birowa	OPAPP
Bong Montesa	UNDP
EJ Galang	UNDP
Atty. Laisa Alamia	ARMM
Peter Hauschnik	GIZ
Marco Chimenton	IOM Cotabato
Rahima (Khim) Alba	DSWD ARMM
Marifah Agar	IOM Cotabato
Erika Pellobello	IOM Cotabato

## Annex F: Survey Questionnaires

### Negros-Panay Citizen Survey

Var	QUESTION TEXT	Options
	You are about to begin a new survey for PAMANA MEMBERS AND CIVILIANS. Is this correct?	
	Please select your name.	Enumerator: from list
survey.province	Please choose the province where you are conducting the survey.	Municipality: from list Barangay: from list
survey.muni	Please choose the municipality where you are conducting the survey.	
survey.brgy	Please choose the barangay where you are conducting the survey.	
	Please read the consent statement to the respondent.	
consent.ask	Did you ask the respondent if they consented to participate?	0–No 1–Yes
consent	Did the respondent give their consent to participate?	0–No 1–Yes
	Hello! Thank you so much for your time and attention today. In this survey, we will be covering a number of topics, including poverty, conflict, and relationships of people in your barangay. We'll start with a few basic questions about yourself.	
age	What is your age today, in years?	
reside.time	How long have you been staying here in this city/municipality?	Years: _____

origin.province	What is your province of origin?	Province: from list Municipality: from list
origin.muni	What is your municipality of origin?	
marital.status	Do you have a spouse or partner?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	0–Never married 1–Married/Living together 2–Separated 3–Widowed -97–Do not know
edu.formal	What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?	0–No formal education 1–Some elementary 2–Completed elementary (Elem. Graduate) 3–Some high school 4–Completed high school (High-School Graduate) 5–Some college 6–Completed college (College Graduate) 7–Graduate school or more -97–Do not know
edu.other	Do you have non-formal/other forms of education and training?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	0–No 1–Technical 2–Vocational 3–Language 5–ALS 88–Other -97–Do not know



employed	Do you have a job at present, not have a job at present but used to have a job, or never had a job?	0–Never had a job 1–Has a job, includes unpaid family worker 2–Does not have a job now but had a job before -97–Do not know
wantswork	[IF employed = 0 or 2:]  Are you looking for a job or planning to establish a business?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know
wantswork.why	[IF wantswork = 0:]  Why are you not looking for a job? Choose all of the following that apply. Is it because...?	1–Believes that there are no available jobs 2–Illness/Disability (temporary or permanent) 3–Too old/retired 4–Household or family duties 5–Currently studying 88–Other -97–Do not know
wantswork.when	[IF wantswork= 0:]  When was the last time you looked for a job?	1–6 months or less 2–More than 6 months ago -97–Do not know
language	What is the primary language you use at home?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	1–Tagalog/Filipino 2–Cebuano/Bisaya 3–Hiligaynon/Ilonggo 88–Other -97–Do not know
religion	What is your religion?	0–Not religious 1–Roman Catholic

		2-Protestant 3-Iglesia Ni Cristo 4-Islam/Muslim 5-Seventh Day Adventist 6-Baptist 7-Born Again 8-Dating Daan 9-Jehovah's Witness 10-Mormon (Latter Day Saints) 88-Other -97-Do not know
ethnicity	Would you consider yourself as:	1-Cebuano 2-Ilonggo 3-Tagalog 88-Other -97-Do not know
ip	Are you a member of an IP community?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
ip.group	[IF ip = 1]  Which IP community are you a member of?	1-Ati 2-Ata 3-Magahat 4-Sulod 5-Bukidnon 88-Other

		-97-Do not know
govt.ip	[IF ip = 1]  Do you have an official role in the Tribal Council?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
govt.ip.role	What is your role?	Role: _____
govt.local	Do you have an official role in your local government?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
govt.local.role	What is your role?	0-No 1-Kapitan 2-Kagawad 3-SK Chair 4-SK Council 5-Tanod 88-Other, please specify: _____ -97-Do not know
org.po	Are you a member of:	1-CPD People's Organization 2-SLP Beneficiary Association 0-Neither
org	Other than those two, are you a member of any of the following types of associations? Choose all that apply.	1-Farmer's group or cooperative 2-Religious association 3-Women's group or association 4-Water committee or management group 5-School committee/club/PTA 6-Sports, music, drama, or dance club

		88–Other -97–Do not know
assets.household	Do you or someone from your household have these items? Choose all that apply.	10–Shared toilet 11–Own toilet, flushing 12–Own toilet, bucket flushing 20–Telephone landline 30–Cellular phone 40–Radio 50–TV 61–Bank account 62–Credit card 63–Insurance 70–Computer without internet 71–Computer with internet 81–Email address 82–Facebook 91–3- or 4-wheeled motor vehicle 93–2-wheeled motor vehicle 95–Firearm for protection -97–Do not know
assets.water	What is the household's main water source?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CLARIFY AND CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	1–Own Use, Faucet, Community Water System 2–Shared, Faucet, Community Water System 3–Own Use, Tubed/Piped Well 4–Shared, Tubed/Piped Well

		5-Dug Well 6-Deep Well 7-Spring, River, Stream, etc. 8-Collected Rainfall 9-Peddler 88-Other -97-Do not know
assets.elec	What is the main source of electricity supply in this household, if any?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CLARIFY AND CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	1-Electricity through electric coop. 2-Petromax 3-Kerosene 4-Generator 5-Solar 88-Other -97-Do not know
assets.elec2	On a typical day, how many hours do you have access to electricity in your household?	Hours: _____
assets.tenure	Do you own or rent your house and lot?	0-Do not have access to a house and lot 1-Owns house and lot 2-Owns house only, not paying for lot 3-Owns house, renting lot 4-Renting house 5-Do not pay rent for house and lot 88-Other -97-Do not know
assets.rent	How much per month are you paying for rent?	Rent/month: _____

sector1	<p>What has been your household's PRIMARY source of income in the past 12 months?</p> <p>[FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CLARIFY AND CODE INTO CATEGORIES]</p>	<p>1–Farming</p> <p>2–Fishing</p> <p>3–Education or teaching</p> <p>4–Self-Employed (Food Vendor, Craftmaker, Small Shop Owner. or Trader)</p> <p>5–Government (Bureaucratic)</p> <p>6–Government (Political)</p> <p>7–Services (Beautician, carpenter, cook, welder, labor, driving, etc.)</p> <p>8–Construction</p> <p>9–Health Services</p> <p>10–Office job/white collar</p> <p>11–Student</p> <p>12–OFW</p> <p>13–Resource extraction (Logging, charcoaling, mining)</p> <p>14–Pension</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
sector.registered	<p>[IF sector = 4,7,8,10,13,88]</p> <p>Are you working in:</p>	<p>1–Registered private company or own business</p> <p>2–Unregistered/informal private company or own business</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
income1	How much was your revenue from this primary source of income?	Revenue: _____
income1.period	<p>[ENUMERATOR CODED]</p> <p>What was the unit of time for revenue?</p>	<p>1–Per year</p> <p>2–Per month</p>

		3-Per week 4-Per day 5-Per harvest 88-Other -97-Do not know
sector2	Can you tell me any OTHER sources of household income you have had in the past 12 months, including all economic activities and investments, as well as remittances and aid? Choose all that apply.	1-Farming 2-Fishing 3-Education or teaching 4-Self-Employed (Food Vendor, Craftmaker, Small Shop Owner. or Trader) 5-Government (Bureaucratic) 6-Government (Political) 7-Services (Beautician, carpenter, cook, welder, labor, driving, etc.) 8-Construction 9-Health Services 10-Office job/white collar 11-Student 12-OFW 13-Resource extraction (Logging, charcoaling, mining) 14-Pension 88-Other -97-Do not know
income2	How much was your revenue from all these OTHER sources of income combined (exclude primary source of income)?	Combined revenue: _____

income2.period	[ENUMERATOR CODED]  What was the unit of time for revenue?	1-Per year 2-Per month 3-Per week 4-Per day 5-Per harvest 88-Other: _____ -97-Do not know
harvest.cycle	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  How many times did you harvest in the last 12 months?	No. of harvests: _____
harvest.invest	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  How much money did you invest in this activity?	Amount of investment: _____
harvest.invest.t	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  [ENUMERATOR CODED]  What was the unit of time for investment?	1-Per year 2-Per month 3-Per week 4-Per day 5-Per production cycle
tenure.own	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  Do you own the land that you use for farming?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
tenure.land	[IF tenure.own = 1]  How many hectares of land do you own?	No. of hectares owned: _____
tenure.titled	[IF tenure.own = 1]  How many hectares of land that you own are titled?	No. of hectares titled: _____



tenure.rent	[IF tenure.own = 0]  What is your land tenure arrangement?	1–Share tenant 2–Lease holder 3–Free 88–Other -97–Do not know
tenure.rentshare	[IF tenure.rent = 1]  What is the share percentage?	% owner: _____ % tenant: _____
till	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  Do you till the land?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know
assets.farm1	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  Do you own any farm implements?	0–None 1–Draft animal (e.g. carabao, cow, horse) 2–Plow and harrow 3–Tractor 4–Generator (irrigation, watering) 5–Rake 6–Harvester 7–Scythe 88–Other, please specify -97 -Do not know
assets.farm2	[IF SELECTED sector1 = 1 OR sector2 = 1]  Do you own any post-harvest facilities?	0–None 1–Solar dryer 2–Coal dryer (for rainy season) 3–Warehouse/storage 4–Rice mill (manual pounding) 5–Roaster

		88–Other, please specify -97–Do not know
services.school	Which of the following types of schools do members of your household have access to?	0–None 1–Elementary school 2–High School -97–Do not know
services.elem	[IF services.elem = 1] How long does it take you to get from your home to the elementary school by motorcycle?	1–Less than 15 minutes 2–15-30 minutes 3–30-60 minutes 4–More than 1 hour -97–Do not know
services.high	[IF services.school = 2] How long does it take you to get from your home to the high school by motorcycle?	1–Less than 15 minutes 2–15-30 minutes 3–30-60 minutes 4–More than 1 hour -97–Do not know
services.otheredu	Do members of your household have access to scholarships, day care, or other education-related opportunities? Choose all that apply.  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CLARIFY AND CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	1 -Alternative Learning System (ALS) 2 -Special Program for Employment of Students (SPES) 3–Other scholarships (CHED, OPAPP, etc.) 4–Day Care 88–Other -97–Do not know
services.hlth	Do you have access to the following health facilities? Choose all that apply.	1–Barangay Health Center 2–Private Hospital

		3–Public Hospital 4–Traditional Healer 5–Rural health Unit 6–Health and dental facility run by revolutionary group -97–Do not know
services.hlth.t	For the health facility you attend most often, how long does it take you to get from your home to the health facility?	1–Less than 15 minutes 2–15-30 minutes 3–30-60 minutes 4–More than 1 hour -97–Do not know
displaced	Since 2000, have you or your household ever experienced displacement because of armed conflict?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know
displaced.num	[IF displaced = 1] How many times did you or your household experience displacement due to armed conflict?	No. of times displaced: _____
displaced.yrs	[IF displaced = 1] Since 2000, could you tell us which years you experienced displacement due to armed conflict? Choose all that apply.	1–2000 2–2001 3–2002 4–2003 5–2004 6–2005 7–2006 8–2007 9–2008

		10–2009 11–2010 12–2011 13–2012 14–2013 15–2014 16–2015 17–2016 18–2017 19–2018 20–2019 -97–Do not know
displaced.duration	[IF displaced = 1] How long was the longest displacement?	Years: _____ Months: _____
displaced.location	[IF displaced = 1] Where did you mainly go?	1–Evacuation center 2–Other sitio/purok, same barangay 3–Other barangay, same municipality 4–Other municipality, same province 5–Other province 6–Other country 88–Other -97–Do not know
displaced.return	[IF displaced = 1] Did you return to your place of origin?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know

displaced.effect	<p>[IF displaced = 1]</p> <p>How did the displacement caused by armed conflict affect your household? (choose up to 3 answers)</p>	<p>1–Lost home</p> <p>2–Lost land</p> <p>3–Lost livestock</p> <p>4–No school</p> <p>5–Lost money</p> <p>6–Lost life</p> <p>7–Suffering</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
	<p>Finally, I'd like to conclude this section on economic conditions by asking you a few questions about your personal opinions on your economic situation.</p>	
self.poverty.abs	<p>Where would you place your family on this scale?</p>	<p>1–Poor</p> <p>2–Earning just enough</p> <p>3–Not poor</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
self.poverty.rel	<p>Compared to the other families who live in your barangay, would you estimate that your family is:</p>	<p>1–Much poorer than average</p> <p>2–A little poorer than average</p> <p>3–About average</p> <p>4–A little richer than average</p> <p>5–Much richer than average</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
self.hunger	<p>In the last 3 months, did your family ever experience hunger and not have anything to eat?</p>	<p>0 –No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
self.hunger.num	<p>[IF self.hunger = 1]</p>	<p>1–Only once</p>

	How often did it happen?	2–A few times 3–Often 4–Always -97–Do not know
self.change.past	During the last 5 years, do you think that the economic situation of your household has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated?	1–Much worse now than before 2–Worse now than before 3–Same as before 4–Better now than before 5–Much better now than before -97–Do not know
self.change.future	In your opinion, what will the quality of your life be in 12 months from now compared to today?	1–Will be much worse 2–Will be worse 3–Will be the same 4–Will be better 5–Will be much better -97–Do not know
	The following section will deal with peace and conflict. Some of the questions are sensitive. I want to reiterate to you that all of your responses are completely anonymous and as soon as the survey is complete, no one will be able to associate your name with your answers.	
	I'm now going to read you a number of statements. Please let me know to what extent you agree or disagree with them.	
security.bgy	I feel safe walking in my barangay at night.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral

		4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
role.community	My community leaders play an active role in keeping my barangay peaceful.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
role.self	I play an active role in keeping a peaceful community.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
activerole.free	[IF role.self = 4 or 5]  Please describe how you do so in one sentence.	
	I'm now going to ask you some general questions about the groups people in your barangay support. Some of the answers to these questions are sensitive and so if you would like your answers to remain entirely anonymous, including to me, you can select the answer choices yourself. In these cases, I WILL READ the question to you and then let you select your answer on the tablet. After you finish answering, SWIPE LEFT to go to the next question. If you do not want to answer a particular question, you can also SWIPE LEFT without selecting an answer. Remember that you can select	

	multiple answers to each of these questions. Here are a couple of examples:	
practice1	Which of these restaurants do your neighbors eat at?	1 -Jollibee 2-Chow King 3-Greenwich 4-McDo- 5-Mang Inasal -97-Do not know
practice2	Which of these pets do your neighbors have?	1 -Cats 2-Dogs 3-Birds 4-Pigs 5-Fish -97-Do not know
	If everything is clear, let's begin?	
rpa.awareness	Which of the following groups are you aware of? Choose all that apply.	0-None 1-NPA 2-RPMP 3-RPA 4-TPG/KAPATIRAN
neighbor.sympathy	In your opinion, which armed groups do your neighbors have sympathy towards? Choose all that apply.	31-RPMP 32-RPA 33-TPG/KAPATIRAN 4-NPA 10-Private armed group 11-Military/CAFGU -97-Do not know
neighbor.support	To which of these groups do your neighbors provide support in the form of	31-RPMP 32-RPA 33-TPG/KAPATIRAN



	food, shelter, money, or other goods? Choose all that apply.	4–NPA 10–Private armed group 11–Military/CAFGU -97–Do not know
neighbor.join	Which of these groups has attempted to recruit your neighbors to join? Choose all that apply.	31–RPMP 32–RPA 33–TPG/KAPATIRAN 4–NPA 10–Private armed group 11–Military/CAFGU -97–Do not know
rank.strength	In this barangay, rank the armed groups from strongest to weakest.	31–RPMP 32–RPA 33–TPG/KAPATIRAN 4–NPA 10–Private armed group 11–Military/CAFGU -97–Do not know
security	How do the following groups affect security in your area?  - Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (RPMP)  - Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA)  - TPG/KAPATIRAN  - NPA  - CAFGU  - AFP  - PNP	0–Not relevant in my area  1–Greatly worsens security  2–Somewhat worsens security  3–Neutral  4–Somewhat improves security  5–Greatly improves security  -97–Do not know
	For the next set of questions, I will be reading a list of items/groups. After I have read all of them, kindly please tell me how many you generally like/support. Please do not tell me the names of the ones that you like/support; instead, tell me HOW MANY of the items/groups you like/support. Please allow me to read the entire list before you give me your answer.	

	First, let's do a couple for practice.	
list.practice1	<p>How many of these TV shows do you watch/support?</p> <p>A. Eat Bulaga</p> <p>B. Showtime</p> <p>C. Kadenang Ginto</p> <p>D. Ang Probinsyano</p> <p>E. Kapuso Mo, Jessica Soho</p>	<p>0-0</p> <p>1-1</p> <p>2-2</p> <p>3-3</p> <p>4-4</p> <p>5-5</p>
list.practice2	<p>How many of these basketball teams do you support?</p> <p>A. Barangay Ginebra</p> <p>B. Magnolia Hotshots</p> <p>C. Golden State Warriors</p> <p>D. Toronto Raptors</p> <p>E. Los Angeles Lakers</p>	<p>0 -0</p> <p>1 -1</p> <p>2 -2</p> <p>3 -3</p> <p>4 -4</p> <p>5 -5</p>
	If everything is clear, we will now move on to the main questions.	
list.groups 1	<p>How many of these groups do you support and/or have goals you generally agree with?</p> <p>A. Philippine Government</p> <p>B. The Catholic Church</p> <p>C. CPP/NPA [Treatment]</p> <p>D. RPA/RPMP</p> <p>E. International organizations</p>	<p>0-0</p> <p>1-1</p> <p>2-2</p> <p>3-3</p> <p>4-4</p> <p>5-5</p>

list.groups2	<p>How many of these groups do you support and/or have goals you generally agree with?</p> <p>A. DepEd</p> <p>B. Local NGOs/CSOs</p> <p>C. DOH</p> <p>D. RPA/RPMP/TPG/KAPATIRAN [Treatment]</p> <p>E. PNP</p>	<p>0-0</p> <p>1-1</p> <p>2-2</p> <p>3-3</p> <p>4-4</p> <p>5-5</p>
	<p>I will now be reading a list of policies. After I have read all of the policies, again please only tell me HOW MANY of these policies you agree with. Please allow me to read the entire list before you give me your answer.</p>	
list.policies1	<p>A. More frequent investigation of potential misuse of local government budgets.</p> <p>B. Decrease the amount of tax deducted from employee's salary.</p> <p>C. Make it illegal for any mayor or local official to employ a relative in their agency or municipality.</p> <p>D. [the treatment] An all-out war with the NPA.</p>	<p>0-0</p> <p>1-1</p> <p>2-2</p> <p>3-3</p> <p>4-4</p>
endorse1	<p>Mining is an important economic activity in many rural parts of the Philippines, but it also increases the danger of landslides and flooding in these areas. It has recently been suggested [BY ACTOR] that a partial mining ban be implemented nationwide. What are your feelings towards this policy?</p>	<p>1-Strongly oppose</p> <p>2-Somewhat oppose</p> <p>3-Indifferent</p> <p>4-Somewhat support</p> <p>5-Strongly support</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
endorse2	<p>The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) was conceived as a way to involve the youth</p>	<p>1-Strongly oppose</p>

	in civic affairs; however, the SK has also been criticized for misallocating funds. It has recently been suggested [BY ACTOR] that the SK be reformed and strengthened. What are your feelings towards this policy?	2–Somewhat oppose 3–Indifferent 4–Somewhat support 5–Strongly support -97–Do not know
	I'm now going to ask you a few questions about your knowledge of the security situation in OTHER barangays near yours.	
infosecurity.mil	Here is a list of other barangays in your municipality. If you were to guess, in which three of these barangays do you think the military has the strongest presence?	Barangays: from list
infosecurity.reb	In which three of these barangays do you think non-state armed groups have the strongest presence?	Barangays: from list
info.violence	Which three of these barangays do you think have experienced the most violence over the last three years?	Barangays: from list
infosource.sec	What types of information did you use to make these determinations? Please select all that apply	1–Local News Sources 2–National News Sources 3–Facebook 4–Information directly from the military 5–Information directly from armed groups 6–Talking to friends and family members in person 7–Talking to friends and family via SMS or on the phone 88–Other -97–Do not know

	<p>I would now like you to think of your three closest friends or family members who live outside of your household; people that you spend time with on a day-to-day basis. You may keep their names to yourself, but please take care to differentiate them in your mind when answering the next set of questions.</p> <p>(Offer to have the respondent do self-enumeration.)</p>	
individual1_attr – individual3_attr	<p>(REPEAT 3 TIMES)</p> <p>Please keep in mind the FIRST/SECOND/THIRD person you thought of.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is he/she a civil servant?</li> <li>- Is he/she a migrant?</li> <li>- Is he/she an IP?</li> <li>- Is he/she a conflict victim?</li> <li>- Is he/she an ex-combatant?</li> <li>- Does he/she have ties to a rebel group?</li> <li>- Does he/she have ties to a private armed group?</li> <li>- Does he/she have ties to the government?</li> </ul>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
	<p>Thank you. I now have a few questions about your direct experiences with conflict. OFFER SELF-ENUMERATION FOR ALL THE FOLLOW-UPS.</p>	
victim.conflict	<p>Have you or a member of your direct family ever been a victim of the following? Please select all that apply.</p>	<p>0–none</p> <p>1–conflict related to land disputes</p> <p>2–conflict related to other family or neighbor disputes</p>

		<p>3–conflict between the government and an armed group</p> <p>4–conflict between two or more armed groups</p> <p>5–violence targeted at civilians by armed groups</p> <p>6–violence targeted at civilians by the military</p> <p>7–violent crime like assault, armed robbery, or murder</p> <p>8–petty crime like theft, trespassing, or harassment</p> <p>9–electoral violence</p>
victim.conflict.when	<p>[REPEAT FOR EACH SELECTION IN victim.conflict]</p> <p>When did the [ANSWER FROM victim.conflict] take place? Please select all that apply if it took place during more than one of these periods.</p>	<p>1–In the last year</p> <p>2–Between 1 and 3 years ago</p> <p>3–Between 3 and 5 years ago</p> <p>4–More than 5 years ago</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
victim.conflict.num	<p>[REPEAT FOR EACH SELECTION IN victim.conflict &amp; IF victim.conflict.when = 1] How many times has [ANSWER FROM victim.conflict] occurred in the past year?</p>	<p>1–Once</p> <p>2–2-3 times</p> <p>3–4-5 times</p> <p>4–6 or more times</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
victim.actor	<p>Have you or a member of your direct family experienced violence inflicted by the following actors in the past 5 years?</p> <p>- RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN</p> <p>- NPA</p> <p>- Private armed group</p>	<p>1–None</p> <p>2–Arrested</p> <p>3–Detained</p> <p>4–Threatened</p> <p>5–Injured or killed</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military / AFP</li> <li>- Police / PNP</li> <li>- CAGU</li> <li>- Barangay Tanods</li> </ul>	<p>88-Other, please specify: _____</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
security.past	During the last 5 years, do you think that the security situation of your area has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated?	<p>1-Much worse now than before</p> <p>2-Worse now than before</p> <p>3-Same as before</p> <p>4-Better now than before</p> <p>5-Much better now than before</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
security.future	In your opinion, what will the security of your area be like in the next 12 months?	<p>1-Will be much worse</p> <p>2-Will be worse</p> <p>3-Will be the same</p> <p>4-Will be better</p> <p>5-Will be much better</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
rebgov.control	Was there a time during which [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] had a regular and strong presence in the barangay, meaning they were in charge of some important aspects of daily life in the community and were not severely threatened by the military or other armed groups.	<p>0-No</p> <p>1-Yes</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p> <p>-98 -Refuse to answer</p>
	When you answer the following questions, I would like to ask you to think about the periods of time in this barangay during which the [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] was at their strongest and most active in the barangay.	

rebgov.inclusive	Who made day-to-day decisions in the barangay about how things should be done?	<p>1–Members of the community made their own decisions about how things should be done in the barangay; the [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] did not interfere with the community's plans and rules for the barangay.</p> <p>2–The [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] made decisions about how things should be done in the community—they created plans and rules for the community without asking community members for their opinion.</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
rebgov.violence	Which of the following two scenarios describes how the [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] used violence in the community?	<p>1–The [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] seemed to use violence unpredictably. Community members were too afraid to go on with day-to-day activities.</p> <p>2–The [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] only used violence to punish people who passed along information to the AFP.</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
rebgov.goods	What type of support have you received from an armed group in the last year? Choose all that apply.	<p>1–Money that was given</p> <p>2–Money that was lent</p> <p>3–Food</p> <p>4–Non-food items</p> <p>5–Job</p> <p>6–Support for schooling or training</p> <p>7–Protection in armed conflict</p> <p>8–Justice or dispute resolution</p> <p>9–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
rebgov.goods.who	[FOR EACH SELECTION IN rebgov.goods]	<p>1–NPA</p> <p>2–RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN</p>



	Which group provided you with [SELECTION]?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	88–Other, please specify  -97–Do not know
rebgov.taxation	Did the [ARMED OPPOSITION GROUP] require citizens to give the group any of the following or was contribution voluntary?  - Food  - Shelter  - Taxes  - Information	0–Voluntary  1- Required  -97–Do not know
	The following set of questions asks about the reintegration of former combatants into your community.	
former.combatant	Do you consider yourself an ex-combatant?	0–No  1–Yes
former.combatant.grp	[IF former.combatant = 1]:  Which group were you formerly a part of?	31–RPMP  32–RPA  33–TPG/KAPATIRAN  4–NPA  10–Private armed group  88–Other  -97–Do not know
rpa.integrate1	People in my barangay willingly accept returnees and ex-combatants into the community.	1–Strongly disagree  2–Disagree  3–Neutral  4–Agree  5–Strongly agree

		-97-Do not know
rpa.integrate2	Businesses in my barangay are willing to hire returnees and ex-combatants as employees.	1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree -97-Do not know
rpa.integrate3	Ex-combatants in my barangay are more engaged in improving peace and development than they are in violence and crime.	1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree -97-Do not know
	Thank you for your answers so far! I'm now going to ask you a series of questions about development programs in your barangay.	
proj.aware.type	What types of projects are you aware of that have benefited people in your barangay over the last three (3) years?	1-New roads or pathways 2-New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3-New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4-New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5-Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6-Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7-Programs that reintegrate ex-combatants

		8-Conditional cash transfer 88-Other -97-Do not know
proj.aware.funds	As you may also know, these types of projects are funded by several different programs or sources. Which of the following programs are you aware of?	1-PAMANA 2-Kalahi-CIDDS 3-SLP 4-4Ps (Pantawid) 5-TISP 6-International Organization (USAID, GIZ, JISP) 7-Sajahatra Bangsamoro 88-Other -97-Do not know
proj.benefit.funds	Which of the following specific programs have you personally benefitted from?	1-PAMANA 2-Kalahi-CIDDS 3-SLP 4-4Ps (Pantawid) 5-TISP 6-International Organization (USAID, GIZ) 7-Sajahatra Bangsamoro 88-Other -97-Do not know
proj.satisfaction	What is your overall satisfaction with the services provided by [PROJECT FUNDER FROM proj.benefit.funds]?	1-Very dissatisfied 2-Dissatisfied 3-Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4-Satisfied

		5-Very satisfied -97-Do not know
proj.benefit.type	Which of the following types of projects have you personally benefitted from?	1-New roads or pathways 2-New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3-New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4-New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5-Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6-Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7-Programs that reintegrate ex-combatants 8-Conditional cash transfer 9-Other -97-Do not know
pam.aware	[IF SELECTED proj.aware.funds = 1] Which kinds of PAMANA projects do you know of that were implemented specifically in your barangay during the past five years or so?	1-New roads or pathways 2-New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3-New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4-New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5-Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6-Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7-Programs that reintegrate ex-combatants

		8-Conditional cash transfer 88-Other -97-Do not know
po.inform	[IF org.po = 1] Have you been informed that you were selected to receive livelihood support through Community Peace Dividends (CPD) or PAMANA-SLP?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
po.disbursed	[IF org.po = 1] Have funds been disbursed for your PO's project?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
po.implement	[IF po.disbursed = 1] Has your PO begun to implement the project?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
po.implement.no	[IF po.implement = 0] Why do you think the project has not been implemented yet?	
po.produce	[IF po.implement = 1] Is the PAMANA livelihood project already producing benefits for your PO?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
livelihood.ben	[IF po.produce = 1] Have you personally benefited from the project?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
po.notproduce.ben	[IF po.produce = 0] Do you believe you will receive benefits once the project is fully implemented?	0-No 1-Yes -97-Do not know
po.notproduce.ben.why	[IF po.notproduce.ben = 0] Why do you believe this?	1-Project will not be successful 2-I will not be included in the benefits 3-I am not interested in participating in the project

		4–The funds will not be disbursed 5–Benefits will not be shared fairly 88–Other -97–Do not know
livelihood.ben.satisfaction	[IF livelihood.ben = 1] How satisfied have you been with the livelihood assistance?	1–Very dissatisfied 2–Dissatisfied 3–Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4–Satisfied 5–Very satisfied -97–Do not know
po.member.benefit.fair	[IF livelihood.ben = 1] To what extent do you feel that the livelihood program benefits given to your PO have been shared fairly with you?	1–Benefits have been shared unfairly 2–Benefits have been shared somewhat unfairly 3–Benefits have been shared neither fairly nor unfairly 4–Benefits have been shared somewhat fairly 5–Benefits have been shared fairly
rpa.fairdev	[IF SELECTED pam.aware = 5] Would you say that former rebels and ex-combatants have benefitted fairly from PAMANA livelihood programs compared to regular citizens in the barangay?	0–Do not know any ex-combatants in the barangay 1–Unfairly favored civilians 2–Slightly favored civilians 3–Benefits distributed fairly 4–Slightly favored returnees 5–Unfairly favored returnees -97–Do not know
po.aware	[IF org.po = 0]	0–No

	Are you aware of any people's organizations in your barangay that provide livelihood assistance?	1–Yes -97–Do not know
po.benefit.industry	[IF po.aware = 1 OR org.po = 1]  To what extent does the livelihood assistance focus on an important industry in your barangay?	0–Not at all 1–Not very much 3–Neutral 4–Somewhat 5–Very much
po.benefit.others	[IF po.aware = 1]  To what extent do the livelihood projects of POs/SLPAs help provide smallholder farmers, fisherfolk, microenterprises, etc. access to markets outside the community?	0–Not at all 1–Not very much 3–Neutral 4–Somewhat 5–Very much
pam.consult1	Compared to other similar projects or services delivered to your barangay, the community was more involved in the project planning than usual.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
pam.consult2	People in my community were consulted about what type of project would best meet our needs.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
pamdif.needs	The project(s) addressed the most important needs of the community.	1–Strongly disagree

		2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree -97-Do not know
pam.impact	The overall impact of the project(s) on the barangay was:	1-Very negative 2-Somewhat negative 3-Neutral 4-Somewhat positive 5-Very positive -97-Do not know
pam.underfire	Armed groups in the area tried to undermine the project.	1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree -97-Do not know
pam.fair	The benefits from the projects or services were distributed fairly to the people in the barangay	1-Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly agree -97-Do not know
pam.timely	How would you describe the extent of timeliness or delays in the completion of these projects (on average)?	0-Never implemented 1-Very delayed (a year or more)



		2–Somewhat delayed (several months) 3–Usually on time (weeks) 4–Always on time -97–Do not know
pam.worthit	The completed project is worth the amount that the government announced?	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
pam.neginfl	Were there certain people or groups who exercised too much influence in the planning and implementation of these projects?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know
pam.neginfl.who	[IF pam.neginfl = 1] Who were these people?	Free response
pam.sustain	For these projects, did they last for at least three (3) years and still have functional/operational roles?	0–No 1–Yes, some of them 2–Yes, all of them -97–Do not know
pam.corrupt	Do you think there were funds allocated to these projects that were not actually used to implement the projects?	0–No 1–Yes, a little 2–Yes, a lot -97–Do not know

proj.desires	What types of projects or services would you most like to see be expanded in your barangay? Select up to three (3)	1–New roads or pathways 2–New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3–New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4–New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5–Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6–Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7–Programs that reintegrate ex-combatants 8–Conditional cash transfer 88–Other -97–Do not know
proj.duplicate	How much do you agree with the following statement? The different agencies and organizations that implement development projects in my community do not duplicate their efforts.	1–Strongly disagree 2–Disagree 3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
	Great, thank you for those answers. I'm now going to ask you about TWO hypothetical projects that might be implemented in your barangay. For each pair of projects, please tell me WHICH ONE of them you would prefer. Notice that for each pair, some of the characteristics might be the same but some are different. Let's start with a practice.	

conjoint.practice	Which of these Jollibee meals would you prefer?	1–Set A: 1 piece Chicken Joy, Jolly Spaghetti, large Coke, French fries  2–Set B: 2 piece Chicken Joy, rice, medium iced tea, peach mango pie  -97–Do not know
	Great! Now let's move on to the real thing.	
conjoint1	Imagine that there are two development projects being considered for your area. They have a number of different characteristics. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	1–Project A  2–Project B  -97–Do not know
conjoint2	Now consider these two projects. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	1–Project A  2–Project B  -97–Do not know
conjoint3	Now consider these two projects. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	1–Project A  2–Project B  -97–Do not know
	I'm now going to ask you a few questions about any projects you know about that were implemented in OTHER barangays in your municipality.	
infodev.mil	Which three of these barangays do you think has received the MOST economic services from the government over the last five years?	Barangays: from list
infodev.reb	Which three of these barangays do you think has received the LEAST economic services from the government over the last five years?	Barangays: from list
infosource.dev	What types of information did you use to make these determinations? Please select all that apply.	1–Local News Sources  2–National News Sources

		3–Facebook 4–Information directly from the military 5–Information directly from armed groups 6–Talking to friends and family members in person 7–Talking to friends and family via SMS or on the phone 88–Other -97–Do not know
pam.future1	What is the most important factor in sustaining projects like these?	1–Contributions from the community 2–Contributions from the government 3–Contributions from other donors 4–Other -97–Do not know
	Great, thank you for those answers so far. I now want to ask you a few questions about the social conditions in your barangay.	
identity	Which of the following is the most important to how you identify yourself?	2–Tribe 3–Religion 4–Ethnicity 88–Other, please specify -97–Do not know
cohesion.coop	Sometimes it is hard to work together for community goods because of differences that exist between people living in the same barangay. WITHIN your barangay, do people from these different groups have trouble working together? - People of different families	1–No trouble working together 2–Some trouble working together 3–A lot of trouble working together 4–Does not apply -97–Do not know

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People of different ethnicities</li> <li>- People of different religions</li> <li>- People of different tribes</li> <li>- People of different wealth (rich and poor)</li> <li>- Former rebels/ex-combatants and other barangay members</li> </ul>	
cohesion.trust	<p>To what extent would you be comfortable doing business with this type of individual in your barangay?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Someone outside your household</li> <li>- Someone from a different ethnic group</li> <li>- Someone with a different religion</li> <li>- Someone from a different tribe</li> <li>- [VARIES DEPENDING ON former.combatant] someone who is a former rebel or ex-combatant OR someone who is not a former rebel or ex-combatant</li> </ul>	<p>1-Very uncomfortable</p> <p>2-Somewhat uncomfortable</p> <p>3-Neutral</p> <p>4-Somewhat comfortable</p> <p>5-Very comfortable</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
cohesion.engage	<p>In the past 6 months, have you done any of the following? Choose all that apply.</p>	<p>1-Attended a community meeting</p> <p>2-Made a speech or suggestion at a community meeting</p> <p>3-Met with community leadership in your barangay to raise an issue</p> <p>4-Notified the police about a local problem or crime</p> <p>5-Met with or contacted a government official to raise an issue</p> <p>6-Campaigned for a political party or candidate</p> <p>7-Participated in a peaceful demonstration</p>

		-97-Do not know
inst.invest	<p>Imagine that the community receives funds to invest in improving the infrastructure in your barangay. A decision needs to be made about how the funds should be spent. To what extent do you trust the following actors to make this decision?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barangay leadership</li> <li>- Municipal leadership</li> <li>- National government</li> <li>- AFP</li> <li>- Local religious leaders</li> <li>- Community leaders</li> <li>- RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN Leadership</li> <li>- NPA Leadership</li> </ul>	<p>1-Strongly distrust</p> <p>2-Somewhat distrust</p> <p>3-Neutral</p> <p>4-Somewhat trust</p> <p>5-Strongly trust</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
inst.justice	<p>Imagine that there is a dispute in your barangay over land ownership. To what extent do you trust the following actors to resolve the dispute peacefully?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barangay leadership</li> <li>- Municipal leadership</li> <li>- National government</li> <li>- AFP</li> <li>- Local religious leaders</li> <li>- Community leaders</li> <li>- RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN Leadership</li> <li>- NPA Leadership</li> </ul>	<p>1-Strongly distrust</p> <p>2-Somewhat distrust</p> <p>3-Neutral</p> <p>4-Somewhat trust</p> <p>5-Strongly trust</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>

inst.access	<p>To what extent do you agree that the following actors are accessible to you when you need their help?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barangay leadership</li> <li>- Municipal leadership</li> <li>- PNP</li> <li>- Local religious leaders</li> <li>- Community leaders</li> <li>- RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN Leadership</li> <li>- NPA Leadership</li> </ul>	<p>1-Strongly disagree</p> <p>2-Disagree</p> <p>3-Neutral</p> <p>4-Agree</p> <p>5-Strongly agree</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
report.major	<p>If you observed someone committing a major crime, like a violent assault, inside your barangay, who (if anyone) would you be most likely to report the crime to?</p>	<p>1-Barangay leadership</p> <p>2-Police/PNP</p> <p>3-Local religious leaders</p> <p>4-RPA Leadership</p> <p>5-NPA Leadership</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
	<p>To what extent do you agree with the following statements?</p>	
represented	<p>I feel that my local government represents my interests well.</p>	<p>1-Strongly disagree</p> <p>2-Disagree</p> <p>3-Neutral</p> <p>4-Agree</p> <p>5-Strongly agree</p> <p>-97-Do not know</p>
inst.commit	<p>I feel that the Government of the Philippines is committed to providing economic development to my area.</p>	<p>1-Strongly disagree</p> <p>2-Disagree</p>

		3–Neutral 4–Agree 5–Strongly agree -97–Do not know
turnout	Did you vote in the May 2019 general election?	0–No 1–Yes -97–Do not know
votechoice.reason	How important are the following factors in your vote choice: - Candidate's political platform - Promises of jobs or private benefits to you or your household - Family ties to the candidate - Candidate's religion - Candidate's ethnicity	1–Not important at all 2–Somewhat unimportant 3–A little important 4–Somewhat important 5–Very important -97–Do not know
male	Respondent gender	0–Female 1–Male
crowd	Were others present and listening to responses during the interview?	0–No 1–1–2 people 2–3–5 people 3–6+ people
public	Was the interview conducted at a public institution?	0–No 1–Yes
scale.answer	Was the respondent able to answer the self-enumerated questions themselves?	0–No, I had to help click on the answers 1–Yes



distance.survey	Estimated distance from [place where interview was conducted] to the respondent's house?	0–N/A 1–0-10 minutes 2–10–20 minutes 3–20-30 minutes 4–30-60 minutes 5–60+ minutes
distance.live	Estimated distance from the respondent's house to barangay hall?	1–0-10 minutes 2–10–20 minutes 3–20-30 minutes 4–30-60 minutes 5–60+ minutes
proxy.status	Was the respondent a primary, proxy, or alternate?	1–Primary 2–Proxy
proxy.relationship	What was the proxy's relationship to the primary respondent?	1–Spouse (wife or husband) 2–Sibling (brother or sister) 3–Parent (mother or father) 4–Child (daughter or son) 5–Other relative (aunt, uncle, cousin, niece, nephew, grandparent, in-law, etc.) 6–Non-relative (housekeeper, friend, etc.)
proxy.reason	What was the reason for not being able to interview the primary respondent?	1–At work or school 2–Unlocated or unknown 3–Lives in another province (including Manila) 4–Lives in another barangay (in the same province) 5–Vacation or temporary work

		6–OFW 7–Refused interview 8–Sick, drunk, mentally unable 9–Deceased
assets.roof	What type of construction materials are the roofs made of?	0–N/A 1–Thatch or plant materials 2–Wood 3–Tarp or other plastic 4–Zinc or other metal 5–Concrete or cement 88–Other

## Negros-Panay Barangay Head Survey

Var	QUESTION TEXT	Options
leader.type	Are you interviewing the Barangay Captain or the PAMANA Head?	1–Barangay Captain 2–PAMANA PO/SLPA Head
	Hello! Thank you so much for your time and attention today. In this survey, we will be covering a number of topics, including poverty, conflict, and relationships of people in your barangay. We'll start with a few basic questions about yourself.	

age	What is your age today, in years?	
reside.time	How long have you been staying here in this city/municipality?	Years: _____
origin	What is your province and municipality of origin?	Province: from list Municipality: from list
marital.status	Do you have a spouse or partner?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	0–Never married 1–Married/Living together 2–Separated 3–Widowed -97–Do not know
edu.formal	What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?	0–No formal education 1–Some elementary 2–Completed elementary (Elem. Graduate) 3–Some high school

		4–Completed high school (High-School Graduate)  5–Some college  6–Completed college (College Graduate)  7–Graduate school or more  -97–Do not know
edu.other	Do you have non-formal/other forms of education and training?  [FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]	0–No  1–Technical  2–Vocational  3–Language  5–ALS  88–Other  -97–Do not know
employed	[IF leader.type = 2]  Do you have a job at present, not have a job at present but used to have a job, or never had a job?	0–Never had a job  1–Has a job, includes unpaid family worker  2–Does not have a job now but had a job before  -97–Do not know

wantswork	<p>[IF employed = 0 or 2:]</p> <p>Are you looking for a job or planning to establish a business?</p>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
wantswork.why	<p>[IF wantswork = 0:]</p> <p>Why are you not looking for a job? Choose all of the following that apply. Is it because...?</p>	<p>1–Believes that there are no available jobs</p> <p>2–Illness/Disability (temporary or permanent)</p> <p>3–Too old/retired</p> <p>4–Household or family duties</p> <p>5–Currently studying</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
wantswork.when	<p>[IF wantswork= 0:]</p> <p>When was the last time you looked for a job?</p>	<p>1–6 months or less</p> <p>2–More than 6 months ago</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
language	<p>What is the primary language you use at home?</p> <p>[FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]</p>	<p>1–Tagalog/Filipino</p> <p>2–Cebuano/Bisaya</p> <p>3–Hiligaynon/Ilonggo</p>

		88–Other -97–Do not know
religion	What is your religion?	0–Not religious 1–Roman Catholic 2–Protestant 3–Iglesia Ni Cristo 4–Islam/Muslim 5–Seventh Day Adventist 6–Baptist 7–Born Again 8–Dating Daan 9–Jehovah's Witness 10–Mormon (Latter Day Saints) 88–Other -97–Do not know
ethnicity	Would you consider yourself as:	1–Cebuano 2–Ilonggo 3–Tagalog 88–Other -97–Do not know

ip	<p>Are you a member of an IP community?</p> <p>[FREE RESPONSE. ENUMERATOR CODE INTO CATEGORIES]</p>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
ip.group	<p>[IF ip = 1]</p> <p>Which community?</p>	<p>1–Ati</p> <p>2–Ata</p> <p>3–Magahat</p> <p>4–Sulod</p> <p>5–Bukidnon</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
govt.ip	<p>[IF ip = 1]</p> <p>Do you have an official role in the Tribal Council?</p>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
govt.ip.role	<p>[govt.ip = 1]</p> <p>What is your role?</p>	<p>Role: _____</p>

govt.local	[IF leader.type = 2]  Do you have an official role in your local government?	0–No  1–Yes  -97–Do not know
govt.local.role	[IF govt.local = 1]  What is your role?	Role: _____
leader.other	[IF leader.type = 1]  What other leadership roles besides barangay captain do you have?	Role: _____
org	[IF leader.type = 1]  Are you a member of any organization or formal group?	0–No  1–Yes  -97–Do not know
org.other	[IF leader.type = 2]  Are you a member of any other organization or formal group?	0–No  1–Yes  -97–Do not know
org.which	[IF org = 1 or org.other = 1] Please tell me the three (3) most important organizations or formal groups that you belong to. (OPEN-ENDED)	Organization 1: _____  Organization 2: _____  Organization 3: _____



	[IF leader.type = 1]	
population	What is the total population of this barangay?	No. of persons: _____
hh	What is the total number of households in this barangay?	No. of households: _____
ethnic.pct	<p>Approximately what proportion of the barangay belongs to the following ethnic group? (numbers should add up to 100 percent)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ilonggo</li> <li>- Cebuano</li> <li>- Ilocano</li> <li>- Tagalog</li> <li>- Chinese</li> <li>- Other</li> </ul>	Percent: ____
rel.pct	<p>Approximately what proportion of the barangay belongs to the following religious groups? (numbers should add up to 100 percent)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Roman Catholic</li> <li>- Protestant</li> <li>- Islam/Muslim</li> <li>- Not religious</li> <li>- Other</li> </ul>	Percent: ____

hh.poor.count	In your estimation, how many households in the barangay are classified as poor?	No. of poor households: ____
hh.poor.pct	If number of poor households is not available, enter percentage of households.	Percent: ____
hilly	Is the barangay located on hilly or flat terrain?	0–Flat 1–Hilly
swampy	Is the barangay located on swampy terrain?	0–Dry 1–Swampy
access.car	Is the main access road to the barangay accessible by car?	0–No 1–Yes
access.car.rain	Is the main access road to the barangay ever inaccessible by car due to rain?	0–No 1–Yes
road.mat	What kind of material is the main access road to this barangay?	0–Dirt 1–Gravel/Stone 2–Asphalt
infra	Please select all the types of infrastructure that are present in the barangay.	1–Public elementary school 2–Public junior high school 3–Public high school 4–Private elementary school 5–Private junior high school 6–Private high school 7–Mosque 8–Church 9–Health clinic 10–Piped water

		11–Police post or police station 12–Food market
infra.distance	<p>If any of the above infrastructure are not present in the barangay, how long does it take to ride a motorcycle to the nearest one outside of the barangay during dry weather?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public elementary school</li> <li>- Public junior high school</li> <li>- Public high school</li> <li>- Private elementary school</li> <li>- Private junior high school</li> <li>- Private high school</li> <li>- Mosque</li> <li>- Church</li> <li>- Health clinic</li> <li>- Piped water</li> <li>- Police post or police station</li> <li>- Food market</li> </ul>	<p>Hours: ____</p> <p>Minutes: ____</p>
gov.dist	How long does it take to ride a tricycle from this barangay to the main district government offices during dry weather?	<p>Hours: ____</p> <p>Minutes: ____</p>
divisions	<p>Sometimes it is hard for communities to work together because of differences that exist between people living in the same barangay. To what extent do differences such as the following tend to divide people in the barangay?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rich and poor</li> <li>- Migrants and other community members</li> <li>- Different ethnic groups</li> </ul>	<p>0–Not a source of division</p> <p>1–Minor source of division</p> <p>2–Major source of division</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People in this barangay and people from neighboring barangays</li> </ul>	
community.violence	<p>In the last 3 years, have there been incidents of physical violence due to the following differences?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rich and poor</li> <li>- Migrants and other community members</li> <li>- Different ethnic groups</li> <li>- People in this barangay and people from neighboring barangays</li> </ul>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
	END [IF leader.type = 1]	
huc	Is your barangay part of a highly urbanized city?	
election.date	When was the last election for barangay captain in this barangay?	__ (MM)/__ __ __ (YYYY)
mayor.meet	When was the last time you met the mayor of your municipality?	__ (MM)/__ __ __ (YYYY)
mayor.resources	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the mayor been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay?	<p>0 Not helpful at all</p> <p>1 Somewhat helpful</p> <p>2 Very helpful</p>
governor.meet	When was the last time you met the provincial governor?	__ (MM)/__ __ __ (YYYY)

governor.resmob	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the provincial governor been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay?	0–Not helpful at all 1–Somewhat helpful 2–Very helpful
rpa.aware	Are you aware of the RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN (Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas / Revolutionary Proletarian Army / Tabara-Paduan Group)?	
rpa.meet	When was the last time you met with the RPA leadership?	__ (MM)/__ __ (YYYY)
rpa.resources	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the RPA been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay?	5 point scale: 1 for not helpful at all; 5 for very helpful
inf.local	In your role as barangay captain, how important is it for you to seek the support of community leaders when you seek government resources for infrastructure improvements in the barangay?	5 point scale: 1 for not important at all; 5 for very important
imp.local	In your role as barangay captain, how important are community leaders to you when you have to resolve disputes between barangays in the barangay?	5 point scale: 1 for not important at all; 5 for very important
	I am now going to ask you about how conflict has affected the barangay.	

killed.five	Approximately how many people were killed in this barangay in the last five years due to armed conflict?	No. of persons: ____
burned.five	Approximately how many houses were burned/destroyed in this barangay in the last five years due to armed conflict?	No. of houses: ____
support.brgy	For each of the following is there no support, some support, strong support in this barangay?  - Government of the Philippines - RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN - NPA	0–No support  1–Some support  2–Strong support
support.brgy.rank	Please rank the following from greatest degree of support among members of your barangay to least support.	1–Government of the Philippines  2–RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN  3–NPA
strength.rank	In this barangay, rank the armed groups from strongest to weakest.	1–Military/AFP  2–RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN  3–NPA  4–Private army
displaced	In your barangay, in the last 10 years, how many households have fled the barangay (for at least three months) due to conflict?	No. of households: ____

displaced.noreturn	In your barangay, how many conflict-affected households have fled and have not yet returned?	No. of households: ____
displaced.return	In your barangay, how many conflict-affected households have fled and have returned?	No. of households: ____
displaced.migration	Are there any conflict-affected internally displaced people (IDPs) from other barangays who came to this barangay and are here still?	0–No 1–Yes
displaced.migration. hh	[IF displaced.inmigration = 1] How many conflict-related IDP households came to this barangay and are here still?	No. of households: ____
pop.returnee	How many RPMP/RPA/TPG/KAPATIRAN ex-combatants live in the barangay?	No. of persons: ____
proj.presence	Which of the following assistance programs have there been in this barangay?	1–PAMANA 2–Kalahi-CIDDS 3–SLP 4–4Ps (Pantawid) 5–TISP 6–International Organization (USAID, GIZ, JISP) 7–Sajahatra Bangsamoro 88–Other-97–Do not know
proj.pamana	Were any projects funded by PAMANA in your barangay?	1–Yes 2–No

proj.pamana.type	<p>[IF proj.pamana = 1]</p> <p>Which kinds of PAMANA projects do you know of that were implemented specifically in your barangay during the past five years or so?</p>	<p>1–New roads or pathways</p> <p>2–New schools, health facilities, or community buildings</p> <p>3–Construction of irrigation</p> <p>4–New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities)</p> <p>5–New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation)</p> <p>6–Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies)</p> <p>7–Land redistribution or agrarian reform</p> <p>8–Programs that reintegrate ex-combatants</p> <p>9–Postconflict reconstruction</p> <p>10–Conditional cash transfer</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
proj.pamana.role	<p>[IF proj.pamana = 1]</p> <p>What was your role in PAMANA implementation?</p>	<p>1–Idea for project</p> <p>2–Develop proposal for project</p> <p>3–Lobby PAMANA staff for project</p> <p>4–Organize implementation of project</p> <p>5–Other</p>
pamana.livelihood.type	<p>[IF SELECTED 6 in proj.pamana.type]</p> <p>What kind of PAMANA livelihood project is in your barangay</p>	<p>1–CPD</p> <p>2–PAMANA-SLP</p> <p>88–Other</p> <p>-97–Do not know</p>
pamana.livelihood.funds	<p>[IF SELECTED 6 in proj.pamana.type]</p> <p>Have funds for this PAMANA livelihood project already been disbursed?</p>	<p>0–No</p> <p>1–Yes</p>



		-97–Do not know
pamana.livelihood.implement	[IF pamana.livelihood.funds=1]  Has the PO begun to implement the project yet?	0–No  1–Yes  -97–Do not know
pamana.livelihood.benefits	[IF pamana.livelihood.implement=1]  Has the livelihood project started producing benefits for PO members?	0–No  1–Yes  -97–Do not know

## Bangsamoro Citizen Survey

Var	QUESTION TEXT	Options
	You are about to begin a new survey for PAMANA MEMBERS AND CIVILIANS. Is this correct?	0 No 1 Yes
	Please choose the BH Survey if you're interviewing a Barangay Captain.	
enumerator	Please select your name.	List of enumerators
starttime_enum	Please enter today's date and the current time.	
survey_muni	Please choose the municipality where you are conducting the survey.	List of municipalities
survey_brgy	Please choose the barangay where you are conducting the survey.	List of barangays
id_randnum	What is the respondent's random number?	
	You typed <b>\${id_randnum}</b> as the respondent's random number. Please double check if this is correct. If this is wrong, please go back to the previous question and correct it.	

consent	Did the respondent give their consent to participate?	0 No 1 Yes
declined	[IF consent = 0] Please indicate why you think the respondent declined to be interviewed. Do not ask the respondent.	
	Hello! Thank you so much for your time and attention today. In this survey, we will be covering a number of topics, including poverty, conflict, and programs in your community. We'll start with a few basic questions about yourself.	
age	What is your age today in years?	
age_unknown	What is the reference period to estimate their age?	
reside_time	How long have you been staying here in this city/municipality?	
origin_province	What is your province of origin?	List of provinces
origin_municipality	What is your municipality of origin?	
marital_status	Do you have a spouse or partner?	0 Never married 1 Married/Living together 2 Separated 3 Widowed 88 Other
marital_status_other	Please specify OTHER.	
edu_formal	What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?	0 No formal education 1 Some elementary 2 Completed elementary (Elem. Graduate) 3 Some high school 4 Completed high school (High-School Graduate) 5 Some college 6 Completed college (College Graduate) 7 Graduate school or more
edu_other	Do you have non-formal/other forms of education and training?	0 No 1 Technical 2 Vocational 3 Language 4 Madrassah

		5 ALS 88 Other -97 Do not know
edu_other_other	Please specify OTHER.	
edu_madrassah	What is the highest level of educational attainment in a Madrassah?	1 Kinder Tahderiya 2 Some ibtidai/elementary 3 Completed ibtidai/elementary 4 Some sanawi/highschool 5 Completed sanawi/highschool 6 Some kuliya/college 7 Completed kuliya/college 8 Alim, Ulama, masteral
employed	Do you have a job at present, not have a job at present but used to have a job, or never had a job?	0 Never had a job 1 Has a job, includes unpaid family worker 2 Does not have a job now but had a job before
wantswork	Are you looking for a job or planning to establish a business?	0 No 1 Yes
wantswork_why	If it's alright to ask, what is the reason for why you are not currently looking for a job? Is it because...	1 Believes that there are no available jobs 2 Illness/Disability (temporary or permanent) 3 Too old/retired 4 Household or family duties 5 Currently studying 88 Other -97 Do not know
wantswork_why_other	Please specify OTHER.	
wantswork_when	When was the last time you looked for a job?	0 Never looked for a job 1 6 months or less 2 More than 6 months ago -97 Do not know
language	What is the primary language you use at home?	1 Tagalog/Filipino 4 Maguindanaon 5 Iranun 6 Maranao 88 Other
language_other	Please specify OTHER.	

religion	What is your religion?	0 Not religious 1 Roman Catholic 2 Protestant 4 Islam/Muslim 88 Other
religion_other	Please specify OTHER.	
ethnicity	What is your ethnicity/tribe?	4 Maguindanaon 5 Iranun 6 Teduray 7 Maranao 8 Tausug 9 Yakan 10 Samal 88 Other -97 Do not know
ethnicity_other	Please specify OTHER.	
govt_ip	Do you have an official role in the Tribal Council?	0 No 1 Yes
govt_ip_role	What is your role?	
govt_local	Do you have an official role in your local government?	0 No 1 Yes
govt_local_other	Please specify OTHER.	
govt_local_role	What is your role?	1 Kapitan 2 Kagawad 3 SK Chair 4 SK Council 5 Tanod 88 Other
govt_local_role_other	Please specify OTHER.	
org	Are you a member of any of the following types of associations? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Farmer's group or cooperative 2 Religious association 3 Women's group or association 4 Water committee or management group 5 School committee/club/PTA 6 Sports, music, drama, or dance club 88 Other

org_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	Great, thank you very much for your answers so far. I'm now going to ask you a few questions about the economic conditions for you and your barangay.	
hh_adults	How many members of your household are between the ages of 21-65?	
hh_adults_male	How many are men?	
hh_adults_female	How many are women?	
hh_ya	How many members of your household are between the ages of 16-21?	
hh_ya_male	How many are men?	
hh_ya_female	How many are women?	
hh_children	How many members of your household are between the ages of 16-21?	
hh_children_male	How many are men?	
hh_children_female	How many are women?	
assets_hh	Do you or someone from your household have these items? Choose all that apply.	10 Shared toilet 11 Own toilet, flushing 12 Own toilet, bucket flushing 20 Telephone landline 30 Cellular phone 40 Radio 50 TV 61 Bank account 62 Credit card 63 Insurance 70 Computer without internet 71 Computer with internet 81 Email address 82 Facebook 91 3- or 4-wheeled motor vehicle 93 2-wheeled motor vehicle 93 Radio ICom
assets_water	What is the main water source of this household?	1 Own Use, Faucet, Community Water System 2 Shared, Faucet, Community Water

		System 3 Own Use, Tubed/Piped Well 4 Shared, Tubed/Piped Well 5 Dug Well 6 Deep Well 7 Spring, River, Stream, etc. 8 Collected Rainfall 9 Peddler 88 Other -97 Do not know
assets_water_other	Please specify OTHER.	
assets_elec	What is the main source of electricity supply in this household, if any?	1 Electricity through electric coop. 2 Petromax 3 Kerosene 4 Generator 5 Solar 88 Other -97 Do not know
assets_elec_other	Please specify OTHER.	
assets_elec2	On a typical day, how many hours do you have access to electricity in your household?	
assets_tenure	Do you own or rent your house and lot?	0 Do not have access to a house and lot 1 Owns house and lot 2 Owns house only, not paying for lot 3 Owns house, renting lot 4 Renting house 5 Do not pay rent for house and lot 88 Other -97 Do not know
assets_tenure_other	Please specify OTHER.	
assets_rent	How much per month are you paying for rent?	
sector1	What was your household's PRIMARY source of income in the past 12 months?	1 Farming 2 Fishing 3 Education or teaching 4 Self-Employed (Food Vendor, Craftmaker, Small Shop Owner. or Trader) 5 Government (Bureaucratic) 6 Government (Political) 7 Services (Beautician, carpenter, cook, welder, labor, driving, etc.)

		8 Construction 9 Health Services 10 Office job/white collar 11 Student 12 OFW 13 Resource extraction (Logging, charcoaling, mining) 14 Pension 88 Other
sector1_other	Please specify OTHER.	
sector_registered	Is the primary income earner working in:	1 Registered private company or own business 2 Unregistered/informal private company or own business 88 Other -97 Do not know
income1	How much was your revenue from this primary source of income?	
income1_period	What was the unit of time for revenue?	1 Per year 2 Per month 3 Per week 4 Per day 5 Per harvest 88 Other
income1_period_other	Please specify OTHER.	
sector2	Can you tell me any OTHER sources of household income in the past 12 months, including all economic activities and investments, as well as remittances and aid? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Farming 2 Fishing 3 Education or teaching 4 Self-Employed (Food Vendor, Craftmaker, Small Shop Owner. or Trader) 5 Government (Bureaucratic) 6 Government (Political) 7 Services (Beautician, carpenter, cook, welder, labor, driving, etc.) 8 Construction 9 Health Services 10 Office job/white collar 11 Student 12 OFW 13 Resource extraction (Logging, charcoaling, mining)

		14 Pension 88 Other
sector2_other	Please specify OTHER.	
income2	How much was your revenue from all these OTHER sources of income combined (exclude primary source of income)?	
income2_period	What was the unit of time for revenue?	1 Per year 2 Per month 3 Per week 4 Per day 5 Per harvest 88 Other
income2_period_other	Please specify OTHER.	
farming		
harvest_cycle	How many times did you harvest in the last 12 months?	
harvest_invest	How much money did you invest in this activity?	
harvest_invest_t	What was the unit of time for investment?	1 Per year 2 Per month 3 Per week 4 Per day 5 Per production cycle 88 Other
harvest_invest_t_other	Please specify OTHER.	
tenure_own	Do you own the land that you use for farming?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
tenure_own_yes		
tenure_land	How many hectares of land do you own?	
tenure_titled	How many hectares of land that you own are titled?	
tenure_own_yes		



lost_land	Has your household ever lost land over the last 20 years?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
lost_land_yrs	What years did you lose land? Click any that apply.	1 2000 2 2001 3 2002 4 2003 5 2004 6 2005 7 2006 8 2007 9 2008 10 2009 11 2010 12 2011 13 2012 14 2013 15 2014 16 2015 17 2016 18 2017 19 2018 20 2019 -97 Do not know
lost_land_yrs_other	Please specify OTHER.	
lost_land_how	How did you lose the land?	1 Fled due to conflict, then someone occupied land 2 Sold land after being threatened or experiencing violence 3 Someone filed for a land title without your knowledge 88 Other -97 Do not know
lost_land_how_other	Please specify OTHER.	
tenure_own_no		
tenure_rent	What is your land tenure arrangement?	1 Share tenant 2 Lease holder 3 Free 88 Other -97 Do not know

tenure_rent_other	Please specify OTHER.	
tenure_rentshare_grp	What is the share percentage?	
tenure_rentshare_owner	% Owner:	
tenure_rentshare_tenant	% Tenant:	
tenure_rentshare_grp		
tenure_own_no		
till	Do you till the land?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
assets_farm1	What farm implements do you own? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Draft animal (e.g. carabao, cow, horse) 2 Plow and harrow 3 Tractor 4 Generator (irrigation, watering) 5 Rake 6 Harvester 7 Scythe 88 Other -97 Do not know
assets_farm1_other	Please specify OTHER.	
assets_farm2	What post-harvest facilities do you own? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Solar dryer 2 Coal dryer (for rainy season) 3 Warehouse/storage 4 Rice mill (manual pounding) 5 Roaster 88 Other -97 Do not know
assets_farm2_other	Please specify OTHER.	
farming		
services_school	Which of the following types of schools do members of your household have access to?	0 None 1 Elementary school

		2 High School -97 Do not know
services_elem	How long does it take you to get from your home to the elementary school by motorcycle?	1 Less than 15 minutes 2 15-30 minutes 3 30-60 minutes 4 More than 1 hour -97 Do not know
services_high	How long does it take you to get from your home to the high school by motorcycle?	1 Less than 15 minutes 2 15-30 minutes 3 30-60 minutes 4 More than 1 hour -97 Do not know
services_otheredu	Do members of your household have access to scholarships, day care, or other education-related opportunities? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 ALS (Alternative Learning System) 2 SPES (Special Program for Employment of Students) 3 Other scholarships (CHED, OPAPP, IDB, MagPeace, etc.) 4 Day Care 88 Other -97 Do not know
services_otheredu_other	Please specify OTHER.	
services_hlth	Do you have access to the following health facilities? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Barangay Health Center 2 Private Hospital 3 Public Hospital 4 Traditional Healer 5 Rural health Unit -97 Do not know
services_hlth_t	For the health facility you visit most often, how long does it take you to get from your home to the location?	1 Less than 15 minutes 2 15-30 minutes 3 30-60 minutes 4 More than 1 hour -97 Do not know
displaced	Since 2000, have you or your household ever experienced displacement because of armed conflict?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
displacement_grp		

displaced_num	How many times did you or your household experience displacement?	
displaced_yrs	Since 2000, could you tell us which years you experienced displacement? Choose all that apply.	1 2000 2 2001 3 2002 4 2003 5 2004 6 2005 7 2006 8 2007 9 2008 10 2009 11 2010 12 2011 13 2012 14 2013 15 2014 16 2015 17 2016 18 2017 19 2018 20 2019 -97 Do not know
displaced_yrs_other	Please specify OTHER.	
displacement_duration	How long was the longest displacement?	
displaced_duration_yrs	Years:	
displaced_duration_mos	Months:	
displacement_duration		
displaced_location	Where did you mainly go?	1 Evacuation center 2 Other sitio/purok, same barangay 3 Other barangay, same municipality 4 Other municipality, same province 5 Other province 6 Other country 7 School 88 Other -97 Do not know

displaced_location_other	Please specify OTHER.	
displaced_return	Did you return to your place of origin?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
displaced_return_other	Please specify OTHER.	
displaced_effect	How did the displacement caused by armed conflict affect your household? Choose only up to 3 answers.	1 Lost home 2 Lost land 3 Lost livestock 4 No school 5 Lost money 6 Lost life 7 Suffering 8 Lost livelihood 88 Other -97 Do not know
displaced_effect_other	Please specify OTHER.	
displacement_group		
	Finally, I'd like to conclude this section on economic conditions by asking you a few questions about your personal opinions on your economic situation.	
self_poverty_abs	Where would you place your family on this scale?	1 Poor 2 Earning just enough 3 Not poor
self_poverty_rel	Compared to the other families who live in your barangay, would you estimate that your family is:	1 Much poorer than average 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Much richer than average
self_hunger	In the last 3 months, did your family ever experience hunger and not have anything to eat?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
self_hunger_num	How often did it happen?	1 Only once 2 A few times

		3 Often 4 Always
self_change_past	During the last 5 years, do you think that the economic situation of your household has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated?	1 Much worse now than before 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Much better now than before
self_change_future	In your opinion, what will the quality of your life be in the next 12 months?	1 Will be much worse 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Will be much better
	The following section will deal with peace and conflict.	
	I'm going to read you a number of statements. Please let me know to what extent you agree or disagree with them.	
security_brgy	I feel safe walking in my barangay at night.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
role_community	My community leaders play an active role in keeping my barangay peaceful.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
role_self2	I play an active role in keeping a peaceful community.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
activerole_self	Please describe how you do so in one sentence.	
	I'm now going to ask you some general questions about the groups people in your barangay support. Some of the answers to these questions are sensitive. We would like to remind you that all your answers will be kept confidential.	

neighbor_sympathy 2	<p>In your opinion, which armed groups do your neighbors have sympathy towards? Choose all that apply.</p> <p>(Please be reminded that you do not have to answer this question if you feel uncomfortable.)</p>	1 MNLF 2 MILF 5 BIFF 6 Maute Group 7 Abu Sayyaf (ASG) 8 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 9 Ansar al Khalifa 10 Private armed groups 11 Military/CAFGU 12 PNP
neighbor_sympathy _pag	Could you specify the private armed groups, from the strongest first?	
rank_strength_grp	Please choose the two strongest groups in your barangay.	1 MNLF 2 MILF 5 BIFF 6 Maute Group 7 Abu Sayyaf (ASG) 8 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 9 Ansar al Khalifa 10 Private armed groups 11 Military/CAFGU 12 PNP 13 BPAT
	<p>For the next set of questions, I will be reading a list of items/groups. After I have read all of them, kindly please tell me how many you generally support. Please do not tell me the names of the ones that you support; just tell me HOW MANY you support. Please allow me to read the entire list before you give me your answer. First, let's do a couple for practice.</p>	
list_practice1_cont	<p>How many of these TV shows do you watch/support?</p> <p>A. Eat Bulaga  B. Showtime  C. Ang Probinsyano  D. Kadenang Ginto  E. Kapuso Mo, Jessica Soho</p>	0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
list_practice2_cont	<p>How many of these basketball teams do you support?</p> <p>A. Barangay Ginebra</p>	0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3

	B. Magnolia Hotshots C. Toronto Raptors D. Golden State Warriors E. Los Angeles Lakers	4 4 5 5
	If everything is clear, we will now move on to the main questions.	
list_groups1_cont / list_groups1_treat	How many of these groups do you support and/or have goals you generally agree with?  A. Philippine Government B. The Catholic Church C. BIFF [TREATMENT] D. MILF E. International organizations	0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
list_policies1_cont / list_policies1_treat	I will now be reading a list of policies. After I have read all of the policies, again please only tell me HOW MANY of these policies you agree with. Please allow me to read the entire list before you give me your answer.  A. Conduct more investigations of corruption by local government officials  B. Integrate Madrassah into the public school system  C. Make it illegal for a mayor to employ a relative in the municipal government  D. Make the Bangsamoro region fully independent--not just autonomous--within the Philippines [TREATMENT]	0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
endorse1_cont / endorse1_biff	A proposal to officialize Shariah Law in Mindanao has been proposed [by BIFF] as a potentially effective means to deter crime. Others worry that the punishments may be too harsh. How do you feel about this proposal?	1 Strongly oppose 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly support
endorse2_cont / endorse2_gph	Poor healthcare access is a prevalent issue in BARMM. Many households are located in remote areas, and a large proportion of the population is poor and cannot afford travel to central areas where the facilities are located. It has recently been suggested by the [Government of the Philippines] that mobile health facilities be	1 Strongly oppose 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly support



	implemented in the whole BARMM region that would focus on reaching rural areas.	
	Thank you. I now have a few questions about your direct experiences with conflict.	
victim_conflict	Have you or a member of your direct family ever been a victim of violence due to the following? Please select all that apply.	0 none 1 land disputes 2 rido or conflict between clans 3 conflict between the government and an armed group 4 conflict between two or more armed groups 5 armed groups targeting civilians 6 military targeting civilians 7 CAFGUs targeting civilians 8 crime like assault, armed robbery, or murder 9 petty crime like theft, trespassing, or harassment 10 elections -97 do not know
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats for every instance of victim_conflict selected)	
victim_conflict_when	When did the victim_conflict take place? Please select all that apply if it took place during more than one of these periods.	1 In the last year 2 Between 1 and 3 years ago 3 Between 3 and 5 years ago 4 More than 5 years ago -97 Do not know
victim_conflict_num	How many times has victim_conflict occurred in the past year?	1 Once 2 2-3 times 3 4-5 times 4 6 or more times -97 Do not know
	(End of repeat group)	
victim_violence	Have you or a member of your direct family experienced violence in the past 5 years? If so, what kind?	0 None 1 Arrested 2 Detained 3 Threatened 4 Injured or killed 5 Other -97 Do not know

victim_violence_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats for every instance of victim_violence selected)	
victim_actor	victim_violence by which actors?	1 MNLF 2 MILF 5 BIFF 6 Maute Group 7 Abu Sayyaf (ASG) 8 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 9 Ansar al Khalifa 10 Private armed groups 11 Military/CAFGU 12 PNP 13 BPAT
	(End of repeat group)	
security_past	During the last 5 years, do you think that the security situation of your area has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated?	1 Much worse now than before 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Much better now than before
security_future	In your opinion, what will the security of your area be like in the next 12 months?	1 Will be much worse 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Will be much better
	When you answer the following questions, please think about the periods of time in this barangay during which the MILF was at their strongest and most active in the barangay.	
rebgov_inclusive	How involved were local MILF leaders in making rules in the barangay?	1 Rules could not be made in barangays without the approval of local MILF leaders. 2 Rules could be made in barangays without the approval of local MILF leaders 88 Other -97 Do not know
rebgov_inclusive_other	Please specify OTHER.	

rebgov_goods	What type of support have you RECEIVED from an armed group in the last year? Choose all that apply.	1 money that was given 2 money that was lent 3 food 4 non-food items 5 job 6 support for schooling or training 7 protection in armed conflict 8 justice or dispute resolution 9 other
rebgov_goods_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats for every instance of rebgov_goods selected)	
rebgov_goods_who	Which group provided you with rebgov_goods?	1 MNLF 2 MILF 5 BIFF 6 Maute Group 7 Abu Sayyaf (ASG) 8 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 9 Ansar al Khalifa 10 Private armed groups
rebgov_goods_who_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	(End of repeat group)	
	Did the MILF require citizens to give the group any of the following or was contribution voluntary?	
rebgov_taxation_food	Food	0 Voluntary 1 Required 88 Other -97 Do not know
rebgov_taxation_food_other	Please specify OTHER.	
rebgov_taxation_shelter	Shelter	0 Voluntary 1 Required 88 Other -97 Do not know
rebgov_taxation_shelter_other	Please specify OTHER.	

rebgov_taxation_tax	Taxes	0 Voluntary 1 Required 88 Other -97 Do not know
rebgov_taxation_tax_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	PAMANA Outputs/Implementation	
	Thank you for your answers so far! I'm now going to ask you a series of questions about development programs in your barangay.	
proj_aware_type	What types of projects are you aware of that have benefited people in your barangay over the last three (3) years?	1 New roads or pathways 2 New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3 New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4 New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5 Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6 Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7 Other -97 Do not know
proj_aware_type_other		
proj_aware_livelihood	What types of livelihood projects were implemented in your barangay? Choose all that apply.	1 Provision of farm implements 2 Provision of farming materials like pesticides, fertilizers, seeds 3 Provision of farm animals, and/or animals for husbandry 4 Support for fisheries 5 Support for crafts industries 6 Training for employment 7 Other
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats for every instance of proj_aware_type selected)	
proj_program	proj_aware_type was/were under which program/s?	1 PAMANA 2 HDAP 3 Barangay Captain

		4 Other 5 SLP (Sustainable Livelihood Program) 6 International Organization (USAID, JICA, Unicef) 7 Sajahatra Bangsamoro 8 HELPS 9 ARMM Programs
proj_program_other	Please specify OTHER.	
	(End of repeat group)	
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats for every project-program pair)	
pam_impact	The overall impact of the proj_program - proj_aware_type in the community was:	1 Very negative 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very positive
proj_satisfaction	What is your overall satisfaction with the proj_program - proj_aware_type ?	1 Very dissatisfied 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very satisfied
proj_benefit	Did you personally benefit from the proj_program - proj_aware_type ?	0 No 1 Yes
	(End of repeat group)	
	(Beginning of repeat group; repeats when PAMANA, HDAP, Barangay Captain, and/or Other were selected in proj_program)	
	Please think about the proj_program projects in your barangay when you answer the following questions.	
pam_consult2	People in my community were consulted about what type of proj_program project would best meet our needs.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3

		4 4 5 Strongly agree
pam_consult3	Women in my community were consulted about what type of proj_program project/s would best meet our needs.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
pamdif_needs	The proj_program project/s addressed the most important needs of the community.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
pam_underfire	Armed groups in the area tried to undermine the proj_program project/s.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
pam_fair	The benefits from the proj_program project/s or services were distributed fairly to the people in the barangay.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
pam_timely	How would you describe the extent of timeliness or delays in the completion of these proj_program projects (on average)?	0 Never implemented 1 Very delayed (a year or more) 2 Somewhat delayed (several months) 3 Usually on time (weeks) 4 Always on time
pam_neginfl	Were there certain people or groups who exercised too much influence in the planning and implementation of these proj_program projects?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
pam_neginfl_who	Who were these people?	
pam_corrupt	Do you think there were funds allocated to these projects that were not actually used to implement the proj_program projects?	0 No 1 Yes, some of them 2 Yes, all of them
	(End of repeat group)	
proj_desires	What types of projects or services would you most like to see be expanded in your barangay? Select up to three (3)	1 New roads or pathways 2 New schools, health facilities, or community buildings

		3 New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-harvest facilities) 4 New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5 Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6 Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7 Other -97 Do not know
proj_desires_other	Please specify OTHER.	
proj_duplicate	How much do you agree with the following statement?  "The different agencies and organizations that implement development projects in my community do not duplicate their efforts."	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
	Great, thank you for those answers. I'm now going to ask you about TWO hypothetical projects that might be implemented in your barangay. For each pair of projects, please tell me WHICH ONE of them you would prefer. Notice that for each pair, some of the characteristics might be the same but some are different. Let's start with a practice.	
conjoint_practice	Which of these meals would you prefer?	
	Okay? Now let's move on to the real thing!	
conjoint1	Imagine that there are two development projects being considered for your area. They have a number of different characteristics. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	BM Conjoint Options
conjoint2	Now consider these two projects. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	
conjoint3	Now consider these two projects. Which of these do you think would you personally prefer to see implemented?	
	I'm now going to ask you a few questions about any projects you know that were implemented in nearby barangays.	

infodev_mil	Which three barangays do you think have received the MOST economic services from the government over the last five years?	
infodev_mil1	Barangay 1	
infodev_mil2	Barangay 2	
infodev_mil3	Barangay 3	
infodev_reb_mil	Which three barangays do you think have received the LEAST economic services from the government over the last five years?	
infodev_reb_mil1	Barangay 1	
infodev_reb_mil2	Barangay 2	
infodev_reb_mil3	Barangay 3	
infosource_dev2	What types of information did you use to make these determinations? Please select all that apply.	1 Local News Sources 2 National News Sources 3 Facebook 4 Information directly from the military 5 Information directly from armed groups 6 Talking to friends and family members in person 7 Talking to friends and family via SMS or on the phone 88 Other
infosource_dev_other	Please specify OTHER.	
pam_comments	Do you have other comments you'd like to share with us regarding PAMANA projects or your community's needs?	
	Great, thank you for those answers so far. I now want to ask you a few questions about the social conditions in your barangay.	
identity	Which of the following is the most important to how you identify yourself?	1 Clan 2 Tribe 3 Religion 88 Other -97 Do not know



identity_other	Please specify OTHER.	
cohesion_trust	To what extent would you be comfortable working with this type of individual in your barangay?	
cohesion_trust_hh	Someone outside your household	1 Very uncomfortable 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very comfortable
cohesion_trust_tribe	Someone from a different clan	1 Very uncomfortable 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very comfortable
cohesion_trust_ethnic	Someone from a different tribe	1 Very uncomfortable 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very comfortable
cohesion_trust_religion	Someone with a different religion	1 Very uncomfortable 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very comfortable
cohesion_trust		
cohesion_mujahideens	Do fighters from the war and non-fighters sometimes have trouble working together for the good of the community?	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
cohesion_engage	In the past 6 months, have you done any of the following? Choose all that apply.	0 None 1 Attended a community meeting 2 Made a speech or suggestion at a community meeting 3 Met with community leadership in your barangay to raise an issue 4 Notified the police about a local problem or crime 5 Met with or contacted a government official to raise an issue 6 Campaigned for a political party or candidate

		7 Participated in a peaceful demonstration 88 Other
inst_invest	Which actors would you trust most to decide on how funds should be spent? Please choose the top 3.	1 Barangay leadership 2 Municipal leadership 3 Provincial Government 4 Regional Government 5 Clan/paramount chief 6 Traditional leaders 7 MILF Leadership
inst_justice	Which actors would you trust most to resolve a land ownership issue? Please choose the top 3.	1 Barangay leadership 2 Municipal leadership 3 Provincial Government 4 Regional Government 5 National Government 6 PNP 7 Clan/paramount chief 8 Local religious leaders 9 Traditional leaders 10 MILF Leadership
report_major	Which actors would you most likely report a violent crime like assault or murder to? Please choose the top 3.	1 Barangay leadership 2 Police/PNP 3 Local religious leaders 4 MILF Leadership 5 Clan/paramount chief 88 Other -97 Do not know
represented	I feel that my local government represents my interests well.	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
gph_commit	To what extent do you believe that the Government of the Philippines will implement the full terms of the Bangsamoro Peace Agreement?	1 Very poor implementation 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Very successful implementation
barmm_service	To what extent do you believe government service delivery will improve under the BARMM?	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important

barmm_security	To what extent do you agree that security will improve under the BARMM?	1 Strongly disagree 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly agree
barmm_security_why	Why do you think so?	
barmm_conflict	Given the terms of the BARMM, can you imagine a scenario in which you would support a return to violence?	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
antidynasty	The Anti-Dynasty Bill is being proposed in Congress. The bill aims to prevent the consolidation of political power in one family in a certain area. What are your feelings towards this policy?	1 Strongly oppose 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strongly support
turnout	Did you vote in the May 2019 general election?	0 No 1 Yes
votechoice_reason	How important are the following factors in your vote choice:	
votechoice_reason_platform	Candidate's political platform	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
votechoice_reason_promises	Promises of jobs or private benefits to you or your household	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
votechoice_reason_fam	Family ties to the candidate	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
votechoice_reason_religion	Candidate's religion	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important

votechoice_reason_ethnicity	Candidate's ethnicity	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
	We have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your time and participation.	
endtime_enum	Please enter the time the interview ended.	
male	Respondent gender	1 Male 0 Female
public	Did you have a private space to conduct the interview in?	0 No 1 Yes
crowd	Were others present and listening to responses during the interview?	0 No 1 1-2 people 2 3-5 people 3 6+ people
crowd_answer	Was this person/persons answering questions for the respondent?	0 No 1 Yes
proxy_status	Was the respondent a primary or alternate?	1 Primary 2 Alternate
	Please inform your cluster leader of the replacement interviewee.	
proxy_relationship	What is the alternate's relationship to the primary respondent?	1 Spouse (wife or husband) 2 Sibling (brother or sister) 3 Parent (mother or father) 4 Child (daughter or son) 5 Other relative (aunt, uncle, cousin, niece, nephew, grandparent, in-law, etc.) 6 Non-relative (housekeeper, friend, etc.)
proxy_reason	What was the reason for not being able to interview the primary respondent?	1 At work or school 2 Unlocated or unknown 3 Lives in another province (including Manila) 4 Lives in another barangay (in the same province) 5 Vacation or temporary work 6 OFW 7 Refused interview

		8 Sick, drunk, mentally unable 9 Deceased
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## Bangsamoro Barangay Head Survey

Var	QUESTION TEXT	Options
survey_correct	You are about to begin a new survey for BARANGAY CAPTAINS. Is this correct?	
	Please choose the BM Citizen Survey if you're interviewing a regular citizen.	
enumerator	Please select your name.	List of enumerators
starttime_enum	Please enter today's date and the current time.	
survey_muni	Please choose the municipality where you are conducting the survey.	List of municipalities
survey_brgy	Please choose the barangay where you are conducting the survey.	List of barangays
consent	Did the respondent give their consent to participate?	0 No 1 Yes
comments		
declined	Please indicate why you think the respondent declined to be interviewed. Do not ask the respondent.	
	Hello! Thank you so much for your time and attention today. In this survey, we will be covering a number of topics, including poverty, conflict, and relationships of people in your barangay. We'll start with a few basic questions about yourself.	
age	What is your age today in years?	
age_unknown	What is the reference period to estimate their age?	
reside_time	How long have you been staying here in this city/municipality?	
origin_province	What is your province of origin?	List of provinces
origin_municipality	What is your municipality of origin?	

marital_status	Do you have a spouse or partner?	0 Never married 1 Married/Living together 2 Separated 3 Widowed 88 Other
marital_status_other	Please specify OTHER.	
edu_formal	What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?	0 No formal education 1 Some elementary 2 Completed elementary (Elem. Graduate) 3 Some high school 4 Completed high school (High-School Graduate) 5 Some college 6 Completed college (College Graduate) 7 Graduate school or more
edu_other	Do you have non-formal/other forms of education and training?	0 No 1 Technical 2 Vocational 3 Language 4 Madrassah 5 ALS 88 Other -97 Do not know
edu_other_other	Please specify OTHER.	
edu_madrassah	What is the highest level of educational attainment in a Madrassah?	1 Kinder Tahderiya 2 Some ibtidai/elementary 3 Completed ibtidai/elementary 4 Some sanawi/highschool 5 Completed sanawi/highschool 6 Some kuliya/college 7 Completed kuliya/college 8 Alim, Ulama, masteral
language	What is the primary language you use at home?	1 Tagalog/Filipino 4 Maguindanaon 5 Iranun 6 Maranao 88 Other

language_other	Please specify OTHER.	
religion	What is your religion?	0 Not religious 1 Roman Catholic 2 Protestant 4 Islam/Muslim 88 Other
religion_other	Please specify OTHER.	
ethnicity	What is your ethnicity/tribe?	4 Maguindanaon 5 Iranun 6 Teduray 7 Maranao 8 Tausug 9 Yakan 10 Samal 88 Other -97 Do not know
ethnicity_other	Please specify OTHER.	
govt_ip	Do you have an official role in the Tribal Council?	0 No 1 Yes
govt_ip_role	What is your role?	
leader_other	What other leadership roles, if any, besides barangay captain do you have?	
org	Are you a member of any organization or formal group?	0 No 1 Yes
org_grp	Please tell me the three (3) most important organizations or formal groups that you belong to.	
org_grp1	Organization 1:	
org_grp2	Organization 2:	
org_grp3	Organization 3:	
population	What is the total population of this barangay?	
hh	What is the total number of households in this barangay?	
	Approximately what proportion of the barangay belongs to the following ethnic group? (numbers should add up to 100 percent)	

ethnic_pct_maguin danaon	% Maguindanaon	
ethnic_pct_marana o	% Maranao	
ethnic_pct_tausug	% Tausug	
ethnic_pct_yakan	% Yakan	
ethnic_pct_samal	% Samal	
ethnic_pct_teduray	% Teduray	
ethnic_pct_iranun	% Iranun	
ethnic_pct_other1	% Other 1	
ethnic_pct_other2	% Other 2	
ethnic_pct_other3	% Other 3	
ethnic_pct_other1_ name	Other 1:	
ethnic_pct_other2_ name	Other 2:	
ethnic_pct_other3_ name	Other 3:	
	Approximately what proportion of the barangay belongs to the following religious groups? (numbers should add up to 100)	
rel_pct_catholic	% Islam/Muslim	
rel_pct_inc	% Roman Catholic	
rel_pct_sda	% Protestant / Christian	
rel_pct_other1	% Other 1	
rel_pct_other2	% Other 2	
rel_pct_other3	% Other 3	
rel_pct_other1_nam e	Other 1:	



rel_pct_other2_name	Other 2:	
rel_pct_other3_name	Other 3:	
hh_poor_count	In your estimation, how many households in the barangay are classified as poor?	
hh_poor_pct	If number of poor households is not available, enter percentage of households.	
hilly	Is the barangay located on hilly or flat terrain?	0 Flat 1 Hilly
swampy	Is the barangay located on swampy terrain?	0 Dry 1 Swampy
access_car	Is the main access road to the barangay accessible by car?	0 Dirt 1 Gravel/stone
access_car_rain	Is the main access road to the barangay ever inaccessible by car due to rain?	0 No 1 Yes
road_mat	What kind of material is the main access road to this barangay?	0 Dirt 1 Gravel/stone 2 Asphalt
infra	Please select all the types of infrastructure that are present in the barangay.	1 Public elementary school 2 Public junior high school 3 Public high school 4 Private elementary school 5 Private junior high school 6 Private high school 7 Mosque 8 Church 9 Health clinic 10 Piped water 11 Police post or police station 12 Food market
	For any infrastructure type that is not present in the barangay, how long does it take to travel to the nearest one outside of your barangay by motorcycle during dry weather?	
	Public elementary school	

infra_distance_public_lem_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_public_lem_min	Minutes:	
	Public junior high school	
infra_distance_public_hs_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_public_hs_min	Minutes:	
	Public high school	
infra_distance_public_hs_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_public_hs_min	Minutes:	
	Private elementary school	
infra_distance_private_lem_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_private_lem_min	Minutes:	
	Private junior high school	
infra_distance_private_hs_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_private_hs_min	Minutes:	
	Private high school	
infra_distance_private_hs_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_private_hs_min	Minutes:	
	Mosque	

infra_distance_mosque_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_mosque_min	Minutes:	
	Health clinic	
infra_distance_clinic_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_clinic_min	Minutes:	
	Piped water system	
infra_distance_pipe_dwater_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_pipe_dwater_min	Minutes:	
	Police station	
infra_distance_pnp_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_pnp_min	Minutes:	
	Food market	
infra_distance_market_hrs	Hours:	
infra_distance_market_min	Minutes:	
gov_dist	How long does it take to ride a tricycle from this barangay to the main district government offices during dry weather?	
	Sometimes it is hard for communities to work together because of differences that exist between people living in the same village. To what extent do differences such as the following tend to divide people in the village?	
divisions_wealth	Rich and poor	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together

		2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
divisions_migration	Migrants and other community members	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
divisions_ethnicity	Different ethnic groups	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
divisions_clan	Different clans	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
divisions_armedgroups	Different armed groups associated with the Moro struggle	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
divisions_brgy	People in this barangay and people from neighboring barangays	0 Does not apply 1 No trouble working together 2 Some trouble working together 3 A lot of trouble working together
	In the last 3 years, have there been incidents of physical violence due to the following differences?	

violence_wealth	Rich and poor	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
violence_migration	Migrants and other community members	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
violence_ethnicity	Different ethnic groups	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
violence_clan	Different clans	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
violence_armedgroups	Different armed groups associated with the Moro struggle	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
violence_brgy	People in this barangay and people from neighboring barangays	0 No 1 Yes -97 Do not know
election_date	When was the last election for barangay captain in this barangay?	
mayor_meet	When was the last time you met the mayor of your municipality?	
mayor_resources	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the mayor been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay?	0 Not helpful at all 1 Somewhat helpful 2 Very helpful
governor_meet	When was the last time you met the provincial governor?	
governor_resources	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the provincial governor been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay?	0 Not helpful at all 1 Somewhat helpful 2 Very helpful
milf_meet	When was the last time you met with the MILF base commander?	
milf_resources	Over the last 3 years, how helpful has the MILF been in securing resources to improve the infrastructure of this barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not at all helpful" and 5 for "very helpful".	0 Not at all helpful 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 Very helpful

inf_clan	In your role as barangay captain, how important is it for you to seek the support of heads of clans when you seek government resources for infrastructure improvements in the barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not important at all" and 5 for "very important".	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
inf_traditional	In your role as barangay captain, how important is it for you to seek the support of traditional leaders when you seek government resources for infrastructure improvements in the barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not important at all" and 5 for "very important".	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
resolve_clan	In your role as barangay captain, how important are heads of clans to you when you have to resolve disputes between people in the barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not important at all" and 5 for "very important".	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
resolve_traditional	In your role as barangay captain, how important are traditional leaders to you when you have to resolve disputes between people in the barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not important at all" and 5 for "very important".	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
resolve_religious	In your role as barangay captain, how important are religious leaders to you when you have to resolve disputes between people in the barangay? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for "not important at all" and 5 for "very important".	0 Not important at all 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 Very important
	I am now going to ask you about how conflict has affected the barangay.	
killed_five	Approximately how many people were killed due to armed conflict in this barangay since the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012?	
burned_five	Approximately how many houses were burned/destroyed in this barangay since the FAB in 2012 due to armed conflict?	
burned_2000_2008	Approximately how many houses were burned/destroyed in this barangay from 2000 (during the all-out war) to 2008 (during the TRO of the MOA AD) due to armed conflict?	
	For each of the following is there no support, some support, strong support in this barangay?	
support_brgy_gph	Government of the Philippines	1 Some support 2 2

		3 3 4 4 5 Strong support
support_brgy_milf	MILF	1 Some support 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strong support
support_brgy_mnlf	MNLF	1 Some support 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strong support
support_brgy_biffkarian	BIFF	1 Some support 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 Strong support
support_choose	In your judgment, do you think the majority of the members of the barangay support:	0 None 1 Government of the Philippines 2 MILF 3 MNLF 4 BIFF
	Please rank the following from greatest degree of support among members of your barangay to least support.	
strength_rank1	Rank #1 (strongest)	0 None 1 Government of the Philippines 2 MILF 3 MNLF 4 BIFF
strength_rank2	Rank #2	0 None 1 Government of the Philippines 2 MILF 3 MNLF 4 BIFF
strength_rank3	Rank #3	0 None 1 Government of the Philippines

		2 MILF 3 MNLF 4 BIFF
strength_rank4	Rank #4 (weakest)	0 None 1 Government of the Philippines 2 MILF 3 MNLF 4 BIFF
displaced	In your barangay, since the FAB was approved, how many households have fled the barangay (for at least three months) due to conflict?	
displaced_noreturn	In your barangay, how many conflict-affected households have fled and have not yet returned?	
displaced_return	In your barangay, how many conflict-affected households have fled and have returned?	
displaced_migration	Are there any conflict-affected internally displaced people (IDPs) from other barangays who came to this barangay and are here still?	0 No 1 Yes
displaced_migration_hh	How many conflict-related households came to this barangay and are here still?	
program_presence	Which of the following assistance programs were in this barangay in the last 3 years?	1 PAMANA 2 HDAP 3 Barangay Captain 4 Other 5 SLP (Sustainable Livelihood Program) 6 International Organization (USAID, JICA, Unicef) 7 Sajahatra Bangsamoro 8 HELPS 9 ARMM Programs
program_presence_other	Please specify OTHER.	
proj_pamana_type	Which kinds of PAMANA projects do you know of that were implemented specifically in your barangay during the past 3 years or so?	1 New roads or pathways 2 New schools, health facilities, or community buildings 3 New farming infrastructure (like equipment and post-



		harvest facilities) 4 New water infrastructure (like water supply or irrigation) 5 Livelihood assistance (like scholarships, employment programs, or agricultural subsidies) 6 Land redistribution or agrarian reform 7 Other -97 Do not know
proj_pamana_other	Please specify OTHER.	
proj_pamana_brgy	What is the name of the PAMANA proj_pamana_type project?	
proj_pamana_role	What was your role in PAMANA implementation?	0 None 1 Idea for project 2 Develop proposal for project 3 Lobby PAMANA staff for project 4 Organize implementation of project 88 Other
proj_pamana_role_ other	Please specify OTHER.	
	We have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your time and participation.	
endtime_enum	Please enter the time the interview ended.	
male	Respondent gender	0 Female 1 Male
public	Did you have a private space to conduct the interview in?	0 No 1 Yes
crowd	Were others present and listening to responses during the interview?	0 No 1 1-2 people 2 3-5 people 3 6+ people
crowd_answer	Was this person/persons answering questions for the respondent?	0 No 1 Yes

brgy_role	Was the respondent the barangay captain, barangay secretary, or another official?	1 Barangay Captain 2 Barangay Secretary 3 Other official
proxy_reason	What was the reason for not being able to interview the Barangay Captain/Secretary?	2 Unlocated or unknown 3 Lives in another province (including Manila) 4 Lives in another barangay (in the same province) 5 Vacation or temporary work 7 Refused interview 9 Deceased

## Annex G: Survey Randomization Protocol

There are two different sampling frames within each barangay. The first is the list of all members of CPD/SLP associations in the barangay. The second is the list of all households in the barangay. For each barangay, you will randomly select 4 members of CPD/SLP associations and 4 individuals that are not members of CPD/SLP associations. The field teams will be responsible for identifying respondents based on the sampling methods outlined below.

### CPD/SLP members

The method for randomly selecting 4 CPD/SLP members is simple. The process is the same for each barangay because you will be provided with the full list of members in each barangay. Simply assign a unique number to each individual on the list and then randomly select 10 numbers using a random number generator. The first 4 numbers are your sample respondents and the second 6 are your replacement respondents. If you cannot reach one of the first 4 selected sample individuals during the first day after multiple attempts, you will replace that individual with one of the 6 replacement individuals (see replacement protocol below). Write down the names and assigned numbers of your selected CPD/SLP member individuals and take a picture using the Survey CTO app.

### Non-CPD/SLP members

For the 4 non-members in each barangay, however, you will need to obtain the barangay roster for the random selection. There are three methods that can be employed, and the method you use depends on the availability of a barangay roster that is complete and has been updated in the last three years (see Table 3).

When...	Use...
There is a complete list of all households in the barangay that has been updated within the last three years	Method A

There is no complete list of all households in the barangay that has been updated within the last three years	Method B
There is no complete list of all households in the barangay that has been updated within the last three years AND it is not possible to get a complete list of households in randomly selected puroks	Method C

## Method A

(use if a complete and updated barangay roster is immediately available)

Step 1. Confirm that the barangay roster is **complete and up-to-date** (updated within the last three years). Complete means that it covers all households in the barangay, including recent migrants and displaced people living in the barangay.

Step 2. Make a copy of the barangay roster. Assign each household a number.

Step 3. Take note of the total number of puroks and households in the barangay and the number of households per purok (approximate number is okay if the number of households per purok was not indicated in the barangay roster); you will later need to input this in the RPA Randomization Results SurveyCTO form.

Step 4. Generate 10 random numbers using the total number of households in the barangay. Use the random number generator app on your tablet. The first 4 randomly generated numbers are your sample households from the barangay and the last 6 are your replacement households.

Step 5. Contact the first four households to determine availability and willingness to participate in the survey. Survey those that you are able to reach and that have agreed to participate within the first day. For those that you cannot reach or that decline to participate within the first day, use the replacement households (see replacement protocol below).

Step 6. Take note of the final 4 selected households. You will need this information to fill out the Randomization Results form.

## Method B

(use if a complete and updated barangay roster is unavailable)

Step 1: Meet with the barangay leader to get the total number of puroks and households in the barangay. Take note of this information as you will later need to input this in the RPA Randomization Results form.

Step 2: Ask the barangay chair to make a list of all puroks in the barangay, and then assign a number to each purok. Take note of the approximate number of households in each purok which you will input in the RPA Randomization Results form.

Step 3. Generate 2 random numbers using the total number of puroks in the barangay. Use the random number generator app on your tablet. The two randomly generated numbers are your sample puroks.

Step 4. If the barangay head or purok kagawad has a complete and updated list of all households in the two selected puroks (or can create one by the next few days), then use these lists for the random selection of households. (if you cannot get a complete list, proceed to Method C)

Step 5. Combine the lists and make sure that every household from the combined list of two puroks has its own unique number. For example, if one purok has 120 households and the other has 50 then the final numbering should run from 1 to 170.

Step 6. Follow steps 4 & 5 according to method A to select 10 households from within the total number of households within the two randomly selected puroks. Take note of the final 4 selected households. You will need this information to fill out the Randomization Results form.

## Method C

(use if an updated and complete list of all households in the two puroks is unavailable)

Step 1. Complete steps 1 - 4 in Method B.

Step 2. If the combined number of households for the two puroks is no greater than 200, continue to Step 3a. If the number exceeds 200, skip to Step 3b.

Step 3a. Walk around each purok and make a list or a map of households in the barangay. For example:


Number	Description
1	The 1 <sup>st</sup> house on the left of X street walking towards the barangay hall
2	The 2 <sup>nd</sup> house on the left of X street walking towards the church

3	The 3 <sup>rd</sup> house on the left of X street walking towards the church
4	The 1 <sup>st</sup> house on the right of X street walking towards school
5	The 1 <sup>st</sup> house on the North of the health center...
6	...

Assign a number to each household on the map/list, combining the households in the two puroks. Ensure that you know where each household in the map is so you can find the selected households to interview (use landmarks!). Follow Steps 4 & 5 in method A to select 10 households (4 sample and 6 replacements) from within the total number of households within the two puroks. Take note of the final 4 selected households. You will need this information to fill out the Randomization Results form.

Step 3b. If the combined number of households in both puroks exceeds 200, use the compass method:

- Stand at a geographically central point in the 1st purok (for example, a church/mosque/school, or the kagawad's house). Make sure you are facing due North.
- Select a random number between 1 and 8.
- Refer to the directional compass to determine the selected direction.



- Now walk in the direction selected to the edge of the purok making a complete list of all households within 10 meters on either side of your path. The structure of roads will prevent you from following

the exact direction selected but you should, insofar as possible, stay on the route determined by the random direction even if that means frequently changing roads.

- Determine the total number of households in that direction, and take note of that for the Randomization Results form. Assign numbers to the households in that direction.
- Repeat this process for the 2<sup>nd</sup> purok, and assign numbers to the households, starting where you left off in the first purok.
- Generate 10 random numbers using the total number of households in the barangay, ranging from 1 to the total number of households in the directions walked in both puroks. The first 4 numbers are the numbers of the households you will sample, and the last 6 are the replacement households. Take note of the final 4 selected households. You will need this information to fill out the Randomization Results form.

## Selection of Individual Respondents

Once the households have been selected, consider only adults as potential respondents (18+). Of the household members present at the time of your visit, select the adult member who has the next/upcoming birthday.

## Replacement Guidelines

There are **four** situations in which you will need to replace one or more of the 4 selected respondents/households, for both CPD/SLP members and non-members, with one or more of the 6 replacement respondents/households. The first three situations will arise before you visit the respondent/household, and the third situation will arise after you visit the respondent/household.

- 1) The barangay official assisting with randomization identifies a household as vacant because the member(s) no longer live there full-time, have moved out of the barangay or are deceased.
- 2) The barangay official contacts the selected household or respondent and they decline to participate
- 3) One or more of the selected respondents' are CPD/SLP members.
- 4) Once you visit the respondent/household, the selected respondent declines to participate or no one is home and neighbors say that no one from the household will be home for the rest of the day.

In the case of situation four, before moving on to a replacement, try your best to find out whether the respondent or someone from the household will be home before the end of the day. If they will be home within a reasonable timeframe, try again to interview them before moving on to the replacement. **Always coordinate with your SFO before selecting a replacement.**



# Annex H: Survey Security Protocol

## Guiding Principles

### IPA Global Code of Conduct

The field team should follow the IPA Global Code of Conduct provisions on safety and security, which requires Researchers (Survey Team) to:

- Adhere to all legal and organizational health and safety requirements in force at the location of work;
- Comply with any local security guidelines and proactively inform management of any necessary changes to such guidelines; and
- Avoid unnecessary risk to the safety, health and welfare to themselves and others, including partner organizations and beneficiaries (respondents).

### Conflict-Sensitivity

The field team is expected to adhere to the conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting (CSPP) principles that guide the implementation of PAMANA and any activity related to it. Specifically, the conduct of the survey shall avoid any incident that may trigger or cause conflict or disagreements among community members and must not interfere in the internal affairs of the community.

### Cultural Sensitivity

All respected religious and indigenous cultural practices in areas where these form part of the sacred and shared values of the community. For example, off-limit areas used in worship activities of Moro and IP communities must be excluded as survey point, unless otherwise offered by their respective leaders for certain reasons.

## General Rules

As a rule, anyone who intends to make a personal appearance (physical presence) in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas (CAA/CVA) must take note of the following:

- Precautionary measures are necessary to mitigate security threats and risks;
- Awareness and understanding of potential risks and hazards in specific geographic zones help prevent untoward incidents; and

- Security is everyone's concern.

## Coordination

Generally, for security purposes, coordination of the survey task must keep with existing coordinating mechanisms and procedures in the target areas, especially those instituted by government authorities like the “Security Protocol for PAMANA Implementing Partners” issued by the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) of CARAGA. While each administrative region or geographic zone has its own guidelines on security protocols, there are standard points of coordination across areas. These include the following at the minimum:

- Armed Forces of the Philippines – headquarters and/or designated infantry battalion
- Philippine National Police – provincial, municipal
- Peace and Order Councils – regional, provincial, municipal, barangay
- Local Government Units – provincial, municipal, barangay
- Line Agencies – regional offices of host program owner (e.g. DSWD-XIII for KC/CDD areas)
- OPAPP – Field Offices/Area Management Teams
- Peace Panel (through OPAPP)
- Non-State Armed Forces Base Command (through OPAPP)
- LGU-accredited CSO or development partner with major operations in a specific survey area
- NCIP or Tribal Council in IP communities

## Crisis Management

In the event of an untoward incident, this Manual suggests the following standard operating procedures:

- Any member of the survey team shall validate the information from a reliable source and report to the immediate supervisor (e.g. Team Leader for enumerators) the affected areas by SMS, call, email or the most efficient form of communication available in the locality.
- All members of the survey team must refrain from going to the affected areas and stay in their stations until given clearance by local authorities; the Team Leader is responsible for preparing a re-deployment plan and issuing order to proceed.

- The survey team must immediately pull out from the area.
- Refrain from riding or using military vehicles.

## Self-Protective & Precautionary Measures

Threats and risks in CAA/CVA may be avoided by virtue of observing self-protective and precautionary measures. Some of these include the following Dos and Don'ts, among others:

- Be prepared to do field work in a CAA/CVA – physically, mentally, psychologically
- In areas/instances where the security sector provided specific instructions, follow the instructions but stay alert with own “gut feel” and “judgement call”
- Bring small peso bills to easily defray expenses; avoid showing in public large amounts of money
- Throughout the duration of the survey task (i.e., from pre- to post-engagement), do not make any comment in any form/channel that is reflective of ideological or political leanings
- Do not conduct survey at night
- Do not bring or wear anything offensive to religious or cultural practices (e.g. pork in Muslim communities); wear appropriate clothing during the survey but bring alternatives (e.g. slippers and short pants in crossing rivers); do not wear or bring anything associated with military operations
- When using hired vehicles, ensure that the driver knows the area, has spare tire and tool box
- Bring first aid kit and other survival paraphernalia (e.g. extra cell phone battery, flashlight, whistle, bottled water, etc.)
- Always have a contingency plan like a foster home when trapped in the area
- Bring handy guidelines/protocols as immediate reference document for guidance.

## Annex I: Negros-Panay Survey Barangays

	Province	Muni	Barangay	Type	Citizens	BH	Notes
1	Aklan	Ibajay	Cabugao	CPD	8	2	
2	Aklan	Ibajay	San Jose	CPD	8	2	
3	Aklan	Kalibo	Estancia	SLP	8	2	
4	Aklan	Kalibo	Pook	SLP	8	2	
5	Aklan	Libacao	Calacabian	SLP	8	2	
6	Aklan	Libacao	Julita	SLP	8	2	
7	Aklan	Libacao	Rosal	SLP	8	2	Replaced Rivera per OPAPP's advisement.
8	Aklan	Madalag	Alasas	SLP	8	2	
9	Aklan	Madalag	Bacyang	CPD	8	2	
10	Aklan	Madalag	Ditana	SLP	8	2	
11	Aklan	Madalag	Galicia	CPD	8	2	
12	Aklan	Madalag	Logohon	SLP	8	2	
13	Aklan	Madalag	Maria Cristina	CPD	8	2	
14	Aklan	Madalag	Mercedes	CPD	8	2	
15	Aklan	Madalag	San Jose	SLP	8	2	
16	Aklan	Malinao	San Roque	SLP	8	2	
17	Aklan	Malinao	Tigpalas	SLP	8	2	
18	Aklan	Nabas	Magallanes	CPD	8	2	
19	Aklan	Nabas	Matabana	CPD	8	2	
20	Antique	Culasi	Magsaysay	CPD	8	2	
21	Antique	Culasi	Flores	CPD	8	2	

22	Antique	Culasi	Osorio	SLP	8	2	
23	Antique	Culasi	Salde	SLP	8	2	
24	Antique	Culasi	Tinabusan	CPD	8	2	
25	Antique	Culasi	Tomao	SLP	8	2	
26	Antique	Culasi	Valderama	SLP	8	2	
27	Antique	Laua-an	Latazon	CPD	8	2	
28	Antique	Pandan	Badiangan	CPD	8	2	
29	Antique	Pandan	Botbot	SLP	8	2	
30	Antique	Pandan	Idiacacan	SLP	8	2	
31	Antique	Sebaste	Abiera	SLP	8	2	
32	Antique	Sebaste	Alegre	CPD	8	2	
33	Iloilo	Bingawan	Quinangyana	SLP	8	2	
34	Iloilo	Cabatuan	Baluyan	CPD	8	2	
35	Iloilo	Cabatuan	Cadoldolan	CPD	8	2	
36	Iloilo	Cabatuan	Guibuangan Tigbauan	CPD	8	2	
37	Iloilo	Cabatuan	Tigbauan Road	CPD	8	2	
38	Iloilo	Cabatuan	Tuyan	CPD	8	2	
39	Iloilo	Calinog	Garangan	SLP	8	2	
40	Iloilo	Calinog	Manaripay	SLP	8	2	
41	Iloilo	Guimbal	Nanga	CPD	8	2	
42	Iloilo	Janiuay	Aguingay	CPD	8	2	
43	Iloilo	Janiuay	Atimonan	SLP	8	2	
44	Iloilo	Janiuay	Canawillian	SLP	8	2	
45	Iloilo	Janiuay	Caraudan	CPD	8	2	
46	Iloilo	Janiuay	Danao	CPD	8	2	

47	Iloilo	Janiuay	Matagub	SLP	8	2	
48	Iloilo	Janiuay	Tambal	CPD	8	2	
49	Iloilo	Lambunao	Bogongbong	SLP	8	2	
50	Iloilo	Lambunao	Cabatangan	SLP	8	2	
51	Iloilo	Leon	Ambulong	CPD	8	2	
52	Iloilo	Leon	Nagbangi	CPD	8	2	
53	Iloilo	Leon	Siol Norte	CPD	8	2	
54	Iloilo	Leon	Tacuyong Sur	CPD	8	2	
55	Iloilo	Maasin	Bugot	CPD	8	2	
56	Iloilo	Maasin	Nasuli	CPD	8	2	
57	Iloilo	Maasin	Subog	CPD	8	2	
58	Iloilo	Maasin	Tigbauan	CPD	8	2	
59	Iloilo	Maasin	Trangka	SLP	8	2	
60	Iloilo	New Lucena	Bololacao	CPD	8	2	
61	Iloilo	Oton	Cadinglian	CPD	8	2	
62	Iloilo	Oton	Galang	CPD	8	2	
63	Iloilo	Oton	Trapiche	CPD	8	2	
64	Iloilo	Tigbauan	Binaliuan Menor	CPD	8	2	
65	Iloilo	Tigbauan	Buyuan	CPD	8	2	
66	Iloilo	Tubungan	Igdampog Norte	SLP	8	2	
67	Negros Occidental	Bacolod	Felisa	SLP	8	2	
68	Negros Occidental	Bacolod	Granada	SLP	8	2	

69	Negros Occidental	Bacolod	Vista Alegre	SLP	8	2	
70	Negros Occidental	Bago	Dulao	SLP	8	2	
71	Negros Occidental	Binalbagan	Biao	CPD	8	2	
72	Negros Occidental	Binalbagan	Payao	CPD	8	2	
73	Negros Occidental	Binalbagan	Santol	CPD	8	2	
74	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Andres Bonifacio	CPD	8	2	
75	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Caduhaan	SLP	8	2	
76	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Celestino Villacin	CPD	8	2	
77	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Jerusalem	CPD	8	2	
78	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Mabini	CPD	8	2	
79	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Magsaysay	CPD	8	2	
80	Negros Occidental	Cadiz	Tiglawigan	SLP	8	2	Replaced Sura per 303 <sup>rd</sup> IB's advisement.
81	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Anie	SLP	8	2	
82	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Cruz	SLP	8	2	
83	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Lemery	SLP	8	2	
84	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Lipat-on	SLP	8	2	

85	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Maaslob	CPD	8	2	
86	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Telim	SLP	8	2	
87	Negros Occidental	Calatrava	Tigbon	SLP	8	2	
88	Negros Occidental	Candoni	Banga	SLP	8	2	
89	Negros Occidental	Candoni	Cabiaan	CPD	8	2	
90	Negros Occidental	Candoni	Gatuslao	CPD	8	2	
91	Negros Occidental	Candoni	Haba	CPD	8	2	
92	Negros Occidental	Candoni	Payauan	SLP	8	2	
93	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Abaca	CPD	8	2	
94	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Caliling	SLP	8	2	
95	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Camalandaan	CPD	8	2	
96	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Camindangan	SLP	8	2	
97	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Guiljungan	SLP	8	2	
98	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Inayawan	CPD	8	2	
99	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Lumbia	CPD	8	2	
100	Negros Occidental	Cauayan	Molobolo	CPD	8	2	



101	Negros Occidental	EB Magalona	San Isidro	CPD	8	2	
102	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Magsaysay	CPD	8	2	
103	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Dianay	SLP	8	2	
104	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Jonobjonob	CPD	8	2	
105	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Japitan	SLP	8	2	
106	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Libertad	SLP	8	2	
107	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Mabini	SLP	8	2	
108	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Old Poblacion	SLP	8	2	
109	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Tamlang	SLP	8	2	
110	Negros Occidental	Escalante	Washington	CPD	8	2	
111	Negros Occidental	Himamaylan	Carabalan	SLP	8	2	
112	Negros Occidental	Ilog	Balicotoc	CPD	8	2	
113	Negros Occidental	Ilog	Canlamay	CPD	8	2	
114	Negros Occidental	Ilog	Tabu	CPD	8	2	
115	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Bantayan	SLP	8	2	
116	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Locotan	CPD	8	0	

117	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Magballo	CPD	8	2	
118	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Oringao	SLP	8	2	
119	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Salong	SLP	8	2	Replaced Tambad per 303 <sup>rd</sup> IB's advisement.
120	Negros Occidental	Kabankalan	Tagukon	SLP	8	2	
121	Negros Occidental	La Carlota	Barangay II	SLP	8	2	
122	Negros Occidental	La Castellana	Camandag	CPD	8	2	
123	Negros Occidental	La Castellana	Manghanoy	CPD	8	2	
124	Negros Occidental	La Castellana	Sagang	CPD	8	2	
125	Negros Occidental	Moises Padilla	Macagahay	SLP	8	2	Replaced Tomina per 303 <sup>rd</sup> IB's advisement.
126	Negros Occidental	Moises Padilla	Montilla	SLP	8	2	
127	Negros Occidental	Moises Padilla	Quintin Remo	SLP	8	2	
128	Negros Occidental	Murcia	Amayco	CPD	8	2	
129	Negros Occidental	Murcia	Santa Rosa	CPD	8	2	
130	Negros Occidental	Murcia	Salvacion	SLP	8	2	
131	Negros Occidental	Sagay	Fabrica	SLP	8	2	
132	Negros Occidental	Sagay	Lopez Jaena	SLP	8	2	

133	Negros Occidental	Sagay	Malubon	SLP	8	2	
134	Negros Occidental	Sagay	Old Sagay	SLP	8	2	
135	Negros Occidental	Sagay	Paraiso	SLP	8	2	
136	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	Bagonbon	CPD	8	2	
137	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	Buluangan	SLP	8	2	
138	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	Nataban	SLP	8	2	
139	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	Quezon	SLP	8	2	
140	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	Rizal	CPD	8	2	
141	Negros Occidental	San Carlos	San Juan	SLP	8	2	
142	Negros Occidental	Silay	Rizal	SLP	8	2	Replaced Canlusong per 303 <sup>rd</sup> IB's advisement.
143	Negros Occidental	Sipalay	Cabadiangan	SLP	8	2	
144	Negros Occidental	Sipalay	Nabulao	SLP	8	2	
145	Negros Occidental	Sipalay	San Jose	SLP	8	2	
146	Negros Occidental	Talisay	San Fernando	CPD	8	2	
147	Negros Occidental	Toboso	Tabunac	CPD	8	2	
148	Negros Occidental	Victorias	Barangay X (Estado)	SLP	8	2	

149	Negros Occidental	Victorias	Barangay XI (Gawahon)	CPD	8	2	
150	Negros Oriental	Amlan	Jantianon	CPD	8	2	
151	Negros Oriental	Amlan	Silab	CPD	8	2	
152	Negros Oriental	Amlan	Tambojangin	CPD	8	2	
153	Negros Oriental	Pamplona	Abante	CPD	8	2	
154	Negros Oriental	Pamplona	Datagon	SLP	8	2	Replaced San Miguel because none of the PO members resided there.
155	Negros Oriental	Pamplona	Magsusunog	CPD	8	2	
156	Negros Oriental	Pamplona	Mangoto	CPD	8	2	
157	Negros Oriental	Pamplona	Yupisan	SLP	8	2	
158	Negros Oriental	San Jose	Janay-Janay	CPD	8	2	
159	Negros Oriental	San Jose	Naiba	CPD	8	2	
160	Negros Oriental	San Jose	Siapo	CPD	8	2	
161	Negros Oriental	Santa Catalina	Alangilan	SLP	8	2	
162	Negros Oriental	Santa Catalina	Manalongon	SLP	8	2	Replaced Casalaan due to killing of barangay official.
163	Negros Oriental	Santa Catalina	Nagbinlod	SLP	5	2	
164	Negros Oriental	Santa Catalina	Nagbalaye	SLP	8	2	

165	Negros Oriental	Santa Catalina	Obat	SLP	8	2	
166	Negros Oriental	Siaton	Cabangahan	SLP	8	1	
167	Negros Oriental	Siaton	Canaway	SLP	8	2	Replaced Linantuyan per 94 <sup>th</sup> IB's advisement.
168	Negros Oriental	Siaton	Mantiquil	SLP	8	2	
169	Negros Oriental	Siaton	Napacao	SLP	7	2	Replaced Nagsaha per 94 <sup>th</sup> IB's advisement.
170	Negros Oriental	Siaton	Tayak	SLP	8	2	
171	Negros Oriental	Sibulan	Tubtubon	SLP	8	2	
172	Negros Oriental	Tanjay	Azagra	CPD	8	2	
173	Negros Oriental	Zamboangui ta	Malongcay Diot	SLP	8	2	
174	Negros Oriental	Zamboangui ta	Mayabon	CPD	8	2	
175	Negros Oriental	Zamboangui ta	Nabago	SLP	8	2	
176	Negros Oriental	Zamboangui ta	Nasigid	SLP	8	2	Replaced Sandayao per 94 <sup>th</sup> IB's advisement.
177	Negros Oriental	Zamboangui ta	Najandig	SLP	8	1	

## Annex J: Bangsamoro Survey Barangays

	Municipality	Barangay
1	Datu Piang	Poblacion (Dulawan)
2	Datu Piang	Kanguan
3	Datu Piang	Buayan
4	Datu Piang	Damabalas
5	Datu Piang	Reina Regente
6	Datu Piang	Magaslong
7	Datu Piang	Balanakan
8	Datu Piang	Liong
9	Datu Piang	Alonganan
10	Datu Piang	Masigay
11	Datu Piang	Dado
12	Datu Piang	Kalipapa
13	Datu Piang	Duaminanga
14	Datu Piang	Ambadao
15	Datu Piang	Montay
16	Datu Piang	Balong
17	Datu Salibo	Tee
18	Datu Salibo	Butilen
19	Datu Salibo	Pagatin
20	Datu Salibo	Penditen

21	Datu Salibo	Balanakan
22	Datu Salibo	Sambulawan
23	Datu Salibo	Alonganan
24	Datu Salibo	Buayan
25	Datu Salibo	Dado
26	Datu Salibo	Kalipapa
27	Datu Salibo	Duaminanga
28	Datu Salibo	Liong
29	Datu Salibo	Damabalas
30	Datu Salibo	Masigay
31	Datu Salibo	Andavit
32	Datu Salibo	Magaslong
33	Datu Salibo	Pandi
34	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Dapiawan
35	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Kitango
36	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Elian
37	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Kabengi
38	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Kitapok
39	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Gawang
40	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Madia
41	Datu Saudi Ampatuan	Salbu
42	Guindulungan	Kalumamis
43	Guindulungan	Macasampen
44	Guindulungan	Bagan

45	Guindulungan	Tambunan II
46	Guindulungan	Muslim
47	Guindulungan	Ahan
48	Guindulungan	Muti
49	Guindulungan	Sampao
50	Guindulungan	Lambayao
51	Guindulungan	Kateman
52	Guindulungan	Datalpandan
53	Mamasapano	Dasikil
54	Mamasapano	Bagumbong
55	Mamasapano	Daladap
56	Mamasapano	Liab
57	Mamasapano	Libutan
58	Mamasapano	Dabenayan
59	Mamasapano	Pimbalakan
60	Mamasapano	Mamasapano
61	Mamasapano	Manongkaling
62	Mamasapano	Tuka
63	Mamasapano	Tukanalipao
64	Mamasapano	Lusay
65	Mamasapano	Pidsandawan
66	Mamasapano	Sapakan
67	Sharif Aguak	Tapikan
68	Sharif Aguak	Bialong



69	Sharif Aguak	Bagong
70	Sharif Aguak	Lapok (Lepok)
71	Sharif Aguak	Labu-labu
72	Sharif Aguak	Timbangan
73	Sharif Aguak	Kuloy
74	Sharif Aguak	Tina
75	Sharif Aguak	Malingao
76	Sharif Aguak	Satan
77	Sharif Aguak	Poblacion I
78	Sharif Aguak	Poblacion
79	Sharif Aguak	Poblacion II
80	Talayan	Talayan
81	Talayan	Tambunan I
82	Talayan	Linamunan
83	Talayan	Damablac
84	Talayan	Katibpuan
85	Talayan	Binangga North
86	Talayan	Binangga South
87	Talayan	Timbaluan
88	Talayan	Kedati
89	Talayan	Tamar
90	Talayan	Marader
91	Talayan	Lanting
92	Talayan	Fukol

93	Talayan	Fugotan
94	Talayan	Boboguiron
95	Talitay	Talitay
96	Talitay	Makadayon
97	Talitay	Kiladap
98	Talitay	Gadungan
99	Talitay	Pageda
100	Talitay	Manggay
101	Talitay	Kilanan
102	Talitay	Kuden
103	Talitay	Bintan (Bentan)

# Annex K: Case Study Guidelines

## FGDs

### Guidelines

1. Review the purpose of the group, and the goals of the meeting:

**“We are trying to find out how well the PAMANA development program met the needs of this community, and how projects like this could be improved in the future”.**

2. Go over the flow of the meeting – how it will proceed, and how the members can contribute:

**“I am going to ask 10-12 questions, and the discussion will probably take about an hour and a half. Not everyone needs to answer every question, but I am very curious to hear from all of you. You are the experts here, so please contribute any information you can”.**

3. Make sure that all opinions on that question get a chance to be heard by...

- Summarizing what you think you have heard, and asking whether the group agrees
- Phrasing the same question in a different way
- Before moving on to the next question, asking if anyone else has any comments on that question
- Looking around the room, and make brief eye contact, especially with those who may not have spoken
- Asking shy participants “can you tell me more about that” or “can you give me an example”.
- Dealing with dominant participants by acknowledging their opinion, but opening up the discussion to others with responses like “Thank you-what do other people think?”

## Other Tips

- It can be helpful to write out the discussion questions on a big sheet of paper (like a poster) and hang it up behind yourself. This way, participants can think about the questions and not feel lost if they forgot what I asked.
- People will always get off topic. Remember that there is a limited amount of time and other participants have a limited amount of energy so guide people back on topic if they stray off or are repeating themselves a lot.

## Focus Group Questions for Community Members

- In what ways (if any) did the PAMANA project(s) differ from other development projects in the barangay?
- Do you feel PAMANA programs are relevant to the concerns you and others in your barangay have about peace and security?
- Were people in the barangay consulted about which type of project would best meet their needs? (if yes) Did you find that process accessible? Did it result in the type of project you wanted?
- Do you feel that the PAMANA project benefits all members of the barangay equally? Why/why not?
- How did the PAMANA project improve the situation in the barangay? (if FGD participants only list economic benefits-ask whether PAMANA project made barangay more secure)
- Do you think these benefits will last long term? (Can you think of examples of PAMANA projects that have helped your barangay create and maintain community-driven peace and security initiatives (e.g. peace committees, early warning/monitoring, local security patrols))
- Sometimes even though development projects are meant to help, they create problems. Did the PAMANA project cause any issues in the barangay? (if yes) who was responsible for those problems?
- What do you think is missing from the PAMANA project or the PAMANA process? What could be improved?

## Focus Group Questions for PO Members

- In what ways (if any) did the PAMANA project(s) differ from other development projects in the barangay?
- Was the PO consulted about which type of project would best meet their needs? What about the broader community? (if yes) Did you find that process accessible? Did it result in the type of project you wanted?
- What are some of the institutional arrangements and mechanisms you have been able to use to coordinate with higher-level government agencies? Would you be able to discuss any challenges you've faced in terms of coordination with higher-level government agencies?

- Do you feel that the PAMANA project benefits all members of the barangay equally? Why/why not?
- How did the PAMANA project improve the situation in the barangay? (if FGD participants only list economic benefits-ask whether PAMANA project made barangay more secure)
- Do you think these benefits will last long term? (Can you think of examples of PAMANA projects that have helped your barangay create and maintain community-driven peace and security initiatives (e.g. peace committees, early warning/monitoring, local security patrols)
- Sometimes even though development projects are meant to help, they create problems. Did the PAMANA project cause any issues in the barangay? (if yes) who was responsible for those problems?
- Were there any disagreements over how resources should be distributed or used? I mean disagreements between members in the PO or disagreements between the PO and barangay leadership. How were these disagreements resolved?
- What do you think is missing from the PAMANA project or the PAMANA process? What could be improved?
- Interview Questions for Barangay Leadership
- In what ways (if any) did the PAMANA project(s) differ from other development projects in the barangay?
- Were you consulted which type of project would best meet the barangay's needs? (if yes) How did you decide what type of project would be most beneficial? Did it result in the type of project you wanted?
- What are some of the institutional arrangements and mechanisms you have been able to use to coordinate with higher-level government agencies? Would you be able to discuss any challenges you've faced in terms of coordination with higher-level government agencies?
- Do you feel that the PAMANA project benefits all members of the barangay equally? Why/why not?
- How did the PAMANA project improve the situation in the barangay? (if interviewee only lists economic benefits-ask whether PAMANA project made barangay more secure)
- Do you think these benefits will last long term? (Can you think of examples of PAMANA projects that have helped your barangay create and maintain community-driven peace and security initiatives (e.g. peace committees, early warning/monitoring, local security patrols)

- Sometimes even though development projects are meant to help, they create problems. Did the PAMANA project cause any issues in the barangay? (if yes) who was responsible for those problems? (if not discussed in previous question) Did any armed group interfere with the implementation of the PAMANA project? (if yes) How?
- What do you think is missing from the PAMANA project or the PAMANA process? What could be improved?

## KIIs

1. To start, make sure you understand the basics about the position/role of individual in the barangay and the main goal of the interview. Have a simple opening statement explaining the interview goals, such as:

**“We would like to understand how well PAMANA has been able to meet the needs of your community members and whether it has helped bring greater peace to your barangay.”**

2. As in the FGDs, go over the flow of the meeting and the types of topics you would like to address so that the interviewee knows how to focus his/her responses.
3. For all interviews, make sure to cover all the topics addressed in the protocol. You do not need to ask questions precisely as written or in the order listed; use your judgement to ask questions in the way and order you think will elicit the best, most truthful responses. It is important to get the interviewee to provide as comprehensive a response as possible. If the interviewee is responding with yes/no or only with simple statements, follow up with questions phrased differently and in an open-ended way to elicit more information. For example: “tell me more about...”, “why do you think...?”, “Can you give me an example of...?”.
4. Taking notes:
  - Make sure that you have familiarized yourself with the interview protocol, topics and questions before the interview so you are not relying too much on the text. This will allow you to make the interview more conversational and comfortable.
  - Take careful, detailed notes in the protocol or in your preferred media during the interview.
  - As soon as possible (within 24 hours), type up a summary of the interview. Include background notes or impressions, even details such as the venue. See the interview summary document for the format.

## Notes Template

**Date:** XX/XX/XXXX

**Start:** 22:23

**Finish:** 00:11

### **Biography /Background**

- a. Name
- b. Age
- c. Ethnicity
- d. Place of Residence
- e. Place of Origin
- f. Interview location (address with barangay name and sub-district name):
- g. Occupation

## Questions

### PAMANA Implementers

1. Relevance of PAMANA to key needs of the conflict-affected areas
  - In what ways are the PAMANA projects you've implemented relevant to the key needs and concerns of the target communities?
    - To what extent did the project focus on key conflict-drivers?
    - What kinds of efforts did you make to reach a range of different groups?
    - Have they improved prospects for sustained peace?
  - Have PAMANA projects improved the capacity of the local government to address community needs? Why/why not?
    - How well have conflict sensitive and peace promotion approaches been adopted by local governments and line agencies?



- To what extent has trust between local government and citizens changed as a result of PAMANA?

## 2. Efficiency of PAMANA implementation

- What was the process of identifying PAMANA beneficiaries and communities?
  - To what extent did you consult with community leaders and community members?
  - Tell me about the role conflict analysis played in the selection of beneficiaries?
  - Did you encounter any challenges in targeting and reaching the targeted beneficiaries?
- How well did national PAMANA agencies and local implementers coordinate activities?
  - What kinds of mechanisms were established to institutionalize PAMANA in local-level agencies?
  - What kinds of project delays and setbacks did you experience?
  - Were there any mayors or local government officials that were champions of PAMANA?
- How did PAMANA change over time to address key challenges and stumbling blocks?
  - What were the sources of the key challenges?
  - How have these changes affected community relations and coordination?
- What are the key lessons that can be learned from PAMANA so far? What would you change/make better?

## 3. Effectiveness of PAMANA in improving access to economic opportunities and fostering peace

- How has PAMANA facilitated communities' ability to achieve lasting peace?
  - Has PAMANA successfully brought people together to work on joint projects to improve their communities? What about marginalized communities or communities that were previously fighting?
  - To what extent have PAMANA projects incited disagreements or new conflicts over resources between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? (Ex)-combatants and non-combatants? Other horizontal conflicts?
  - How has PAMANA affected trust in local government?

- How has PAMANA enhanced communities' access to resources and opportunities for employment and livelihood development?
  - Have livelihood programs resulted in more small businesses and greater access to markets? What about infrastructure projects?
  - To what extent has this improved access been concentrated in the hands of a few or in particular social networks? If so, who/which networks have benefited the most?
- To what extent has PAMANA enhanced local governments ability to adopt a peacebuilding agenda?
  - Do local governments find value in a CSPP approach to development? Why/why not?
  - Are there guidelines and mechanisms in place for local governments and line agencies to follow CSPP approaches?
- What are the key factors that influenced PAMANA success?
  - How did conflict dynamics influence success?
  - Were there any actors that attempted to divert or subvert PAMANA projects? Who? Why?

#### 4. Sustainability of the PAMANA program

- How sustainable are the PAMANA Projects?
  - How are recipients of livelihood projects maintaining their small enterprises?
  - To what extent have local governments and line agencies internalized conflict sensitive processes in non-PAMANA projects?

### Community Leaders

#### 1. Relevance of PAMANA to key needs of the conflict-affected areas

- To what extent do you think that PAMANA projects are relevant to the needs and concerns of your community?
  - How well has PAMANA improved key socioeconomic drivers of conflict in your community?

- To what extent do you think that PAMANA projects have reached the appropriate individuals? Can you think of marginalized or conflict-affected groups that did not benefit from PAMANA that should have?
- To what extent has the local government's ability to serve your community improved as a result of PAMANA? Why/why not?
  - Do you notice a greater presence of your local government officers and facilities?
  - How has your trust in local government been affected by PAMANA? Your community's?

## 2. Efficiency of PAMANA implementation

- How involved were you in the process of identifying beneficiary communities for PAMANA projects?
  - To what extent did the local government or implementing agencies consult with you regarding PAMANA project beneficiaries?
  - How has your community's history of conflict affected who receives benefits?
  - Did you experience any setbacks in the implementation of PAMANA? To what extent did the PAMANA project in your community achieve its goals?
- What role, if any, did you play in the implementation of PAMANA in your community?
- What were the key challenges and road blocks you encountered in accessing PAMANA benefits?

## 3. Effectiveness of PAMANA in improving access to economic opportunities and fostering peace

- How has PAMANA facilitated your community's ability to achieve lasting peace?
  - Has PAMANA brought people together to work on joint projects to improve your community? What about marginalized communities or communities that were previously fighting?
  - To what extent have PAMANA projects incited disagreements or new conflicts over resources between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? (Ex)-combatants and non-combatants? Other horizontal conflicts?
  - How has PAMANA affected your trust and engagement with local government?

- How has PAMANA enhanced your community's access to resources and opportunities for employment and livelihood development?
    - Have livelihood programs resulted in more small businesses and greater access to markets? What about infrastructure projects?
    - To what extent has this improved access been concentrated in the hands of a few or in particular social networks? If so, who/which networks have benefited the most in your community?
  - What are the key factors that you believe influenced PAMANA success?
    - To what extent did the particular conflict dynamics in your community influence success?
    - Were there any actors that attempted to divert or subvert PAMANA projects? Who? Why?
4. Sustainability of the PAMANA program
- How sustainable are the PAMANA Projects?
    - Have recipients of livelihood projects had success in creating small businesses?
    - Would you like PAMANA projects to continue in your community? Why/why not?

### Local Politicians

1. Relevance of PAMANA to key needs of the conflict-affected areas
- To what extent do you think are PAMANA projects relevant to the needs and concerns of your constituency?
    - How well has PAMANA improved key socioeconomic drivers of conflict in your constituency?
    - To what extent do you think that PAMANA projects have reached the appropriate individuals? Can you think of marginalized or conflict-affected groups that did not benefit from PAMANA that should have?
    - As [insert appropriate elected official title], would you continue the PAMANA projects in your community if you had another term? Why/why not?
  - To what extent has your ability to serve your constituency improved as a result of PAMANA? Why/why not?
    - Do you think PAMANA has increased civic engagement in your constituency? If so, how has this impacted your ability to govern?

- How has trust between you and your constituency changed as a result of PAMANA? Has it affected the political support you receive?

## 2. Efficiency of PAMANA implementation

- How involved were you in the process of identifying beneficiary communities for PAMANA projects?
  - What criteria did you use to identify beneficiaries?
  - How has your constituency's history of conflict affected who receives benefits?
  - Did you experience any setbacks in the implementation of PAMANA? To what extent did the PAMANA project in your constituency achieve its goals?
- What were the key challenges and road blocks you encountered in accessing PAMANA benefits?

## 3. Effectiveness of PAMANA in improving access to economic opportunities and fostering peace

- How has PAMANA enabled a lasting peace in your constituency?
  - Has PAMANA successfully brought people together to work on joint projects to improve their community? What about marginalized communities or communities that were previously fighting?
  - To what extent have PAMANA projects incited disagreements or new conflicts over resources between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? (Ex)-combatants and non-combatants? Other horizontal conflicts?
- How has PAMANA enhanced your constituency's access to resources and opportunities for employment and livelihood development?
  - Have livelihood programs resulted in more small businesses and greater access to markets? What about infrastructure projects?
  - To what extent has this improved access been concentrated in the hands of a few or in particular social networks? If so, who/which networks have benefited the most in your community?
- What are the key factors that you believe influenced PAMANA success?
  - To what extent did the particular conflict dynamics in your constituency influence success?
  - Were there any actors that attempted to divert or subvert PAMANA projects? Who? Why?

#### 4. Sustainability of the PAMANA program

- How sustainable are the PAMANA Projects?
  - Have recipients of livelihood projects had success in creating small businesses?
  - Would you like PAMANA projects to continue in your constituency? Why/why not?

#### Bangsamoro Fronts

- How has PAMANA created an enabling environment for the transition to BARMM?
  - Involvement of ex-combatants and civilians in PAMANA project planning and programming.
  - Impact of PAMANA infrastructure projects on government's commitment to the peace process
  - Impact of PAMANA projects on support and trust in BARMM

#### CPP/NPA/NDFP

- How has PAMANA been able to address the key drivers of conflict between the government and CPP/NPA/NDFP?
  - Reach of at-risk communities
  - Perceptions of PAMANA among combatants and civilians
  - Conflict between CPP/NPA/NDFP and PAMANA implementers/beneficiaries

#### Completion Agreement Areas

- How have PAMANA projects facilitated ex-combatant reintegration and social cohesion?
  - Ex-combatant livelihood and access to services
  - Social cohesion between ex-combatants and civilians
  - New conflicts arising over unequal access to PAMANA related development projects
  - Civic engagement and community cooperation

## Annex L: Case Studies

Six case studies were undertaken as part of the evaluation covering six areas:

- RPA in Negros Occidental
- CNN in the Bicol Region
- CNN in Samar
- CNN in Caraga
- MNLF
- SPMS Box and adjacent areas in Maguindanao

While we have edited the case studies to remove all personally identifying information (PII), and in some cases redacted passages, we have preserved the main ideas and observations of the case study researchers.

# Moving Forward by Giving Back:

## PAMANA in Negros Occidental as Dividends of a Peace Agreement

### Case Study of PAMANA in RPA Communities

Written by Sheryl Datinginoo

### Background

The Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) program's presence in Negros-Panay is primarily anchored on its complementation to the peace negotiating table with the *Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas* / Revolutionary Proletariat Army / Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPM-P/RPA/ABB simply RPA for the purpose of this study<sup>17</sup>).

Negros-Panay is home to most RPA leaders and members who split from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) / New People's Army's (NPA) / National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP or CNN) as part of the Rejectionists (RJ) – Reaffirmists (RA) schism of the 1990s. This defection by a majority of NPA combatants from the Western Visayas significantly weakened the communist stronghold in the area.

On 6 December 2000, the RPA forged a political settlement with the government with the signing of a Peace Agreement (PA)<sup>18</sup> that provided the requirements for RPA to pursue its ideological and parliamentary work without the armed component. Four major components are outlined thereof: cessation of hostilities, civil-political rights and reintegration for alleged political offenders/political prisoners, development projects in select barangays, policy reforms (fiscal and empowerment of marginalized sectors), and disposition of arms and forces.

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<sup>17</sup> RPM-P/RPA /ABB or RPA has since transformed into a legitimate organization known as Kapatiran para sa Progresong Panlipunan or simply Kapatiran.

<sup>18</sup> Formally the “2000 Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) – RPM-P/RPA/ABB Peace Agreement”



At the time of the PAMANA launch in 2011 under President Benigno S. Aquino III, the peace pact was on its 11<sup>th</sup> year and was besieged with mounting implementation issues. It carried with it a decade's worth of lessons and frustrations from two prior administrations (Estrada, Arroyo), the assassinations by the CPP-NPA of several regional and community leaders (RPA leader Arturo Tabara was gunned down in 2004), and an internal split of the RPA into two factions – the Tabara-Paduan Group (TPG) mostly of Negros and the Nilo Dela Cruz Group (NDCG Group) of Luzon, Iloilo and Central Mindanao. TPG, validated to be the larger group with more than 700 fighters, is headed by Veronica Tabara (wife of the late Arturo Tabara) and RPA national commander Stephen Paduan while the NDCG is led by Dela Cruz of the ABB.

The Aquino administration handled the two groups as separate peace tables and PAMANA was intended to serve as a complementary track in negotiations with the TPG: all unimplemented socioeconomic provisions of the 11-year old peace agreement were lodged under the fund and under the larger reintegration and transformation framework outlined in a draft of a new closure/completion peace agreement originally drafted in 2011.

This closure agreement remained a draft under the Aquino administration but was finalized and effected under the Duterte administration with the signing of the “Clarificatory Implementing Document (CID) to the 2000 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the RPM-P/RPA/ABB” on 19 July 2019. With the CID, the RPA's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) was given a clearer path to succeed after 19 years of setbacks and delays.

## PAMANA in RPA Areas

The nature of PAMANA programming in RPA areas involved three interconnected components: 1) infrastructure investments for the establishment of resettlement sites (identified public lands where RPA members can put up residence) and for support to congregated and *in situ* settlements (communities where RPA members currently reside); 2) Community Peace Dividends (CPD) or livelihood projects for 100 barangays with conflict history or are vulnerable to CPP-NPA influence; and 3) employment and social protection support for individual TPG members.

PAMANA for RPA was spread across different levels of government, showing the convergence and inclusive nature of the program. Twelve (12) national agency partners, three (3) provincial governments, four (4) city governments, and one (1) educational institution implemented various project types that were all requisites for the RPA's transformation from a non-state armed group into a socio-political organization. Project types include agricultural product support, agri-fishery, Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development Protection Plan (ADSDPP) formulation, capacity building, community infrastructure projects (roads, bridges, etc), electrification, water projects, livelihood, security arrangement, social protection and various implementation support projects.

Table 1 shows PAMANA projects appropriated to the RPA amounting to P2,413,521,975. Over time and across the board, investments in the construction / rehabilitation of roads and bridges took the highest share

(32.5%) of projects. In 2017, appropriation for roads and bridges reached its peak, receiving 40% more than all other project types combined. Support for agricultural productivity received the least share at 1.7%.

**Table 1. PAMANA Appropriations for RPA by project type, 2011 to 2017**

Project Type	Project Cost							TOTAL	%
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Road & Bridge			91,650,000	212,000,000	104,000,000		378,247,000	785,897,000	32.5
Agricultural Productivity Support			13,500,000	3,600,000			11,200,000	28,300,000	1.17
CDD		27,935,000	1,000,000	11,000,000	45,550,000	104,900,010	29,840,000	220,225,010	9.12
Livelihood	53,200,000	12,995,000			501,000	98,638,000	16,000,000	181,334,000	7.51
Water			16,000,000	19,000,000	8,500,000		2,650,000	46,150,000	2.0
Electrification			26,000,000	18,000,000	9,500,000			53,500,000	2.22
Capacity Building	7,300,000	2,250,000			18,285,000		53,924,716	81,759,716	3.4
Land Tenure	78,000,000	30,970,000			105,625,000	129,300,000	65,263,579	409,158,579	17.0
Social Protection			1,744,800	1,744,800	28,894,800	39,356,564	26,298,127	98,039,091	4.06
PDCs					100,000,000			100,000,000	4.14
Other	78,000,000	30,970,000			105,625,000	129,300,000	65,263,579	409,158,579	16.9
Total	216,500,000	105,120,000	149,894,800	265,344,800	526,480,800	501,494,574	648,687,001	2,413,521,975	100

Source: OPAPP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit; General Appropriations Acts of 2011 through 2017

PAMANA was instrumental in regaining the trust and confidence of the RPA to stay committed to the peace process as the government undertook a diligence review prior to the signing of the closure agreement. PAMANA funded the unimplemented socioeconomic provisions of the 2000 PA even without a closure document. Although funds totaling P363.5 million lapsed, were cancelled or waived (attributed to delay in

the signing of a closure agreement and other procedural issues), PAMANA commitments reassured the RPA of the government's resolve and fiscal capacity to see the process through. Table 2 below shows the lapsed funds reverted to the National Treasury.

**Table 2. PAMANA Lapsed, Cancelled and Waived Projects for RPA, 2011 to 2016**

Agency	Project Type	Project Cost						TOTAL
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
DILG	Various		50,000,000	14,000,000	-	-	103,300,000	167,300,000
DSWD	Community Infrastructure, CPD, Livelihood for RPA members		48,200,000		-	-		48,200,000
NEA	Electrification			9,500,000	-	-		9,500,000
OPAPP	Various	138,500,000			-	-		138,500,000
Subtotal		138,500,000	98,200,000	23,500,000			103,300,000	
TOTAL								363,500,000

Source: OPAPP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit

## PAMANA in Negros Occidental

Negros Occidental, the country's sugar capital and a traditional stronghold of the CNN. The NPA capitalized in the social tension brought by the sugar crisis of the 1980s to recruit poor and discontented sugar farm workers in its ranks. The crisis brought massive layoffs on the island where economists believe 90% of economy is linked directly or indirectly to sugar. A declassified May 1985 intelligence report from the United States Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged that, as a result, there was a likely swelling of NPA recruits in both the Negros provinces (Occidental and Oriental). Sugar workers not owning lands and dependent on the magnanimity, or lack thereof, of the sugar oligarchs were easy targets for NPA recruitment.

Inequality and land tenure issues still persist to this day – the same issues used by the CNN to mobilize support in the 1980s. However, recruitment stalled in the province after the RPA split from the CNN in the 1990s. Key informants from the provincial government and civil society also cite the many government and non-government interventions that addressed and mitigated the sugar crisis from happening again as deterrents to NPA recruitment, as well as sustained efforts to diversify the economy away from the sugar monocrop. The political climates of the administrations of Estrada (1998-2000) and Arroyo (2000-2010),

both plagued by corruption scandals, however, may have provided fertile grounds for new NPA recruits<sup>19</sup> in this area and the rest of the Philippines.

The 303<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade commander General Benedict Arevalo's current estimates of NPA fighters in Negros Occidental is around 200 and he expects to further bring this number down. Local army units have stepped up their anti-insurgency campaign and have set a timeline to end the insurgency in the province by 2019 yearend. They are supported by the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 32 (22 November 2018) that added troops deployed in CNN areas including Negros Island, and Executive Order No. 70 (4 December 2018), which created a national task force to end the insurgency and mandated localization of the peace talks under a to-be created National Peace Framework.

With the exception of a few projects, PAMANA has deliberately not accompanied the formal peace table with the CNN in Negros-Panay and has instead prioritized projects complementing the closure of the RPA peace table. While the goal of PAMANA is to address the roots of conflict, it has been branded by CNN as a counterinsurgency device, similar to how the military used hard and soft projects to weaken NPA mass bases. Dissociating PAMANA RPA from the PAMANA CNN interventions protected the process from being a target of the general CNN anti-PAMANA propaganda.

This nuancing had somehow escaped provincial executives and CSO partners who perceived, perhaps begrudgingly, that PAMANA RPA projects are detached to the still existing conflict with the CNN in the province. While they agree with PAMANA complementation to the RPA track, they felt that addressing development gaps in areas with CNN presence should also be funded by the national government. OPAPP then yielded to some proposals and funded projects under OPAPP, PAMANA-DILG and PAMANA-DSWD.

**Table 3. PAMANA for CNN in Negros Occidental, 2011 to 2016**

Agency	Project Type	Project Cost								TOTAL
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
OPAPP	Road	7,500,000			-	-	-	-	-	7,500,000
DILG	Road, Water	-			-		33,900,000	-	-	33,900,000
DSWD	Livelihood	-			-	-	-		27,000,000	27,000,000
TOTAL										68,400,000

Source: OPAPP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, DSWD Field Office VI

<sup>19</sup> Chapter 3 of the Philippine Human Development Report 2015

## Research Objectives, Methodology, Scope and Limitations

This case study aims to investigate the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of PAMANA projects in RPA areas, with a focus on Negros Occidental. Attention was given to PAMANA Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP) that is implemented through the DSWD, and on its interfaces with both the RPA and CNN conflict lines. The study hopes to provide contours of the role PAMANA will play in the succeeding years as the Duterte administration pursues a military and localized approach to the CNN conflict line.

Negros Occidental was chosen as the area of study because it is a hub of RPA membership and received the bulk of PAMANA-SLP projects. As the country's sugar capital, where oligarchs still hold influence over the economy and violent clashes between the military and the NPA still erupt intermittently, the province is also best positioned to offer lessons from the RPA peace process that may be useful to the current track of localizing peace talks with the CNN mandated by EO 70.

The study's scope is also its limitation. The case study focuses in on mechanisms relating to PAMANA-SLP's microenterprise development track in Negros Occidental and is not meant to generalize PAMANA's attainment of its success indicators across the board. However, by focusing on the program's relevance, efficiency, effective, and sustainability in this one case, I hope to illuminate micro-level mechanisms that are, at the very least, important to keep in mind when implementing PAMANA in other areas.

Three (3) SLP projects were studied. In Escalante City, a traditional NPA stronghold, the study conducted key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGD) in two barangays, barangay 1 where a chicken egg-layering project was implemented and barangay 2 where a carabao milk farming project was implemented. Barangay 1 and its surrounding barangays have experienced frequent NPA and military encounters of late. Barangay 2, meanwhile, had not reported violent encounters since the time of Martial Law. The rice trading project in barangay 3 was studied in the Municipality of Binalbagan, an area "cleared" by the military but is still vulnerable to NPA influence. These cases were selected with the help of OPAPP's Area Management Team for Western Visayas and the DSWD - SLP Provincial Office, both located in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

In total, three (3) focus group discussions and eleven (11) key informant interviews were held from 12 to 24 September 2019 in the Cities of Bacolod, Sagay, Escalante and the Municipalities of Murcia and Binalbagan.

## Key Findings

### On PAMANA-SLP Relevance

PAMANA-SLP's relevance is best understood when seen through the history<sup>20</sup> of the provision of impact development projects, including livelihood assistance to the RPA and its communities, from the time of the 2000 PA signing to present.

RPA's participatory approach to implementing the 2000 PA impact development projects demonstrated an effort to reintegrate into communities. The 2000 PA committed P500 million worth of impact development projects as **“a concrete measure to address poverty in areas identified by the RPMP/RPA-ABB, and rehabilitate its members, families and beneficiaries.”** The Joint Enforcement and Monitoring Committee (JEMC), the oversight and implementing body created by the 2000 PA initially identified 147 barangays as target areas. Community Needs Assessment (CNA) ensued to consult these identified barangays on the projects most needed in their communities, indicating that the RPA intended to make the process inclusive and participatory in initializing their reengagement/reintegration with the communities not as a non-state armed group but as a government partner in peace and development.

Implementation of the P500 million “Development Fund” was done mainly thru the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KALAH) Kalayaan sa Barangay Program (KBP). Projects include farm-to-market roads, classroom buildings, and water and electrification projects<sup>21</sup>, to name a few. By May 2010, OPAPP reported implementation of 92.55% of the P500 million commitment covering 73 of the total 147 identified barangays. However, both the TPG and NDCG question the attribution of KBP projects as part of the 2000 PA commitment.

Livelihood projects were tied to the P10 million Reintegration Fund stipulated in the 2000 PA's “Release of Political Prisoners” component, intended to assist alleged political offenders / political prisoners (APOs/PPs) as they go back to communities and lead normal lives. In practice, this never took place, as the release of APOs/PPs took a long time since the dropping of cases had to hurdle the slow processes of the judiciary and the bureaucracy. This was a missed opportunity for the APOs/PPs to avail of the Reintegration Fund benefits but was later addressed by their participation in the profiling activities under President Aquino. The profiled APOs/PPs were then made eligible for all the 2019 Clarificatory Implementing Document (CID) benefits provided to all RPA profiled members.

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<sup>20</sup> References: Report on the Implementation of the GRP-RPMP/RPA-ABB PEACE AGREEMENT of the General Secretariat for RRA Talks, 8 July 2010 KII with former RPA spokesperson Ricky Guzon.

<sup>21</sup> Project types were sourced from a 2009 news release by the Philippine Information Agency “Badian town gets more development projects” as KALAH KBP project list is not available at the time of writing.

The RPA resolved to implement livelihood projects nonetheless and made their organization Reform and Peace Movement in the Philippines Foundation Incorporated (RPMFI) as fund conduit. People's Organizations (PO) and cooperatives were organized to serve as beneficiaries and managers of the livelihood projects. A total of P22,240,000 – more than double of what was stipulated in the 2000 PA – was released in 2005 and 2006. The 2005 funds were released to the RPMFI while the 2006 funds were coursed directly to the POs as cracks in RPA leadership rendered the RPMFI untenable as a conduit. The formal RPA splinter into TPG and NDCG announcement came later in June 2007.

Ten years on and by the time Aquino's administration commenced in 2010, mounting discontent of the RPA on the slow and uncoordinated implementation, and of the government – on RPA violations of the ceasefire agreement (display of RPA firearms, etc) and disunity on RPA leadership – hounded the peace table. On the ground, RPA members were subject to attacks by the NPA, making them more and more insecure about how the peace process affected their personal safety.

It was at this juncture that both parties mutually redesigned how to move the process forward. Guided by the general 2-track framework for the comprehensive peace process on all conflict lines, Track 1 for RPA saw the need for a final political document to put closure on the 2000 PA, and Track 2 (PAMANA) became the delivery mechanism whereby agreements on Track 1 (to include unimplemented provisions of the 2000 PA) should be lodged.

While the RPA has always intended for the communities to also benefit from the peace attained by the 2000 PA, the uncoordinated and slow implementation of both hard and soft projects made it difficult for the RPA to fully claim the projects as dividends of the RPA peace process.

Under the Aquino administration, this intent of the RPA to share the dividends of peace as “indemnity” (Guzon, 2019) for communities that suffered or supported them while they were still part of the NPA, was included in the draft closure agreement as “Community Peace Dividends” (CPD). For better accounting and attribution, CPD was operationalized under DSWD's PAMANA-SLP. PhilHealth benefits and CHED scholarships were also extended to the same RPA-identified and CNA-validated communities.

Under the Duterte administration, Article VIII of the CID further defined CPD as “resources provided for the pursuit of livelihood endeavors and activities, aimed at enabling the beneficiary communities to jumpstart a sustainable process of development with the support of the local governments and other stakeholders.” A list of the 91 PAMANA-SLP projects to be implemented as early as 2016 was also annexed.

PAMANA-SLP as the delivery mechanism for the RPA's concept of CPD thus carried the role of including the communities in the stakes and benefits of the peace process. For the RPA, it is important to make communities feel that they, too, can personally benefit from the political settlement negotiated by the RPA with the government. Unlike hard infrastructure projects where benefits are collectively shared and felt over time, benefits of the participatory and community-driven nature of SLP project cycle (including empowerment and increased income) are immediate and can be felt at the individual level, as in the case



shared by one FGD participant who profusely thanked the SLP project for helping many families survive through the sugar industry's off-season. She noted that due to the rice trading project, families now have a low-interest credit line that they can use to buy rice when cash-strapped. Rice is a staple food and without this credit line, families resort to loan sharks that keep them deep in poverty and debt.

Another FGD participant, a current local member of activist group Pamalakaya (National Federation of Small Fisherfolk Organization in the Philippines), articulated a more positive perception of the government since being made officer of the SLP PO. It appeared that participating in a national government program made him appreciate efforts of government to address local development issues. It also made him closer to members of the PO – at one point acknowledging that it was the PO that helped defray the hospitalization costs of one member of his family, something none of the Pamalakaya members was able to do.

The relevance of PAMANA-SLP in helping achieve and support peace in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities was further evidenced by its expansion to 90 more barangays of Negros Occidental with CNN affectation. This expansion was a product of the 2016 Negros Peace Congress II wherein the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental and the province's Diocesan Social Action Centers conducted a province-wide consultations to surface issues and concerns that hinder the attainment of peace from the people's perspectives. Livelihood issues identified in the consultations were translated into project proposals endorsed for 2018 PAMANA-SLP funding. The consultations also produced a Peace Framework officially adopted by the Provincial Development Council.<sup>22</sup>

In this sense, the 2018 PAMANA-SLP takes on a Track 1 nature as it aims to bring the CNN back into the negotiating table. This goal, however, has now taken a back seat as the Duterte administration steps up its military offensive in the province with the issuance of MO 32 and EO 70 in 2018.

## On PAMANA-SLP Efficiency

The study found evidences of issues in PAMANA-SLP implementation that significantly hindered program efficiency.

**One major issue for efficiency was the lack of participation and buy-in from municipal and city local government units (LGUs).** This happened because project areas were predetermined by the processes set forth by the 2000 PA. It is however mandatory for PAMANA-SLP Project Development Officers (PDO) to hold an orientation with local officials to present implementation process, eligibility, and targeting and selection processes. For regular SLP, this meeting allows LGU to propose the inclusion of non-project barangays to some extent. For PAMANA-SLP, the LGU was not given such flexibility. The downside was that the program may not have maximized available help from the provincial or municipal LGU (i.e.

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<sup>22</sup> Powerpoint briefier on the Provincial Peace Integration and Development Program and Negros Peace Congress II, last updated 20 August 2019



technical support from respective agriculture and trade and industry offices), which would have been immensely helpful to the POs since they are geographically closest to the LGU than the PDOs who are non-locals and mostly on-assignment in other areas. During an FGD, one PO leader puts this in perspective when she said that when the contract of the DSWD-SLP PDO assigned to them ended, they felt that they were left on their own, with no one to answer their questions nor help address emerging implementation problems. To their minds, since the LGU is not involved from the beginning, they will not be able to help them midway implementation. **Participation of local officials is more evident at the barangay level. This is largely the case because some Sustainable Livelihood Program Association (SLPA) / PO members are also barangay officials, as observed in two of the barangays, which were the focus of this study.** This swings both ways as a positive and negative. On one hand, there is barangay ownership and better capacity to handle the projects. On the other hand, it exhibits elite capture wherein opportunity to participate for the poorer members of the community was lost to the already well-off members. As a positive, one well-off PO official has financed other capital needs of the project, especially on times that they cannot access the PO funds in the bank due to lack of supporting documents (i.e. liquidation of expenses, signature of the PDO).

Implementation carried on with a joint OPAPP-DSWD consolidated guidelines specific for the RPA where Conflict-Sensitive Peace-Promoting (CSPP) principles<sup>23</sup> were incorporated, but implementers were neither able to provide copies to the research team while on the field, nor were some able to exhibit familiarity on CSPP principles, which were key advocacies of PAMANA. A bright spot is at the provincial level where PAMANA principles of CSPP and convergence have been institutionalized in the Provincial Peace Integration and Development Unit (ProPIDU). ProPIDU was created in 2012 as the action arm of the Provincial Peace and Order Council and functions to improve coordination between and among government agencies to consolidate efforts for peace and development projects. While its creation was influenced by the Philippine Army's Internal Peace and Security Plan "Bayanihan" campaign, which predates the PAMANA launch, its interfacing with PAMANA contributed to collective problem-solving on RPA project areas especially on the issue of settlement sites on parts of North Negros Natural Park (NNNP). The Provincial Government of Negros Occidental initially opposed projects in NNNP but with the consultative mechanisms of ProPIDU, the issue was eventually addressed.

A number of implementation problems can be attributed to issues on the lack or inadequate allocation of DSWD staff to efficiently implement the projects. In Negros Occidental, the DSWD PAMANA-SLP office currently handles 351 projects in various stages of implementation. Of these, 90 are 2018 PAMANA-SLP. At the time of the KII, only seven PDOs were field-based to oversee all these projects, averaging 50 projects per PDO. Adherence to the process has suffered, with some PDOs taking shortcuts, especially in fully

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<sup>23</sup> CSPP principles include transparency and accountability, public consultations, community-driven, gender equality and protection of children, among others.

undertaking a study on the viability of enterprises to local conditions. Project options presented to the POs are mostly duplicates of other enterprises already implemented in other areas.

PDO job performance is also measured by the number of projects completed financially (funds released) and physically (hardware / goods and products purchased), which meant there is no incentive to monitor and provide post-implementation support once enterprises begin operations. Although a number of factors contribute to project success, post-completion technical support can increase chances of success. All three observed project cases projects are at risk to fail, based on the FGDs.

In the chicken-layering project, PO members were all first-timers in handling such kind of enterprise and were at a loss when some of the hens fell ill. They were assured by the PDO and the supplier of the hens that sick hens may be replaced but the contractor reneged and no longer honored such warranty when illness showed in the next few days after delivery. Almost a quarter of the hens died and without the PDO to help exact accountability on the supplier, egg production and overall sales projection took a dip.

In the carabao milk production project, the absence of post-completion support also left PO members at a loss, with no one to advise them or endorse them to agencies who can help with the technical aspects of carabao milk production. None of the carabaos have produced milk so far, a year into the project.

Budget constraints also affected implementation. PDO contracts were not renewed or new hires took time to be onboard leading to delays in implementation.

## On PAMANA-SLP Effectiveness

Generally, PO members and community members appreciate the livelihood projects, with two of the three POs studied exhibiting positive perceptions towards the RPA as a result of PAMANA-SLP implementation. In Barangay Payao in Binalbagan, one respondent cried while narrating how she sees the project as indemnity for the pain and trauma her family endured while caught at the crossfires when she was a little girl. As with most residents in the barangay, she was part of the initial wave of settlers who made the area their home when they escaped the heavy fighting in the mountainous parts of Binalbagan.

In Barangay 1 in Escalante City, where PO members recall not much interaction with RPA members in recent memory, they were nonetheless thankful on the inclusion of their barangay in PAMANA-SLP.

But negative perceptions on the RPA remains. One narration from PO member in Brgy. Barangay 2 indicated no relative improvement on how the PO views and accepts the mainstreaming of RPA living in their community. She narrated that had she known that the project was initiated by the RPA, she wouldn't have participated in it. Her apprehension stemmed from intimidation brought by the knowledge that RPA members in their community still casually display firearms on occasion. Unknowingly, RPA members have intimidated the PO member by the thought that even slight disagreements in project implementation may put her life at risk. She narrates the fear she felt when the RPA members acted abrasively, at one point

soliciting an initial “share” on the project fund. This tension was later resolved but it led to the resignation/non-participation of the RPA in the PO project

While all three projects are at risk to fail in its economic goals, it is evident that their presence enhanced social cohesion at the barangay level. PO members and barangay officials feel close to each other and are proactive in finding collective solutions to problems encountered. In Barangay 1’s egg-layering project, FGD participants all agreed that the experience now gives them confidence to undertake another livelihood project, especially when they know they can rely on each other for help each step of the way.

In the carabao dairy project in Barangay 2, the village captain himself allocated an area for the carabaos to graze. When the grass had dried, willing PO members took on the responsibility of feeding and caring for each carabao in their own yards.

The larger community also stands to benefit in this project as the priority beneficiary of the milk produce are the thirteen malnourished children being monitored by the Barangay Nutrition Scholar who is also the current PO president.

## On PAMANA-SLP Sustainability

A big factor in project sustainability is the extent of hand-holding from the implementors. For the most part the POs comprise of non-entrepreneurial members, and to assume that the limited lecture / training sessions provided can make skilled entrepreneurs out of them, without additional technical support post-completion, is a highly improbable proposition. The non-renewal of the DSWD PDO contracts compounded the problem – their sudden departure left all the POs hanging. No endorsements to LGU officials or local agriculture / trade and industry offices were made. All POs showed apprehension to approach local offices for help, thinking that they do not have the “jurisdiction” on a national project.

**All three POs, however, also acknowledge the lack of commitment of members to fully attend to the needs of the projects.** Some were shocked at the extent of attention it entails – one PO president has signified intention to resign as the PO already takes much of her time otherwise allocated to a more profitable enterprise (i.e. selling food items at the local public school).

This lack of commitment may have stemmed from the POs having been organized solely for PAMANA-SLP to have a beneficiary organization. It’s a curious setup: organizations are usually formed to address development gaps. These organizations formed organically are proactive in finding funders/donors to finance their projects, and are wary of the high stakes involved should they fail to show results. For PAMANA-SLP, the members were recruited on the basis of the promise of a profitable enterprise, and there were no stakes nor accountability should projects fail. Some PO members are also married / related to profiled RPM-P/RPA /ABB members and probably knew the government would not impose penalties in consideration of the sensitivities connected to the peace process.

## Recommendations

Sharing the dividends of a peace agreement to communities facilitates healing and reconciliation between former non-state armed group and the communities where they once operated. RPA's concept of CPD as operationalized in PAMANA-SLP's engagement with RPA-identified communities is tied with the objectives of Track 1 and the RPA's transformation framework that posits a peace agreement needs a healing and reconciliation component that breaks the social stigma and prejudices of communities against a non-state armed group. This component can facilitate a non-state armed group's easier integration into their local political and economic spheres.

In this context, PAMANA-SLP provides a safe space for the RPA to reintroduce themselves to their immediate social system in a way that also brings tangible benefits to the community. Two of the POs exhibited positive perceptions towards the RPA as a result of PAMANA-SLP implementation and this is a positive indicator for healing and reconciliation brought by community's enjoyment of the peace dividend. The study, however, observed one case showing the PO's aversion to engage with the RPA which, along with disagreements on the projects, may be traced to the POs being intimidated by the awareness that RPA has access to firearms. Moving forward, this is where decommissioning helps. Along with designing projects or activities that increase positive RPA engagements with their immediate communities, it is worth studying whether perceptions have changed with the awareness that decommissioning had taken place.

Successful implementation of projects gives legitimacy and trust in the government and can disincentivize non-state armed groups to go back to, and civilians to join, the armed struggle. Through a mix of programs and projects that improve economic conditions and done with perceived high degrees of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, government legitimacy is established and former combatants as well as civilians are disincentivized to pursue ideologies through armed conflict. Towards this end it is recommended that implementation issues such as inadequate project staffing, lack of buy-in from LGUs, and weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms be proactively addressed both by OPAPP and implementers on the ground. Three weeks after the fieldwork for this study, DWSD reported that the heavy caseload of PDOs had been eased by the recent hiring of five more PDOs. Hopefully, this will ensure a new round of hand-holding, problem-solving, and monitoring of PAMANA-SLP.

For future livelihood projects in conflict areas, it may help if skilled enterprise managers are hired to accompany the process. OPAPP has begun exploring this idea with consultants now on board and looking into viable enterprise designs in RPA settlement sites.

A focused and comprehensive livelihood plan must also accompany the process of developing the RPA settlement sites because they are located far from the cities, businesses and labor markets. This comprehensive livelihood plan should take into account the crops and enterprises suitable to the areas and the initial investments and capital needed to sustain own economies. Since most sites are within the North Negros Natural Park, it will be worth to look at agricultural and nature tourism models that recharge the enterprise and employment sectors of localities.

A model OPAPP can also look into is Altertrade Philippines Inc's. Altertrade has a successful system where agrarian reform beneficiary associations (ARB) are assisted in their transition from being farm workers to farmer entrepreneurs.

Altertrade also observes that, although not by design, assisted sugar farms have exhibited resilience to NPA efforts to win them back. This is worth noting for future program design enhancements on CNN areas and for the planned RPA settlement sites. While the CNN will most likely attack such approach as another counterinsurgency, this tag will have little impact on the government's current military strategy. The Duterte administration's suspension of the formal peace talks with the CNN and the localization of the task to end the Communist insurgency where key government agencies are on board, essentially renders all programs of government in conflict areas (PAMANA or otherwise) as counterinsurgency.

There is a need for a research tool that will establish direct links between government programs and societal peace goals, i.e. lessened violent conflict incidence. No direct link exists between PAMANA-SLP projects and lessened violent conflict incidence in Negros Occidental, though it may be too much to ask for PAMANA to lead to these outcomes on such a short timeframe. For example, can one program's intermediate gains offset the cycle of conflict that may perpetuate with a military operations hounded by alleged human rights violations? Will the children who were made orphans by the killing of every alleged NPA fighter remember PAMANA when his/her search for justice lead to him/her joining a new generation of activists willing to take up arms against a perceived repressive system?

Since the roots and drivers of conflict cannot be addressed by a single action or intervention, correlations between societal peace goal and conflict incidence may be established with a common tool that can measure or assign weights to the mix of services and interventions (even inaction) the government deliberately undertakes to address the roots and drivers of conflict in a given area.

A good point of entry is through the Provincial Task Force to Ending Local Communist Conflict (PTF-ELCAC), jointly created in Negros Occidental on 27 August 2019 by the Provincial Development Council (PDC) and the Provincial Peace and Order Council (PPOC) in response to EO 70. The PTF-ELCAC is tasked to deliver services that will address the roots of insurgency in the province. As the ELCAC mechanism is new, baselines may still be established that can help measure each agencies' contributions in a number of local variables.

In the end, and as with PAMANA, the ELCAC's successes may be best determined when either program is made irrelevant to exist. This can only be guaranteed when government makes attainment of peace front and center in all its plans and actions.

# Integrating Community Development and Peacebuilding:

## The Implementation of PAMANA and Kalahi-CIDSS in Sorsogon<sup>24</sup>

### Case Study of PAMANA in the Bicol Region

Written by Aries Arugay

#### Background

This case study is about the implementation of PAMANA-funded projects in the Bicol region. Particularly, I conducted research in the province of Sorsogon. This area in the Philippines is known to still have an active communist insurgent movement that has historically controlled considerable portions of regional (Bicol) and provincial (Sorsogon) territory. Revolutionary taxation (through cash and kind) and other revenue-generating activities (e.g., permit to campaign fees during election campaign season) remain rampant. The military has a constant presence in most of Sorsogon's municipalities and participates in most "whole of government" approaches to peacebuilding through the "peace caravans".

Sorsogon is also known to be a province with rampant poverty. In the past, it has become a site for the implementation of community-driven development programs such as Kalahi-CIDSS (KC). The relative success of this anti-poverty and community empowerment program nationwide became the impetus of integrating KC with PAMANA given the province's peace and conflict situation. It is the interface of these two projects and how its implementation is perceived by different government officials, members of the security sector, and particular communities that is the focus of this case study.

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<sup>24</sup> The author is grateful to Mary Joyce Bulao for her valuable research assistance in data collection and helping to draft this case study report.

## Research Objectives/Questions

This case study examines the implemented PAMANA projects based on the agreed evaluation criteria formulated by the IPA team, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

- Relevance to key needs of conflict-affected areas and improved capacity of local governments to address those needs
- Efficiency in project identification of beneficiary communities and in the coordination of activities
- Effectiveness in improving economic access and fostering peace
- Sustainability of the PAMANA program

For this particular case study, another objective is to examine the prevalence of revolutionary taxation in PAMANA project implementation. Finally, this case study also examines the role played by inter-agency collaboration between national and local civilian agencies as well as the security sector.

## Methodology, Scope, and Limitations

Sorsogon was chosen as a particular case municipality for the Bicol region because of the bulk of PAMANA projects in the province and in the specific towns of Prieto Diaz and Gubat. Interviews were conducted among implementers at the provincial and municipal levels, local government units, and AFP personnel. A total of 12 key informant interviews were conducted from 1 to 8 June 2019. Two FGDs of barangay officials and community members at large were also conducted separately to gather insights on how PAMANA-KC-funded projects were implemented and their perceived impact to their community.

The two municipalities – Gubat and Prieto Diaz – were purposively chosen given their extensive PAMANA-KC projects throughout the years (2011-2018). They also have separate “big ticket” PAMANA projects such as roads. This case study did not make any analytical distinction between these two types of projects, but our interviewees had significant awareness of and knowledge about these projects. The fieldwork research I conducted also included visiting some of the PAMANA-KC projects implemented at the municipal and barangay level.

## Findings

The case of Sorsogon showed both achieved and unachieved goals in the implementation of PAMANA-KC projects in the Bicol Region. While most success has been attributed to poverty alleviation, other benefits such as increased participation and capacity building among community members have been identified. However, there has been inadequate evidence of success in terms of conflict reduction, specifically on revolutionary taxation as it continued despite the socioeconomic benefits that PAMANA and PAMANA-KC brought to communities. The subsequent subsections discuss the findings in more detail through identified dominant themes.



PAMANA's relevance is most prominent in improving socioeconomic conditions, not necessarily on conflict management and reduction. Roads are a game-changer among all the PAMANA projects.

Based on the data gathered through interviews on the local government and other implementing agencies and through focus group discussions with community-beneficiaries, one of the major successes of the PAMANA projects lie on improving the socioeconomic conditions in otherwise impoverished, isolated areas. Farm-to-market roads facilitated product delivery to markets, lessened product damage and substantially reduced transportation costs. In an interview, a PAMANA implementer from the regional office of the Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD), said"

"This is an agricultural area... most of their complaints is how their produce can reach the market. It is very difficult for them. For example, they need to pay to collect their harvested bananas and put them in tricycles. Then they have to endure transporting them in rough roads. The bananas won't be in good quality once they reach the market. Thus, even if they want to sell it for P20-30 per kilo, it will only be sold around P10-15 per kilo. But if they have good roads, the tricycles can come to far-flung areas and the transportation costs for their products will surely be less."

This was confirmed by both community members and other implementing agencies such as the LGU. In the FGD in another Barangay, one participant shared:

"Those who owned land that has *copra* (coconut-based product) already use the road and therefore have minimized their costs of transportation. They don't need to go through a more difficult and mountainous route that uses a carabao (water buffalo) that also needs to be rented. It is no longer difficult than before."

Such socioeconomic benefits brought especially about by roads, foot bridges, and other projects allow for better access to communities. The planning officers of both Prieto Diaz and Gubat added that aside from product transportation, the roads have also allowed the local government units to build structures so that other services such as health and education be brought closer to the formerly isolated communities.

PAMANA's Theory of Change revolves around the idea that addressing the cause of conflict would result in lesser conflict and violence. One of the determined root causes of insurgency is poverty and PAMANA's goal has been to reduce poverty by fostering a more conducive environment for socioeconomic development. However, while this study shows evidence of how PAMANA projects addressed socioeconomic problems, there has been no substantial proof that this led to lessening insurgent conflict or eliminated revolutionary taxation.

In the KC-PAMANA projects for example, FGD participants have been very vocal about how their socioeconomic needs have been addressed but have chosen not to respond to questions related to revolutionary taxation. This might suggest the continued prevalence of this practice. In terms of bigger PAMANA projects, especially those handled by LGUs and other departments, there has been a vocal admission that revolutionary taxation has never been resolved. In an interview with the head of Sorsogon's



Provincial planning office, it was pointed out how projects implemented through contractors were forced to pay revolutionary taxes, with a threat of damage to unfinished projects. When asked about revolutionary tax, the officer said: “That is a problem. Even if there is already a PAMANA project [that addresses poverty], there is still a [revolutionary] tax being asked... like in our projects with the DA [Department of Agriculture]... seven sites where we put solar driers... they [NPA] blocked their construction...[Interviewer: If that’s the case did we give them the tax?].... We don’t know but we know that they asked.”

**Community empowerment is a strong positive outcome of Kalahi-PAMANA projects.** Both implementers and community members and leaders have been keen in pointing out community empowerment as the strongest positive outcome of KC-PAMANA projects. Empowerment comes in the following forms: (1) the community identifying their needs and having the capability to address their needs, (2) the community realizing their capabilities in planning and project management, (3) being equipped with skills that allow them to not only become community members but community leaders. As shared by a DSWD KC-PAMANA implementer:

“Community empowerment. I was the community facilitator for the PAMANA projects in a barangay in Sorsogon. This was a barangay that you can’t reach by riding a motorcycle. You will have to walk for two to three hours. But people there had basic awareness of socioeconomic issues so long as you involve them, and they eventually owned the program. They are empowered on what to do, how to engage other actors. They said that we might be from a far-flung barangay but we share many issues and concerns with other communities. They notice that like others, they don’t feel national government presence. We don’t have public services such as irrigation among many things.”

The community-beneficiaries take a sense of pride in their accomplishment, emphasizing how they planned the projects and closely monitored them in order to ensure quality. In the FGDs, participants shared of how difficult it was at first for them to go through the CDD processes and how hesitant some community members were in participating in the project. This changed however upon completion of the first project and the subsequent projects were easier to implement as more people in the community became project volunteers and workers. Community-beneficiaries own the project. They get themselves involved from planning to monitoring and implementation because they believe they own the project and will greatly benefit them. As a result, community members gain skills in project proposal preparation, budgeting, and monitoring. These skills, aside from the fact that these are useful beyond the project timeline, has given community members, especially project volunteers the confidence in taking a central role in their barangays. Volunteers in the KALAHIPAMANA projects pride themselves as elected barangay officials, not anymore as ordinary community members.

DSWD implementors in Sorsogon gave us a detailed description of how community members assess their peace and conflict situation as a way to identify significant and needs-based PAMANA projects. One implementor said:

“Prior to the identification of PAMANA sub-projects, an activity called Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA) was conducted. This is an activity where the community members themselves identify the pressing needs/problems in the community and the appropriate intervention for the identified need. Various strategies were undertaken (e.g., house to house invitation, posting of announcements in conspicuous places, bandillo system, purok assemblies, barangay assemblies) to ensure participation and inclusion of community members in the decision-making activities.”

The results of these assessments were adopted into the barangay’s plans such as the Barangay Development Plan. This in turn informed the formulation of the Municipal Development Plan. One key impact of the KC-PAMANA “combo” was encouraging the LGUs to include the identified needs of the communities in their development planning. In a way, this bottom-up approach considered the community’s input.

**There is significant difference in outcomes between community-driven PAMANA projects and LGU-and-departmental-driven PAMANA projects.** Community-driven projects have shown impact on participation and people empowerment. There was an expressed preference for LGU-OPAPP partnership in a project than those coursed through other national-level departments because of (1) ease of communication and coordination, (2) less administrative requirements, and (3) more flexibility.

The major differences between KC-PAMANA projects and LGU-and-departmental-driven PAMANA projects lie in (1) the process that is undergone in the determination of projects and in (2) the process of implementation and monitoring of the project. These differences have led to different consequences, both positive and negative.

KC-PAMANA projects utilized the community-driven development (CDD) approach, which requires intensive community involvement from planning to implementation. As a result, community members, possibly including members of insurgency groups, are more involved and own the projects in their localities. When asked about the possible involvement of members of the communist movement, FGD participants said that they only want to gather intelligence and see the extent of government presence in the project implementation. This is not so much to sabotage the projects since that will likely anger the members of the community. Therefore, it becomes difficult for the insurgents to use the project for their own purposes because undermining them would likely result in resentment from the community.

**These kinds of projects encouraged communication between the community members and officials and promoted meaningful participation.** “Communication between ordinary citizens and members of the barangay and municipal development councils have improved that did not occur before PAMANA. During that time, community members felt that they were not involved. When these projects arrived, they were given a chance to get involved... the engagement of marginalized groups such as farmers and women are very evident even if its no longer a PAMANA project. There seems to be more community involvement in the development processes since PAMANA.” (Community member, interview)

“Before, we had difficulty in encouraging people to participate in project implementation. They were skeptical on the size and quality of these projects. But when they saw that the first project cycles that were

finished generated good infrastructure projects with smooth implementation and even opportunities for employment, it was no longer difficult to convince participation in the second cycle.” (Community member, FGD,)

Community involvement and participation in infrastructure projects disincentivized intrusion from the communist insurgents and possibly undermining their implementation. People in the community understand the significance of the project for the community that they themselves protect it. Also, the budget is often too meager for any revolutionary taxation to be asked since every peso needs to undergo strict liquidation processes. As told to us by community member:

“They [communist insurgents] do not ask from PAMANA as far as I know. But I don’t know about other areas if they are still asking at present. But in our case, this is community-led implementation. If community members are the ones talking to them, the drive for revolutionary taxation disappears. Maybe they still ask from the contractors... Normally the tax is put on top of the total project price that increases the project costs. There is a big difference between a community-led P300,000 implemented project from a similar project that cost P1 million from a contractor. The outcome are almost the same project but their cost and quality are surely different.”

But my interview with a former mayor revealed that revolutionary taxation on PAMANA projects implemented at the municipal level existed during his time as municipal mayor. He recalled that he refused to give in to the demands of the community insurgents for a revolutionary tax for a livelihood center funded by PAMANA. He told me that this resulted in the non-completion of the project.<sup>25</sup> For him, this is preferable since his constituents know that it was the New People’s Army that causes this outcome.

On the other hand, for LGU- or department-led PAMANA projects, community members are relatively disengaged and not involved in their implementation. Decisions on project sites may even be political rather than needs-based (as reflected in interviews with a former mayor and a general). As a result, there is no sense of ownership in the community and not enough motivation to monitor implementation and disincentivize revolutionary taxation. Moreover, because contractors handle the projects, they are easy targets for revolutionary taxation.

Our interviews with municipal implementers expressed a preference for OPAPP-LGU projects that those coursed through agencies such as DA and DILG. One said: “For DA [projects], they’re not good. They even take out 2% as administration cost. And the processing and liquidation does not go to the regional office but to the national [which might be burdensome and often takes. Along time].” (Interview, PPDO) Aside from these, a planning officer also expressed dismay over the lack of flexibility of partner government agencies so that they were asked to return the excess in one project instead of allowing them to utilize the budget in supplemental projects despite the approval of OPAPP.

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<sup>25</sup> This livelihood center project is not in the list of PAMANA-funded projects in Gubat as shared by OPAPP.

**Local political dynamics have an impact on coordination (for Kalahi-PAMANA) and project prioritization (for LGU-based or department-based projects).** Local political dynamics have an impact on project prioritization. Local chief executives (mayors) play a significant role in LGU or department-based projects, as admitted by the politician and military interviewees. While consultations are done in order to ensure that identified locations are those with high insurgency problem, decisions of the military have not necessarily been agreeable with provincial politicians at all times. A former general described it as trying to get a “slice of the pie.” Provincial governors compete for PAMANA projects because it translates to an additional infrastructure or service for their constituents, which is especially useful during election cycles. Governors have a lot of power in determining how much project funding will go to each municipality under the governor’s jurisdiction.

“They have information, there is a need to strategize at the national level... there is politics involved because we are talking about government funds... there are governors or politicians who receive PAMANA projects but in the end it has no bearing in counterinsurgency.” (Interview, General Almerol)

The skepticism of a top official in the AFP on the value of PAMANA projects reflected the prevailing opinion among the security sector that the military approach (counterinsurgency) is still the more appropriate strategy.<sup>26</sup>

The impact of political considerations, however, is less felt in KC-PAMANA projects because the LGU does not play a role in project identification. Since most of these projects received the same amount (P300,000) per annum, regardless of their peace and conflict situation and financial need. Instead, the LGU facilitates the coordination between KC implementers from the DSWD and municipal coordinators. But the role of the municipal mayor is critical. A hands-on, highly involved local chief executive meant faster coordination between personnel while difficulties may arise when the local chief executive is less supportive of the project. Key differences of a more involved and participatory municipal mayor include the speed of the release of funds, quick liquidation and accounting, and integration with other development and peace initiatives of the municipality. KC-PAMANA then becomes a critical part of a host of peacebuilding projects locally owned and implemented by the barangays with assistance from the municipality rather than a “top-down” initiative from the national government.

Effectiveness and sustainability are largely dependent on the order and speed of implementation given budget limitations and governmental process requirements.

Effectiveness and sustainability are key outcomes that are challenging to deliver in every PAMANA project in Sorsogon, whether community-based or LGU/department-based. Several factors affected effectiveness and sustainability, including: (1) budget size, (2) budget disbursement, (3) implementation and monitoring,

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<sup>26</sup> This is based from the author’s previous research about the Philippine security sector and peacebuilding in the Philippines.

and (4) administrative processes. Sequencing of project implementation has also played significant role on the effectiveness.

Budget availability is one of the biggest factors that affect PAMANA projects from project selection to implementation. First, for the KC-PAMANA projects, an equal amount of P300,000 per barangay does not reflect realities that some barangays have higher levels of conflict and therefore need more intervention than others. Second, budget affects project selection more than community prioritization and needs. Below is an extract from an FGD that demonstrated this:

B: “Because we went through a barangay assembly. We had a consultation which are the three priority projects and we voted on them.”

A: “What was not given any priority?”

B: “The flood control project, sir. Because it requires a huge budget. And we don’t have a place for evacuation if there is flooding.”

A: “So in the end, what was funded was not based according to need. But what if there are adequate funds for it?”

B: “Then we will be very happy since no we will have an evacuation center and flooding can be controlled.”

LGU-based projects have a higher budget than community-based ones. However, the budget amount was still inadequate for the completion of infrastructure projects. Implementers chose to divide the projects in phases. As a result, part of implemented project may have already deteriorated even before completion through the last phase. This however does not discount the fact that such infrastructure, despite being uncompleted has already served the purpose such that uncompleted roads have already been used and have eased transportation and made isolated communities more accessible.

Aside from size, budget disbursement has also had a significant impact on speed of project delivery. Regardless of the implementers, delayed budget disbursement in turn delayed project completion and may even have increased cost. Delayed budget disbursement was caused mostly by certain administrative process requirements such documents that need to get submitted, and compliance with the Procurement Law.

Implementation monitoring is a problem only for LGU-based projects. Neglect of monitoring usually leads to project failure while local executive’s high level of involvement in both project implementation and monitoring led to successful projects (interview with PPDO). Implementation sequence also affects the desired outcomes. Among the three pillars, softer, community-driven projects should be implemented alongside infrastructure and support. However, this did not happen.

J: “That’s why I don’t know because if you look at the Pillars, they should all be implemented at the same time. But in our case, we went ahead. DSWD implemented first then DILG. The salin-tubig of DILG [irrigation] is also a PAMANA project.”

A: “Ok, why is that? Why were you first? But you are on Pillar 3? So you should be in charge of “softer” projects. In Sorsogon, what we wanted to see is the biggest budgeted PAMANA project, the farm-to-market road?”

J: “That is the one implemented by DA.”

A & MJ: “Ah, its not implemented by DILG”

J: “DILG implemented Salin-tubig”

A & MJ: “Ah ok.”

...

A: “But what you’re saying that this was delayed?”

J: “They implemented last.”

A: “Why is that?”

J: “I think we were part of a PAMANA pilot since we were in the field during that time.”

A: “I see.”

J: “They (DA and DILG) don’t have enough manpower to engage the community.”

A: “And since there is already KALAHIs in your area...”

J: “DSWD through KALAHIs-CIDSS was already in the community.”

Therefore, the potential impact of PAMANA is compromised if one of the national-level agencies or departments do not synchronize project implementation with the other implementers of other kinds of PAMANA projects.

## Recommendations

From the discussion, this case study report has the following recommendations.

**Formulate a single project implementation scheme for PAMANA projects.** The case study of Sorsogon revealed that there were two ways PAMANA projects were implemented: the conventional PAMANA

projects implemented by line agencies (e.g., DILG, DA) and the KC-PAMANA integrated projects, which combined KC's CDD paradigm and the conflict-sensitive approach of PAMANA. In a way, this was cognizant of the circumstances surrounding the Bicol region as an area with a lingering communist presence and widespread poverty. While this twin approach afforded flexibility, local-level implementers were often confused about the differences between them. One way to address this is for KC and PAMANA to be fully integrated in “softer” projects nationwide. For big ticket items or the regular PAMANA projects, there must be ways to infuse the CDD principles in order to promote peacebuilding while also fostering community empowerment and popular participation.

**Identify mechanisms for better synchronization of PAMANA project phases.** The case study of Sorsogon showed that the three pillars of PAMANA were mostly not implemented according to its elaborate design. The main implementation gaps were in the efficiency and speed of implementation of different national-level cabinet agencies. While it will take institutional overhaul to provide OPAPP with implementation powers at par with these agencies, it is important that mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation and sequencing of the project are provided. As an agency under the Office of the President, OPAPP needs to remind other departments in the cabinet of the necessity of implementing PAMANA projects according to its intended sequence. The current milieu seemed to be favorable given the Duterte Administration's release of Executive Order 70 for better inter-agency coordination. Though it is questionable whether this executive-led initiative can lead to a sustainable peace in the country.

**Minimize uncertainty from local political dynamics.** The receptiveness of local political leadership to the promise and potential of PAMANA is a key variable in determining the effectiveness and sustainability of the impact of its projects. In both of the municipalities this case study studies, there was a firm belief in the local officials of the importance of PAMANA and they made efforts to integrate it with their own development and peace initiatives. The information from the security sector validated the insight that poor local governance can magnify the negative impact of the state of conflict. One way to minimize uncertainty from local politics is to institutionalize the principles of PAMANA in the LGU's own project implementation mechanisms. Therefore, CDD and other popular participation mechanisms should also be implemented in the other projects of the local government. Rather than rely on the political will of the local chief executive, LGUs need to pass binding legislation, create institutions, and incentivize commitment from other local political actors to the PAMANA peacebuilding paradigm.

**Conflict sensitivity and gains from peacebuilding must inform future PAMANA project support.** While the KC-PAMANA “combo” was effective in fostering peace, the uniform amount of money defeated the purpose of PAMANA to provide funding that is supposed to be informed by the conflict situation in the locality. OPAPP needs to determine ways to assess the changes in the conflict situation and “peace dividends” from the implementation of previous PAMANA projects. This will ensure the momentum will not be wasted from the local ownership or buy-in of the community that KC-PAMANA was able to generate.



## Appendix: English Translations of Quotes

Section and Page No.	Actual Quotation	English Translation
Section II. A., p. 2	<p>“This is an agricultural area... karamihan, ang hinaing nila yung pag anihan, paglabas ng kanilang mga produkto, pahirapan. Halimbawa, saging yung product nila. Kailangan nila magbayad ng singkwenta (50 pesos) kada sako para sa mga maghahakot. Tapos pag naisakay na sa tricycle, ang dadaanan nila, lubak-lubak. Darating man yan sa market, hindi na ganoon kaganda yung quality, so imbes na maibebenta nila ng thirty per kilo or twenty per kilo, bibilhin na lang sa kanila ng kinse or ten pesos na lang. While kung nagkaroon sila ng magandang daanan, makakapasok na yung tricycle sa kasuloksulukan. So yung pamasah, yung pang hauling na fifty wala nay un plus yung tricycle na arkila nila or pamasah, nababawasan.”</p>	<p>This is an agricultural area... most of their complaints is how their produce can reach the market. It is very difficult for them. For example, they need to pay to collect their harvested bananas and put them in tricycles. Then they have to endure transporting them in rough roads. The bananas won't be in good quality once they reach the market. Thus, even if they want to sell it for PhP 20-30 per kilo, it will only be sold around PhP10-15 per kilo. But if they have good roads, the tricycles can come to far-flung areas and the transportation costs for their products will surely be less.</p>
Section II. A., p. 3	<p>“yung mga owner ng mga lupa, yung kopra nila na taga rito, dun na dumadaan, mas less ang expenses. Kesa na dito ka dadaan sa bundok, na hahakutin pa ng kalabaw. May babayaran pa. Di na siya mahirap.”</p>	<p>... those who owned land that has copra (coconut-based product) already use the road and therefore have minimized their costs of transportation. They don't need to go through a more difficult and mountainous route that uses a carabao (water buffalo) that also needs to be rented. It is no longer difficult than before.”</p>



Section II. B., p. 3	<p>“Problema yan..kahit may project na.. actually, project ng PAMANA kinukunan pa yan... yung seven project naman sa DA, yung drier.. solar drier, seven sites yun. hinarang... [pano po pag ganun? magbibigay. [ilang percent po ang hinihingi?] hindi naming alam. basta nangyari yun.”</p>	<p>That is a problem. Even if there is already a PAMANA project [that addresses poverty], there is still a [revolutionary] tax being asked... like in our projects with the DA [Department of Agriculture]... seven sites where we put solar driers... they [NPA] blocked their construction...[Interviewer: If that’s the case did we give them the tax?].… We don’t know but we know that they asked.</p>
Section II. B., p. 3	<p>“Community empowerment. I have, nung community facilitator ako, nung nag-pa-PAMANA kami in Irosin, Sorsogon barangay Kawayan. Ito yung barangay na hindi mo pwedeng puntahan nang nakasakay ka sa motor. Lalakarin mo talaga sya ng 2-3 hours. Pag yung basic awareness ng tao, pag they feel involved doon sa ginagawa, they owned the program. So, and pag empowered sila kung papano gagawin. Kung papano makikipag-engage, nakakalimutan nila na sa layo ng barangay namin, hindi pala kami naiiba din sa iba. I belong. Malayo kami pero kasama kami sa pinag-uusapang development ng government na somehow, in some cases, nagtitrigger ito sa iba. Kasi nefeel nila na bakit parang walang nakakarating sa amin na tulong from the national government. Wala kaming mga, salat kami sa patubig, salat kami sa ano.”</p>	<p>Community empowerment. I was the community facilitator for the PAMANA projects in a barangay in Sorsogon. This was a barangay that you can’t reach by riding a motorcycle. You will have to walk for 2-3 hours. But people there had basic awareness of socioeconomic issues so long as you involve them, and they eventually owned the program. They are empowered on what to do, how to engage other actors. They said that we might be from a far-flung barangay but we share many issues and concerns with other communities. They notice that like others, they don’t feel national government presence. We don’t have public services such as irrigation among many things.</p>
Section II. C., p. 6	<p>“na-improve na din kasi yung pakikipagcommunicate ni ordinary citizen doon sa development council na dating hindi gawa, hindi ganap doon sa community. So, parang noon, ang</p>	<p>...communication between ordinary citizens and members of the barangay and municipal development councils have improved that did not occur before PAMANA. During that time, community members felt that they</p>

	<p>sinasabi nila, hindi sila involved. Nung dumating yung ganitong type of program, nabigyan sila ng pagkakataon na ma-involve... yung engagement ng marginalized group, farmers, yung mga women, very evident yung engagement ng program regardless kung anong funding source yan, PAMANA sya o hindi, etc. Very evident yung involvement nung mga tao doon sa development processes na ginagawa.”</p>	<p>were not involved. When these projects arrived, they were given a chance to get involved... the engagement of marginalized groups such as farmers and women are very evident even if its no longer a PAMANA project. There seems to be more community involvement in the development processes since PAMANA.</p>
<p>Section II. C., p. 6</p>	<p>Nung una po kase, nahirapan din kami magpatawag ng tao, kase naranasan na ng tao na ang proyekto ngaya, konti lang nman yan. Substandard ngaya yan. Ang concept ng tao, may mga negative effects talaga. Pero nung nakita nila sa cycle na maganda yung patrabaho, na magandang ang takbo ng implementasyon, sa second cycle namin, di kami nahirapan, hanggang sa huli”.</p>	<p>Before, we had a difficulty in encouraging people to participate in project implementation. They were skeptical on the size and quality of these projects. But when they saw that the first project cycles that were finished generated good infrastructure projects with smooth implementation and even opportunities for employment, it was no longer difficult to convince participation in the second cycle.</p>
<p>Section II. C., pp. 6</p>	<p>“PAMANA kasi, hindi nila hiningan eh. Yung mga implemented project natin, I don't know sa ibang areas kung nangingihingi pa rin sila ngayon. Pero sa case namin, parang kasi nga, community-lead implementation to eh. Pag si community na yung kumakausap sa kanila, nawawala itong mga revolutionary tax na hinihingi nila. Baka sa mga contractor na implementation... Pag contractor hinihingan si contractor. Pinapatong dun sa total price nung ano. Lumulobo yung project cost. Pag si community na, makikita mo yung kaibahan eh ng</p>	<p>They [communist insurgents] do not ask from PAMANA as far as I know. But I don't know about other areas if they are still asking at present. But in our case, this is community-led implementation. If community members are the ones talking to them, the drive for revolutionary taxation disappears. Maybe they still ask from the contractors... Normally the tax is put on top of the total project price that increases the project costs. There is a big difference between a community-led PhP300,000 implemented project from a similar project that cost PhP1 million from a contractor. The</p>

	isang 300,000 na inimplement ng PAMANA at nung sa one million na inimplement na parehong size, parehong sukat na contractor ang nagpagawa. Even yung mga tulay natin na ginawa, may pagkakaiba...”	outcome are almost the same project but their cost and quality are surely different.
Section II. C., p. 7	Yung sa DA, hindi maganda yun. Binabawasan pa kami ng 2%...administration fund daw... Saka yung processing ng papeles at liquidation, di na dadaan sa region, diretso na kami sa kanila.”	For DA [projects], they’re not good. They even take out 2% as administration cost. And the processing and liquidation does not go to the regional office but to the national [which might be burdensome and often takes. Along time].
Section II. D. p. 7	“May information sila, ang kailangan dito as a nation mag-strategize tayo, as a governmen kasi pag ano natin kasi as a political, kasi may politics dyan eh, kasi may pondo eh... may governor, may politiko, kung saan...minsan nga the worst part of it, ang Pamana projects na ibinibigay is walang bearing sa counterinsurgency.”	They have information, there is a need to strategize at the national level... there is politics involved because we are talking about government funds... there are governors or politicians who receive PAMANA projects but in the end it has no bearing in counterinsurgency.
Section II. E. p. 8	<p>B: Kase po dumaan naman po kami sa barangay assembly. Nagpriority, consultation, kung ano po yung three priority projects. Yun po yung pinagbotohan.</p> <p>A: Ano po yung hindi nabotohan?</p> <p>B: Yung flood control sir. Kase malaking budget. Ang 7M daw po kulang pa.,</p> <p>Evacuation, wala kaming lote.</p> <p>A: Pero po kung бага yung naging prioritization nyo kung ano lang yung</p>	<p>B: Because we went through a barangay assembly. We had a consultation which are the three priority projects and we voted on them.</p> <p>A: What was not given any priority?</p> <p>B: The flood control project, sir. Because it requires a huge budget. And we don’t have a place for evacuation if there is flooding.</p> <p>A: So in the end, what was funded was not based according to need. But what if there are adequate funds for it?</p>

	<p>practical at kaya ng budget. Pero kung talagang po, kunwari, ang budget andyan?</p> <p>B: Evacuation!</p> <p>Unanimous: Kung Sir kung nangyaring may lupa kami, evacuation sana ang gusto namin tapos yung ano, yung flood control.</p>	<p>B: Then we will be very happy since no we will have an evacuation center and flooding can be controlled.</p>
Section II. E. pp. 9	<p>J: Kaya, I don't know, pero kung titingnan nyo ang Pillars, sabayan kasi dapat nagiimplement eh. Parang sa case, as I've observed, parang nauna kami, si DSWD nagimplement ng PAMANA kaysa kay DILG. Yung mga saling-tubig ni DILG is also a PAMANA Project eh.</p> <p>A: Ok. Bakit ganun? Ba't nauna kayo? Kung Pillar 3 kayo diba? So dapat, mas softer kayo. Kasi kunyari sa Sorsogon, yan nga yung gusto naming makita. Yung pinakamalaking budgeted PAMANA Project there, yung farm-to-market road sa Unyon Sagas?</p> <p>J: Yan naman yung iniimplement nung DA.</p> <p>A &amp; MJ: DA yan? Hindi yan DILG?</p> <p>J: Salin-tubig ang DILG eh.</p> <p>A &amp; MJ: Ah ok.</p> <p>...</p> <p>A: Pero ang sinasabi nyo sir, mas delayed 'to?</p>	<p>J: That's why I don't know because if you look at the Pillars, they should all be implemented at the same time. But in our case, we went ahead. DSWD implemented first then DILG. The salin-tubig of DILG [irrigation] is also a PAMANA project.</p> <p>A: Ok, why is that? Why were you first? But you are on Pillar 3? So you should be in charge of "softer" projects. In Sorsogon, what we wanted to see is the biggest budgeted PAMANA project, the farm-to-market road?</p> <p>J: That is the one implemented by DA.</p> <p>A &amp; MJ: Ah, its not implemented by DILG</p> <p>J: DILG implemented Salin-tubig</p> <p>A &amp; MJ: Ah ok.</p> <p>...</p> <p>A: But what you're saying that this was delayed?</p> <p>J: They implemented last.</p> <p>A: Why is that?</p>

	<p>J: Mas huli silang nag-iimplement.</p> <p>A: Bakit?</p> <p>J: uhm, I think kasi ni-ride on sa amin yung PAMANA as a pilot kasi kami na yung nandun sa field that time.</p> <p>A: I see.</p> <p>J: Wala silang enough manpower to engage community.</p> <p>A: Saka since may KALAHÍ, parang...</p> <p>J: Si DSWD through KALAHÍ-CIDSS ang nandun sa community that time, kaya..</p>	<p>J: I think we were part of a PAMANA pilot since we were in the field during that time.</p> <p>A: I see.</p> <p>J: They (DA and DILG) don't have enough manpower to engage the community.</p> <p>A: And since there is already KALAHÍ in your area...</p> <p>J: DSWD through KALAHÍ-CIDSS was already in the community at that time.</p>
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# Insurgency Ends Where the Road Begins: PAMANA Inter-Municipality Road Projects in Samar Province

## Case Study of PAMANA in Samar

Written by Rosalie Arcala-Hall

### Introduction

This case study examines the local implementation dynamics and outcomes of two inter-municipality road projects funded under PAMANA in Samar province from 2011 onwards. It compares road projects carried out by different national agencies (DILG and DPWH) but under the same local political administration. Project A was for the most part completed, while the Project B was mostly incomplete, with high negative slippage rates among its contractors and funding that is almost four times that of the completed road.

The two focus areas of the study are consistently identified by the Philippine Army 8th Infantry Division (whose area of responsibility includes the island of Samar) as the “communist heartland”— an area of high concentration of CPP-NPA threat activities and strong mass support, called *Militia ng Bayan*. *Katungod Sinirangan Bisayas*, an organization labeled as an “NPA-front organization” by the military, periodically mounts rallies in Tacloban City in protest of what it calls “militarization” of the Samar rural areas. Conflict incidents have been most pronounced in barangays where PAMANA projects are located. Table 1 shows that conflict incidents peaked in 2012 (21 total) and 2013 (14 total) at the start of Project A, with encounters between the military and communist rebels being the most frequent type. The number increased again in 2017 (10 total) with the start of the PAMANA road opening project, which linked the center of Municipality A to a barangay at the provincial border. Encounters were concentrated in and around the construction sites.

**Table 1: Significant Incidents in Case Study Areas (CY 2011-2019)**

Incidents/Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Encounter	4	17	11	5	0	1	6	0	1
Sniping	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harassment	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0
Intimidation	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Abduction	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strafing	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Evacuation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shooting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Liquidation	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0
Total	4	21	14	6	0	3	10	2	2

Source: 8th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Catbalogan, Samar 2019.

The Tan family has controlled the governorship of Samar for the duration of the projects, with the mother Milagros Tan and daughter Sherri Ann Tan-de los Santos elected as governors and Samar Second District representatives back-to-back. The Sarmientos, meanwhile, held the seat as Samar First District Representative. Municipality A and B have seen a number of violent episodes in their local politics. Two previous mayors from Municipality A were gunned down and replaced by kin still locked in a violent rivalry. The newly elected mayor was ambushed recently; a former mayor and her sibling went into hiding presumably for fear of being attacked. A multi-term mayor of Municipality B was also ambushed recently and died from the attack. The current mayor of Municipality B won under controversial circumstances, with low voter turnout, supposedly as a result of the CPP-NPA not allowing residents to vote freely in areas they controlled.

The location of PAMANA inter-municipality road projects is consistent with the army's prioritization, given the high concentration of communist rebel threats. There is a common understanding among government agency members in the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) and Regional Development Council (RDC) that PAMANA projects are important in achieving peace in these conflict-affected areas. They believe that poverty and the lack of noticeable government presence allows for rebel recruitment and mass support. There is a marked difference between the army and Tacloban-based government agencies' assessment that these are conflict-affected areas and the local government representatives' perception of the communist threat. The locals in the two municipalities studied argue that they suffer from this negative stereotype of being a center for communism or being communists themselves. Only the mayor of Municipality A openly admits and is candid about the presence of the NPA and the workings of the shadow government apparatus in the far-flung barangays. This finding suggests a weak conceptual link between PAMANA projects and the goal of addressing the root cause of vertical conflict, insofar as community beneficiaries are concerned. It also suggests a disconnect between elite-outsider and local-insider perspectives of the problem that PAMANA is trying to address.

The road projects were intermittently funded and implemented by various government agencies (army, provincial government, DILG, DPWH). Each implementing agency weaved their organization's ethos into the projects, with varying levels of interest in injecting conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding processes into their implementation and monitoring mechanisms. There are multiple convergence platforms (RPOC and RDCs), with different functionalities and structures. Both have technical working groups that conducted monitoring of PAMANA projects, but until recently, the RDC did not have a dedicated unit for PAMANA, unlike the RPOC under the DILG chairmanship. The RPOC included civil society representatives as monitors, while the RDC recently included local army units as part of the monitoring team. Under DILG, there was more room for negotiation and engagements with LGUs, which resulted in some changes in program works that were deemed necessary for the symbolism and public buy-in for the project. DPWH monitoring is weak, and other agencies suspect there is insider collusion with contractors for project awards. DPWH has no engagement with contractors and no contact with LGUs in carrying out the PAMANA road projects. Municipal local government units have no direct involvement in the road projects, apart from bundled SLP projects in which community beneficiaries were more consistently informed and volunteer-monitors were organized. The local army unit deployed static forces (CAFGU paramilitary detachments) and ran kinetic operations in or nearby the road construction but were not formally engaged to provide security to private contractors undertaking the projects. Regular monitoring of the progress of construction work recently became part of the tasks of co-located army units deployed in the municipalities. The army was formally assigned a role as PAMANA project monitor by the RDC, expanding their involvement in the PAMANA projects.

PAMANA projects brought visible improvements to the local economy. More affordable transportation options are now available for locals, in turn providing more income-earned for single motorbike driver-owners and buses. Respondents agree that the road provided more direct access to bigger markets for their farm products and reduced the price of hauling goods to and from these markets. More educational opportunities are available for children and young adults. Teachers and government employees can now report to their posts more regularly. It also opened potential tourism revenues. However, there are also unintended consequences to the PAMANA road project. Illicit activities such as charcoal making and quarrying intensified; land ownership claims become more contested; and a new security threat from private armed groups emerged. The PAMANA project also increased security risks for the deployed army units.

## **Background on the PAMANA Project Case**

The PAMANA projects in Samar Island intended to address three main objectives: (1) improve economic conditions, (2) strengthen government institutions to be more responsive and effective in addressing peace and conflict concerns, and (3) empower communities to address conflict and engage in peacebuilding (OPAPP Field Office 8-Eastern Visayas Profile). PAMANA Kalaha-CIDSS (PAMANA-KC) projects have been implemented in the four Samar municipalities from 2011–2015 (varying years). In addition, many barangays within these municipalities were provided a yearly Peace and Development Fund of P300,000 for community peacebuilding projects for three years, under the PAMANA-Sustainable Livelihood



Program (PAMANA-SLP) of DSWD. There were also PAMANA inter-municipality road construction projects. Samar province received most of the funding for road projects at 1.87 billion pesos (allocated, not necessarily released).

**Table 2: Amounts for PAMANA Pillar 3 (Road Construction) Projects, Samar Island 2011-2018**

	<b>Samar</b>	<b>Eastern Samar</b>	<b>Northern Samar</b>	<b>Total Investments for the Island</b>
<b>2011</b>	4,500,000	0	225,500,000	230,000,000
<b>2012</b>	15,000,000	20,000,000	15,000,000	50,000,000
<b>2013</b>	100,000,000	88,000,000	184,000,000	372,000,000
<b>2014</b>	0	150,000,000	0	150,000,000
<b>2015</b>	200,000,000	260,000,000	200,000,000	660,000,000
<b>2016</b>	1,019,500,000	282,000,000	559,000,000	1,860,000,000
<b>2017</b>	100,000,000	0	347,000,000	447,000,000
<b>2018</b>	0	0	0	0
	1,872,000,000	800,000,000	1,530,500,000	4,203,000,000

Source: OPAPP Filed Office 8-Eastern Visayas Profile, n.d.

The two projects studied here were significant inter-municipality road projects funded under PAMANA for multiple years under various implementing national government agencies. Funding began in 2011, and these two projects constitute about 80% of the total allocation for PAMANA Pillar 3 projects for Samar province (see Table 3). Both aim to connect remote municipalities to the national highways traversing the island. Prior to the PAMANA road projects in 2012, traveling by dirt tracks and through the river were the only way to access Municipalities A and B.

*[NOTE: Due to concerns related to revealing PII, we redacted a short comparison of the two roads in Municipalities A and B.]*

As part of the “ground-truthing” for the consultancy, I traversed said PAMANA roads going to the municipalities. Save for a few hundred meters from the exit where construction is still ongoing, the road all the way to Municipality A was completed. The team went as far as where the contractors’ bulldozers have succeeded in cutting through a hill, just below a CAFGU paramilitary detachment. By contrast, the Road B has sections in various stages of completion. One stretch featured thinly cemented road with obvious sections severely deteriorated from use by heavily loaded vehicles hauling materials from a nearby quarry. In another stretch, there were alternate segments with 10–20-meter concrete roads on either side (the other side is crushed gravel). The team saw about five personnel working on one segment but did not see any equipment on the road. The one-kilometer approach to the town proper of Municipality B was concreted, starting from the bridge turnoff. The elevated bridge, the municipal officials reported was

completed in 2018, and was helpful in replacing the causeway, which was always flooded during the rainy season, making vehicle crossings dangerous.

In recent years, there have been important security concerns in and around the road construction projects. Assault against the military and political figures were cited by Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo as being some of the key events behind Memorandum Order Number 30, which provided for increased deployment of troops to Samar Island (along with Bicol and Negros).

## Research Question

This case study answers the following research questions:

1. In what ways has PAMANA been relevant in helping achieve and support peace in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable communities? How has PAMANA been relevant in addressing causes and impacts of internal armed conflicts and other issues that affect the peace process?

PAMANA projects target conflict-areas. As per design, conflict areas are based on security assessment by the local military unit (Infantry Division), which is channeled to their General Headquarters and relayed to OPAPP. According to a PAMANA area manager, during the early years of PAMANA (2010-2016), a vetting process of project areas was done in consultation with the PAMANA area manager, and the regional/provincial Peace and Order Council (POC). This process allowed for local inputs and pre-project validation of the suitability of the sites. It also functioned as an early buy-in to local government units where the projects will be located, and possibly improved inter-LGU negotiations. According to the Area Manager, this process changed from 2016 onwards. With the creation of a Project Management Office under PAMANA, all decisions regarding project areas and type of projects are now centralized at the national office (OPAPP), with no consultation at the local level.

2. How have PAMANA inter municipality road projects been implemented by national government agencies (NGAs) and local government units (LGUs) since 2011?
  - a. How has convergence been operationalized by OPAPP and PAMANA implementing agencies at regional and local levels?
  - b. What are the institutional arrangements and mechanisms for convergence (between PAMANA road projects and other peace and development interventions by government agents in the same area) and how do they function?

Multi-million government infrastructure projects by design have to be presented and approved by the Regional Development Council (RDC), which is anchored at the National Economic Development Agency (NEDA) regional office. PAMANA projects are supposed to provide platforms for convergence of the

planning and monitoring stages at the provincial and regional levels, even though implementation is a singular stream. For example, one national agency is tasked as implementer and develops its own implementation guidelines specific to PAMANA projects, in consultation with the OPAPP-PAMANA area manager. The processes and mechanisms are expected to be distinct from any other road projects undertaken by other national government agencies because the site, project selection, and implementation were determined through conflict analysis and informed by the conflict sensitive and peace-promoting (CSPP) processes. Implementors at each stage – government agency, LGUs, communities, private contractors – are expected to have received training on CSPP and observed such principles in carrying out the projects.

Big ticket infrastructure projects carry heavy political value. Local government officials want them located within their jurisdiction because they provide considerable electoral mileage, particularly when attributed to a mayor or governor. They are also magnets for corruption, incentivizing many approving LGU officials (involved in site and project selection) and private contractors to collude on project cost. There are many anecdotes of side payments (i.e. skimming off a percentage of the project cost in exchange for contract awards) made to incumbent politicians for government road construction projects. While difficult to document, the perception of key actors – such as the military commanders, heads of regional government agencies and local government officials in the project site – that this is happening or that it is practiced for PAMANA road projects is worth noting. The monitoring task in convergence platforms becomes more pronounced and engagements within this platform become more heated and contested when there is strong perception of fund irregularities done by implementing parties. Because Regional Development Councils have recommendatory powers over continued funding/termination of national-government funded projects (especially infrastructure), they can leverage such decision-making power whenever they sense corruption transpiring. Corruption allegations by these elite actors can potentially close the tap from which PAMANA funds flow.

The linkages between OPAPP-PAMANA area manager, the government agency implementor, and the LGU is an important part of the project implementation. The public benefits of the road project (whether opening, rehabilitation or concreting) must be weighed against adverse private property claims, general inconvenience (dust, noise), displacement from homes and farms, and the strength of communist propaganda that such project will only bring economic exploitation and maladies. How these contestations on the ground are overcome in the project implementation must be taken into account. Benefits from the road projects are seen in the future and contingent (unsure that it will be 100% completed), while the inconveniences caused by them are current. CPP-NPA claims that the road project will yield exploitation are more resonant against the backdrop of years of government neglect. PAMANA, government agency and LGU officials providing a consistent and sustained narrative that the project will be completed, and use symbolic achievements, no matter how little, to drive home the point are imperative.

The PAMANA road projects under study were implemented alongside other livelihood and community development packages (small-scale infrastructure at the barangay and municipal levels) designed to maximize outcomes. PAMANA areas include locales with high levels of poverty, marginalized farmers,

and geographic isolation, making them likely project areas for other development projects – DSWD Kalahi-CIDSS and parallel development interventions by the DILG and DA. How PAMANA projects are received and “branded” (if at all) by communities and LGUs is noteworthy. For community beneficiaries, national government projects stand out for their novel approaches, which becomes a template for other subsequent government projects. The KALAH-CIDSS program, which had small-scale infrastructure projects and followed community-driven approach in implementation, targeted the same barangays in conflict areas as PAMANA. In this sequencing of government programs carried out in the same locales, the conflict-sensitivity and peace building aspects of PAMANA projects were muted. PAMANA projects are bundled together with KALAH-CIDSS because the approaches are very similar.

Where both prior government road projects (by DPWH, by provincial government) and PAMANA road project were implemented, the similarities become even more stark and project identities blurred. Inter-municipality road projects have no built-in grassroots participation mechanisms for planning, implementation, and monitoring (the institutional arrangement and mechanisms are at the regional and provincial level). This scalar disconnect is a familiar refrain to government road projects of this magnitude. Municipal LGUs are neither party to, nor are necessarily privy to information about government road projects. By design, inter-municipality projects do not lend themselves readily or unobtrusively to locals as conflict-reducing at the community level; unlike the rebel organizations, whose operations are greatly disrupted. Hence the imperative of “bundling” the inter-municipality road project with other community-based livelihood, small-scale infrastructure projects and service delivery caravans. Without these add-ons, road projects have little PAMANA branding mileage.

As areas of active conflict, the locations of PAMANA road projects coincide with army posting for counterinsurgency operations. Regular and paramilitary (CAFGU) units are present in the zone and are involved in both static and kinetic operations. Under the Philippine Army’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), officers are tasked to “engage stakeholders” in all their activities, which also include civil-military operations, facilitating the setting up of barangay and municipal peace and order councils (POCs), among others. Army units invariably provide “security services” to government agents implementing projects in these localities. With this co-location, how is the implementation of PAMANA road projects linked to (if at all) with the army’s operational rhythms? Is the local army unit involved at all in the implementation process? In the case studies, the military was initially involved in a road opening in one municipality, but a change in the national program design shifted implementation to DILG and DPWH. The army makes deployment decisions independent of PAMANA projects. While there is a strong correlation between static army presence (i.e. CAFGU detachment and the PAMANA projects), the kinetic operations are independently decided. Until recently, the army participated in regional PAMANA implementation platforms, but they were not part of the Technical Working Group or monitoring teams. This disconnect between development interventions under PAMANA and army operations in the same space leads to burgeoning frustration about project delays and gaps.

3. How and to what extent has PAMANA improved the socioeconomic conditions in conflict-affected/ conflict-vulnerable areas? How and to what extent has PAMANA enhanced communities' access to

resources and opportunities for livelihood and employment? What indicators can be identified and/or developed to provide a metric of these contributions?

Because road projects go to insurgent heartlands, their effects are expected to be multi-fold. A new road network disrupts a rebel network, specifically their logistics and ability to mobilize mass support. In turn, the military's operational ability against the insurgents is improved; they can move men and war equipment closer to the battlefield and can put up more static presence (i.e. detachments). Beyond security outcomes, the road network is expected to transform the local economy by generating more local business through better connections to markets where farmers can directly command higher prices for their products and lower price commodities with reduced transportation cost. Roads make improved delivery of government services possible, as they incentivize LGUs to affect more government service delivery in previously underserved areas.

The empirics of project outcomes can be established using the following measures: conflict incidents and improvement in socioeconomic conditions. In addition, elite and community member perception of the outcomes of PAMANA road projects can also be good gauge of project outcomes.

## **Methodology, Scope and Limitations**

This project involved 10 interviews of key informants and two Focus Group Discussions. The key informants were interviewed from 04 June to 09 June 2019 in four cities. The FGD in one municipality was conducted on 05 June 2019 at the municipal hall and had 10 participants while the other FGD was held on 06 June 2019 at the legislative assembly hall with 10 participants. The first FGD was arranged through the assistance of a municipal government employee, while the second FGD was facilitated by a military official.

My assistant and I, accompanied by the PAMANA OPAPP area manager and elements of the Philippine Army 8th Infantry Division, traversed said roads as part of the “ground-truthing” requirements of the consultancy. We traveled in unmarked civilian vehicles with an army convoy. During our travel, the convoy party stopped at certain points to take photos and for military officials to explain important locations. The party also checked the progress of the road openings. No stops were made during the second portion of travel due to safety reasons.

To verify events (e.g. ambush, armed conflict episodes in the PAMANA project area, PAMANA project meetings) and legal documents mentioned by key informants during the interviews, I also looked at newspaper or media accounts, as well as resolutions passed by the Region 8 Development Council (NEDA RDC 8) on the internet. Several journal articles on the Samar insurgency and the Samar Island National Park were also used.

## Results and Discussion

### A. Elite consensus on the substantive and symbolic relevance of PAMANA to achieving and supporting peace in conflict affected areas

There is consistent understanding across implementing agencies about the unique nature of PAMANA projects, and how they are linked to other government projects. The PAMANA roads are supposed to be followed by entry of other government services into the area. They are highly symbolic as well, because they are meant to counter the communist narrative that government roads are entry points towards exploitation of local people and their resources.

The local military unit acknowledges contributing vital information to the RPOC resulting in the prioritization and selection for funding of the two road projects in question here. They consistently apprise the RDC and RPOC about the need to make sure said projects are completed, given the high concentration of CPP-NPA in the barangays with PAMANA projects to be implemented. The army informants articulate that project setbacks block the army's troops from penetrating the areas and affect decisive operations against the armed rebels.

As leaders of conflict zones, the mayors of the two municipalities have varying outlooks on the nature of the CPP-NPA threat in their communities and on the link between the PAMANA projects and the insurgency problem. Municipal Mayor A was upfront before other LGU and government officials that the town is a conflict area and that there are barangays strongly influenced by communist rebels. To the mayor, Municipality A is eligible for PAMANA projects and that the projects will “drive away” the insurgents and open up new economic opportunities that will stem rebel recruitment at the barangay level. The mayor relayed that initially, the rebel leaders directly communicated their opposition to the PAMANA projects and told communities under their control that PAMANA was tantamount to militarization.

The mayor narrated how it was gravely disappointing when none of the barangays submitted a proposal for the P300,000 livelihood package during the first round, but the LGU managed to convince the community (and their shadow communist rulers) that the money will go to training in time to get funding for the second round. Mayor A acknowledged support from the military since they carried out the crucial task of doing the road opening. Because it was the first ever highly visible government project for the town, it carried tremendous symbolism that they are no longer insignificant in the eyes of government. By contrast, the mayor and FGD participants in Municipality B were not candid about the extent of communist threats in their area, nor did they link the PAMANA road projects to addressing the insurgency problem. FGD participants opined that their town is stereotyped as a “communist lair”, an image that persists largely because government authorities could not enter their area.

### B. Disparities and disconnects in the local mechanisms for implementation of PAMANA road projects

The PAMANA road projects in Samar province received intermittent annual funding and were implemented by different national agencies. Project A, for instance, was started by the engineering battalion of the local



military unit, then continued by the DILG (which entered into a MOA with the Provincial Engineering Office), then the DPWH. With the shift, the province insisted on its own Program of Works even with the change to the DPWH First Engineering District, which was an aberration. But according to the PAMANA area manager, the DPWH First Engineering District was easier to handle or *madaling hawakan*, i.e. more transparent than DPWH Region 8, which does not make any effort to coordinate activities.

There are key differences in the monitoring setup at the regional level for PAMANA road projects in general. In Region 2, platforms exist where PAMANA projects are vetted, selected and monitored – the Regional Development Council and the Regional Peace and Order Council. A Technical Working Group specific to monitoring and evaluation of PAMANA projects was created in the RPOC (DILG was previous chair; replaced by DPWH in 2016). The TWG included a third-party monitor – the Samar Island for Peace, Prosperity and Development, SIPAD. An endorsement by the RPOC is needed for the release of another tranche to the private contractor. By contrast, the Regional Development Council Key did not have a separate monitoring body for PAMANA projects but rather placed under the Project Monitoring Committee. An RDC TWG specific to PAMANA projects was created only in 2018 (Resolution Number 80, series of 2018) arising from concerns about project delays. There is a PAMANA TWG at the Provincial Peace and Order Council, chaired by the governor, but according to the PAMANA area manager, it did not meet regularly.

The military is a member of the RPOC and an observer for RDC. The military's role in these regional agencies also varied. The RPOC PAMANA TWG-site inspection team coordinates with the military when conducting major activities, i.e. *nagpapasabi* (inform). The local army unit typically sends soldiers in civilian garb on motorcycle for a security sweep before the arrival of the main party. The military does not accompany the RPOC PAMANA TWG-monitoring team. In 2018, following the RDC creation of a TWG to monitor PAMANA projects, the army was also designated a member of the TWG. It is expected that, henceforth, a representative from the local military unit will join the motoring team in site visits.

As implementer for Project B, DILG Region 8 signed a MOA with the Samar Provincial Engineering Office to undertake the construction of a provincial road. Upon consultation with the former mayor and with agreement from the RPOC TWG and provincial bosses, the Program of Works was “adjusted” so that part of the road project went to the municipal LGU and was used for concreting the 1-kilometer stretch leading to the municipal hall. The parties who agreed to the plan variation understood the premium for “public visibility” of the road project. FGD participants confirmed that the previous municipal administration fought to redirect some of the PAMANA road project money towards concreting two lanes of the said road. They said it helped to alleviate doubts – “*aabot ba talaga? hanggang dito?*” (will the project really reach us? until here?) – that the project will reach the municipality. The flexible approach to implementing the project was also seen in the way the RPOC did not flag the Samar Province Engineering Office's peculiar practice of one-lane completion to “stretch” the road as far as possible given that there was no assurance of continued funding. The symbolism behind a road project (regardless of quality) is something understood and accepted by the RPOC TWG.

No representative from the DPWH region or engineering district was interviewed for this case study, but insights as to how they implement projects were gleaned from discussions with the NEDA Region 8 informant who is familiar with details of government road construction projects. According to the PAMANA area manager, DPWH Region 8 did not understand the fundamentals of PAMANA and only had implementation guidelines for road projects much later. To date, the RDC TWG has issued resolutions requesting access to Project Contract and Management Application for PAMANA road projects implemented by DPWH, and linkage of their guidelines/rules on project monitoring to those of other government agencies. From the May 2018 problem solving session, the NEDA and military informants question the transparency and accountability process of DPWH with respect to private contractors. There is a view that the mechanisms for project termination/continuance based on negative slippage rates were ignored by the DPWH; that the DPWH does not fully investigate claims by private contractors for unfavorable weather conditions or grave security threat as basis for contract extension or mutual termination; and that the DPWH staff does not do proper validation with actual field visits. There is also strong suspicion by other key government informants of collusion between DPWH agents, the provincial local government unit and private contractors; that one private company is a shell company owned by the Samar Governor, and that the key interest is only to get the initial royalty then to subcontract the projects. Despite common observations by other government agencies of private contractor malpractices (e.g. unmarked equipment; no personnel deployed on site), DPWH does not exert enough pressure on the private contractors to correct these malpractices. The DPWH's evasive stance was also noted in that the office did not send a division head representative during the May 2018 problem solving session; it did not convene the RPOC PAMANA TWG after taking over from DILG as Chair in 2016; and the publication of an accomplishment report (circulated to RDC members), which claims completion of said PAMANA road projects.

Informants from regional government agencies point to serious gaps in the implementation of PAMANA road projects. The RPOC TWG pointed out findings of insufficient work done on the project, multiple contractors hired by the SPEO, and big negative slippage rates by private contractors. They also noted that the Samar LGU did not strictly observe the rules on project termination/cancellation. Rather, the Samar LGU just accepted the contractors' justification for delays and extended the period for project completion. The DILG key informant said Samar LGU was flagged for these delays.

The role of the provincial LGU, as earlier noted, is as project implementor (under MOA with DILG). But key informants argue that it also played an informal gatekeeping role in the bidding process for the contracts. Common complaints include that one of the private companies is secretly owned by a high-ranking political official and that there are side payments made to government authorities who approve the bidding process "*may nanalo na bago pa ang bidding*" (there was a winner even before bidding began). As Governor Sherri Ann-de los Santos was not interviewed for this case study, no contrary opinion is offered to refute this claim.

Municipal LGU involvement in the PAMANA road construction project is uneven. Mayor B said that he heard that the PAMANA area manager periodically comes for a visit, but that she had not done a courtesy



call to him as mayor. In his reckoning, there was no coordination by the DPWH or the local contractor to his office with respect to the project. The mayor mentioned other PAMANA projects (vegetable production) and government projects in the area (e.g. DILG Salintubig, DSWD Kalahi CIDSS evacuation center, DA animal dispersal, NIA Irrigation) but admits knowing little of project details as these were done earlier. FGD participants, although cognizant of the implementor of the PAMANA road projects, e.g. DILG and DPWH, say that contractors have never coordinated with the local government authorities. They remember that Ms. Bonifacio came once, to explain about livelihood projects and that she has attended MPOC meetings several times to inform them about PAMANA projects. Unlike one municipality, which was able to get PAMANA livelihood packages, these FGD participants appear unaware that the same were given to them. Barangay officials said they did not have any dealings with PAMANA. The municipal local government officer said he attended LGU cluster meeting and a training on CSPP, from which he got the information about the project, but not about the budget nor the contractor or subcontractors. The PAMANA area manager said the DSWD Kalahi CIDSS community water system at P300,000 per barangay were given to the communities covered by Project B, only the residents knew them not as PAMANA funded. One participant commented: *“Dapat may participation ang community, katulad ng Kalahi-CIDSS”* [There ought to be community participation like Kalahi CIDSS].

By contrast, Mayor A reports that Ms. Bonifacio regularly came and coordinated with the LGU with respect to the road and other PAMANA projects. The mayor appeared to be very knowledgeable about the peace lens underpinning PAMANA projects, knew the requirements for mobilization of volunteers and barangay officials as local project monitors, and the livelihood packages that are available to PAMANA areas. The mayor mentioned other government projects that were carried out in their locality (e.g. DSWD Kalahi CIDSS), recognizes their alignment to the objectives of the PAMANA project, and notes similarity in the emphasis for community empowerment. Officials attended workshop sessions on CSPP. FGD participants noted that the mayor called upon the barangay chairmen, and particularly those from far-flung barangays who initially felt threatened by the PAMANA road project because the military was implementing it. Barangay monitoring management teams, as well as civil society, monitors were formed. Even women were hired to haul (*hakot*) materials, enabling them to earn some income. FGD participants noted the DILG implemented the next stage of the road project, the social preparation, peace caravan and information campaign that followed. It appeared to be a community-driven process, with various barangays being able to find projects they themselves identified, e.g. river landing, concrete pathway, barangay health center from PAMANA. In the end, 18 barangays from one municipality received PAMANA social livelihood projects (SLP). In contrast to FGD participants, the other municipality respondents appear to be more cognizant of the PAMANA brand, distinct from other government projects that were given to them.

Various key informants have expressed doubts on the governance capacity of both municipalities. When I reported my visit and FGD with LGU officials and representatives in both localities, they opined that my announced visit in connection with PAMANA might have engendered expectations that I was there on monitoring capacity on behalf of the government. While the mayor was not present during my visit, the DSWD, Engineer and MLGOO were present. However, it was evident that no business was happening at the municipal hall as all offices were closed (except for the police). There was a larger showing of LGU

officers for the FGD in Municipality B. The DILG region officer said Municipality B, as per their record, has a zero score for POC; it has no document to show that the municipal Peace and Order Council has even been convened or functioned in the last two years. The military commanders reported the same thing, that during unannounced visits to these sites, the LGU officials and officers were not at their post.

The local military unit, until recently has been a side player to the PAMANA road project implementation. As previously mentioned, they attend the RDC meeting as observers and are often tasked to provide a security briefing or update. In the PPOC and RPOC, they attend as members, but, as opined by informants, the CPP-NPA security is never discussed as part of the agenda. There is a perception widely shared by the military commanders that security issues are not appreciated by the civilian government agents. The 87 Battalion Commander shared that he attended a PPOC meeting once where the PAMANA road project was discussed; and that the DPWH Engineering District Office presentation about the status of the projects was very confusing and hotly contested by the PAMANA area manager. On the side, they supported the PAMANA road construction projects by providing security services (escort or sweeps) to monitoring teams, but with the exception of the 2012 project in one municipality, which involved the 54 Engineering Construction Battalion as implementor, they have never been directly involved. The battalion commanders also opined that the private contractors never asked for security assistance, nor reported to them about CPP-NPA harassment or extortion. The two municipalities have also not coordinated any PAMANA road construction activities to them. Despite being sidelined, the army leadership is quite public in its criticism of the Samar province LGU with respect to the implementation of PAMANA projects. The Division commander has publicly questioned the governor about irregularities in the release of PAMANA livelihood project fund earmarked for the military, and has submitted reports similarly about PAMANA road project irregularities to the Secretary of National Defense. The 8th Infantry Division leaders have been unequivocal in their frustration over the delay in completing the PAMANA road construction projects, as such has repercussions to their kinetic operations in the Samar interior where again, they face the staunchest rebel strongholds. There is a sense that they could not put an end to the Samar insurgency because the PAMANA road project takes too long to finish.

The release of Executive Order 70 and mandates to create convergence platforms at the regional and local levels is much needed, from the local army's perspective. The creation of a dedicated RDC TWG to monitor PAMANA projects, their inclusion in the TWG, and the Engineering Construction Brigade taking over the implementation of terminated and incomplete PAMANA road projects are most welcome developments. The military is also independently doing convergence initiatives with the battalions and brigades conducting their own monitoring of PAMANA projects. With these, they expect to energize the province, and wean it away from the debilitating years of neglect and decay under the control of a political dynasty.

## **Positive Effects & Unintended Consequences**

The PAMANA road projects regardless of their stage of completion have brought palpable economic benefits to the local economy. In one municipality, there are now numerous single motorbikes (*habal-habal*) ferrying passengers, the price of goods in the town market and sari-sari stores have gone down, and

ice cream is now sold in the market. The economy has become livelier as farmers are now able to directly sell their price in the markets. FGD participants said the road cut down considerably the time it took to travel to a nearby city – from six hours through pump boats to one hour by multi-cab or motorbike – making it easier for students to go to school and to college. Mayor B confirmed that there were now more passenger buses (eight, up from four, which are locally owned), enabling residents to transact, buy goods, and do business in bigger markets and government centers more frequently and easily than before. Improved road conditions, specifically the graded and compacted/crushed road in one segment, encouraged more direct trucking/hauling services of high-value produce (e.g. copra, abaca and upland rice) to bigger markets. FGD participants from both municipalities say other government agencies are now able to come to their area, with the road fixed. As one participant said: “*Ang kalsada ay gateway, palabas at papasok*” (The road is a gateway for things to go in and go out). National government agency employees, i.e. teachers and social workers, would report more regularly. They also expect more tourism revenue to follow with the completion of the road project. Both sets of participants are hopeful that the road will eventually lead to outsiders no longer labelling them as communists. As such, for the respondents, the PAMANA projects are not conflict reducing per se, but would help redeem their town’s image as a conflict area.

But the road also intensified economic activities, which are deemed illegal, e.g. quarrying and charcoal making. Because of improved road conditions, contractors can now collect more local limestone mined by hand by residents at two barangays in one of the municipalities. During my visit, piles of these limestone (used to layer road projects) line either side of the road, waiting for the dump truck to pick them up. When queried about this, Mayor B mentioned that there was an order from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau banning local limestone mining, but municipal authorities have not been able to enforce it. The mayor and FGD participants are wary about the effects of the road widening and the town’s inclusion in the Samar Island Natural Park in terms of the cadastral lands. Locals expect that once the PAMANA road project goes further in, there will be a need to establish land ownership for rights of way. In one municipality, a woman who owns property eaten by the road construction donated her own portion of the land as a way to convince other locals facing similar loss of private acreage from demanding substantial government compensation and delaying the project. Given the weak property rights set-up in these areas (e.g. most lands are untitled), the completion of the PAMANA road project potentially could intensify contest on land claims as areas close to the road will likely see real estate property values go up. The mayor hopes that the PAMANA road project will also facilitate cadastral surveys so as to also fix the town’s real estate income base.

FGD participants from one municipality said with the road completed, government authorities are now more accessible. Mayor A says the security situation in the municipality has improved, with communists relocating their mass base elsewhere. They now only use the barangays as a highway – *dumadaan na lang* [they just pass by]. FGD participants in the other municipality, by contrast, do not readily connect the economic gains from the PAMANA project and conflicts occurring in their locality. The army’s conflict incident tally points as well to a marked decline for Municipality A. Except for 2017, only a few incidents were recorded from 2014-2019 (see Table 1). The few incidents recorded, however, were in the very barangays where the PAMANA road project was being undertaken. In the absence of data on actual NPA

surrendered personnel from both towns or decline in rebel recruitment from locals in both municipalities, the link between economic impact and conflict outcome is not clear.

Mayor noted the rise of a new security threat, i.e. goons, proliferation of firearms, shooting incidents. FGD participants also noted the rise in violent crime, as was the case of a fatal shooting of an itinerant vendor. Mayor B did not mention any improvement in security brought about by the PAMANA road project. From a military standpoint, the road projects have increased security risks for their troops deployed in static locations and those engaged in kinetic operations. There had been two ambush incidents of soldiers monitoring the projects in one municipality; armed encounters between government troops in another municipality has caused displacement; project equipment was burned in one area. These incidents are expected to spike further as the military takes on implementation and monitoring roles for these projects. The delays in the PAMANA projects have also been the subject of mobilization/rallies by *Sinirangan Bisayas*, a coalition of left-leaning people's organization tagged by the military as NPA fronts.

Local government officials from both towns adjudge that project implementation was slow, delayed and involved many time-consuming meetings and workshops. However, they appear not to be very upset about the project delay. For Mayor B, who has waited three decades for the roads to connect his town, waiting a few more years is inconsequential. Mayor A expressed the same level of patience: *"nakahintay na kami ng matagal, may assurance na tayo"* (they have waited so long, at least now they have an assurance [that government will help them]). FGD participants are simply relieved: *"natapos na din sa wakas"* (it is finished, at last). FGD participants say that this will be faster if the Engineering Battalion will implement the project. Locals long deprived of a road operate on far longer time frames, than regional level government agents who are more time-sensitive.

## Analysis and Conclusion

The nature of inter-municipality road projects requires management and monitoring mechanisms at higher levels – province and region. In the case of the two PAMANA projects, Technical Working Groups specific to PAMANA projects were not set up until late (not until 2018 by Region 8 Development Council), did not meet regularly (Samar PAMANA TWG) or was not set up at all (DPWH Region). Each implementing agency also have different modalities in carrying out the PAMANA road projects. The DILG Region, which implemented both projects from funding years 2012-2015, worked within the Regional Peace and Order Council PAMANA TWG. Unlike DPWH, DILG's mandate includes supervision of POCs and therefore had platform ready with which to manage and exercise oversight on PAMANA projects in general. DILG by all indication had implementation guidelines that closely followed PAMANA intent— convergence through peace caravans, information campaign in the municipalities, which were carried out alongside the road project. Key informant interviews and FGDs with locals from two municipalities confirm these activities and time frames. DPWH, which took over the implementation of projects funded from 2016 onwards, did not appear to have the same portfolio. Local authorities in fact note that neither the DPWH nor the private contractor coordinate nor provide substantive details about the road project (amount, duration, specifics). Moreover, DPWH entirely contracted the projects to private companies, thereby

arrogating the task of accountability to their office. By contrast, DILG signed an MOU with the Samar Provincial Engineering Office for Project B, which in turn contracted it to private entities. Thus, the LGU did not have a direct role in the DPWH implementation. But even presumably within these different modalities, the provincial governor is suspected widely by key informants of orchestrating the bidding process for both PAMANA projects, leading to side payments. The huge sums involved, that most of it were awarded to Northern Builders with local affiliates, the delays and lack of visible work put into the projects despite huge releases fuel suspicion of irregularities.

Unlike Pillar 1 and 2 PAMANA projects, the inter-municipality road project did not organically invite participation by municipal and barangay governments. Where the road is going to be located is not subject to vetting or competition by various municipalities and barangays, as such (naming conflict-affected community) is done by the military. Yet as indicated, at the start of the project, LGUs were able to “negotiate” with the implementing agencies and the province, leading to some program of works modification that follows their expressed demand. In the case of Municipality B, a 1-kilometer, 2-lane concrete road in the town proper was a necessary showpiece to make the project visible to the erstwhile skeptical public. In Municipality A, the road opening carried out (and completed) by the 54 Engineering Brigade had the same effect: it showed to the locals that the government was serious this time about the road project. These narratives show local agency and the need for government planners from higher ups to account for confidence building measures in these kind of projects that takes a very long time to finish. For locals long deprived, even a small token is important to show sincerity of undertaking.

No local monitoring system was set up paralleling those at the provincial and regional level. The community-based local monitors mentioned were for the PAMANA livelihood and small-scale infrastructure projects, not for the road project. As such there was no feedback mechanism in place for locals to lodge concerns and complaints about the road project. This feeling of being left in the dark is magnified by the dearth of coordination by PAMANA officials, DPWH and private contractors especially for San Jose de Buan.

The positive effects of the road project on the local economy, even if incomplete in the case of Project B, are already visible. More public transportation available (passenger single motorbikes or buses), more hauling of farm products to bigger markets, and more diversity of goods in the town market. As both towns become more accessible, it is expected that more movement of people and goods will follow. However, the road completed also came with higher security risks. The repositioning of army units around the municipalities have already resulted to more armed confrontation with the communist rebel groups in and around the road projects. Episodes similar to the evacuation of households and the harassment of military monitors in the construction sites will likely increase as the road openings make further progress. The recent developments investing direct implementation role for the military on PAMANA road projects, and their being assigned as RDC RPMC monitors is likely to make these armed contacts more likely.

The mechanism linking the economic gains from the PAMANA projects and conflict outcomes is not clearly understood by municipal and barangay officials-elites and community members. Their framing suggests more of an improvement in their collective image (by outsiders) – from a communist lair to a

communist free area – rather than a definitive reduction of the threat itself, by way of concrete measures like surrendered personnel, recruitment, armed incidents, etc. Perhaps this cognitive disconnect is a consequence of the fact that the PAMANA projects coincided with army deployments for counterinsurgency operations. Conflict reduction metrics are more readily attributed to military action (kinetic or civil-military operations) rather than prospective or actual economic gains from government projects.

The PAMANA road projects also portend to the enduring dynamics of local politics and governance deficits, perturbed little by the entry of national government interventions. In Samar, there is a wide perception that the previous governor was corrupt and that the proceeds from the big ticket PAMANA road and other livelihood projects under her watch was similarly siphoned off. In the absence of robust management and monitoring mechanism at the regional and provincial levels, such is very difficult to flag. Of greater concern are the violent electoral politics in the two municipalities, which continue unabated between rival local dynastic politicians and the shadow communist government able to control electoral outcomes by barring residents to vote, or to vote for the candidate they support. The PAMANA project's impact on the quality of local governance was present but unsustainable given the fluid nature of local politics. In the FGD, representatives from barangays and volunteer groups are wary about what will happen to them, because they worked with Mayor A, who is no longer serving. In one municipality, key informants from the DILG and the military are suspicious of Mayor B. That they scored the municipality a zero in the MPOC ratings for 2018 is a telltale sign that much learning curve on governance has yet to be achieved.

## Recommendations

The revealed engagements between the municipal authorities and the local communist leaders in one municipality, as well as between the latter and deployed local army unit portend to some possibilities on how to recalibrate the implementation of PAMANA projects:

1. There are informal channels at work allowing for dialogue and negotiation between local rebel command, the municipal mayor and the deployed local army. To review, Mayor A was able to overcome an initial resistance from rebel-influenced barangay captains not to submit proposals for the PAMANA-SLP by selling the project as “capability building.” The army commander received a missive that “construction will no longer be allowed beyond a certain point,” but he awaits command instructions from his higher-ups whether to push for kinetic operations or try another tactic.

Recommendation (1): Allow municipal mayors to strike bargains with and negotiate with local rebel leaders on PAMANA project implementation. Project termination or cessation is never an option, but at least this arrangement could give the local government authorities some elbow room to get the projects in and avoid rebel leaders into taking the hard option of sabotaging the project altogether.

Recommendation (2): Give local army commands (Infantry) room to explore non-kinetic options when dealing with local rebels who at least are open to dialogue. The military's appointment as PAMANA



monitors is likely to engender more footprint in PAMANA project areas, but with command-directive for selective armed engagement to rebel groups they can communicate/dialogue with, conflict occurrences may be avoided altogether.

2. PAMANA road projects have implementation mechanisms lodged at the provincial and regional level, while the SLP bundles are at barangay level. In both instances, the municipal level is disconnected. As illustrated in the case of Mayor B who negotiated with DILG for a change in program of works so as to have a road showpiece for his constituents, or Mayor A who interceded against recalcitrant barangay captains who did not want to apply for the SLPs, one cannot discount mayors as important lynchpins in PAMANA projects. Mayors are also the most electorally-vulnerable to rebel pressures, as illustrated in Municipality B.

At the provincial and regional level, there is a tendency to view mayors as “competing” for big ticket PAMANA projects because of the money involved, rather than seriously addressing the conflict problem in their area.

Recommendation: Effect a buy-in from mayors for all PAMANA projects and deepen the mechanisms for implementation to include mayors. The mechanism should be inter-municipality, regardless of which provinces they belong. The tendency to lodge the mechanism at tri-province, or region-wide is misplaced and does not mirror the spatial realities of CPP-NPA threat, as seen by the military.

To this end, PAMANA projects must have mechanisms that reflect spatial, not administrative jurisdictions to determine who gets to decide on where projects will be undertaken and how they will be pursued.

3. Previous study by Crost and Johnston (2014) found that Kalahi CIDSS as development aid has a short-run effect of increasing conflict, as they incentivize rebels to sabotage projects. Direct income transfers, however, like the Pantawid Pamilya were found to reduce conflict because rebels do not have an opportunity to derail the program (Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2016). These studies point to rebel incentive structures mattering more, and how these are affected by entry of government programs in areas they control.

Recommendation: Convergence efforts of government agencies for all development projects (including PAMANA) in Samar CPP-NPA ground zero communities, must be coordinated with army deployment decisions. Both are state agents, and each must contribute towards altering that rebel incentive structure towards a mutual outcome – they will surrender and be unable to recruit. It is expected that will come about with localized peace process and kinetic operations, simultaneously. It is the calibration of these strategies that are key to bringing the desired change in rebel incentive structure.

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# A Spirited Journey for Peace in Caraga

## Case Study of PAMANA in Caraga

Written by Ma. Victoria Maglana

### Background

The implementation of the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) Program of the Philippine Government for peacebuilding, reconstruction, and development of conflict-affected areas in Caraga Region can be traced back to the series of consultations conducted in 2010 in Butuan City. Intended to surface issues and develop proposals in response to peace and conflict issues in the region, particularly those concerning the Andap Valley in Surigao del Sur where the New People's Army (NPA) Guerilla Front 19-B was operating, the process led to the creation of the Andap Valley Development Program.

The program was subsequently presented to the Philippine Congress with an initial funding request of P50 million. With the assessment that it was too ambitious to go on-site in Andap Valley, the amount was proportionately distributed in 2011 by the Caraga Field Office of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) to support projects in the valley's main entry points: Sibagat and Bayugan in Agusan del Sur and Marihatag, Lianga, San Francisco, and San Miguel, all in Surigao del Sur.

Since then, PAMANA has covered all the provinces of the Caraga Region, except for Dinagat Island where no significant activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), and the NPA have been reported.

From 2011 to 2019, PAMANA operations in Caraga have evolved in terms of planning and project identification, implementation arrangements, monitoring and evaluation, and management set up as a result of national directions but also in response to regional and more local developments.

Six major indigenous ethnic groups call Caraga home. These are the Manobo, Higaonon, Mamanwa, Banwao, Talaandig, and Mandaya. There is no official data on the region's indigenous peoples (IP) population. Estimates include 2013 partial data from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) of 101,515 IPs in 20 ancestral domains that had been issued Certificates of Ancestral Domain Titles

(CADTs)<sup>27</sup> to the half a million IPs cited by the Indigenous Peoples Development Programme supported the International Labour Organization (ILO) around the same period<sup>28</sup>.

Caraga gets its name from the word “Kalagan” that, in turn, has been said to either refer to the Kalagan people who are a sub-tribe of the Mansaka ethnic group or comes from the Cebuano root word “kalag” meaning “soul” but also referring to “strong” or “spirited.” In the days of the Spanish colonizers, Caraga was referred to as “Land of the Brave and Fierce People” or the “Region of Spirited Men.”<sup>29</sup>

Caraga is primarily affected by the CPP-NPA-NDF and is host to a majority of the nationwide forces of the NPA. At least 10 guerilla fronts operate in Agusan del Norte and Sur and Surigao del Norte and Sur. Three of the revolutionary committees (RCs) – the North Eastern, North Central, and Southern Mindanao RCs – as well as the Section Committee or SECOM are also based in specific areas of the region. New Peoples' Army National Spokesperson Jorge Madlos, better known by his nom de guerre Ka Oris, is also known to be based in Caraga.

Although their forces are highly mobile, the CPP-NDFP-NPA spheres of influences in Caraga are said to be generally in upland inter-provincial or inter-municipal boundary<sup>30</sup> areas that are also home to IP communities. The armed conflict situation in Caraga is very fluid, easily spilling over to adjacent areas of Regions X and XI.

CPP-NDF-NPA presence in Caraga came to be established in the middle of the 1970s, which also coincided with the period of indigenous peoples' reckoning with the timber industry that had come to exploit the forest resources of the region. IP leaders and their clans came to be associated with either timber companies or the CPP-NDF-NPA that encouraged and supported resistance to commercial exploitation of natural resources in the region.<sup>31</sup>

The narratives of the two IP communities – Manobo and Higaonon – that were involved in the focus group discussions (FGDs) for this case study attested to the effects of the timber industry on their lives and IP interactions with insurgent groups. Former Peace Adviser, Atty. Jesus Dureza, was quoted as saying that about eight of every 10 recruits of insurgents are IPs living in rural areas.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> As reported in the Caraga Regional Development Plan 2017-2022

<sup>28</sup> [https://www.ilo.org/manila/projects/WCMS\\_124759/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/manila/projects/WCMS_124759/lang--en/index.htm)

<sup>29</sup> <http://nnc.gov.ph/index.php/regional-offices/caraga/58-region-caraga-profile/322-caraga-region-history-and-geography.html> and also <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caraga>

<sup>30</sup> Quitariano p. 20

<sup>31</sup> Quitariano, p. 21

<sup>32</sup> <https://peace.gov.ph/category/news/cpp-npa-ndf/page/3/>

Dureza further ascribed the relative ease with which IPs are recruited to perceived government neglect, poverty, and the lack of education facilities. A key official of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) assigned in Caraga cited the following as issues exploited by the CPP-NDFP-NPA: “no development, government neglect, and services not being delivered.”

Significant progress was made in the peace talks between the Philippine Government and the CPP-NDFP-NPA early in the term of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. The supplemental agreement for a Joint Monitoring Committee on the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was signed, the fourth round of talks was completed in April 2017, and written agreements that would have formed part of an interim peace accord were signed by the chairpersons of the two negotiating panels.<sup>33</sup>

However, clashes between the two contending armed groups continued and an acrimonious word war between President Duterte and NDFP chief political consultant Jose Ma. Sison, among others, affected the viability of the peace talks. The President cancelled the fifth round of talks and issued Proclamation No. 360 in November 2017 that officially terminated the peace negotiations with the CPP-NDF-NPA. By the end of the year, Proclamation No. 374 declared the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations under RA 10168 The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012.

Other measures, such as systematic red- and terrorist-tagging and the continuing state of martial law in Mindanao, have generated the assessment that the environment has become more repressive and unfavorable for the promotion of peace that addresses injustices and promotes respect for human rights.

In late 2018, Executive Order (EO) 70 that provided for a Whole-of-Nation approach in defeating the communists was issued by President Duterte. The National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) mandated to, in the words of the country’s National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon: “synchronize the utilization of the government’s instrumentalities of power with the capabilities of private sector stakeholders to finally end the 50-year long deceit, lies and atrocities committed by the communist terrorists against the people”<sup>34</sup> was established.

PAMANA, as the complimentary track of the peace processes pursued by the Philippine Government with the different conflict lines, was designed to “close the gap between events at the negotiating table and realities on the ground.” It is an acknowledgement of the need to make field conditions conducive for the peace talks at the national level to continue.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> <http://jjcicsi.org.ph/lights-and-shadows/peace/>

<sup>34</sup> From the National Security Adviser Yearend Statement <http://www.nsc.gov.ph>

<sup>35</sup> This paragraph and the next two are from the document Discussion note for case study on PAMANA in Caraga, prepared by Ms. Ica Fernandez

In the case of the areas affected by the CPP-NDFP-NPA, it was imperative to a) make peace dividends felt by communities regardless of the status of the talks and even before new agreements are signed; b) make conflict more “costly” and thus untenable and unpopular; c) and also enable peace advocates to have a bigger voice.

From a development perspective, the massive gaps between conflict-affected and more “stable” communities warranted government affirmative and preemptive action through PAMANA to enable more robust private sector development.

## Research Objectives and Questions

The case study aims to support an overall evaluation of PAMANA to establish a better understanding of PAMANA’s impacts and challenges with a view to informing future efforts to implement development-as-peacebuilding policies in the Philippines.

The case study of PAMANA in Caraga seeks to answer the questions related to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability as outlined in the overall study design.

Specifically, the case study for Caraga sought to look into:

- Participation and empowerment of indigenous peoples
- Overlaps and/or convergences between PAMANA and other projects directly designed for resource-based armed conflicts in mining and ancestral domain areas (e.g., GIZ’s Conflict Sensitive Resource and Asset Management Program [COSERAM])
- Role of local governments and the regional and provincial peace and order councils

## Methodology, Scope and Limitations

After an initial round of interviews with the OPAPP AMT and in discussion with IPA, it was decided to concentrate the case study on key assistance to IPs, particularly the preparation of the Ancestral Domains Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP), the application for Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), as well as roads projects. This entailed a focus on Agusan del Sur and, to a certain extent, Agusan del Norte.

The research methods used included:

- Review of documents
- Key informant interviews (KIIs)
- Focus group discussions (FGDs)

The list of interviewees was initially developed in consultation with the OPAPP AMT and expanded through a modified “snowballing” technique. The Caraga Office of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and OPAPP were instrumental in the decision to conduct FGDs with the:

- Manobo tribe in Agusan del Sur which had an approved CADT
- Higaonon tribe in Agusan del Norte

Efforts were made to cross-validate data by checking where it was possible to verify against documents and triangulating perspectives articulated by informants or discussants.

A timeline of PAMANA implementation in Caraga was also prepared to cluster data to aid validation.

There were difficulties in reconstructing the files of PAMANA Caraga. Although there were documents pertaining to Davao and Compostela, which were also covered by the CDC, there was little that was specific to Caraga. In the first period of implementation (2010 to 2016), figures were lumped and reported as CDC.

The case study was not able to gather data from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Regional Office on the components of PAMANA handled by the agency. In part, this was because of the decision to focus the research on indigenous peoples. Another key factor was the policy of the agency of obtaining Central Office clearance for all requests for research and interviews. Although the IPA previously coordinated with the DSWD Central Office on the PAMANA evaluation, agency action on the request for data and interviews happened outside the window of time allocated for fieldwork and data-gathering.

In the early stages of the research there was an intention to look into the displacement of IP communities and related issues such as Lumad schools, and the so-called “*taktikang bakwit*” (evacuation tactics allegedly used by forces allied with or sympathetic to the CPP-NDFP-NPA) in Surigao del Sur. However, the decision to concentrate on operations to meet the objectives of the PAMANA evaluation and the focus on key assistance to IPs, particularly the preparation of the Ancestral Domains Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP) and the application for Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) necessitated a focus on Agusan del Sur and, to a certain extent, Agusan del Norte.

## Analysis and Conclusion

PAMANA projects implemented in localities where the CPP-NDFP-NPA is active are meant to improve the quality of life of communities as well as to improve governance to ensure that local governments pay attention to conflict triggers.

The general philosophy linking socioeconomic development efforts and peacebuilding particularly for the CPP-NDFP-NPA conflict line is expressed in the language of Executive Order (EO) No. 125 s. 1993 creating OPAPP itself, and its amendatory EO No. 3 s. 2001, which details the policy and administrative

structures of the comprehensive peace process. This policy builds on the so-called Three Principles and Six Paths to Peace of OPAPP’s precursor, the National Unification Commission.

From the military perspective, this complements (and sometimes contradicts) the clear-hold-consolidate-develop approach to civil-military operations and counterinsurgency fostered by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The Caraga-Davao-Compostela unit handled PAMANA implementation in Caraga from 2011 to early 2016. The CDC was headed by a program manager who has had previous experience working in Caraga for a multi-donor peacebuilding program.

Under Secretary Jesus Dureza, the CDC gave way to Area Management Teams (AMTs), of which eight were created for Mindanao. A separate AMT handled Caraga and was handled by the same Program Manager. In 2019, the eight Mindanao AMTs were reduced to four – Cotabato, Davao, Iligan, and Zamboanga. Caraga became part of the Davao office. A new program manager was assigned to Caraga.

The focus and emphasis of PAMANA from 2011 to 2019 are summarized in Table 7.

**Table 7. Focus of PAMANA in Caraga, 2011 to 2019**

Year	PAMANA Focus
2011–2013	Programming around guerilla bases in CDC
2014	PhP40 billion for Caraga based on whole-of-government approach (WGA); focused on guerilla fronts
2015	Whole-of-nation initiatives (WNI) through EO No. 70
2016	Projects were based on WGA-WNI
2017	WNI multi-year and unfunded projects became the priority to address connectivity; PhP40 million for Caraga ADSPP and CADT (Pillar 1)
2018	<p>IPCDD was approved in 2017 but started in 2018; funds were allocated and IPs identified projects, whether livelihood or infrastructure</p> <p>All of the 2018 second tranches were put on hold, put under review, and eventually reverted with the understanding that the amounts could be requested again</p> <p>No budget for PAMANA OPAPP</p>
2019	No PAMANA projects were implemented but funds for operations (for all DSWD PAMANA projects), the EAP, and PhilHealth registration were available



The orientation of PAMANA Pillars shifted in the two periods of 2010 to 2016 and 2017 to 2019. How the shifts were implemented in Caraga (see Table 8) did not come across as significantly noticeable. From the perspective of a member of the AMT, it was only that specific elements were added from 2017 to 2019.

**Table 8. PAMANA Pillars as Pursued in Caraga, 2010 to 2019**

Pillar	PAMANA Pillars as Pursued in Caraga	
	2010 to 2016	2017 to 2019
Pillar 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy to address conflict roots</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy interventions to address injustice</li> <li>ADSDPP and CADT; funding of Php2 million for SDS but the CADT application did not prosper; funding coursed through NCIP for delineation and titling started in 2014, prior to this the PPOC of ADS funded planning activities; biggest support provided for ADSDPP and CADT from OPAPP and downloaded to NCIP was in 2017; OPAPP also downloaded funds for the PAMANA EAP (Education Assistance Programme)</li> <li>Capacity building under DILG through LGA and NBOO</li> <li>Peace education and dialogues</li> </ul>
Pillar 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community-driven development (CDD)</li> <li>DSWD CDD from 2011 to 2019; saturate all PAMANA barangays</li> <li>PAMANA SLP in 2013</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacity building as part of CDD</li> <li>Empowering the community</li> <li>Small livelihood</li> <li>Focus of OPAPP in Caraga</li> </ul>
Pillar 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sub-regional projects; big ticket projects (later transferred to DILG)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Peace-promoting socioeconomic interventions</li> <li>Sub-regional development; big ticket projects such as bridges, water systems, and roads</li> <li>Focus of OPAPP in Caraga</li> </ul>

In late 2017, the Caraga Road Map for Peace (CRMP) was developed under the leadership of a core group composed of government representatives from DILG, NEDA, AFP, and the Philippine National Police (PNP), and led by Fr. Carlito Clase, who was from civil society.

The CRMP is anchored on conflict sensitivity and peace promotion (CSPP). It features the Peace and Development Zones (PDZs) as a centerpiece, which uses clustering of areas as a method. Clustering is understood to have both focusing and domino effects. The CRMP promotes a more civilian-led – rather than military-led – approach to the armed conflict in Caraga. It also subscribes to bottom-up from the community planning, believing that regional agencies should hear the recommendations from the communities themselves through consultations facilitated by civilians.

Although there were challenges in operationalizing the CRMP in 2018 and 2019, with the championing by the Caraga Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) there have been improvements in the awareness and understanding of DILG personnel, as well as other regional agencies and stakeholders beyond the AFP, PNP, and NEDA.

PAMANA's focus on conflict-affected areas was critical for bringing needed services to conflict affected areas that had limited interactions with state institutions. Without PAMANA, the likelihood is lesser that there would be significant interventions – not even by government – in areas that are not viewed as ideal for pursuing mainstream change initiatives. A DILG official described one PAMANA area as a place that was so deep in the interior of the region that there they encountered: *“mga tao na first time pa nakakita og mga sakyanan”* (people who saw motorized vehicles for the first time). Government agencies, which are generally risk averse in their planning, programming, and implementation, would likely not include areas frequently affected by conflict in their regular service offerings to the public.

Some IP communities find themselves in conflict with the political and economic interests that dominate local governments. The two IP groups who participated in the FGD were cases in point. The facilitation and brokering support provided by another government body such as a higher level local government, a government agency, or a program like GIZ-COSERAM and PAMANA is necessary to enable IPs to break through the barriers imposed on them by iniquitous power relations and arrangements, and to be able to access vital assistance and resources for their own aspirations and endeavors.

Alignment with regional priorities, practice of CSPP, and building capacity of LGUs and regional agencies. The establishment of PDZs in Caraga is jointly supported by the RPOC and the RDC (per the results of the 1st RPOC-RDC Execom Joint Meeting) in June 2017. Four overlapping conflict lines beleaguer Caraga and its peoples: resource-based conflicts, insurgency, issues affecting IPs, and criminality. According to the PDZ analysis, insurgency in Caraga is driven by heightened recruitment, displacement, and extortion and is affected by many factors. The elements of the PDZ include maps per conflict line, an operational framework, and peace actors.

While 47 PDZs across the region were identified, national government as part of operationalizing EO 70 has identified under the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (ELCAC) 80 sites for Caraga. While the OPAPP AMT is aware of and conversant with the PDZs, the reference has not been used to guide the identification of sites for PAMANA projects for 2018 onwards. Thus, OPAPP missed out on an opportunity to more clearly align with regional priorities. This is explained by the fact that the PDZ has only been recently developed and the shift in OPAPP PAMANA management arrangements. With the NPMO leading planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation beginning 2017, AMT input and involvement in PAMANA matters have been minimal.

In two specific instances, there was a need for PAMANA policies and practices in Caraga to be harmonized with the rest of the region. A 400-meter PAMANA road project under DILG from Puting Bato in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte to Lanuza in Surigao del Sur was intended to, among others, ensure access and shorten travel. However, the road would have affected a primary growth forest that was also a

watershed. Hence, the RDC recommended that it be rerouted. An official of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) also noted that while PAMANA road projects were costed as a whole, they were implemented in Caraga in chunks so that local governments could implement them rather than for the budget to flow through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Regional Office.

Observing the need for all road implementing agencies such as the Departments of National Defense (DND), Agriculture (DA), Agrarian Reform (DAR), Tourism (DOT), DILG and DPWH, NEDA Caraga called for what it called “road convergence.” However, OPAPP was not involved in such an effort.

Contributing to horizontal coordination and alignment of government institution’s work on peacebuilding, PAMANA in Caraga was compliant with the coordinating platforms set at the national level: the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) and the Regional Development Council (RDC). The Program was “*sikat*” (prominent) among members of the Caraga RPOC because it was frequently included in the updates portion of the meeting agenda. According to a member of the OPAPP AMT, PAMANA was seen by the regional mechanisms as the first initiative for peace from the national level.

Respondents reported that what distinguished PAMANA in terms of implementation were: the premium put on community participation, the commitment to resolve issues of communities, adherence to the process, and non-realignment of project sites and beneficiaries. Except for resolving community issues, which could be viewed as a manifestation of the application of the Do No Harm principle, the observed patterns of action were consistent with good program management and development practice. Ensuring ease in citizens access to government assistance is part of standard public administration performance parameters. But it gains more prominence in a context where conflicting governance bodies are seeking to secure the recognition and support of the populace. This is an argument against requirements that are heavy on documentation and might be prohibitive for impoverished communities. IP respondents from the Manobo tribe cited that, “*Hinabang sa pikas, walay papel-papel. Ang sa gobyerno, makwartahan pa ka*” (The assistance from the other side does not require paperwork. But when availing of assistance from government, one could get fleeced).

In monitoring community consultations in PAMANA areas, OPAPP staff reported that community members showed increased confidence in their participation. They also were less reluctant to engage government representatives and were more open about the issues that concern them. Further, there were indications that their perspectives about government were changing. These behaviors are consistent with the peace effectiveness criterion of the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that drive conflict.

PAMANA was an important alternative source of development inputs for communities that were often neglected because the resources and capacities of local governments were inadequate to meet growing needs of an increasing number of the population. A Manobo IP leader attested that: “*Dako ang tabang sa mga komunidad ng wala matabangan sa lokal nga panggamhanan tungod kay limitado ang budget sa mga munisipal*” (Significant support was provided to communities that were not assisted by their local governments due to limited budgets).

# Case Study of PAMANA-MNLF

Written by Nelia Agbon

## Introduction

Aligning with the key strategies articulated in the Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016) to bring all armed conflicts to permanent and peaceful closure, the PAMANA (Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan) program was conceptualized by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) as a complementary effort to the peace negotiations by addressing causes and impacts of all internal armed conflicts and other issues affecting the peace process through socioeconomic development interventions. In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), this refers to the implementation of the socioeconomic provisions of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the Government. Section 19 of the FPA provides for socioeconomic, cultural and education program for MNLF members who will not be absorbed into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF), which was envisioned in the FPA to be the PNP Regional Command in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The FPA did not provide details on the mechanisms, deliverables and timeline of socioeconomic development, leading OPAPP to conceive of PAMANA-MNLF as government's catch-up socioeconomic program for MNLF communities in the provinces and cities covered by the Special Zone of Peace and Development (Gallardo 2019).<sup>36</sup>

The FPA was to be implemented in two phases. This first phase was for a period of three years for the creation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and Consultative Assembly to oversee the intensive socioeconomic development in SZOPAD and the integration of MNLF members with the security forces. The second phase pushed for reforms at the regional level and involved an Act of Congress for an amendatory law to amend or repeal Republic Act 6734 or the *Organic Act of the ARMM* to determine the new autonomous government.

PAMANA-MNLF started at the heels of the closure of the GPH-UN Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme in 2010. The fourth phase of this GPH-UN Multi-Donor Programme (MDP), which began in 1997, initially exclusively supported 1) MNLF members and families who desired to mainstream into civilian lives and 2) MNLF guerilla bases and positions, transforming these into Peace and

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<sup>36</sup> SZOPAD covered the ARMM provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi); Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Palawan; and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa. <sup>36</sup>

Development Communities (PDC). There were other ongoing foreign-funded programs that supported the 1996 agreement, such as the SZOPAD Social Fund of the World Bank and the Japanese government. Specific reference, however, is made to ACT for Peace/MDP because during the field interviews, PAMANA-MNLF was viewed to have been designed to sustain the work of this program in the PDCs. MDP worked intensively with Peace and Development Advocates (PDA) who were trained on peace building, project management and community organizing skills.

There were two key interrelated directions in the peace table with the MNLF at the time PAMANA was implemented. First, the GPH-MNLF-OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) TriPartite Review (TPR) process of the FPA was underway since 2007. This review was proposed in 2006 by the OIC Fact-Finding Mission, after receiving conflicting reports from government and the MNLF. Government asserted that all issues from the review have been addressed, moving for the completion of the process. The MNLF thinks otherwise. By 2016, the fifth and final session of the Tripartite Meeting formalized the completion of the review.

Second, significant milestones were achieved with government's peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the signing of the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) two years later. The OIC welcomed these developments as consistent with the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 FPA, urging the MNLF and MILF to unify their efforts and therefore fold both peace tables into one Bangsamoro process. For the MNLF, this meant a shift in the arena of negotiations with regard to the implementation of the FPA and emerging concerns in the Bangsamoro. This new platform involved personalities who used to be their comrades in the MNLF but joined former MNLF head of foreign affairs Hashim Salamat in forming the MILF in 1977.

An added complexity to this peace table is the rounds of split within the MNLF. In 2001, disgruntled with the increasingly dictatorial ways of Chairman Nur Misuari and his inability to lead reforms in ARMM as its Governor in 1996-2001, MNLF Vice-Chairman Hatimil Hassan, Secretary General Muslimin Sema and some other members of the Central Committee split to form the Executive Council of 15 (EC-15), with Hassan as the nominal leader. Two other factions were formed, i.e. the Alvarez Isnaji group which remained loyal to Misuari and the Islamic Command Council. In 2014, original members of the MNLF Central Committee reportedly installed Abu Khayr Alonto as the chair. Alonto was the Founding Vice Chair of the MNLF and would later be appointed as the Chair of the Mindanao Development Authority. Recognizing this, the General Secretariat of the OIC brokered a unity deal on a common agenda and leadership among the MNLF leaderships, known as the Jeddah formula. They were to represent the MNLF in the tripartite meetings.

## Research Objectives/Questions

The big question for this case study was the extent to which PAMANA-MNLF was viewed to have been complementary to the implementation of the 1996 FPA. Operationally, “complementary” was described in

the OPAPP documents as “closing the gap between events at the negotiating table and realities on the ground,” therefore making the pursuit of peace more viable as a result of huge investments in socioeconomic development. Consequently, the inquiry looked into the process and mechanisms for defining what in the GPH-MNLF agreement PAMANA aimed to achieve relating to complementarity through security, justice and development interventions. As a socioeconomic catch up development plan, the process and mechanisms for defining and achieving targets was looked into. Significantly, this research inquired into how the program’s guiding principles of peace building and mutual trust were built between the main parties of the peace agreement.

Drilling down, this case study also looked into how these higher level issues affected implementation. At the community level, it inquired into the process of implementing PAMANA-MNLF as well as more operational metrics on the relevance of the implemented projects in addressing key needs, the effectiveness of the processes that brings together each community to work for a common objective of increasing access to opportunities and resources, the efficiency of implementing projects from a conflict-sensitivity lens and sustaining the gains in conflict-volatile environments.

## **Methodology, Scope and Limitations**

The focus of inquiry of this case study necessitated that the key informant interviews (KII) be done with senior and middle-management personalities from OPAPP (central and field offices), ARMM, local governments units and MNLF Central Committees and ground command. They either had a role in or were familiar with the program. At the community level, focus group discussions (FGD), key informant interviews (KII) and project visits were done mostly in South Central Mindanao at the same time reaching out to Davao Occidental, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu and Basilan through off-site interviews. Time- and funding-wise, however, field work in the island provinces of ARMM, particularly in the MNLF stronghold of Sulu, was not possible.

The reality of fractures within the MNLF required that interviews be done with representatives from each of the two major factions, which, in some cases, required travel to where they were based. Efforts were taken to obtain relevant reports and other documents, since memory of events that date nine years back may not be as reliable. Information was also triangulated across several respondents.

## **PAMANA-MNLF**

The framework of PAMANA as a national program is also the north star of PAMANA-MNLF. Heeding the recommendations of the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, the program’s logic is that addressing conflict involves two key strategies of mitigating security, justice, and economic stressors particular to a given community, and strengthening legitimate institutions to better respond to addressing drivers of conflict. Although the objectives were recast in 2017, these continued to revolve around poverty-



reduction through targeted socioeconomic interventions, improved governance and enhanced community capacities to address disputes through participation and inclusion.

PAMANA was premised on the thinking that the delivery of government programs in conflict-affected areas (CAA) should not use business-as-usual procedures, as this would only worsen tensions that have intensified due to, among others, unfulfilled expectations. In CAAs, government has to think of flexible modalities for delivering programs that are not conventional in more stable environments. Thus in addition to the usual technical process of defining program directions, OPAPP incorporated a peace and conflict sensitivity lens in the program, both at the community level and in the bureaucracy, for instance, by clearly explaining how infrastructure was linked to peace. PAMANA was about building relationships and bridging the trust gaps (Former high-ranking OPAPP official, May 22, 2019).

PAMANA-MNLF was intended for PDCs with a higher level of social preparedness but continued experiences of underdevelopment (OPAPP 2015). Eventually, the site prioritization criteria were level of conflict-affectedness and conflict-vulnerability of closure areas needing development (OPAPP 2017). The program provided economic infrastructure support and livelihood assistance as well as social protection support through scholarships from the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and health insurance from PhilHealth.

A former high-ranking Regional Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) official traced the beginnings of PAMANA-MNLF to a question in 2010 about what the MNLF could do with PDCs that were lagging behind after the closure of the ACT for Peace Programme. Their idea was agriculture-based community industry development. Fleshing out the concept even more as a volunteer at the OPAPP office, brainstorming sessions with the leadership of this office and of the MNLF and a huge funding opportunity from the Aquino Administration's Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) kickstarted the implementation of PAMANA in the PDCs. Eventually, it evolved into an intervention that had other funding sources, different target beneficiaries, implementation modalities and shifting roles for OPAPP. The plan was to initially work with PDAs in five PDCs in each of the MNLF State Revolutionary Commands (SRC) based on the list from ACT for Peace. In turn, it was envisioned that the PDAs in these PDCs would mentor other areas. 2010 was a period of conceptualizing. Director Susan Marcaida, who was then with the Mindanao Affairs Office (MAO) of OPAPP, and her team, assisted by Atty. Randolph Parcasio and Jimmy Labawan<sup>37</sup>, did social preparation activities in the PDCs in 2010 based on the list from ACT for Peace.

PAMANA-MNLF commenced in 2011, launched at the ARMM regional center and in the Central Mindanao towns of Talayan and Pigcawayan, both heavily affected by the violent clashes after the blotched Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in August 2008. In the face of resistance from the MNLF-Misuari faction, the MAO organized a PAMANA-MNLF orientation and consultation in

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<sup>37</sup> Legal Counsel and former Vice Chair of the MNLF-Misuari faction, respectively

Cebu in 2011 with the leadership from the two factions. This was seen as a good start to level off on the operating context in the MNLF areas at that time and agree on program directions (Former high-ranking OPAPP official, interview, May 22, 2019). The activity resulted in a list of proposed sites and projects from the MNLF. Subsequently, OPAPP signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with provincial governors, DSWD, and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Federation of United Mindanawon Bangsamoro Women (FUMBWMPC) was tapped as the third party monitor. In the same year, the Senate questioned why OPAPP was performing an implementing role when the Executive Order creating this office mandated OPAPP to be a coordinative body. By 2016, only 174 of the projects in the PDCs were completed.

In the same year, a Republic Act 10153 synchronizing the elections in ARMM with national and local elections was passed. Mujiv Hataman and Karon were appointed as OIC Regional Governor and Regional Vice Governor, respectively.

In 2012, OPAPP's role in PAMANA shifted back to being an oversight body. The Supreme Court deliberated on the case regarding the DAP, which caused lapsed funds for PAMANA by the latter part of the year. OPAPP had to convince line agencies to include its commitments to PAMANA in their respective GAAs. Two years later, the Supreme Court declared the following schemes of the DAP as illegal: 1) creation of savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and the withdrawal of these funds for use by implementing agencies; 2) cross-border transfers of the savings from one branch of government to another; and, 3) allotment of funds for projects, activities, and programs not outlined in the GAA. OPAPP had to continue negotiating with agencies to include PAMANA in their GAAs.

ARMM initiated efforts to reach out to the MNLF, such as the signing of the MOA of ARMM Governance Reform, the executive order creating the Joint Peace and Development Monitoring Committee chaired by MNLF General Abdul Sahrin and consultations with the MNLF leaders. A key agreement from the consultations was the creation of mechanisms to oversee implementation of projects in the MNLF communities in ARMM.

In 2013, Hataman won as the ARMM Governor. PAMANA in ARMM for the MNLF commenced this year, with implementation placed under the operational supervision of the Office of the Regional Governor (ORG-ARMM). Funds were downloaded to this office and implementation was done by contract, administration or memorandum of agreement with line agencies. ORG-ARMM also partnered with the Cooperative Development Authority since it targeted its support to MNLF Cooperatives. The ARMM PAMANA Management Office (PMO) and Steering Committee (PSC) were created. By 2016, the total PAMANA allocation was at P8.35 billion, funding projects of 291 cooperatives. Social protection coverage included scholarships from the Commission on Higher Education and health insurance from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (OPAPP 2016).

PAMANA-Community Security Management commenced in Sulu in 2014. A series of dialogues were conducted between OPAPP and MNLF Commanders to discuss development interventions and reduction of arms in their communities.



In 2017, ORG-ARMM returned responsibility for PAMANA-MNLF to OPAPP that in turn signed a MOA with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the implementation of PAMANA-MNLF in conflict-affected areas in ARMM. The year 2018 saw a sudden twist of fate with the President's public dismissal of OPAPP Undersecretary and PAMANA National Program Manager Ronald Flores and Assistant Secretary for Support Services and PAMANA Concerns, Yeshter Donn Baccay and the subsequent resignation of PAPP Dureza.

## Findings

The design and implementation modalities of PAMANA-MNLF as a complementary program and catch up plan to the socioeconomic provisions of the 1996 FPA were not acceptable to the MNLF leaderships, resulting in dissatisfaction among its ranks. The absence of details, i.e. mechanism, roadmap, phasing or exit agreement in the peace accord itself on the socioeconomic package opened the doors for divergent accounting of what has been implemented prior to 2010 that is definitely attributable to FPA implementation. This shaky ground made it difficult to determine the starting point and other key elements of PAMANA-MNLF.

The TPR could have been instrumental in establishing the parameters of PAMANA-MNLF. In 2006, the OIC sent a fact-finding mission, headed by Ambassador Sayed El-Masry, Adviser to the Secretary-General, to determine the progress of the implementation and concluded that a tripartite review be done to narrow the gap between the conflicting reports of government and the MNLF. By 2007, the First Session of the Tripartite Meeting was convened, forming joint thematic working groups to do the review on their assigned topics. Their reports were adopted by the Third Session in 2009, during which an agreement to form a GRP-MNLF Legal Panel was reached, to transform the common proposals into legal form. In 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Tripoli, Libya, to among others, undertake a tripartite process and mechanism to monitor implementation of the peace pact, and likewise the security, governance and delivery of economic activities and social services in the conflict-affected areas. For this, OPAPP had prepared an inventory of assistance implemented in the MNLF areas but this was not tabled for discussion by the TPR. One option pursued was to put the PAMANA-MNLF itself on the table for discussion with the view of leveling off on program. A key leader in these talks said that he “tried to include PAMANA-MNLF in the agenda of the TPR meetings but government was not responsive.”

The Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund (BDAF)<sup>38</sup> elicited more interest from the MNLF. This Fund was created to jumpstart projects needed in MNLF communities. There was apparent greater interest

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<sup>38</sup> The BDAF was not part of the 1996 FPA but an agreement in 2010 by the GPH-MNLF Joint Legal Panel. The creation of this Panel was agreed during the 3rd Session of the Tripartite Meeting to transform into legal forms the proposals for amending RA 9054.

on the part of the MNLF on BDAF than on PAMANA MNLF as a barometer for the implementation of the socioeconomic provisions of the FPA.

The lukewarm attitude of the MNLF to the program was mainly due to their observation of their diminishing role in the program. “From the very start, the role of the MNLF was unclear until it became apparent to us that we had no role. Thus, the MNLF did not accept PAMANA. We left the decision to accept the projects to the local commanders,” (MNLF Political Affairs official, interview, June 26, 2019). The 2011 consultation in Cebu led to the expectation of joint implementation by the MNLF. This happened despite initial resistance from some governors, who refused to acknowledge the presence of the MNLF in their communities or getting tagged as hosting conflict-affected areas. After this consultation, OPAPP entered into a MOA with provincial governors for the implementation. It was reportedly downhill from there. From OPAPP’s perspective, its hands were tied because of government’s procurement rules. For the MNLF, this caused a loss of trust. In another interview, an MNLF commander commented, “Government must understand – we have to show that we are capable of leading our people but we were just asked to monitor,” (MNLF member, interview, June 30, 2019).

In the end, both the MNLF-Misuari faction and the MNLF-EC 15 did not endorse PAMANA-MNLF. Misuari reportedly sent out a directive not to engage with government on socioeconomic projects including PAMANA. In spite of this, PAMANA was unilaterally implemented by the government in the MNLF communities and was not part of the peace process (Attorney, Facebook message, 2019). At the same time, the government cited PAMANA as supporting its claim on the real status of the GRP-MNLF peace process, describing it as having transformed former MNLF bases into PDCs (Office of the President 2013).

In an effort to reach out to the MNLF and ensure transparency and inclusion, OPAPP required MNLF representation in LGU-led technical working groups. Involvement of the MNLF in these TWGs was uneven, as it was dependent on the openness of the two parties at the local level to work together and on the ability of the MNLF factions to designate a trusted representative to this mechanism. At the regional level in ARMM, the PAMANA Project Steering Committee (PSC) was created as the governing body, composed of ARMM, OPAPP, Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom) and MNLF. The Chair of the MNLF-EC 15 used to sit in the PSC. However, the Chair’s representation was as Deputy Regional Governor for Muslim Affairs.

This decision not to engage led to missed opportunities for the MNLF to strategically engage in making programmatic decisions, for instance, in the selection criteria for projects and sites or vetting of proponents. OPAPP was deluged with proposals, some unreasonable like putting up gas stations, some from pseudo-MNLF members since there was no vetting process within the MNLF. Ground commanders held their own fort and there can be more than one commander on the ground, distinguishable by their alliances to which leadership faction. In Matalam for instance, the Misuari faction is represented by the Upper and Lower Sebangon SRC, while the EC-15 could count on the SKSRC. This adds another layer of dynamics, as contestations over PAMANA projects occur between the factions.

The MNLF also took exception to being relegated to being spectators in their communities. “We were mere decorations. Because we had no role, all we can do is watch what was going on. Our communities know us, we know them. But we were not involved and sadly, we were forced to explain why PAMANA projects were so,” (Former Kagawad, interview, June 30, 2019). “Misuari (who carried a nom de guerre) first held camp and lived with us here in Palimbang. This is where he talked to us about our right to self-determination but now, we are at the sidelines as other people determine things for us” (Palimbang community leader, interview, 2019).

The MNLF insisted that PAMANA-MNLF was not attributable to the 1996 FPA or to their struggle more generally. “We need our people to understand that programs that are implemented in communities are the fruits of our struggle. It should be clear to them that these came with the blood of our martyred fathers and brothers. OPAPP forgot this with PAMANA” (MNLF official, interview, July 2, 2019). In Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, the community wanted the peace center to be built on the site where the 1974 Malisbong Massacre had happened but the owner of the land refused because of rumors that the project was not real.

“I really wanted the peace center to be built on the land where the mosque is. I remember the day it all began, at around 4 pm, the military gathered all the men and women, separately. They were looking for the MNLF leaders but couldn’t find any. Months later, as we were doing our evening prayers in the mosque, the naval boats came and suddenly, we saw the heads of our fathers and husbands falling, like dried coconuts from the huts. We heard the gunfire. They shoved the women into the naval boat. My cousin who didn’t want to be touched by the soldiers defended herself with a pair of scissors when one of them pulled her down. They shot her. All we can do is watch with horror. I buried my child in the sand and stayed beside him so that the bullets won’t hit him. The military gathered all the remaining men and fired upon them. We have a long history of pain and we agreed to the peace process with government hoping to get justice. But look at how they treat us. Look at this PAMANA” (Palimbang community leader, interview, 2019).

The discourse over the role of the MNLF in PAMANA was elevated at the formal peace table. At the 8<sup>th</sup> Informal Meeting of the GPH-Implementation Panel in 2017, the two parties discussed the regular socioeconomic development projects other than BDAF in the MNLF communities. The participation of the MNLF in PAMANA was discussed; with the GPH Panel reassuring it will look into the matter (OPAPP 2018).

PAMANA-MNLF was susceptible to external critical political and security events, as one of the first options to thwart potential escalation into more violence. As a development program expected to be managed with a technical lens, PAMANA-MNLF was vulnerable as a tool to preempt or mitigate impact of events that posed serious threats to security. “Almost every year, depending on the political climate, the program changes” (PAMANA high-ranking official, interview, May 23, 2019). Case in point, the Zamboanga siege in 2013. By the end of 2012, Misuari was already positioning against the TPR, insisting that government should focus on the full implementation of the FPA. Misuari has since reclaimed his original position of independence of Mindanao. Government countered that it pushed for the closure of the Review Process but did not terminate the FPA. Misuari was also against the GPH-MILF peace talks and

the call for the MNLF-MILF convergence. In his view, both were acts of betrayal. He was beyond himself when he learned that then President Benigno Aquino III met with MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim in Japan in 2011 (MNLF-Misuari wing official, interview, 2019). Sema supported Misuari's position that the MNLF felt betrayed with the way government handled the FPA (Dizon 2013).

"Misuari was obligated to push for his position on the talks. Government had to respond by making its presence felt in the MNLF areas through PAMANA" (PAMANA program manager, interview, July 15, 2019). In 2012, OPAPP staff were directed to strategize how to dissuade Misuari-aligned field commanders from joining his call. A series of consultations were done with 27 identified commanders urgently targeted for PAMANA projects. The Zamboanga Peninsula towns were a hub of MNLF presence and were thus marked for heavy infusion of PAMANA assistance. "PAMANA had a huge impact in these areas. The commanders did not join Misuari in the siege," (PAMANA program manager, interview, July 15, 2019). In Lanao del Norte, a known Misuari loyalist commander was among the regular recipients of PAMANA. His comrades perceive him to be a government showcase. An equally important tactical objective was to "neutralize" at the very least, their position on the FAB. This "27" approach was expanded to Sulu, shifting the PAMANA focus from PDCs to "Camps to Communities" (C2C), retaining the tactical objective. It was not clear from the interviews how C2C worked and what the results were, but apparently EC 15 members from the C2C areas were convened separately for their proposed projects, resulting in projects in three commands under Jikiri. This caught the ire of other commanders, who felt sidelined and opted for an alliance with the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Misuari's growing dissatisfaction with the implementation of the peace accord and his waning influence resulted in his offensive posturing, leading to the attacks in Sulu and Zamboanga City. The 20-day Zamboanga Siege was known to have been instigated by Misuari and loyal follower, Habier Malik, to declare the "Bangsamoro Republik" and raise its flag at the City Hall.

Recognizing potential reinforcement by ground commanders loyal to Misuari and escalation of the violence, OPAPP sought the counsel of the MNLF leadership aligned with Misuari and offered PAMANA-MNLF projects on a larger scale to commanders aligned with Misuari and may potentially join their comrades. "Senior officials of OPAPP came to my house to ask for my opinion on the Zamboanga Siege. I said it was because of lack of communication. Frustrations were running high. PAMANA was offered to us. We were invited to propose as many infrastructure projects as we can," (MNLF-Misuari wing official, interview, 2019). An initial list referred to as the long list was sent OPAPP, which it asked to be reduced to a short list due to financial constraints. The latest word was to reduce the list to five projects for each province. The reduction to five came with a reason that did not sit well with some official – that their conflict was not current so their projects were not prioritized.

In 2016, PAMANA-CSM in Sulu targeted MNLF members who did not join the siege and who were open to the CSM approach, which involves the reduction and regulation of arms along with PAMANA projects.

Participation (no matter how limited) and clarity about the selection criteria of sites, projects and beneficiaries was key to encouraging the communities to have a greater role, no matter how small, in the

implementation. Where consultations were done by the LGUs, the MNLF community organizations were more open to engage in whatever opportunities there were and candidly reported benefits from the projects. The PLGU of Sultan Kudarat for instance, convened an assembly for MNLF communities. A PDC in Palimbang was among those targeted for assistance. “We were told each project had an allocation of funding, potentially for a peace center. Back in the community, we discussed it and agreed to have this building constructed. I gathered signatures in support of this project. Now we have the biggest building in the barangay, which can host MNLF meetings, assemblies and even weddings. Just recently, it was used for a meeting of the MLGU and the military,” (Palimbang community leader, interview, June 2019).

The reviews were similar for peace centers in other villages. “We thought of a project that can benefit many thus, this gym. We do not have the largest Moro population but this is where Muslims flock during Eid’l Fitr and Eid’l Adha because we can accommodate hundreds in this gym. It has become known as a place in General Santos where we converge in prayer and solidarity. There is an Arabic school in the same compound; they use the gym for graduation ceremonies. Young people use this gym for basketball” (Volunteer, June 29, 2019).

In a barangay in Matalan, a water system and livelihood (animal dispersal) projects were identified by the municipal government and subjected to community consultation. The local people’s organization managed the consultations and coordination with government. The water system was to cover two communities, one populated by Ilonggos, the other by Maguindanoans. The project brought the two communities into a space of dialogue and cooperation to see the project through.

Weak spots in the implementation mechanism and procedures undermined whatever successes PAMANA achieved as a complementary program. The degree of relevance to the most pressing needs was a concern in some areas. For instance, in some villages, residents suffer from lack of potable water. Thus, a huge part of the household income went to water purifying stations. Funds were used for the construction of a peace center instead of a water system project. Moreover, corn was abundant in the barangay, thus their need was for a warehouse and corn sheller to minimize processing costs. They also prefer pulverized corn as their rice but this they have to buy from Midsayap, a town in another province, when they could have produced this in the barangay itself.

Snags in the proposal development and funds disbursement process in addition to weak construction supervision led to severe delays in the implementation and in poor quality of the civil works, fueling more frustrations. These led to questions about how the implementation fared vis a vis available resources, including time. The six-year and continuing saga of the “long to short to five list” left the Vice Chairman in a bind with ground commanders. Amidst the decision of the MNLF to disengage, he thought it was his responsibility to keep the lines open between OPAPP and the organization. In Maguindanao, one of the huge projects approved under the Aquino administration, the P250 million Lamud-Ganassi-Biarong Road in South Upi and the Makir-Sibuto-Kinebaka Road in Datu Odin Sinsuat, were not implemented by the Engineering Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, despite funds already downloaded to this office. The project suffered another setback when the remaining balance was not released due to the SC decision on the DAP (OPAPP 2018). Other areas had their own stories to tell. Failure to submit financial

documents by four provincial governments in ARMM led to the suspension of the release of the remaining amount for the construction of women peace centers in these areas. In a village in Palimbang, the total amount released reportedly fell short. On top of this, the foreman ran away with a large portion of the payment.

A number of the local organizations also refused to accept the projects because of incomplete work. For example, a water system was operational only for one community. Peace centers had all sorts of issues, from incomplete installation of roofing, tiles or electrical connections, to non-delivery of fixtures and kitchen equipment. These were known not from the program of work for each project since copies were not provided but from discussions with the LGU or OPAPP. Signs of decay in the buildings are apparent, with leaks from the ceilings or unprotected openings and holes on the walls. Sustainability then becomes an issue in projects where accountability is not clear since no turnover has been done. For the rest, the absence of operations and maintenance policies compromised sustainability.

Observations about suspicious deviations from implementation protocols led to allegations of corruption. These allegations were rife across the board but for the MNLF, the worst form came from one of their kind. During the FGDs in the villages in North Cotabato, participants expressed disgust over alleged corrupt activities headed by the contractor of several PAMANA projects who was a relative of a prominent MNLF commander. In a visit to one barangay, the barangay captain pointed to a four-kilometer irrigation project from PAMANA-MNLF, which merely looked like a widened canal. No concreting was done. In the records of the North Cotabato PLGU, this was reported completed.

## Recommendations

Treat PAMANA-MNLF as a peace process. With the MNLF leaderships, jointly redesign the program's strategic and operational elements and protocols to realign it to the framework, objectives and guiding principles of PAMANA-MNLF as a complementary intervention to and catch up plan of the 1996 FPA. Addressing the absence of details in the socioeconomic provision of the peace accord has to be a priority agenda. These can be challenging given the following: a) how does one do joint processes, with the factions within the MNLF; b) folding the socioeconomic development into a one Bangsamoro track, with the GPH-MILF having far more detailed joint implementation arrangements; c) targeting in mixed MNLF and MILF communities; and d) the layers of resentment developed over time, even among the PDAs, and potential alignments with armed groups that may have more attractive incentives. The limited role of the MNLF has been recognized by OPAPP and the 8<sup>th</sup> Informal Meeting of the Implementation Panels opened the space for this conversation. It is prudent to sustain the discussions to arrive at firm consensus on how to move forward.



Given the current contexts that are also operative in the MNLF communities, planning has to be more strategic and comprehensive<sup>39</sup>. This refers to the regional government's planning directions, national government's massive support to socioeconomic infrastructure development in the region and in conflict-affected areas, and the ongoing implementation of the decommission process as agreed in the Annex on Normalization of the CAB. There are four major components of the GPH-MILF normalization process, i.e. security aspect, socioeconomic development program, confidence building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation and along with the MILF camps transformation plans, these will have geographic overlaps with the MNLF areas. A spatial process is recommended to be integrated in planning to better link the proposals to populations and resources and for complementation across sites.

Political insulation of PAMANA-MNLF is necessary. While designed in support of a political process, it is a socioeconomic development program that has to be consistently managed with a technical lens to maintain the program's impartiality and hence, its credibility. For instance, adding another layer of criteria for selecting sites, projects and beneficiaries to deter participation in armed attacks led by Misuari, resulted in mixed signals on the intent of the program. This led to the view that PAMANA was a counterinsurgency and decommissioning program after all.

The allegations of corruption against PAMANA-MNLF eroded the integrity of the program and have to be investigated. In a program that is aimed at promoting peace and espouses the fundamental ethical values of good governance, turning a blind eye on these allegations will impact on trust from the stakeholders. The safeguards built into government's procurement procedures must be protected in the successor phases. Having a third party monitoring was regarded as good practice and must be sustained.

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<sup>39</sup> One interviewed MNLF member recommended the concept of building communities in resettlement areas in public lands, with MNLF and MILF members opening idle lands for development and beginning new lives.

# Case Study of PAMANA in SPMS Box & Adjacent Towns

Written by Assad Baunto

## Background

The event in 2015 in Mamasapano brought to the national consciousness the constant exposure to danger and the survival of communities and households in the SPMS Box and 11 surrounding towns – a haven for multitude of conflict actors. Between 2011 and 2015, an average of four conflict incidents resulted in 44 persons either killed, injured, kidnapped, or missing in the area every week, according Conflict Alert data.

This case study focuses on the role of PAMANA funds in supporting the humanitarian and early recovery of the vulnerable communities through the ARMM Humanitarian and Development Assistance Program.

## The SPMS Box

The SPMS Box is a conflict haven of various armed actors. It is a poster child of mobile, rooted, and fluid conflicts. Consisting of four adjoining municipalities in Liguasan Marsh, SPMS Box was coined by the security sector and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a locus of conflict in Maguindanao and, arguably, the whole of Central Mindanao.

The SPMS Box sits along the Liguasan Marsh, an expansive flood plain covering 2,220 square kilometers that cuts across two other provinces outside of the ARMM. The tall reeds of the marshland, patches of coconut plantations, and the forested Daguma Mountain Range provide a perfect cover and mobility for various armed groups. Camp Omar, one of the six recognized camps of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is tucked away in Daguma. The camp is not a permanently settled site. MILF members are assigned to patrol the camp on a one- or two-month rotation shift and they go down to their families who are settled in the lowlands of SPMS Box and adjoining towns. The 118<sup>th</sup> Base Command of the MILF led by Sheik Abdulwahid Tundoc and the 105<sup>th</sup> Base Command led by Ustadz Zacaria Guma are within the highly settled and rural areas of SPMS Box. Other armed groups, like the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), an MILF breakaway group, and ISIS-inspired groups operate in the area and they meld themselves into the densely packed communities.

Until recently, the MILF, along with the BIFF and ISIS-armed groups, aspired to establish an independent or Islamic State in Mindanao. In 2019, the MILF signed a peace pact with the Government of the Philippines to carve out a new political entity called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and its leaders hold key positions of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. Behind their respective aspirations are deep-seated frustrations of how marginalized they have been, especially in



managing their affairs and natural resources. Almost every resident of the SPMS Box knows that several kilometers from the camp is a monstrous logging mill owned by a large construction firm and property developer, which employs its own private armed groups in Daguma. Its presence since the 1980s is a daily reminder to the residents and members of the MILF base commands just how they have been pushed away from their desire to have a share of the resources endowed by their ancestral lands. “For as long as development does not trickle down to our communities and our natural endowments are stolen from us, armed violence will never stop. We will fight till the end<sup>40</sup>,” (Resident of SPMS Box, interview, 2019).

The potential resource stream of revenues from natural gas that arguably lays underneath vast the Liguasan Marsh, which the rebel groups and community members claim will no doubt be a flashpoint of future armed violence in the SPMS Box.

While the SPMS Box is wracked by resource-based conflict, the area has been a magnate of political violence, extortions, and violence extremism. The incident in 2015 in Mamasapano, one of the towns of SPMS Box, was the most crucial. At least 250 individuals, including members of the elite Special Action Forces of the Philippine National Police, perished in a botched security operations to capture a Malaysian bomb maker/terrorist and high ranking members of the BIFF.

Mamasapano was, in 2015, a rendezvous for the BIFF and the MILF, despite the fact that they lived alongside each other. Further, the social landscape added a tacit collusion for certain armed groups to protect the status quo because everyone is each other’s kin, childhood friends, or long-time neighbors. “We are all from the same location. Even for a single family [living under one roof], each member may belong to different armed groups”<sup>41</sup> (Active MNLF fighter, interview, 2019).

In addition, powerful political clans and traditional local leaders who have their own band of armed groups add another layer of complexity to the conflict geography of SPMS Box. What was once part of a unified Cotabato empire, this part of Maguindanao has seen a rapid rise of gerrymandering starting in early 2001, during the Arroyo administration, to give way to clans contesting for fiscal resources, notably the internal revenue allocations. The SPMS Box consists of four municipalities carved out from each other: Shariff Aguak, Pagatin (now, Datu Saudi Ampatuan), Mamasapano, and Shariff Saydona Mustapha.

Incidents of *rido* (or clan feuds) over resources and land involving members of MILF, BIFF, ISIS-inspired groups, or powerful political clans in the SPMS Box have evolved into violent clashes of major armed groups and are common occurrences. Escalation of conflict often requires involvement of the military. Some members of the armed groups hold key positions in the local government so that local elections can

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<sup>40</sup> Translated from: “*Habang di nabibigay ng gobyerno ang nakakabuti sa ating mga Moro at nandyan pa rin ang pagnakaw sa ating mga lupain, di matitigil ang gulo dito. Lalaban at lalaban kami.*”

<sup>41</sup> Translated from: “*Magkakasama-sama naman kami. Maskin sa isang pamilya, magkakaiba ang grupo.*”

invite violent clashes of major armed groups. Hence, the web of personal, social, and political relationships among actors in the SPMS Box renders putting an end to conflict an intractable challenge.

## PAMANA in the ARMM

The ARMM was a beneficiary of PAMANA right at the very start of the program in 2011 under the Adiong administration as a designate regional governor. Violent clashes between the MILF and the military followed the Supreme Court’s declaration that the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain was unconstitutional, resulting in a large displaced population. Reeling from the effects, the municipalities of Talayan, Datu Salibo, and Datu Saudi Ampatuan in Maguindanao were among the first recipients of the PAMANA program. About 2,520 units of shelter worth P172 million, along with the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) project valued at P29.11 million were constructed for the internally displaced population. A project management office (PMO) that administered the shelter project was set up under the Technical Management Services of the Office of the Regional Governor. Despite the noble intention of the program, the Adiong administration was hounded by alleged corruption involving the shelter project.

Learning from the hiccup, the PAMANA program pursued investments in more shelter projects in the ARMM worth P230 million in 2012 for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) communities in 75 barangays across the region. Instead of a local PMO, the PAMANA PMO at the national level directly managed the project – just like how the WASH project was managed the previous year – and implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) of the ARMM. “Despite the (alleged corruption) problem in ARMM at the start of the program, PAMANA pressed on since there were still wide development gaps in the conflict-affected areas,” one OPAPP director lamented (interview, 2019).<sup>42</sup> In the next two years, under the new administration of Hataman, who was appointed acting Regional Governor in December 2011 and elected to the office in 2013 until early 2019, the assistance expanded its scope to infrastructure, shelter, and social projects spanning 2,159 barangays across the five provinces of the ARMM.

The Mamasapano massacre in 2015 prompted the ARMM to draft a humanitarian and early recovery planning document, erstwhile called ARMM-Humanitarian and Development Assistance Plan, to assist communities in the SPMS Box and 11 other neighboring municipalities: Datu Salibo, Talitay, Talayan, Datu Anggal Midtimbang, Guindulungan, Datu Piang, Rajah Buayan, Datu Unsay Ampatuan, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, and Datu Odin Sinsuat. Two key strategies were employed by the ARMM-HDAP: a community-centered approach and the convergence of humanitarian and development interventions and strategies of various agencies and offices of the regional government, for optimum impact of assistance to the communities. By 2015, much of the PAMANA program funds in the ARMM were

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<sup>42</sup> Translated from: “*Sa simula pa lang may problema na sa dating ARMM, pero di tumigil ang PAMANA dahil marami pa ring nangagailangan sa CAA.*”

committed to the regional government's regular programming exercise of ARMM-DSWD and the Annual Infrastructure Projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The ARMM-HDAP received funding from the national government through PAMANA later in the year after an arduous budgeting process with the Department of Budget and Management and the Congress. With funding secured, the plan evolved into a program, ARMM-Humanitarian and Development Assistance Program.

## **ARMM-HDAP**

### **Implementation and Operations**

It was only in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2016 that the autonomous regional government was able to organize and implement the ARMM-HDAP after a brief interlude because of the national election. The regional government issued Executive Order No. 022 Series of 2016 establishing the ARMM-HDAP PMO under the Office of the Regional Governor (ORG). The PMO was lodged at the Regional Planning and Development Office while funds administration was under the ORG. The PMO immediately forged memoranda of agreements (MOA) with various ARMM agencies and offices.

Under the MOA, ARMM agencies or offices would submit proposals based on the priority projects identified in the ARMM-HDAP planning document to the PMO. The latter would evaluate and approve the proposals based on relevance and efficacy. This means ARMM agencies and offices, together with the local government units, determined the types of project considered, which aimed to reduce conflict, address core basic needs, and be accepted by the community.

Guided by ARMM-HDAP Implementing Guidelines, implementing agencies and local government units jointly identified and endorsed the beneficiaries. After careful review, the PMO endorsed to the ORG the first release of funds of three tranches to the ARMM implementing agencies but only after the latter had submitted supporting documents such as Deed of Donation for land property, work and financial plan, Detailed Engineering Design, Program of Work, and project profile. About 50% of total allocation constituted the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche, 40% for the 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche, and 10% upon completion of the project. Funds were treated as cash advances and implementing agencies were required to adhere to the existing liquidation procedures defined in the MOA.

Each implementing agency was required to submit the following documents for the release of funds: request letter, physical and financial status report, statement of work accomplished, detailed expenditure accounts, photos or videos, and other progress reports. Implementing agencies would procure the necessary inputs and sign up contractors using the national procurement standards through public bidding. For the contractors, an initial mobilization fund constituting 15% of the total bid awards were provided by the ARMM-HDAP but only when the contractors had submitted the following documents: Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed, Contract Agreement, Surety Bond, among others. Contractors could request or bill their succeeding payments provided that they were able to submit reports on physical accomplishments to the

implementing agencies accompanied by actual site visits and photo-video documentation jointly arranged by the contractors, agencies, LGUs, and the PMO.

The PMO maintained a Project Information System database to track accomplishments and identify delays and course of action. The office prepared periodic physical and financial accomplishment reports, which they would submit to the Office of the Regional Governor. An ARMM-wide inter-agency committee, the Regional Project Monitoring Committee (RPMC) also provided another layer of monitoring of implementation progress of ARMM-HDAP. The RPMC identified critical implementation issues requiring high-level decision by the Regional Economic and Development Planning Board.

## Summary of Investments

The ARMM-HDAP had a total budget of P2.234 billion for infrastructure, agriculture, livelihood, social, and governance projects, as well as humanitarian assistance over the period 2016 to 2018. About 82% of the total budget represented Capital Outlay and the remaining 18% Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses. Each ARMM implementing agency was allowed to use a maximum 3% of total program fund allocation to support administrative and monitoring services. As of December 15, 2018, about 84.6% of the total budget were obligated, 71.5% released to the implementing agencies, and 71.1% disbursed accomplishing 73.4% of physical delivery of the overall program.

One of the strategic interventions of ARMM-HDAP was the construction of evacuation centers called Community Peace and Development Centers (CPDCs) to cater to the forced migration trend, which became normal to the community life in SPMS Box and neighboring municipalities. To date, a total of 16 CPDCs were either completed or partially constructed. In 2017, the ARMM “returned” (a misnomer since the DBM did not download the funds to the ARMM) half of the P300 million programmed for the construction of the evacuation centers to ARMM-DSWD, being the implementing agency. The regional government blamed DBM’s failure to transfer funds for the error in classifying the programmed budget line item for the construction of evacuation centers as “other biological assets” using the DBM’s Unified Accounts Code Structure. The latter was a national innovation of the DBM, Department of Finance, and the Commission of Audit to facilitate financial reporting of fiscal resources and expenditures and only rolled out three years prior. So, the regional government asked DBM not to download the funds to prevent any reputation risk to the administration. But the ARMM’s latest action was taken by OPAPP differently. “Others (at the national-level) think it’s corruption whenever we right the wrong,” an ARMM official lamented (interview, 2019).<sup>43</sup>

The political transition period to the BARMM sent jitters across ARMM and to ARMM-HDAP contractors and suppliers. Construction activities and supply of intervention inputs subsided a few months before the turnover because of the impending uncertainty over whether the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) would renege on fulfilling the terms of contracts entered into by the incumbent. And true enough, two

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<sup>43</sup> Translated from: “*Kung itutuwid mo, iisipin naman nila kurapsyon.*”

months after the BTA was installed, despite prohibitions of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, the Office of the Interim Chief Minister of the BTA issued an announcement disallowing BTA to honor any outstanding obligations and contracts by the ARMM, which served as a death knell to many ARMM-HDAP projects. This happened despite the fact that the operational funds that oil the BTA during the fiscal year of 2019 were the approved budget allocated to finance programmed activities specific to ARMM projects and operations. As of July 2019, some of what could have been high impact infrastructure and community projects for emergency, rehabilitation, and early recovery, like the CPDCs, lay unfinished and wasted, sprawled with tall flora and strewn with rusty metals in different parts of the SPMS Box and neighboring towns. There appeared to be a pervading belief among the current BARMM staff and officials that anything, including development projects, associated with the ARMM should be abandoned for a “new” start.

During a visit by the interviewer in the IDP community in a barangay in Maguindanao on the 2<sup>nd</sup> week of June 2019, a farmer, who was a veteran of forced displacements and whose family and community were on their toes because they expected another violent clash to happen that day, solemnly observed: “Persevere (or put faith in Allah). I fully support the Bangsamoro because [its benefits] are for all of us. However, I have not thought until now that even [development] projects for the marginalized can have political surnames (i.e. highly political). We need these projects whether BARMM or ARMM exists. [We need these projects] like now,” (interview, 2019).<sup>44</sup> He was pointing at a military helicopter hovering overhead searching for ISIS-inspired groups in a rural area in Maguindanao. Any patrolling helicopter seen scouring the area had been a foreboding sight of incoming violent clashes and his family’s constant search for a brief respite.

## Findings

### Impact

**No reduction of conflict but strengthening risk-management and risk-coping mechanisms.** Perhaps, the farmer in Maguindanao was right that the assistance provided respite from the unending level of insecurity in the SPMS Box and adjacent towns. For one, the ARMM-HDAP program was never meant to bring positive peace in the target areas because there is an existing formal mechanism for peace settlement under the Government of the Philippines (GPH)-MILF peace table. And second, the current peace settlement with the MILF will not end armed conflict in the area where other conflict actors operate. The MILF base commanders and their followers are hopeful about the BTA and the future Bangsamoro government, but it is not far-fetched to think that any hint of let up in meeting their expectations will result

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<sup>44</sup> Translated from: “*Sabar. Saki a, kinad tabang kanu Bangsamoro na tidtu tidtu. Kagina ka isa, na lakitanu e nan. Way na adan ba nya da masot a pamikilan ko, ka apya besan su project a masla e madtabang nin kanu mga tao a nakasisita lun, na katambilan o diya ka amungan na politika ba nya a pedtalun. Abpun man daw san sa dua anan BARMM ang gu ARMM na sakami na nasisista nami e nan saguna.*”

in conflict reversal. Their personal and family ties will fast track recruitment to other armed groups (akin to easing frictions in a “labor market”).

Under these circumstances, the ARMM-HDAP demonstrated to local communities that despite their exposure to the vagaries of conflict the program cushioned the beneficiaries from negative shocks. To improve income and diversify risks, the livelihood assistance was added to the portfolio of production of households who traditionally rely on rice or corn farming as their main source of income. Roads facilitated or expanded access to opportunities and eased the mobility of residents during attacks involving the security forces and armed groups. Food and non-food assistance were distributed to IDPs to prevent sudden decline in consumption. Health facilities and provision of health equipment and staff were essential in the communities. Construction of post-harvest facilities allowed farmers to command more margin from their produce to support basic needs (particularly, food) of family members for survival.

At the operational level, the program demonstrated that the convergence approach was necessary to address the deep-seated challenges of communities in contested areas. Conflict in this part of ARMM is a multi-faceted problem requiring multi-faceted solutions. The ARMM-HDAP leveraged its key resources by tapping the Central Maguindanao Development Cooperation (CMDC) Alliance, which was formed by 15 local government units through the support of ARMM-DILG in 2016. The program was able to unify the LGUs, whose mayors were from warring political clans to support programs in the communities, at least for a time, before the upcoming election.

**“There’s an advantage of having a government.”** For many decades, many conflict-haven communities in the target areas were aware that the presence of various groups, including the LGUs, competing for legitimacy frames the environment in which residents produce and transact. In a sense, the economic and political environment in the areas encouraged diversion of limited fiscal resources towards providing human and economic security and away from production of economic outputs such as agriculture or delivery of much needed social services. The ARMM-HDAP showed that despite all odds there existed a working government responsive to the needs of the local communities. Livelihood projects, provision of agricultural inputs, construction of post-harvest facilities, shelter, and connective and social infrastructure including water systems were notable projects of the ARMM-HDAP that resulted in significant economic and social impacts to the communities. Receiving assistance from the government for the first time in 2016 to 2018 conferred exceedingly high marginal (i.e. last additional) economic and social benefits to the communities. “It was only recently that we received assistance for the poor in our community. Before, there was none. The government or politicians come to us only during election period. Now, we feel that there is an advantage of having a government, especially the ARMM,”<sup>45</sup> observed by an ARMM-HDAP beneficiary in a municipality that has not received its internal revenue allotment since its creation (interview, 2019).

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<sup>45</sup> Translated from: “*Ngayon lang kami nakaranas ng totoong programa para sa mga mahihirap sa lugar namin. Dati, wala talaga. Lumalapit sa amin ang gobyerno pag may election. Ngayon, naramdaman naming na may pakinabang din pala ang gobyerno lalo na sa ARMM.*”



In a barangay in Maguindanao, an agrarian reform community that received 16 social housing units, solar dryer, warehouse, and livelihood assistance for banana chips production from ARMM-Department of Agrarian Reform through ARMM-HDAP believed that the projects had made their relationship with the LGU stronger.

**Social benefits far outweigh private returns.** Some of the social benefits identified by the beneficiaries of selected ARMM-HDAP projects were:

- **Integrated Potable Water System (level 3).** The water system encompassed eight municipalities and served approximately 150,000 households. Some local residents and LGUs observed a reduction of reported incidence of water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, which freed household time devoted to fetching water at community taps or deep wells. Further, the community in a barangay in Maguindanao was hopeful that its water reservoir would bring its people together, especially after a historical incident that infamously marked the barangay.
- **Roads.** Connective infrastructure reduced travel time and logistic costs bringing people closer to markets. Roads facilitated the deployment of other needed public goods and services including education, health, and social programs. (See further discussions in the next section).
- **Socialized housing for ARBs with provision of solar power and communal toilets.** Some of the agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) who were given housing units indicated that their confidence and social standing improved. Their children spent more time studying at night due to available source of lighting. Compared to 10 beneficiaries in one municipality, the 16 unit owners in another municipality believed that the assistance increased their sense of community and responsibility. They met at least once a week to discuss home improvements, gardening, and livelihood opportunities.
- **Livelihood assistance and trainings.** In one barangay in Maguindanao, women IDP-mat weavers earned at least P3,000 each per month from sales. There were more than 100 women IDPs engaged in mat weaving in the community. Two different local traders from a nearby city visited the area to collect the finished products once a week and paid them on the spot. In one municipality, about 30 female banana chips makers realized that it was much “easier” to survive despite multiple sources of shocks (conflict and weather) when they began diversifying their sources of income. Prior to the program they relied only on what they earned from rice farming. They sold their produce at nearby schools and local markets. In another barangay, bottled calamansi juice production was deemed successful and the a private company initially run by an eight-person staff began supplying schools in an adjacent town. Production was lucrative and it encouraged a whole local industry of competitors in the area. The beneficiaries, who were Christians, were astounded by the act of generosity of a Moro-sponsored program called ARMM-HDAP. It was a realization that ARMM-HDAP was building trust.

- **Warehouses and solar dryers.** The projects not only reduced wastage but freed local farmers at the mercy of unscrupulous traders. (See further discussions in the next section).

However, beneficiaries did not explicitly indicate a reduction of conflict incidents when they availed of the program. In fact, conflict can negate the economic and social gains of ARMM-HDAP. For instance,

- The female mat weavers had to halt their production every time the military engaged in offensive operations against ISIS-inspired groups in one barangay, which served as the place of origin for IDPs temporarily residing in the area. Their husbands gathered *balabas*, a type of reed endemic to the area, which the women IDPs used as raw materials for mat weaving.
- The five socialized housing units along the national highway in one municipality were occupied by military troops, displacing the original beneficiaries. The housing units were converted into outposts after an unfortunate incident of IED explosion allegedly planted by ISIS-inspired group in January 2018. The LGU gave the military the permission to occupy the housing units.
- The notorious BIFF faction headed by Commander Kariala in one village extorted contractors by sending out letters disguised as solicitation for *sadaqa* (or charity). This resulted in the non-completion of one Barangay Health Station.

## Relevance and Effectiveness

Beneficiaries of selected projects indicated that the assistance were based on their local needs. For some project sites, there were no Barangay Development Plans that articulated the needs of the communities. The interventions were identified in the list of PPAs that accompany the planning document of the HDAP. The following highlights how these needs translated to socioeconomic improvements.

**“Saved from bondage.”** Maguindanao produced about 67.8% of total 638,397 metric tons of *palay* in the ARMM in 2018 (PSA, 2018). The fertile marshy plain of SPMS Box and adjacent areas is suitable for rice production. Despite the agriculture potential in the area, the ongoing price wars between rice and corn wholesale traders have been achieved by pressuring farmers to reduce their asking price and to bond them with agricultural inputs and post-harvest services, which has a profound effect on the farmers’ ability to survive in the midst of multiple economic and conflict shocks. Before ARMM-HDAP, the power over farmers’ fortunes was held by a few middlemen and rice traders. Farm communities within the 118<sup>th</sup> Base Command harvested 80 sacks of *palay* (1 sack of *palay* = 63 kilograms) for every hectare of land. Lacking capital in a highly seasonal production environment, farmers greatly relied on local traders for the provision of fertilizers and post-production services including milling, packaging, and storage. On average, farmers spent P6,000 on *abono* (fertilizers/pesticides) and two sacks of rice seeds, which they saved from the previous harvest for every hectare of farmland. And for every sack of *palay* harvested, farmers spent P15 for jute sack and about P20 to P35 for storage in a *bodega* (storehouse). For the lucky few, they distributed their harvests equally to their neighbors, usually their kin living in tiny *nipa* houses for temporary storage. But not for long because the consignment constantly became a source of inter-family frictions. Since the



*bodega* owned by the traders were located 2.5 kilometers away from the farms, farmers had to transport each sack of *palay* on a *payong-payong* for P20 per sack. Since it is a captured market, traders bought the milled rice from the farmers for a mere P14 pesos per kilo, or one-third to one-fourth of what the rice could command in the retail market. When milled, a sack of *palay* generated half a sack of rice. What was left to the farmer household, in most cases, was only 15 sacks of *palay*, which would be apportioned for household consumption. Households would then save two sacks of *palay* seeds for the next harvest cycle lasting 120-160 days. For example, a typical farmer in Kitango owned or leased one-half to one hectare of farmland. If the farmer does not own the land, he or she would set aside one-half of total gross harvest to the landowner.

ARMM-HDAP's provision of rice mills, threshers, solar dryer pavements, and warehouses not only helped reduce wastage and saved transport and storage costs, but also freed rice farmers from economic bondage to middlemen and traders. The projects allowed farmers to more effectively ration out household consumption during hard times. Farmers were able to command higher prices of their produce from the traders. This significantly improved farmers' margins, which they used to defray education expenditures for their children. This illustrates that provision of physical capital to farmers conferred high private returns and economic benefits. "We are no longer upset with the traders, and our relatives or neighbors (who we used to store for us our harvests) do not harbor ill will at us because of the rice warehouse given to our community," beamed a group of mothers (Focus group discussion, 2019).<sup>46</sup>

**Mobility, Land Market, and the Most Wanted Man.** Connective infrastructure, particularly municipal and barangay roads (or farm-to-market roads), accounted for almost 40% of total development investments of ARMM-HDAP. Its role in economic growth and local development was clear, as it brought people closer to trade and markets, and it facilitated the movement of people.

As of end of 2015, about 43% of total barangays in the SPMS Box and 39% of total barangays in other HDAP areas were not connected to paved municipal, provincial or national roads, according to ARMM-DPWH's infrastructure database called E-ARMM. Since Maguindanao is the granary of the ARMM, road infrastructure would serve as the backbone of rural development as spelled out in the ARMM Regional Development Plan. Roads would also likely facilitate growth spillover of more economically dense towns such as Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao and Esperanza and Tacurong in Sultan Kudarat to rural areas in the SPMS Box and neighboring areas. Agglomeration of economies was a strategy identified in the 30-year Regional Physical and Development Plan of the ARMM.

The relevance of roads to communities is better seen in terms of its local impacts on the daily life in the communities. Local residents of one barangay witnessed the growth of its land market since ARMM-HDAP invested in the concreting of road in an adjacent barangay. "No one was interested in us before. But, now,

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<sup>46</sup> Translated from: "*Hindi na kami galit sa mga traders ngayon at hindi rin galit sa amin ang mga kamag anak o kapit bahay dahil may bodega na kaming lahat.*"

the demand for our land spiked because of a paved road,” beamed one member of a community organization (interview, 2019).<sup>47</sup> “We had been asking our previous mayors to construct road in our community (connecting to the main road). It is only recently we had one and it bore fruits,” explained a barangay captain (interview, 2019).<sup>48</sup>

While the benefits of roads were experienced in one barangay, a different experience emerged in another area because connective infrastructure became a source of instability within the sphere of public policy debates. Sandwiched between two national roads were three inland barangays, which were the fiefdoms of MILF, BIFF, and ISIS followers. Prior to 2016, the three barangays were traversed by a 9.5-kilometer dirt road right through paddies and dense canopies further to the south. The only mode of transportation suited to the clayey soil was carabao-drawn cart. The terrain and rebel-controlled outposts served as bulwark of the three groups and resident farming communities so that during the wet season it took one hour to travel about 1 to 1.5 kilometers along the Dulawan-Marbel road.

The concreting of the Kitango-Maganoy road through ARMM-HDAP significantly reduced the travel time to 5-10 minutes, allowing *payong-payong* ply the three barangays. While the paved road helped local farmers and residents, it also provided logistical ease for deploying resources and the movement of conflict actors, including the military. Sometime in 2018, the military intelligence coordinated with the MILF to allow the security forces to enter Kitango and Malangu and capture Abu Turaife. According to the agreement, Commander Tondoc and his followers would plant a white flag to demarcate the MILF territory from the area controlled by the BIFF, but the military did not see the flag. Consequently, the military swooped in and attacked both the MILF and BIFF. The military did not capture Abu Turaife and the unintentional attack put rebel groups on high alert. Commander Tondoc admitted that there were more rebel checkpoints installed along the Kitango-Maganoy road than previously. The checkpoints appeared to have negated the ease of mobility provided by the paved road.

**“What conflict sensitivity module?”** None of the two mayors, two technical officers, one barangay captain from four different LGUs heard about OPAPP’s Conflict-Sensitivity and Peace Promotion (CSPP) module. Despite the lack of awareness of the communities and LGUs on the training module, the projects were able to respond meaningfully to the impacts of conflict through risk-management and risk-coping mechanisms (See earlier section on Impacts).

## Efficiency

The quality of the physical accomplishment of specific projects would show that the ARMM-HDAP implementing agencies were capable of managing the project funds and funds were utilized for their

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<sup>47</sup> Translated From: “*Dati walang pumapansin sa amin. Ngayon nagsisi-ubusan na ang mga lupa dito dahil may daan na.*”

<sup>48</sup> Translated from: “*Ang tagal na naming hinihingi sa mga naging mayor dito na magkaroon ng magandang daanan dito sa lugar namin. Ngayon lang nagkaroon at nagbunga na.*”

intended purpose. Generally, the system worked as planned until the political transition to BARMM and with the exception of two projects whose funds were not downloaded by the DBM to the ARMM (see notes of Table 2). Of the 19 implementing agencies of ARMM-HDAP, five have physical and financial accomplishments below 50% as of December 15, 2018: ARMM-DAF, ARMM-DOH, ARMM-DOST, ARMM-DSWD, and ORG.

**Implementation and procurement.** There were some implementation issues identified: (1) the inability of contractors to submit complete sets of documents required for billing; (2) allegations of local capture of few projects by local executives; (3) no support for a barangay captain and the substandard use of material by a local contractor; and (4) very limited financial contribution from the counterpart LGU. While there were instances of jealousy in the selection of beneficiaries (socialized housing), these were settled after explaining the selection criteria during one of the regular meetings of the ARBs.

The high-risk environment of the program site prevented the entry of a single big and experienced contractor to deliver the projects and activities for security reasons. Hence, small- and medium-sized local contractors with suitable experience, absent economies of scale, were selected. For other sites that have high reported incidence of harassments or extortions by armed groups, the ARMM had to involve the 524<sup>th</sup> Engineering Construction Battalion of the military for the construction of certain projects (e.g. barangay health stations and rural health units in some villages).

**“The sum of the whole is significantly influenced by the ‘weakest link’.”** The construction of the Integrated Potable Water System was noteworthy because it involved a consortium of five local contractors who were also engaged in the construction of other ARMM-HDAP infrastructure (roads, health stations, post-harvest facilities). The project was divided into five packages across the eight municipalities. Each contractor had a different capacity level; therefore, any weakest link could significantly delay the completion of the whole distribution network. Fortunately, the support they received from the CMDC Alliance guaranteed that each package was calibrated for the system to work. The “weakest link” contractor, with support (security, logistics, time, etc.), was able to get the water system on track. As of December 2018, the project was 98.4% complete.

**Per-unit cost.** The economic efficiency of ARMM-HDAP depends on the type of project. Table 2 summarizes the per-unit or average cost of each assistance in comparison with similar PAMANA projects in ARMM since 2013 (see Table 1). Caution must be made when comparing per-unit cost at different periods due to inflation and discount factors and at different units. One could easily compare the average cost of ARMM-HDAP projects with similar projects implemented in other regions. The comparator database is maintained by NEDA. Know that one must factor in the cost calculus the risk premium in security-challenged places like the SPMS Box and neighboring towns.

**Table 1. Total and Average Costs of PAMANA Projects Implemented within the ARMM Region**

	Project Type	Total Cost <sup>a</sup>	Total No. of Projects	Total Length (for Roads and Bridges)	Average cost
PAMANA DILG CY 2013	Public markets	15,520,000	2	-	7,760,000 per unit
	Roads	319,380,000	20	28.97 km.	11,024,508 per km.
	Bridge	25,000,000	2	120 meters	208,333 per meter
	Water (level 2)	14,850,000	2	-	7,425,000 per project
	Water (level 3)	24,750,000	2	-	12,375,000 per project
PAMANA MNLF CY 2014	Warehouse	20,839,500	30	-	694,650 per unit
	Rice mill and building	742,500	1	-	742,500 per unit
	Solar drier	7,821,000	17	-	460,059 per project
	Low-cost housing	1,980,000,000	1	-	-
	Community hall	3,465,000	4	-	866,250 per project
	Open court	495,000	1	-	495,000 per project
PAMANA PSC MNLF CY 2014	Warehouse	23,800,000	31	-	767,742 per unit
	Solar dryer	9,000,000	16	-	562,500 per unit
	WaSH	1,000,000	3	-	333,333 per unit
	Multipurpose hall	1,000,000	1	-	1,000,000 per unit
PAMANA Road to Peace Project (implemented by OPAPP) CY 2014	Roads	2,052,400,000 <sup>b</sup>	34	204.15 km.	10,053,392 per km.
PAMANA Road to Peace Project (Implemented	Roads	50,000,000	3	-	16,666,667 per project

	Project Type	Total Cost <sup>a</sup>	Total No. of Projects	Total Length (for Roads and Bridges)	Average cost
by OPAPP) CY 2015					
ARMM-HDAP (refer to table 2)	(encompassing)	1,894,243,951 (excluding funds that were reverted to DBM)			
PAMANA CY 2018	Roads	543,297,000	8	28.98 km.	18,747,308 per km

a - based on project allocation/cost as opposed to appropriations

b - based on project budget appropriations

Note: The PAMANA assistance in 2018 was a carry-on of previous years.

Source: DPWH ARMM Implementation Status, as of January 31, 2019

**Table 2. Total and Average Costs of ARMM-HDAP, as of December 15, 2019**

Project type	Total Cost	Total No. of Projects or Beneficiaries	Average Cost	Implementing Agencies
1. Infrastructure	1,472,369,278			
a) Disaster Response and Emergency Infrastructure	320,000,000			
Evacuation Centers	320,000,000	16 units	20,000,000 per unit	ARMM-DSWD, ORG and DILG
b). Connective Infrastructure	727,100,000			
Roads and FMR	727,100,000	30 projects	24,236,667 per project	ARMM-DPWH and DAF
c). Social Infrastructure	315,819,266			
Water system (Level 3)	165,000,000	31,538 households	5,232 per household	ARMM-DILG
Deep well	7,500,000	15 units	500,000 per unit	ARMM-DOH
Communal Toilets	3,750,000	15 units	250,000 per unit	ARMM-DOH
Provincial Hospital	46,426,298	1 unit	46,426,298 per unit	ARMM-DOH
RHU	12,264,976	5 units	2,452,995 per unit	ARMM-DOH
BHS	68,377,993	34 units	2,011,117 per unit	ARMM-DOH

Project type	Total Cost	Total No. of Projects or Beneficiaries	Average Cost	Implementing Agencies
MPB/C	12,500,000	11 ARCs	1,136,364 per ARC	ARMM-DAR
d). Post-production Infrastructure	79,450,012			
Rice processing center	24,000,000	4 units	6,000,000 per unit	ARMM-DAF
Solar dryer, drying pavement, and warehouse	25,450,012	31 units	820,968 per unit	ARMM-DAF, DAR
Fish landing	15,000,000	3 units	5,000,000 per unit	ARMM-BFAR
Ice plant storage	15,000,000	3 units	5,000,000 per unit	ARMM-BFAR
e). Governance Infrastructure	30,000,000			
Municipal Hall	30,000,000	5 units	6,000,000 per unit	ARMM-DILG
2. Economic Services	168,006,337			
a). Direct production inputs	88,023,762			
Livestock, other animal supplies, and trainings	46,861,750	-	-	ARMM-DAF, ORG
Fish hatchery	4,000,000	240 farmers	16,667 per farmer	ARMM-BFAR
Fish cage, corral, and pots	9,905,000	478 fisherfolk	20,722 per fisherfolk	ARMM-BFAR
Banca (motorized and non-motorized)	17,500,000	1,037 fisherfolk	16,876 per fisherfolk	ARMM-BFAR
Fertilizer production support facility	3,055,000		-	ARMM-DAR
Farm inputs	6,702,012	11 ARCs	609,274 per ARC	ARMM-DAR
b). Post-harvest facilities	34,555,000	80 units	431,938 per unit	
c). Livelihood and skills training and assistance	45,427,575			ARMM-TESDA, DAR, DOST, DSWD, and DOT
3. Social Services	85,776,924			
a) Education capability building	5,598,968	493 participants	11,357 per participant	ARMM-DepEd
b) Materials and equipment (education)	3,593,762	31 schools	115,928 per school	ARMM-DepEd
b) Materials and equipment (health)	47,544,194	-	-	ARMM-DOH

Project type	Total Cost	Total No. of Projects or Beneficiaries	Average Cost	Implementing Agencies
c) Low-cost housing	29,040,000	132 units	220,000 per unit	ARMM-DAR
4. Institutions-related Services	37,590,000			
a) Land governance	11,640,000	1,800 hectares	6,467 per hectare	ARMM-DENR
c) Capacity building	20,950,000			ARMM-DILG
d) Equipment	5,000,000			ARMM-DILG
5. Humanitarian and early response	126,998,511	50,030		
a) Direct assistance (food and non-food)	116,631,286	25,000 individuals	4,665 per individual	ARMM-HEART
b). Capacity building	10,367,225		345,574	ARMM-HEART
6. Administration including M&E of implementing agencies	3,502,900*			
Total Actual Cost	1,894,243,951**			

Note:

\* - figure reflects only the M&E and admin cost of few implementing agencies. This does not yet include the admin and M&E cost of ARMM-HDAP PMO (estimated to be about 34 million pesos).

\*\* - This excludes two projects worth PhP150,000,000 ('other biological assets') and PhP30,383,300 ('12-year salaries to staff of Maguindanao Provincial Hospital') that were reverted to the DBM.

Source: ARMM-HDAP program document, as of December 15, 2018.

**Staffing.** Almost 90% of technical staff of the ARMM-HDAP PMO were engineers. However, the office was challenged by a high turnover of technical staff. "They came and went. We trained them. With the skills and experience we gave them, staff were easily recruited by others," observed by an ARMM official. Among the reasons of high staff turnover was the time-bound nature of the project. There was no security of tenure in ARMM-HDAP. Even highly skilled staff were signed as contractual workers.

## Sustainability

Among other types of completed or almost completed projects that were visited, water supply (level 3) presented the biggest challenge as far as sustainability is concerned. ARMM-DILG managed the water system for the first year. However, it did not have the same capacity that any corporate or cooperative organization would have had with a combined profit- and social welfare-maximizing motives to run a system that services a network of households/consumers (a club-good) and that taps from a water reservoir (a common resource). First, the dry season and changing weather patterns could cause potential lapses in supply-source validation affecting design. Second, the expensive water filter system could threaten long-term operations and maintenance. Lastly, local conflicts could affect system operations. As a result,

ARMM-DILG decided to relinquish its role in managing and maintaining the water supply and distribution system.

There were three options being considered: LGU, CMDC Alliance, and ARMM-DILG. An LGU would have likely been unsuccessful because of the inherent free rider problem of the remaining seven municipalities. Moreover, the Alliance would have also been unsuccessful due to inter-LGU cooperation. The local executives were from opposing political parties in SPMS Box, so tensions would likely occur in the adjacent areas with the incoming election. Eventually, one of the member-contractors of the consortium assumed the management and maintenance of the Integrated Potable Water System.

At the microscale, a juice industry that had sprouted in two municipalities pushed an ARMM-HDAP supported cooperative to the margin. The cooperative sourced some of its raw materials, such as sugar, plastic (PET) bottles, caps, and stickers from the same municipality it supplies. High transportation costs, due to sourcing the juice from an orchard, kept the retail price higher than its competitors'. What used to be an eight-person team became only three women, who were left running the production line while others left to work abroad or in big urban areas in the country. The cooperative used to produce two lots/batches per week but production recently dwindled to two batches per month. Since it began operation in 2017, the cooperative only offered one product.

But for how long would the member-contractor and the cooperative survive?

It would be the member-contractor's first entry in the utility service industry, while the juice company would be on the verge of economic demise. These cooperatives may have to take some risks to diversify their respective portfolio in order to adapt.

## Conclusion

The ARMM-HDAP was originally designed to last for two to three years, enough to assist the communities affected by the Mamasapano incident and to allow them to recover. A humanitarian and early response intervention should, after all, not be a long-term program.

However, the political transition abruptly stopped the completion and delivery of critical components of the ARMM-HDAP before communities could fully realize what the program hoped to achieve. Even then, the ARMM-HDAP had surely made a difference in the communities.

In an environment where conflict is fluid, rooted, and conflict actors are mobile, the IDPs and residents have become the poster child of tenacity – masters of survival. Even for a short number of years, the program managed to contribute to enhancing that skill, despite challenges in the implementation.

And, for many years to come, the residents of SPMS Box and the 11 adjacent municipalities will remember the ARMM-HDAP. “If it were not for the Mamasapano massacre, we would never experience



development,” was the parting words of the farmer whom I interviewed in one barangay as he scanned the trail of the helicopter of the military zooming distantly above us.<sup>49</sup>

And, probably, he is right. Conflict is a violent development process in this part of the country.

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<sup>49</sup> Translated from: “*Kung di nangyari ang Mamasapano massacre, di rin aabot dito ang development sa lugar naming.*”

